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2019年5月31日(金)13:00~16:10 第127回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 (共催:IPP研究会)

第127回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会

■日時:2019年5月31日(金)13:00-16:10
■場所:大阪大学豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟  6階会議室
【発表者】
講師:山下拓朗 氏(Toulouse School of Economics)
議題:"Speculators enhancing Transparency in Auction."
Abstruct
A (pure) speculator in an auction context is a bidder who participates in an auction to make a profit but without winning, observed in practice typically in auctions with resale. Given that speculators could potentially steal some rents from ``real'' bidders possibly by upsetting allocations, it is an important policy question whether speculators should be allowed to participate in an auction. In this paper, I consider a bilateral-trade (or ``double-auction'') environment where a deficit-constrained principal (e.g., a public authority) can acquire information crucial for the efficiency of trading outcomes. I show that it is welfare-maximizing to fully acquire and disclose information in the auction with a speculator, while such full-information policy is strictly suboptimal without a speculator. Because of this information channel, allowing for a speculator can increase the expected total welfare. In this sense, the paper provides a rationale for allowing for a speculator in certain auction contexts to enhance the welfare and transparency.
講師:下村研一氏(神戸大学)
議題:"A Crash Course in Cooperative Game Theory."
Abstract
This seminar is meant to familiarize the participants with some fundamental concepts and results in the theory of cooperative games. In particular, I cover theory and background of classical cooperative solutions such as the core, the bargaining set, and the nucleolus.

■共催:IPP研究会( http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/ipp/index.html
■お問い合わせ:東京大学社会科学研究所 中林真幸研究室
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