イベント


2017年1月5日(木)16:20~17:50 第17回 大阪大学経済学研究会(待兼山セミナー)

日時 :2017年1月5日(木) 16:20-17:50
場所 :大阪大学豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
報告者:中林 純 氏(近畿大学)
テーマ: "Regulatory Capture in Public Procurement: Evidence from Revolving Door Bureaucrats in Japan"

アブストラクト:
 We study how hiring public officials affects firms' ability to win government contracts. By linking personnel transitions of public officials and government construction projects awarded to firms in Japan, we find evidence consistent with the exchange of post-retirement employment for an increase in government contracts. We find that firms that hire a public official experience an increase of about 7--12 percent (0.7--1.2 percentage points) in the probability of winning a contract. Our results also suggest that quid-pro-quo arrangements are not made as simple bilateral agreements between an individual public official and a firm, but rather maintained through repeated interactions between a firm and generations of public officials, consistent with the model of Salant (1995).
言語 :英語または日本語
共催 :大阪大学経済学研究会、IPP研究会、「人材配置の経済学」研究会
お問い合わせ:瀧井研究室 602sec*osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp (*には@をお入れください。)
(2016/12/07)


ページの先頭へ