

Suggested Papers (Signaling, Reputation and Career Concern)

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Abstract

This is a list of suggested papers that students can choose for their presentation.

1 Theory

1. Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2008) “Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments,” *Journal of Law and Economics*, 273-306.
2. Anderson, Alex and Lones Smith (2010), “A Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations,” *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol.77, 3-29.
3. Auriol, Emmanuelle, Guido Friebel, Lambros Pechlivanos (2002), “Career Concerns in Teams” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 289-307.
4. Camargo, Braz and Elena Pastorino (2011), “Human Capital and Career Concerns,” Mimeo.
5. Cisternas, Gonzalo (2011), “A Continuous-Time Model of Career Concerns and Human Capital Accumulation” Princeton Working Paper. .
6. Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole (1999), “The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: pp. 183-198.
7. Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole (1999), “The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies” *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: pp. 199-217
8. Ely, Jeffrey C., and Juuso Välimäki (2003), “Bad Reputation,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, 785–814.

9. Garicano, Luis, Ignacio Palacios, and Canice Prendergast. (2001) “Favoritism under Social Pressure”. NBER Working Paper 8376.
10. Holmstrom, Bengt. (1999) “Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective”. *Review of Economic Studies* 66(1).
11. Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 27, 253–279.
12. Mailath, George. “Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types.” *Econometrica* 55, No. 6 (Nov., 1987), pp. 1349-1365
13. Mailath, George J, and Larry Samuelson (2001), “Who Wants a Good Reputation?,” *Review of Economic Studies* 68, 415–441.
14. Martinez, Leonardo (2009) “Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments,” *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (Contributions)*, Article 15.
15. Ottaviani, Marco and Peter Sorensen. *Professional advice: the theory of reputational cheap talk*. 2001.
16. Prat, Andrea (2005), “The Wrong Kind of Transparency”, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 862-877Published
17. Prendergast, Canice and Lars Stole. *Impetuous youngsters and jaded old-timers*. *Journal of Political Economy* 104(6), 1999.
18. Yeon-Koo Che, Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik. *Pandering to Persuade*. *American Economic Review*, forthcoming

2 Labor

1. Arcidiacono, Peter, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo (2010), “Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 2 (October 2010): 76–104.
2. Arrow, Kenneth J., “Higher Education as a Filter,” *Journal of Public Economics*, II (1973), 193–216.
3. Bordón, Paola and Breno Braga (2014), “Employer Learning, Statistical Discrimination and University Prestige,” Mimeo.
4. Clark, Damon and Paco Martorell (2014) “The Signaling Value of a High School Diploma,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 282-318.

5. Landers, Renée M, James B. Rebitzer, and Lowell J. Taylor. (1996.), “Rate race redux: adverse selection in the determination of work hours in law firms.” *American Economic Review* 86(3),
6. Lofstrum, M., and J. Tyler. (2007). “Modeling the Signaling Value of the GED with an Application to an Exogenous Passing Standard Increase in Texas.” IZA Discussion Paper no. 2953, Inst. Study Labor, Bonn.
7. Spence, Michael, “Job Market Signaling,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXXVII (1973), 355–374.
8. TYLER, JOHN H., RICHARD J. MURNANE, JOHN B. WILLETT (2000) “ESTIMATING THE LABOR MARKET SIGNALING VALUE OF THE GED” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 431-468.

3 Political Economics

1. Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2007), “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task” *American Economic Review*, 169-179.
2. Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2008), “Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks” *Journal of Public Economics*, 426-447.
3. Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. (2003), “Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence.” Working paper, LSE. .
4. Maskin, Eric and Jean Tirole (2004), “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,” *American Economic Review*, 1034-1-54.
5. Morris, Stephen. (2001), Political Correctness. *Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 109, Number 2.
6. Phelan, Christopher (2001), “Public Trust and Government Betrayal,” in *Journal of Economic Theory*.

4 Corporate Governance

1. Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. Do CEOs set their own pay? The ones without principals do. NBER Discussion Paper 7604, 2000.
2. Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison. Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incentives. *Journal of Political Economy* 105(6), 1997.

3. Gibbons, Robert and Kevin J. Murphy. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and Evidence. *Journal of Political Economy* 100(3), 1992.
4. HERTZBERG, ANDREW, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, and DANIEL PARAVISINI (2010), "Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation," *THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE* • VOL. LXV, NO. 3.
5. Jiang, Wei and Hualin Wan, "Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting," Mimeo.
6. Levit, Doron (2012), "Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards" Mimeo.
7. Levit, Doron and Nadya Malenko (2013), "The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance," Mimeo.
8. Milbourn, Todd T. (2003), "CEO reputation and stock-based compensation," *Journal of Financial Economics* 68 (2003) 233–262
9. Milbourn, Todd T., Richard L. Shockley and Anjan V. Thakor (2001), "Managerial career concerns and investments in information," *RAND Journal of Economics*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 334–351.
10. Ruiz-Verd, Pablo and Ravi Singh (2011), "Board Reputation, CEO Pay, and Camouflaged Compensation," unpublished.
11. Roberts, Peter W. and Grahame R. Dowling (2002), "Corporate Reputation and Sustained Superior Financial Performance," *Strategic Management Journal*, 23, 1077-1093.
12. SONG, FENGHUA and ANJAN V. THAKOR (2006), Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance," *THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE* • VOL. LXI, NO. 4., 1845-1896.

5 Corporate Finance

1. Atkeson, Andrew, Christian Hellwig, and Guillermo Ordonez. Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns. *QJE* forthcoming
2. Chari, V. V., Ali Shourideh, and Ariel Zetlin-Jones. "Reputation and persistence of adverse selection in secondary loan markets." *American Economic Review* 104.12 (2014): 4027-70.
3. Dasgupta, Amil and Andrea Prat. (2006), "Financial Equilibrium with Career Concerns". *Theoretical Economics*, Volume 1, Issue 1, March

4. Diamond, Douglas W (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," *Journal of Political Economy* 97, 828–862.
5. Guerrieri, Veronica and Péter Kondor (2012), "Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility," *American Economic Review*, 1986-2017.
6. MYERS, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. MAJLUF (1984), "CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHEN FIRMS HAVE INFORMATION THAT INVESTORS DO NOT HAVE" *Journal of Financial Economics*, 187-221.
7. Ordonez, Guillermo L. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking." *Theoretical Economics* 8.3 (2013): 653-700.
8. Ordonez, Guillermo. Sustainable shadow banking. No. w19022. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
9. Zitzewitz, Eric. Measuring Herding and Exaggeration by Equity Analysts and Other Opinion Sellers. Working paper, Stanford University, 2001.

6 Corporate Reputation

1. Andersson, Fredrik (2002), "Pooling reputations," *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 20, 715–730.
2. Cabral, Luís M B (2000), "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," *Rand Journal of Economics* 31, 658-673.
3. Choi, J.P. (1998), "Brand Extension and Informational Leverage," *Review of Economic Studies* 65, 655–69.
4. Fishman, A., and R. Rob (2005), "Is Bigger Better? Customer Base Expansion through Word of Mouth Reputation," *Journal of Political Economy*.
5. Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1982) "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis." *Econometrica* 50, no. 2 (March 1982): 443-59.
6. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts (1982), "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," *Journal of Economic Theory* 27, 280–312.
7. Tadelis, S. (1999), "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," *American Economic Review* 89, 548–563.
8. Tirole, Jean (1996), "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," *Review of Economic Studies* 63, 1–22.

7 Accounting Theory

1. Bertomeu, Jeremy, Lecture Note of Voluntary Disclosure, Earning Management, and Markets and Information.
 - <https://sites.google.com/site/jeremybertomeu/ph-d-course>
2. Demers, Elizabeth and Chong Wang (2010), “The Impact of CEO Career Concerns on Accruals Based and Real Earnings Management” INSEAD working paper.
3. Demers, Elizabeth and Chong Wang (2014), “Career Concerns and Earnings Management” unpublished.