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2019年6月14日(金)13:00~16:10 第128回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 (共催:IPP研究会)

第128回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会
■日時:2019年6月14日(金)13:00-16:10
■場所:大阪大学豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟  6階会議室
【発表者】
講師:室岡健志 氏(大阪大学)
議題:"Deception under Competitive Intermediation."
Abstruct
This paper investigates the incentive of intermediaries, such as financial advisors, mortgage brokers, or insurance salespeople, to educate consumers who misperceive the value of products. Two types of firms sell products through competing common-agent intermediaries and pay commissions for sales. One sells a transparent product, while the other sells a deceptive product that has a hidden fee, quality, or risk. Each intermediary chooses which product to offer and whether or not to educate consumers about the hidden attribute. I show that a non-educating equilibrium exists if and only if the degree of misperception is large. In the equilibrium, intermediaries earn high commissions despite competition. Furthermore, because consumers ultimately bear the cost of such commissions, consumer welfare is lower when intermediaries can educate consumers than when they cannot. I also provide a condition to detect such welfare distortion from market data, and discuss the effects of various regulations.
講師:石原章史氏(東京大学)
議題:"Pre-emptive Production in Oligopoly with Private Information."
Abstruct
We investigate a firm's pre-emptive behavior by comparing Cournot games and Stackelberg ones with one leader and multiple followers, where each firm has private information on stochastic demand. We show that the firm prefers pre-emptive quantity choice (Stackelberg structure) to simultaneous quantity choice (Cournot structure) if and only if the firm's signal is less informative relative to the other firms' signals. The firm's preferred choice of production timing is not preferable for the producer surplus in the industry. The firm's option of production timing is beneficial for the consumer surplus in duopoly competition, but harmful when there are many competitors in the market.
■共催:IPP研究会( http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/ipp/index.html
■お問い合わせ:東京大学社会科学研究所 中林真幸研究室
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