Post-Reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations

A Preliminary Survey of Local Politics and the Bases, 1972-2002

Robert D. Eldridge
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我闘やちょっとわど
Wada ya chon wadu nu

儒ならぬ世界に
Mama naran shike ni

彼ようらめゆる
Ari yu urami yu ru

よしのあるいは
Yushi nu arui

--本部按司、19世紀

In a world full of obstacles,
One cannot steer his course at will.

Why should I think ill of others,
When they fail to suit me?

--Prince MUTUBU Anji, 19th Century
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About the Author

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I. Introduction

Purpose of the Study

The so-called Okinawa problem historically has been, currently is, and will likely continue to be an issue that challenges policy-makers, politicians, and civic leaders well into the future.

The Okinawa problem, not to mention Okinawa itself, is full of contradictions and certainly not one-dimensional in nature. The fundamental issues (bases, economic development, social and administrative integration with Japan, relations with the central government) inherent in the problem can be seen across years and decades, forming seemingly endless cycles and patterns. At the same time, frustratingly, no one solution seems to exist because the issues are so intertwined. Indeed, the Okinawa Problem is like a knot. If you pull one string too hard, the knot only gets tighter. Untying the knot that the Okinawa problem has become during the post-reversion years (1972− ) continues to require patience and skill (assuming the actors wish to move beyond simply the status quo), especially in an emotionally and politically charged atmosphere.

In 2004, for example, the return of Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, agreed to in 1996 remains unrealized due to, among other things, local opposition to its relocation within the prefecture. In April this year, residents in Nago, the site of the planned relocation, and representatives of citizens’ groups, clashed with officials who were about to start a drilling survey from the Defense Facilities Administration Bureau in Naha, an organization that represents to Okinawans both a source of personal prosperity and a symbol of Okinawa’s victimization by the central government. Similarly, strong opposition of local residents has been seen to the planned construction of an Army urban conflict training facility in Camp Hansen, set to be completed within a year’s time.

On the other hand, demands by the Okinawan Prefectural Government for the revision of the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement, which symbolizes for Okinawans the victimization of Okinawa by the United States and the weak-kneed diplomacy of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not standing up to the United States, grow in intensity, literally, by the day.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense is in the final stages of completing a major review of its global posture, including forces in Japan and the Asia-Pacific, which will have implications for Okinawa for years to come (to what degree remains unclear). As part of this review, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld visited Japan in mid-November 2003, and went to Okinawa on November 16, being the first Defense Secretary to go there in more than 13 years. Governor Inamine Keiichi met Rumsfeld with a list of demands for resolving the different base issues that he proceeded to read off during their meeting at the Prefectural Government office. In late April 2004, during a meeting in Washington with leaders of the ruling parties in Japan, Rumsfeld reportedly stated that the concerns of the people of Okinawa Prefecture would also be taken into consideration in the realignment planning. How policy-makers formulate answers to these issues over the coming months will set the tone—hopefully one that is more positive and forward-looking—for the decades ahead. The answers will reflect and be developed in light of the many dimensions of the Okinawa problem— intra-community dynamics, intra-prefectural politics, prefecture-central government affairs, and Okinawa-Japan-U.S. relations, and a constantly changing international environment. In light of these complex issues, efforts to further the

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understanding of the historical and contemporary aspects of the so-called Okinawa problem are vital.

The following study was undertaken precisely as an attempt both to begin to fill the gap that exists in the literature regarding the post-reversion history of Okinawa and more importantly to understand this history and what it means for the contemporary Okinawa-Japan-U.S. relationship. More specifically, this study is meant first to be a preliminary survey to help us observers, scholars, alliance managers, and ultimately, decision-makers, better appreciate the path Okinawa has taken in the post-reversion era and to help us anticipate (if not understand) where Okinawa—its people (often, but not always, divided) and their elected representatives—want to go in the future.

This study does not singularly focus on events after the 1995 rape incident—the author and others have written on this tragic event and period following in detail before—although it does take up some of the issues that emerged during this time. It instead attempts to examine the socio-political atmosphere in Okinawa from 1972 through 2002, highlighting some of the key issues that emerged in Okinawan elections (gubernatorial, prefectural assembly, mayoral, and national Diet), base-related matters, and complicated dynamics between Okinawa and the central government (as well as vis-à-vis U.S. representatives). Likewise, the study does not attempt to propose extensive policy recommendations—again, the author has done this elsewhere—but rather to provide a better grasp of the events of importance in Okinawa following its long-awaited reversion.

Previous Research

There is surprisingly no systematic research on the first 20-plus years of the post-reversion period, with the possible exception of the works of the prolific writer of postwar Okinawan political thought and activist Arasaki Moriteru (currently President of Okinawa University). But even with his works, two qualifications are necessary. First, while prolific in number, much of the writing is repetitive and only borrows from his earlier works. Secondly, the tone and contents of the writing are biased, laced with terminology that is emotional and cannot be described as objective. His writings are told from a purely people’s anti-base movement perspective, and thus tends to be subjective and limited. Similarly, basic historical facts and

3 Symbolic of the differing perspectives on the issue, Okinawans describe the issue as more the Japan problem or the U.S. base problem, rather than as the generic Okinawa problem.

4 This study was also done for a second and personal reason. Namely, it will serve as the basis of a future full-length book on the post-reversion years, as part of this writer’s intended 3-volume study of postwar Okinawa. The first in the series was my The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 (New York: Garland-Routledge, 2001), and the second is one which is underway, The Road to Reversion: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1952-1972.


7 While aware that all writers and observers are subjective in their views in some way, I purposely emphasize the term subjective here because he and some other writers do not attempt to take other perspectives, such as those of moderates, conservatives, policy-makers, military officials, etc., into consideration. When someone consistently presents only one view or perspective on an issue and does not look at it from other angles, it does, in the author’s opinion, a disservice to Okinawa and the U.S.-Japan relationship because it only furthers the stalemate. Numerous factors and actors are involved in the so-called Okinawa problem, and as a result it is necessary to understand the other perspectives in order to find room for compromise to move issues forward. This is as true for Okinawan writers and leaders as it is for those on the U.S.- and mainland Japan-side. The
events that could be interpreted as favoring the conservatives or government are ignored and not even cited in the chronologies appearing in the back of his works (such as the second and third successful re-elections of conservative governor Nishime Junji in 1982 and 1986) while events favorable to the reformists (such as the election and re-election of Ota Masahide as governor in 1990 and 1994) are both cited and extensively covered.

Because the post-reversion history is covered in such an uneven fashion, it has been necessary to piece things together like a jigsaw puzzle that when you are about to finish you rudely become aware that all the pieces were never there to begin with.

Materials Used

Nevertheless, in doing this study, I have benefited from a number of writings that paint partial pictures of this period which, when combined, helped to just about cover the canvas.

First, the numerous memoirs of politicians and opinion leaders in Okinawa have proven quite insightful into events. In particular, the outstanding diaries, introduced below, of Yara Chobyo, governor from 1968 to 1972, Nishime Junji, governor from 1978 to 1990, biography of Taira Koichi, governor from 1976-1978 (written by his supporters), and memoirs of Yara Chobyo and Ota Masahide, governors from 1968 to 1976 and 1990 to 1998 respectively, were particularly helpful.

Second, the party histories of the Okinawa Social Masses Party and the Japan Communist Party were of use to understand the party dynamics, platforms, and personalities in local politics in the early post-reversion years. For subsequent years, I requested in-house documents from the respective parties.

Third, interviews and oral histories I have done with most of the post-reversion U.S. ambassadors to Japan and U.S. consuls general to Okinawa, as well as with several of the commanding generals (Marine Corps) assigned to Okinawa, have given me further insights into the policy process and management of issues. Lists of these individuals and their respective tours in Okinawa appear in the text.

Fourth, numerous writings on the bases and related affairs, as well as on civic movements, have provided the author with a variety of perspectives and new or not-well-known details of the different issues. By reading all of them, the author was able to discover the similarities between the issues over the three decades this study covers.

Fifth, extensive interviews with local, prefectural, and central government officials, media representatives, activists, and others, have helped to fill in the gaps in events, movements, personalities, and human networks, and to provide essential background information.

This study is far from complete, and it certainly does not represent the final word on the subject. Only when the official records are declassified will a more detailed book be possible. Likewise, more interviews are necessary to expand on the nuances of the decisions reached and views held by decision-makers and other participants in events at the time.

The author is planning to conduct a follow-up study in the immediate future that will expand on this one, looking specifically at public opinion in Okinawa throughout the post-reversion years. It will be published along with this study in the U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Series of the Center for International Security and Policy (CISSP), established at the School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, in April 2003.

Structure of Study

The study itself is divided into four parts, including this Introduction (Part I) and a concluding section (Part IV).

Part II serves as an overview of socio-political issues and politics (people, parties, elections), and Part III focuses on the dynamics of the problems related to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa at the local and
bilateral (U.S.-Japan) level. While there is some overlapping due to the nature of the issues, Part III includes a discussion of the different base problems that emerged in each decade, while Part II looks at the policies toward the base issues pursued by the respective prefectural governments. The Conclusion will highlight some of the issues from an historical and comparative perspective, and make suggestions both for future research topics and policy choices. A set of appendices appears at the end of related agreements, individuals, and other essential data.

Final Remarks and Acknowledgments

The author welcomes any and all criticism as to whether he has succeeded in reaching the modest goals outlined above. Similarly, suggestions for improvement and expansion are highly encouraged, particularly because he hopes to build on this manuscript in the future. In particular, this study is meant to serve as the basis of a future book-length manuscript of Okinawa and U.S.-Japan relations on the post-1972 period as part of the 3-volume series, identified above in footnote 4, that the author is working on relating to Okinawa and U.S.-Japan relations in the postwar period and thus there will be ample time to revise and update.

Last, but not least, during the course of this research, the author has been indebted to many individuals and institutions.

First, he wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science (Monbukagakusho) which sponsored a version of this study (Fukkigo no Okinawa to Nichibei Kankei: Hondo Nami e no Tsuikyu) as part of their grants for the years 2002-2004 (No. 14720067).

Second, this writer wishes to thank the Center for International Security Studies and Policy for its institutional support, and for assisting in the publication of this manuscript. In particular, administrative assistant Mori Maki provided outstanding technical support, and Center Fellows, Capt. Michael R. Ercolano, III, USMC, a Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer, and Lt. Daniel E. Fillion, USN, recipient of the prestigious Olmsted Foundation Scholarship (2003), provided helpful advice on understanding the U.S. military’s operational requirements involved in basing issues.8

Third, the author wishes to thank the Heiwa Anzen Hosho Kenkyusho (Research Institute for Peace and Security, or RIPS), Beinichi Zaidan (United States-Japan Foundation), Okinawa Kyokai (Okinawa Association), for material and/or financial support in the early stages of my research in years past.

Fourth, although he can not recognize policy-involved individuals by name, the author wishes to express his appreciation to officials of the U.S. Consulate in Okinawa, the U.S. Embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including its Okinawa Liaison Office, the U.S. Marine Corps (in Okinawa, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C.), U.S. Forces, Japan (Yokota), the Okinawa Prefectural Government, and local community offices for cooperation in this and related previous studies. He also wishes to acknowledge the help of individuals affiliated with local political parties, movements, and finally the Ryukyu Shimpō, among other organizations.

Finally, one person who needs to be recognized by name is Dr. Higa Mikio who 40 years ago pioneered the study of local politics and its implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship.9 His support and mentoring over the years to this writer and dozens (perhaps hundreds) of young scholars and interested individuals has allowed non-Okinawans to better appreciate the postwar history of that important island-prefecture. The author only wishes another young scholar from Okinawa would have followed in Professor Higa’s footsteps to do a study looking at the period following his pioneering work, while acting as

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8 The Center has expressed its interest in hosting visiting fellows from the Okinawa Prefectural Government and the local media to provide their insights into Okinawa and U.S.-Japan relations, but unfortunately, neither has yet taken up the offer.

9 Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963). This study was published in Japanese as well for a more general audience, appearing in 1965 as Okinawa: Seito to Seiji (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho).
a bridge in both thought and deed that currently appears to be lacking between Okinawa, mainland Japan, and the United States.

Robert D. Eldridge
May 15, 2004
(32nd anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa)
II. Overview of Politics and Social Dynamics in Okinawa Following Reversion

As mentioned in the Introduction, there are surprisingly few systematic studies on the post-reversion period. Of those, most focus solely on social (human rights, anti-base, anti-central government, or a combination of them) movements and do not examine the political history and decision-making dynamics to any great extent. Because of this, a gap in the discussion has occurred in which the influence of social movements on policy has either been over-emphasized (as all powerful) in some places or lamented (as powerless) in others.

The existence of this dichotomy suggests that quite often the local political situation and the overall policy process remains little understood, with the connections between policy, politics, movements, and public opinion as a whole inadequately studied.

Some examinations of post-reversion Okinawan politics of course do exist, such as analysis and commentary by local newspapers and observers at the time of elections and other politically significant events. Moreover, two scholars (then at the University of the Ryukyus) Shimabukuro Kuni and Egami Takayoshi have looked at the post-reversion elections and politics and introduced in their respective writings a simple overview of the trends during the first several administrations. Both articles, however, lacked more than superficial detail and because they appeared approximately 15 and 10 years ago respectively, the authors were reporting on the bases and SOFA-related issues. See Ryukyu Shimpōsha, ed., Gunji Kichi to Tatakau Jumintachi: Nihon Kaigai no Genba Kara (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2003). While both newspapers are considered to be highly partisan regarding the bases, a dispassionate, in-depth study of the Okinawan media from a historical perspective has yet to be done. A recent study, fortunately, has looked at Okinawan media from a comparative perspective including mainland-based and international reporting. See Mark Holstein, Framing Security: A Tri-cultural Discourse Analysis of Ideology in Newspaper Reports about the United States Military in Okinawa (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 2000). A recent look in an industry journal at local media and the 30th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion can be found in Higa Kaname, Fukkiko 30 Sen (Okinawa Asahi Shimbun (Okinawa’s 30th Anniversary of Reversion and the Local Newspapers), Sogo Jaanarizumu Kenkyu (Research on Journalism), No. 182 (Autumn 2002), pp. 12-16.

10 In Okinawa, two main local newspapers exist: the Ryukyu Shimpo and the Okinawa Taimusu. The Shimpo is the older of the two, dating its history to September 1893. It continued as the Ryukyu Shimpo until 1940 when it merged with the Okinawa Asahi Shim bun to form the Okinawa Shimpo as a pro-war propaganda organ of the Japanese military. The Okinawa Shimpo was discontinued in May 1945, and some of the former staff of the Ryukyu Shimpo came together to form the Uruma Shimpo in July that year. The Uruma Shimpo was renamed the Ryukyu Shimpo in September 1951 and continues with this name to this day. The Okinawa Taimusu came into being in July 1948, drawing on former staff of the Okinawa Shimpo and the Okinawa Asahi Shim bun. Both were located in downtown Naha, although the Taimusu has recently built a new head office and moved to the Omoromachi area in northern Naha City. Where possible, I have used articles from their English versions, which began to appear in the 1990s, for the benefit of non-Japanese readers. The articles, which appear once a week, were not translations per se but summaries of events. The Taimusu stopped publishing the English version in early 2003. Both newspapers claim a daily circulation of approximately 200,000. Recently, a team of reporters from the Ryukyu Shimpo won a journalism award for its writing a simple overview of the trends during the first several administrations.
obviously not able to address the changes that have taken place since then, nor to make use of the many memoirs that have appeared in the meantime, such as those of Nishime Junji, Uehara Kosuke, Ota Masahide, and other important figures in post-reversion Okinawa.12

In Part II below, the author makes use of these and other new writings to provide greater detail and new insights into the post-reversion period. Specifically, he highlights the social and political trends in Okinawa over the three decades by analyzing the Prefectural Assembly, gubernatorial, Lower House, and Upper House elections between 1972 and 2002. This writer also looks at the personalities and issues that emerged as well as the views of the political parties and related support groups, such as organizations both for and against the status quo. Furthermore, the author introduces the results of public opinion polls seen at different points during this time to help highlight certain trends, both short- and long-term.

A. The Reformist Years, 1972-1977

The years from 1972 to 1977 can be described as the reformist ones, in which leftist candidates, basing their campaigns on dissatisfaction with the reversion and on calls for greater autonomy for Okinawa in national affairs, won big in elections at all levels, building on the momentum, public support, and organizational structures of the pre-reversion years.13 For example, in the 1972 and 1976 gubernatorial elections, the reformist candidates, supported by the Komeito (Clean Government Party) and the Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi (Reformist Joint Struggle Council), comprised of the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaito), Okinawa Social Masses Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishutou), Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto), Okinawa Teacher’s Association (Okinawaken Kyoshokuin Kumiai), and the Joint Council of Prefectural Workers (Kenrodo Togo Kyogikai), won decisive victories over their conservative counterparts.14 Moreover, reformists captured a majority in the Prefectural Assembly elections held in 1972 and 1976. Likewise, at the local level, leftists won in large numbers at the city, town, and village level. Furthermore, in the 34th general elections held in June 1976, the reformist camp won 3 of the 5 seats up for grab maintaining the balance first established in 1970, when candidates from Okinawa were first allowed to run in and be elected to the postwar Diet.15 This wave, riding on the dissatisfaction with reversion, would not last forever, however, because of a number of factors described later.

Before we look at those aspects, it is necessary first to examine the dynamics of the reformist years in more detail and the three different complex feelings of happiness to be returning to Japan after 27 years of control by

gubernatorial level. However, when looking at the overall trends, such as the conservative mood setting in throughout Okinawa as seen in local elections and in the Upper House one, we can also use 1977 as an ending point when describing the reformist period and a starting point for the conservative one.


13 In some research, the reformist period is described as ending in 1978, when conservative Nishime Junji was elected governor. This is an appropriate delineation if one is focusing on prefectural politics at the

14 These different parties and organizations are described below. For a history of the association prior to reversion, led by Yara Chobyo (who became Chief Executive and later Governor of Okinawa), see Yara Chobyo, Okinawa Kyoshokuinkai 16 Nen: Sokute Fukki-Nihon Kokumin to Shite no Kyoiku o Mezashite (16 Years of the Okinawa Teacher’s Association: Toward Reversion and Education as Japanese Citizens), (Tokyo: Rodo Junposha, 1968).

15 The first official request for direct participation in elections was made in April 1961 after the Ryukyu Rippoin or Ryukyu Legislature (which was an elected body) passed a unanimous resolution in March. Participation in national elections was not realized until 9 years later, two years prior to Okinawa’s return to Japanese administrative control.
the United States, *disappointment* over the contents of the reversion agreement, and *anxiety* of the Okinawan people toward their future.¹⁶

Symbolic of these mixed feelings toward reversion, on May 15, 1972, the day Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration, three different but simultaneous gatherings were held. The first one, an official ceremony sponsored by the Japanese government and conducted at the Japan Budokan in Tokyo, saw the presence of Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, and U.S. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.¹⁷ In Okinawa, on the other hand, Governor Yara Chobyo, choosing not to attend the function in Tokyo, led a ceremony attended by some 1500 (and co-organized by the central government with television link-ups).¹⁸ Nearby in Yogi Park, Naha, members of the Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland (*Okinawaken Sokoku Fukki Kyogikai*), or *Fukkikyo*, held their own rally in the pouring rain denouncing the reversion agreement and describing the terms by which Okinawa was returning as another *Ryukyu Shobun*, in which Okinawa’s fate was handled in a way that benefited first and foremost Japan and ignored local views.¹⁹


¹⁸ Yara did not attend the June 17, 1971 signing ceremony of the reversion agreement in Tokyo, as well, due to strong pressure by his support groups. He instead watched the ceremony on television along with the leadership of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. For more on this, see Yara, *Gekido no 8 Nen*, pp. 150-155.

¹⁹ Okinawa Taimusu Shashi Henshuinkai, ed., *Shimbun 30 Nen*, pp. 185-186. Also see Okinawa

As is discussed later, in addition to U.S. bases remaining (which visibly suggested to Okinawans that reversion did not mean an end to life with the bases), Okinawans would now have to host the Self Defense Forces in the prefecture for the first time since their creation 18 years earlier. To Okinawans, not only were they not seeing a departure by the U.S. military, they now also had to put up with the successor organization to the dreaded Imperial Army (which Okinawans see as responsible for the fate that befell their islands in World War II when more civilians died than the deaths of both the Japanese and U.S. militaries combined), something that some still have not yet come to terms with.

Moreover, in their daily lives, Okinawans were dramatically affected by economic factors beyond their control that they blame on *fukki* or reversion to Japan and the way in which the Japanese and U.S. governments handled the process. For example, the local economy shifted from being dollar-based to a yen-based one. Until the *Nixon Shocks* of the summer of 1971 when President Richard M. Nixon announced the United States would be taking the dollar off of the gold standard (as well as including a 10% surcharge on Japanese goods imported into the United States), the exchange rate had been 1$=360¥ for most of the postwar. Suddenly, the exchange rate jumped to 305¥, a 15% increase. For Okinawans who would be exchanging their dollars for yen with the shift to the yen-based economy, this represented a huge loss. Subsequently, the Japanese government agreed to compensate for the loss

Shakai Taishutoshi Hensan Inkai, ed., *Okinawa Shakai Taishutoshi* (A History of the Okinawa Social Masses Party), (Naha: Okinawa Shakai Taishuto, 1981), p. 129. Earlier examples of *Ryukyu Shobun* include the dissolution of the Ryukyu Kingdom into the Ryukyu Domain and then Okinawa Prefecture in the 1870s and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (whose Article 3 permitted the United States to continue to administer Okinawa on behalf of Japan and the Allies). In another book, the author recreates the negotiations over the peace treaty, which suggest that Okinawa was not sacrificed by Japan as previously argued, but the deeply held feeling in Okinawa that this is the case will not easily go away. See Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, particularly chapters 5 and 7.
but the emotional shock and economic disruption was significant.

In the meantime, individuals, criminal organizations, and other groups tried to take advantage of the artificial exchange rate (compensation), by having dollars sent in from other places. These actions simply added to the confusion. Unsure what the actual rates were, prices of products fluctuated as manufacturers hedged.

Prices also shot up dramatically at this time, leading to demonstrations at the end of May following reversion. During the six days of the currency conversion period (May 15-20), people were allowed to use both currencies, but not being used to seeing prices in yen, people walked around with exchange rate tables during this time.20

The situation became all the more severe when large-scale layoffs began following U.S. base closures. In the first round of layoffs, some 900 were laid off in late 1972, and by the end of the decade almost 13,000 had been dismissed. Although many did not want the bases there, many others, like the base workers, shopkeepers, landlords, and other people in the service industry, were dependent on the bases for their livelihood.

As expressed in public opinion polls at the time, Okinawans were unhappy with the reversion and what it meant for them. They were also uncertain about the future, what life, for the first time in 27 years, would be like under Japanese control and if they would ever have a say again in their own destiny.

1. The 1972 Gubernatorial and Prefectural Assembly Elections

Symbolizing the numerous anxieties that existed around the time of reversion regarding the reversion agreement, the status of American bases, and economic adjustments such as the conversion to a yen-based economy, the rise in prices, and base-related and other layoffs, Okinawan voters went with the candidate they felt shared their concerns and would most likely address them. This, of course, did not necessarily mean that these candidates could actually solve their problems, but simply reflected a belief that these candidates would stand up to the central government on these issues. Having just returned to Japanese administration, many, ironically, were now looking for a more autonomous option.

Six parties existed in Okinawa at the time of the reversion in 1972.21 From right to left they were: the Ryukyu Dokuritsuto (Ryukyu Independence Party22), Okinawa Jiyu Minshuto Kenren (Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party), Komeito Okinawa Kenhon (Clean Government Party Okinawa Prefecture Branch), Minshuto Kenhonbu (Democratic Socialist Party Prefecture Headquarters), Nihon Shakaito Okinawaken Honbu (Japan Socialist Party Okinawa Prefecture Headquarters), and Nihon Kyosanto Okinawaken Iinkai (Japan Communist Party Okinawa Prefecture Committee). Of these, the latter five were the main parties in Okinawan politics in the post-reversion period and thus will be the focus of this study.23

The Prefectural Branch of the LDP is the successor to the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP), first created October 1959 through a merger of like-minded conservatives and the former Ryukyu Democratic Party (Ryukyu Minshuto), which was established in August 1952 by defectors from the OSMP. Like their conservative compatriots in mainland Japan who formed the LDP in late 1955 to secure a majority in the Diet, the 1959 merger

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21 For writings on parties prior to reversion, see Toyama, Masaki, Seiji no Butai Ura: Okinawa Sengoshi (Behind the Scenes in Politics: The History of Postwar Okinawa), (Ginowan: Okinawa Aki Shobo, 1987), and Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa.

22 For more on the creation of the Ryukyu Independence Party and its eventual dissolution, see Toyama, Seiji no Butai Ura, pp. 290-292.

23 Splinter parties and new parties (affiliated with similar groupings in the mainland) subsequently came into being and will be treated later in this study when relevant.
of the conservatives in Okinawa appears to have been more an effort to secure a majority in the Ryukyu Legislature and see the appointment of a conservative as Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands than any pressing or overriding philosophical mission. The marriage-of-convenience did not go well initially and saw some problems, including defections, before it was able to regroup in December of 1967. The Prefectural Branch of the LDP subsequently came into being on March 8, 1970, and had Inamine Ichiro, father of the current governor, Inamine Keiichi, as its first president (see Appendix 37). In the latter half of the 1970s, and the first half of the 1990s, it would again see defections and splits followed by returns to the party and reunifications due to scandals and other problems, described later.

The Prefectural Branch of the DSP, which was to the left of the LDP but to the right of other parties, came into being on April 29, 1972

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24 Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa, p. 32. Until 1968, the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was an appointed position established by the U.S. government in 1952. The Chief Executive was answerable to the U.S. governor, later known as the High Commissioner, who headed the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). In 1968, the people in the prefecture were given the right to choose the chief executive in a public election, something that had been demanded by them for a long time. (The elected chief executive was ultimately responsible to the U.S. High Commissioner, an Army lieutenant general appointed by the president. In 1968, this person was Lt. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger.)

25 For more on Inamine the senior, see Inamine Ichiro, Sekai o Butai ni: Inamine Ichiro Kaikoroku (The World’s a Stage: The Memoirs of Inamine Ichiro), (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1988). While factional alliances and heads would change in the LDP over the years, the initial breakdown of local leaders followed the three main factions at the national headquarters, namely the Tanaka Kakuei faction, the Fukuda Takeo faction, and the Nakasone Yasuhiro faction, with Nakamura Seiji belonging to the Tanaka faction, Kokuba Kosho belonging to the Fukuda group, and Oda Saburo a member of the Nakasone group. Within Okinawa, each of these individuals controlled their own factions, with the Kokuba faction being the largest (primarily because of the financial strength of Kokuba, whose family ran Kokuba Construction, one of the largest construction companies in Okinawa. For more on Odo, see Odo Saburo, Hitosuiji no Michi (One Path), (Naha: Okinawa Kosoku Insatsu, 1979).

26 For more on the Komeito in Okinawa, see Komeito Okinawaken Honbu, ed., Komeito Okinawaken Honbu no Ayumi (The History of the Prefectural Branch of the Komeito), (Naha: Komeito Okinawaken Honbu, 1990).

27 An Okinawa Socialist Party had been formed in September 1947, but it was not related to the Japan Socialist Party in organization or ideology. It merged with the Ryuku Socialist Party to form simply the Socialist Party later that year. Essentially it was a
became the Prefectural federation (Okinawa Kenren) followed by the Okinawa Kenhonbu (Prefectural Headquarters) a year later in February 1963. Labor activist Uehara Kosuke, first elected to the House of Representatives in 1970 (who served as Minister of the Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency in the Hosokawa Morihiro Cabinet), would subsequently lead it for much of the post-reversion period until he too left the party in 1998 (bringing about a near fatal blow to the already weak JSP) due to frustrations with its approach to security and defense issues, which he saw as unrealistic (see Appendix 38).

Finally, the Okinawa chapter of the Japan Communist Party has the longest consistent history of the parties in Okinawa, having been created in July 1947 as the Okinawa Jinminto (Okinawa People’s Party). Its name changed to the Ryukyu Jinminto in January 1952 to include the Amami Islands chapter and then back to the Okinawa Jinminto after the Amami Islands reverted to Japan in late 1953. It did not officially change its name to include the Communist Party until May 1972 at the time of reversion. Since the early 1950s, Senaga Kamejiro, elected to the Lower House in 1970, dominated the OPP and then the Okinawa prefectural committee. Because of doctrinaire policy and the over-centralization of the party at the national level, it was not always in step with local mood of the Okinawan public or even of its own supporters. As an example of this, in the early postwar years, the national JCP called for the independence of Okinawa and Amami although local members were strongly in favor of reversion to Japan and were some of the most active in organizing the reversion movement.

In subsequent years, several splinter groups and break-off parties would emerge. As alluded to shortly before, with the centrist parties, these groupings would influence (and be influenced by) different trends, alliances, and marriages of convenience. Since politics is often about numbers, the role of these swing votes (while not as big as perhaps that in the Diet) was nevertheless important.

At the time of reversion, in any case, it was the center-left and leftist groups that dominated the political environment in Okinawa. Yara Chobyo, a popular educator who was elected in 1968 in the first direct election for governor (then chief executive), was seen as their collective leader and was at his peak politically in 1972 at the time of the June election. Unhappiness vis-à-vis the central government with the reversion process was great, and the Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi, led by the largest local party, the OSMP, was at this point still fairly well unified and organized. Because this was the first gubernatorial election in the post-reversion era and would set not only the tone of the politics in Okinawa but perhaps its future direction as well, both sides fought especially hard.

The reformist camp got an early start with the election when the OSMP, at its party convention in April 1972, agreed to support Yara as the joint candidate of the anti-base groups in the election. The conservatives, too, had begun considering the candidacy issue early on. By August 1971, the OLDP (later the Okinawa Prefectural Branch of the LDP), had narrowed its choice of candidates to Ota Seisaku, a former chief executive from 1959 to 1964, and Nagamine Akio, former speaker of the Ryukyu Legislature, predecessor to the Prefectural

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Assembly. However, both men were seen as people of the past. Secretary General of the LDP in Tokyo Hori Shigeru called for the nomination of Nishime Junji, believing him to be representative of the future. Tanaka Kakuei, an influential member of the LDP in Tokyo and soon-to-be prime minister (July 1972-December 1974), argued differently, telling Ota, who was also secretary general of the Okinawa LDP, that Nishime had just been elected to the Lower House in 1970 (the first time representatives from Okinawa were chosen) and still had a great deal of work to do there relating to passing the reversion bills. Eventually, Nishime (who had been a student of Yara Chobyo and ran against him in the 1968 election, dubbed the “teacher-student battle”) decided to announce that he would not run for the governor’s office at that time, and the LDP endorsed Ota’s candidacy.

Voting took place on June 25, beginning at seven a.m. with polls closing at six p.m. Although this was the first prefecture-wide election for governor ever in the history of Okinawa prefecture (as opposed to the chief executive election in 1968), voting was not as high as hoped or anticipated. Compared with the election for the chief executive in 1968, which saw 87 percent turnout, only 76.28 percent of voters came out in 1972.

Nevertheless, despite the smaller turnout, Yara won by a huge margin (73,450 votes)—251,230 versus 177,780—and was easily reelected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Stance</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yara Chobyo</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>251,230</td>
<td>58.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ota Seisaku</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>177,780</td>
<td>41.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Prefectural Assembly elections were also held that day. Historically, with the exception of the first election for the Ryukyu Legislature on March 2, 1953, all of the other seven elections were conducted under the single-seat constituency (shosenkyoku seido) format. However, beginning in 1972,


31 Nishime did become the secretary general of the Okinawa LDP on February 13, 1972 on the eve of reversion, thus firming up his support within the local LDP. He did not waste his time while in Tokyo, either. For example, he was chosen to become Vice Minister (Seimu Jikan) in the newly created Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency (Okinawa-Hokkaido Kaihatsuchu) in November 1973 followed by Vice Minister of the Economic Planning Agency (Keizai Kikakucho) in September 1976. See Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Kite, pp. 241-242, and Sakuta Shigeru, Nishime Junji Kenkyu (On Nishime Junji), Rev. Ed., (Naha: Gekkan Okinawa-sha, 1990). For his other activities and responsibilities in Tokyo, see footnote 87.

32 Polls now remain open until 8:00 p.m.

33 Prewar governors in Okinawa were appointed (as they were in other parts of Japan) by the central government, and not elected to office. In the case of Okinawa, the appointed officials were all yamatonchu or mainlanders, i.e. those from outside the prefecture, which created friction and resentment with locals due to their perceived arrogance and lack of understanding of local culture (not to mention the efforts to suppress local culture in favor of assimilation). Elections for local governors of island groups were held in the early years of the U.S. occupation but subsequently were appointed as chief executives beginning in 1952 by the U.S. military governor. Public elections for governor in the other prefectures began some 20 years earlier in 1946.


36 Okinawa Sengo Senkyoshi Henshu Iinkai, ed.,
prefectural assembly elections were conducted under the medim-size constituency (*chusenkyoku seido*), with 44 members being elected from 12 districts. Although the LDP emerged as the largest party with 20 seats gained, the reformists as a whole were victorious through their combined strength of 23 (OSMP, 11 seats; JCP, 6; JSP, 4; *Komeito*, 1, Independent, 1). With the reformists in control, Taira Koichi, secretary general of the OSMP and later governor, became Speaker of the Prefectural Assembly.38

### Results of 1972 Prefectural Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Those Elected</th>
<th>Strength Before Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inc. New/Former</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSMP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 /2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 /20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indp</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0 /10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the gubernatorial and prefectural assembly elections, Taira afterwards commented in a *Okinawa Times*-sponsored roundtable on June 28 that the elections were a “referendum on the central government” by the people of Okinawa. Indeed, both his victory and that of reformists were interpreted as signifying that voters sought more autonomy and an Okinawa without the bases, and were dissatisfied with the reversion itself.

What made the elections and those that followed in the late fall in Urasoe, Naha, and for the Lower House particularly favorable to the leftists was the problems that emerged, or perhaps better stated, continued with the bases. On May 20, just five days after reversion in what appeared to be a visible demonstration that reversion had no effect on the way the bases would be used, three B-52s arrived from Guam, apparently to avoid bad weather there. In July, another 28 arrived, followed by more on August 3. It began to appear that the B-52s, then the largest Air Force planes in existence and capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were about to be permanently stationed in Okinawa, a fear added to when 103 B-52s arrived between October 26 and 27. For Okinawans, this meant that their situation had not changed with reversion.

The 33rd general elections for the Lower House were held amid this environment on December 10 that year. Eight candidates emerged, fighting for the five seats representing Okinawa. These were: Nishime Junji (LDP), Uehara Kosuke (JSP), Kokuba Kosho (LDP), Senaga Kamejiro (JCP), Asato Tsumichiyo (OSMP), Tamaki Eiichi (*Komeito*), Kuwae Choko (*Komeito*), Yamagawa Yasukuni (Independent). In the end, Nishime and

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[37] For a breakdown of the districts and numbers elected from each, see *Ibid.* The Ryukyu Legislature was comprised of 32 seats.

[38] Taira was a candidate from Nakagamigun. It was his 11th straight victory in running in elections since he became the mayor of Nishihara village in 1948. See Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko linkai, ed. *Dochaku no Hitot: Taira Koichi Den* (Native Person: A Biography of Taira Koichi), (Nishihara-cho: Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko linkai, 1994), p. 134.

[39] In the mayoral elections for Urasoe City, immediately north of Naha, on November 12, Matayoshi Seiichi was elected. In the subsequent mayoral elections in the traditionally leftist Naha City held on November 19, Taira Ryosho, the reformist incumbent, was safely reelected, defeating Onaga Josei by winning 67,932 of the108,000 votes cast. For Taira’s platform at the time, see Taira Ryosho, *Hansen to Jichi: Kodomotachi no Shorai no Tame ni (Anti-war and Local Autonomy: For the Future of the Children)*, (Naha: Kyoei Insatsu, 1972). In the by-election held that same day for the city assembly, several leftists were chosen, including Kyan Shinei (one of the leaders of the reversion movement and a future gubernatorial candidate) and Kinjo Kenichi, who was born in 1945, making him the first person born in the postwar to be elected.


[41] One of Taira’s first responsibilities as speaker of the assembly was to oversee the passage on July 16 of the assembly’s “Opinion Regarding the Stoppage of B-52 Strategic Bombers from Landing (*B52 Senryaku Bakukekiki no Sairai Soshi ni Kansuru Ikensho*”) and leading the delegation that delivered it to the central government in Tokyo. See Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko linkai, ed. *Dochaku no Hitot*, p. 138.
Kokuba from the LDP and reformists Uehara, Senaga, and Asato were elected. Those chosen were all incumbents, which meant that the 3-2 balance between reformists and conservatives had not changed (and would not in fact change until 1992). In this hard-fought battle, there was no room yet for new faces amidst the uncertainty that the post-reversion transition period represented.

**Results of 1972 Lower House Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Nishime Junji</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>74,073</td>
<td>16.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Uehara Kosuke</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>68,999</td>
<td>15.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Kokuba Kosho</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>65,961</td>
<td>15.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Kamejiro Senaga</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>64,433</td>
<td>14.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Asato Tsumichiyo</td>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>57,203</td>
<td>13.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaki Eiichi</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>44,520</td>
<td>10.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwae Choko</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>38,255</td>
<td>8.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamasakawa Yasukuni</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>22,716</td>
<td>5.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That same day, however, something happened that would affect the local political dynamics for years to come. Because the Democratic Socialist Party, created in January 1960 as a rightwing break-off of the Socialist Party, did not do well in the elections in the rest of Japan, its secretary-general, Sasaki Ryosaku, asked Asato, who had cooperated with the party in the past, to officially join it. When the OSMP central committee refused to give Asato permission, he left the party on December 20. At the 29th party convention held on January 14, 1973, the OSMP promoted Taira Koichi, the secretary-general of the party and speaker of the Prefectural Assembly, to the chairmanship. Asato, whose name value was large and who had been a professional politician for more than two decades, would quickly assume the leadership of the DSP becoming its chairman (with Nakada becoming vice chairman). Little did anyone expect, however, that Asato and Taira, former comrades-in-arms, would go head-to-head four years later in the 1976 gubernatorial elections.

2. The 1974 Upper House Elections

Despite the problem of Asato’s departure, the reformist lead would continue to grow into the mid 1970s as dissatisfaction with the central government’s perceived mishandling of the economic situation (in the wake of oil shocks and dollar crisis) and base problems deepened.

**Results of 1974 Upper House Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyan Shinei</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>261,396</td>
<td>58.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sho Sen</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>182,689</td>
<td>41.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In July 1974, the first post-reversion Upper House election was held. This election was significant also because it was the first one in which Okinawan voters were choosing in nation-wide constituencies (zenkoku-ku), and thus they went to the voting booths with not only a prefectural perspective but a national one as well. In the end, reformist Kyan Shinei, a former schoolteacher who saw many of his students die in the Battle of Okinawa, 42 43 44 45

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43 Egami, Politics in Okinawa Since the Reversion of Sovereignty, p. 833.


46 Ibid., p. 132. The other members of the leadership chosen were Takahara Hisao as vice-chair, Chibana Hideo as secretary general, and Nakamoto Anichi as deputy secretary general.

47 While not as many as anticipated, Asato was able to bring with him several people who also left the OSMP, including his son, Masayoshi, Kinjo Goro, and Kinjo’s son, Jimmatzu, who all basically dominated the top leadership of their adopted party. Surprisingly, this takeover by Asato’s team did not seem to cause major problems with the existing members of the DSP.

defeated his LDP-sponsored opponent Sho Sen by almost 80,000 votes, the widest margin in the post-reversion period.

3. The 1976 Gubernatorial and Prefectural Assembly Elections

Gearing up for the next gubernatorial election held in late 1976, supporters of Yara asked him to consider running a third time. Having been faced with numerous tough choices throughout his 8 years in office--easily the most difficult time in postwar Okinawan history--the 74-year old decided against doing so for health reasons and the reformist camp was forced to choose another candidate.

The most logical choice was Taira Koichi, as he headed the largest party within the ruling coalition. At its central committee meeting held on January 25, 1976, the OSMP, which acts as both the driving force as well as a crucial swing-vote in reformist politics, decided on Taira, although he had resisted being named. Endorsements from the JSP and Komeito quickly came after that, followed by those from labor and civic groups. On February 1, the JCP subsequently added its support, thus bringing the reformist parties all in line behind one candidate (increasingly not an easy task as we will see).

At the same time, the JCP and the JSP were divided over how to proceed with the united front in the election. The Communists called for a formal restarting of the Joint Council, that had been used in the past, while the rival JSP hoped to see an expanded council. Eventually, a new Okinawa Kensei Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi (Joint Council for an Okinawa Prefecture Reformist Administration), which included the Komeito as observers, came into being at a meeting among the leaders of the reformist camp over the weekend of February 8, thus beginning a semi-formal relationship between the reformists and the more middle-of-the-road Komeito. On the 11th, the council met and agreed to a joint platform of reformist principles (kakushin toitsu koryo).

Taira, despite his initial reluctance, announced his candidacy at a press conference later that month on the 27th at the Education Hall in Maebashi, Naha City. While this may seem early for a candidate to have been chosen, the conservatives were in fact much quicker in having decided on its man. As early as January 1975, LDP prefectural branch president Nishime had declared that recovering the governorship from the reformists was no easy task… and therefore could not be done by the LDP alone. 52 The LDP and the DSP would begin exploring the selection of Asato, from the DSP, as their joint candidate. On January 2, the conservatives created the Atarashii Okinawa o Tsukuru Kai (Committee for the Creation of a New Okinawa) and proceeded to formally choose Asato as their candidate. 53 Asato officially announced his candidacy on January 30.

With the DSP cooperating with the LDP, a new dynamic was introduced into Okinawan politics. Until this time, the clash had been between the LDP and every other party. Now the line dividing the political camps was LDP-DSP against the reformist parties. 54 The LDP had successfully cut into the opposition parties. Another new dynamic seen at the time was the effect that realization of reversion had on Okinawan political leaders. Namely, pre-reversion colleagues in the reformist movement and progressive politics had now become rivals as former reformists and their political groupings argued over new policy directions for the future and broke away from the traditional party line. Local newspapers in

51 Ibid., p. 133.

52 Ibid., p. 133.

53 Ibid., pp. 133-134.

54 Komeito’s joining the LDP in supporting Inamine in 1998 represented another sea change and creation of a new dividing line.
particular seized on this new aspect, longtime political allies suddenly facing one another as seen in the clash between former colleagues Taira and Asato.\(^{55}\)

The clash was also seen in the difference in their platforms, based on the relationship between Okinawa Prefecture and the central government—the traditional axis in post-reversion gubernatorial politics. Taira had sought to build on Yara’s approach to governing, which was to call for the elimination of central [government] domination (chuo shihai) and establishment of local autonomy (chiho jichi no kakuritsu), a theme that still resonated among voters despite the poor economic performance of the prefecture and other problems facing Okinawa. Asato on the other hand realized the continued need for the central government’s assistance calling for the establishment of a self-sufficient prefecture with the cooperation of the central government. \(^{56}\)

Results of 1976 Gubernatorial Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Stance</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taira Koichi</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>270,880</td>
<td>53.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asato Tsumichiyo</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>238,283</td>
<td>46.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eventually Taira, the anti-central government candidate, defeated Asato by some 30,000 votes.\(^{57}\) Voters it seems were still willing to continue with the reformists, for at least a while longer. It would not last that long, however.

For the reformists, Taira’s victory was important not only practically but also symbolically. In other words, his election reflected the passing of the torch from one reformist administration to the next, and, as the newspaper headlines at the time blared out, represented the Second [Generation] Reformist Governor. \(^{58}\) In retrospect, however, it can be said that the overwhelming gap between the reformists and conservatives was rapidly closing. In this election, as mentioned above, the LDP learned that they could split the center-left groups, who were searching for a more practical way to deal with the bases and other issues in the context local and national politics, away from the die-hard leftists. This was something that the LDP would try again in 1998 when Uehara Kosuke left the renamed Social Democratic Party and the LDP initially but unsuccessfully sought to have him run as their candidate in the gubernatorial race that year.

Elections were also held at this time for the prefectural assembly. Of course, any person being chosen governor would need the support of the assembly, and thus both camps fought hard over the now–46 seats up for grab.\(^{59}\) Because of these efforts, the LDP maintained a total of 21 seats, while the reformists increased their number to 25. Of those that were elected 30 were incumbents with 16 of them new candidates. Of the latter group, the first female assembly member (Uezu Toshi) was finally elected in the traditionally male-dominated Okinawa society.\(^{60}\)

\(^{55}\) Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko Iinkai, ed. *Dochaku no Hito*, p. 142.


\(^{57}\) Following the defeat in the elections, the DSP rehauled the party leadership, installing people of the next generation, such as Asato’s son Masayoshi and Kinjo’s son Kisho, who had both joined the party when Asato joined the party in late 1972. These changes would have the effect of speeding up Asato’s loss of influence in politics. See Toyama, *Seiji no Butai Ura*, p. 287.

\(^{58}\) Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko Iinkai, ed. *Dochaku no Hito*, p. 142.

\(^{59}\) Okinawa Sengo Senkyoshi Henshu Iinkai, ed., *Okinawa Sengo Senkyoshi*, pp. 54-55. In light of the population increase since 1972, the number of assembly members to be chosen was increased to 46. The number of representatives from Urasoe increased by one (making 3 in total), and Shimajirigun (south of Naha City) saw its number increase by one to five in total. The number of assembly members would increase again in 1984 to 47 seats and to 48 seats in 1992 following the 1990 census, where the number stands now.

\(^{60}\) For more on Uezu, see the chapter about her in Okinawaken, ed., *Sengo 50 Nen: Okinawa Josei no Ayumi* (50 Years of the Postwar: the Path Women of Okinawa Have Travelled), (Naha: Okinawaken, 1996), pp. 218-219. For other books on Okinawan female
Results of 1976 Prefectural Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Those Elected</th>
<th>Strength Before Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inc.</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSMP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indp</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous problems would continue with the bases over the coming months and years, but shortly after these elections, the leftist domination of post-reversion Okinawan politics began to fall apart. These factors are explained below.

One issue that emerged shortly after Taira’s victory was in the selection of his administration. Taira planned to employ two vice governors, as had been the precedent established in April 1974 by Yara, one for administrative affairs (Jimu shori tanto) and the other for political affairs (Seimu shori tanto). Taira had no problem in naming his vice governor for administrative affairs, but when it was reported in the newspapers that Kinjo Takashi of the Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi lawyer’s support group was to be tapped for vice governor in charge of political affairs, opposition emerged from within the ruling parties. Taira was furious with and shocked by their opposition, particularly because he reportedly had an understanding with his support group that it would not interfere in personnel matters and in his strong belief that having the right people is 80 percent of the battle to see a successful administration. In the end, however, Taira was forced to abandon his plan to name Kinjo and instead choose Yabe Hiroshi, who was then treasurer (Suitocho), to become vice governor.

Another problem during this time was the economic stagnation in Okinawa and the related socio-psychological impact this would have locally following the Okinawa International Ocean Exposition (Okinawa Kaiyo Hakurankai), held between July 20, 1975 and January 18, 1976 on the Motobu peninsula in the northwestern part of the main island of Okinawa. As the third and final event commemorating reversion, and the largest one, a great deal of money was pumped into the prefecture on infrastructure and hotels. Some 4.5 million visitors were expected, but in the end, only 3.5 million came and as a result many construction firms, hotels, and related businesses went bankrupt. Some of the buildings would remain vacant or half-completed for years to come. Naturally,


61 Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko linkai, ed. Dochaku no Hito, p. 144. According to his biography, Taira chose Kinjo for the following reasons: 1) his legal background; 2) his ability to serve as a liaison with the ruling party; 3) his having once been a candidate for the Upper House; 4) his network from his alma mater, Tokyo University; 5) Taira’s interest in developing Kinjo as a successor.

62 Ibid., p. 145.

63 Okinawa Prefecture, ed., Okinawa, pp. 306-307. The budget for the Ocean Expo totaled 2,371,000,000 yen. The other two events were the tree-planting ceremony on the former battlefields in southern Okinawa on November 26, 1972 and the holding of the Wakanatsu Sports Festival with 3000 participants from all over Japan between May 3-6, 1973 at Onoyama Sports Park in Naha.

64 A similar phenomenon was feared as a result of the hosting of the 2000 G-8 Summit in Okinawa, when a great deal of money was pumped into Okinawa in the year and a half prior to hosting the gathering.
many people lost their jobs, with unemployment rising to 6.3% in 1976 and 6.8% by 1977 (see Appendix 53). While these figures do not seem overly high by international standards at the time (or Okinawan standards today), it was comparatively high for Okinawans at the time for two reasons. First, compared to figures in 1973, Okinawan unemployment was only 3.5%, which means that by 1977, unemployment had doubled. Second, when compared to mainland Japan, whose unemployment stood at 2.0% in both 1976 and 1977, Okinawan unemployment was more than three times that of their compatriots. Combined with the mass lay-offs from the base closures and consolidations of the 1970s where some 12,760 people lost their jobs and the general stagnation in the wake of the Middle East 1973 oil shocks, the economic impact was widely and deeply felt.

It was in the atmosphere that Taira began his administration. Because of the so-called “after-effects” of the International Ocean Expo, he decided to reexamine the second half of the First Okinawa Economic Development Program (Okinawa Kaihatsu Shinko Keikaku), which began in 1972 and ran for ten years. In particular, Taira had been critical of the plan’s emphasis on promoting heavy industry, and instead sought to expand support for primary industries. (His selection of Nojima Takemori, formerly head of the OPG’s Forestry and Water Production Division, as one of his vice governors was in line with this thinking.) As a result of this review, Taira’s administration found 75 items that required revision either at the implementation level (37) or institutional level (38). Taira requested the Okinawa Development Agency and other central government organizations to consider the OPG’s request, and he began working on other pending items.

One of these issues that emerged and is explored in the next part in more detail had to do with the bases, whose presence in Okinawa Taira felt to be the root of all evils. Relating to this, Taira’s administration clashed with the central government on two key problems—the government’s draft bill of the land clarification law and Taira’s efforts to seek the passage of the Guntenpo, a law (explained later on page 45 on the first Ota Masahide administration) that would permit the reutilization of land designated for return. As part of these efforts, Taira became Chairman of the Council to Promote the Conversion of Military Land in Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa Ken Gunyochi Tenyo Sokushin Kyogikai), which also included the mayors of 36 communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Agenda/Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | 1972-1981 | * Correct discrepancies  
      * Foundation for autonomous development. |
      * Foundation for autonomous development.  
      * Realization of an Okinawa Prefecture that is peaceful, full of vitality, with a new lifestyle. |
      * Foundation for autonomous development.  
      * Region with unique flavor that will contribute to the cultural and socio-economic development of our country. |
| 4   | 2002-2011 | * Foundation for autonomous development.  
      * Formation of a center for exchange and cooperation with the world. |

65 For more on the economic development plans, including copies of them, see the homepage of the Okinawa General Bureau, responsible for the promotion and development plans at: [http://www.ogb.go.jp/sinkou/sinkou.htm](http://www.ogb.go.jp/sinkou/sinkou.htm). Also see Makino Hirotaka, Saiko Okinawa Keizai (Reexamining Okinawa’s Economy), (Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1996); Miyakuni Hideo, Kichi Keizai to Okinawa: ryukyu no Rekishi Kara Mita Mirai Tenbo (The Base Economy and Okinawa: Future Visions as Seen from Ryukyu History), (Urasoe: Puresu Okinawa, 1999); and Yamazato Shoko, ed., Zu de Miru Okinawa no Keizai (Okinawa’s Economy as Seen in Diagrams), (Naha: Shinpo Shuppan Insatsu, 1979). Makino is currently Vice Governor in charge of economic matters.

66 As part of this plan, mainland companies were invited to establish oil storage tank facilities in Okinawa, sparking several years of protests by people opposed to the environmental impact. The CTS problem, as this came to be known, was the most divisive issue in Okinawa after the bases. For more, see Yara, Gekido no 8 Nen, pp. 266-285.


69 *Ibid.*, p. 169. A draft proposal on the way in which to proceed entitled Okinawa ni Okeru Gunyochi no Tenyo...
The final issue that Taira faced was the necessity to correct discrepancies between administrative procedures in Okinawa and the mainland, such as in traffic laws and police possession and use of weapons. These issues, particularly with regard to the changeover in traffic patterns (from driving on the right to driving on the left as is done in the rest of Japan\(^70\)) and the social disruption that it caused, proved more problematic than originally expected and resulted in Taira’s overwork and eventual physical collapse. The difficulties in unifying Okinawa and Japan administratively, socially, and economically, became quite apparent and would lead to voters to begin looking to a candidate or party that could act as a greater bridge with the mainland.

B. The Conservative Shift, 1977-1988 \(^71\)

There are several reasons for the conservative shift that began to emerge during this time, including changes in economic and social factors, the policies of the central government in financial and base affairs, and most significantly, political infighting within the reformist camp. These factors would continue to work in favor of the conservative camp all the way to the late 1980s. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, however, the dynamics in Okinawa began once again to shift toward the reformists, who would win the governorship on calls, among other things, for a peace dividend to be given to Okinawa.

The conservative shift in the latter half of the 1970s was not at first apparent. The year 1977 corresponded with the 5th anniversary of the return of Okinawa. In public opinion polls conducted by the local newspapers leading up to the 5th anniversary, in March, only 40 percent responded that reversion was a good thing. \(^72\) In contrast, 55 percent stated that reversion did not live up to their expectations. In Okinawans were unhappy with, among other things, the rise in prices, the fear of unemployment, problems in healthcare and housing, the rise in crime, and the inability to find a good job. On the surface, the central government was being blamed. But at the same time, its cooperation was necessary. Similarly, another underlying factor of Okinawan frustration was dissatisfaction with the inability of the current reformist administration to make the situation in Okinawa better due to its confrontational style with the central government. A new approach was necessary, and Okinawan voters began increasingly to look to the conservatives to realize what the reformists could not deliver.

1. The 1977 Upper House Election

The July 10, 1977 Upper House election, which saw the easy re-election of LDP-supported Inamine Ichiro (father of Inamine Keiichi) against Fukuchi Hiroaki, then chair of the Okinawa Teacher’s Association and someone supported by the Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi, was the start of this conservative wave in that the LDP candidates won in local elections in Naha City, Okinawa City, and Urasoe City, all previously controlled by reformists. \(^73\) While

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70 The verdict is still out on whether they have been successful or not in securing traffic safety. Informal observations during 35 visits to Okinawa by this writer suggest that authorities there have not been.

71 As explained earlier, there are several possible delineations with dates concerning when a conservative or reformist period began and when it ended. Here, I use 1977 as the year when the conservative influence began, and 1988 when it waned and the reformist wave started again. The governorship was still, of course, in conservative hands in 1988, but the mood of the prefectural residents was changing.

72 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 54.

73 Shimabukuro, Fukkigo no Okinawa Seiji Kozo no Henyo, pp. 44-45. For more on Inamine, see his memoirs, Sekai o Butai ni. For more on Fukuchi, see his Okinawashi o Kakenuketa: Fukuchi Hiroaki no Hansei (Living Okinawa History: The Life of Fukuchi Hiroaki), (Tokyo: Dojidaisha, 2000). Fukuchi is a prolific writer, in addition to having worked as a schoolteacher, member of the teachers’ union, and as
Inamine, first elected in June 1971\(^74\), was successful due likely to his being the incumbent and able to run on his well known name, the fact that the reformist camp took a long time to decide on their joint candidate due to rivalries and competing party interests no doubt worked to the advantage of the conservatives who, better organized, got an early start. It suggested too that the reformists were in disarray. As a result, Inamine won by almost 20,000 votes.

### Results of 1977 Upper House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inamine Ichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>249,496</td>
<td>52.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuchi Hiroshi</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>230,163</td>
<td>47.98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dissatisfaction within the OSMP was growing, and members of the Okinawa City Assembly had begun exploring the establishment of a new movement or party along the lines of Eda Satsuki’s *Shakai Shimin Rengo* (Socialist Citizen’s League) that had become active around the time of the Upper House election and was its own response to dissatisfaction with the Japanese Socialist Party whose leadership was being taken over by doctrinaire leftists.\(^75\)

Related to these movements was the rivalry between the leadership of the OSMP and Oyama Chojo, former mayor of Koza (now Okinawa City\(^76\)) who had created that city’s branch of the party decades before. Oyama had planned to run in the Upper House election, but members of OSMP support groups and electoral partner JCP opposed Oyama’s nomination because he did not exhibit the proper progressive credentials.\(^77\) The OSMP was forced to abandon its old friend to his great anger as well as that of those close to him. Oyama did not openly join the efforts of those in creating the SCL, but it was well known that he was considered their mentor and they planned to support him in his Upper House bid by having him run on the SCL ticket.\(^78\) However, they were unable to do so as they had not officially created a party—Oyama’s supporters were simply a group of like-minded politicians. Eventually on the morning of March 29, 1978, Oyama resigned from the OSMP and helped officially launch the creation of Social Democratic Federation (*Shakai Minshu Rengo*) in Okinawa that afternoon.\(^79\)

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74 Inamine ran against Kinjo Takashi, representing the *Kakushin Kyōtai* and Sakima Toshikatsu of the Ryukyu Independence Party, defeating both.

75 Eda Saburo, a key figure of the JSP, led it in March 1977 and was preparing to run in the Upper House election after creating Socialist Citizens League (*Shakai Shimin Rengo*) when he died from cancer in May. His son, Satuki, an Oxford-educated lawyer, led the Bar to succeed his father. After adding new members, such as Den Hideo, from the JSP, the larger SCL renamed itself the Social Democratic Federation (*Shakai Minshu Rengo*) and officially became a party on March 26, 1978. For more on *Shaminren*, of which Kan Naoto (who recently resigned as head of the Democratic Party due to another scandal) in his younger days played a major role, see the party’s history at: [http://www.eda.jp.com/index.html](http://www.eda.jp.com/index.html). Also see Ronald J. Hrebenar, *Political Party Proliferation: The New Liberal Club and the Mini-Parties*, in Hrebenar, ed., *The Japanese Party System*, pp. 222-224, and Masami Junnosuke, *Contemporary Politics in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 342-344.

76 Koza City, whose name was assigned incorrectly by U.S. forces who misread a wartime map, was changed to Okinawa City in 1974. However, the name Koza is often used as it has a sentimental connotation from the pre-reversion years. Okinawa City’s homepage, one of the most developed English-language homepages among local communities, has more information on this history. See [http://okiarea.city.okinawa.okinawa.jp/main/library/okiUSA/top.html](http://okiarea.city.okinawa.okinawa.jp/main/library/okiUSA/top.html).

77 Toyama, *Seiji no Butai Ura*, p. 300.

78 Ibid., p. 301.

79 Ibid., p. 302, and Shimabukuro, *Fukkigo no Okinawa Seiji Kozo no Henyo*, p. 45. The Okinawa branch of the party eventually disbanded on October 8, 1983. The mainland party dissolved in May 1994 when he joined with *Nihon Shinto* (Japan New Party), which itself became a part of *Shinshinto* (New Frontier Party), headed by Ozawa Ichiro, in December that year.
These problems among the reformist continued in the mayoral elections in Urasoe City that August which helped the LDP to win easily. The following year, during combined local elections held throughout Okinawa, the conservatives continued to make great strides. In 39 contests for city, town, and village assemblies, the conservatives secured majorities in most of them. Similarly, in 27 contests for city, town, and village mayors, the conservatives won 21 of them.

These numbers are quite significant. Prior to reversion, 8 of the 10 mayors of cities in Okinawa were reformist; by 1978, that number had dropped to 4. Likewise, of the 53 communities in Okinawa, 36 were now controlled by the conservatives. Similar trends could be found nation-wide.80

2. The 1978 Gubernatorial Election

This wave proved to be a crucial base of support when elections for the governor were unexpectedly held in 1978. Normally, governors in Japan serve for 4 years, which means that the term for Governor Taira, elected in 1976, was scheduled to finish in 1980.81 However, Taira, busy with preparing for the switchover in traffic laws, to become effective July 30, 1978, and dealing with the central government over that and other issues, collapsed with a stroke from overwork on July 21 during a trip to Tokyo for the National Governors Conference (Zenkoku Chiji Taikai), and eventually decided to resign on October 24.82 As a result, elections were held for the next governor on December 10.

The problem of deciding on a candidate, seen above, was not strictly a problem of the reformist camp. It has also been seen among the conservatives, more dramatically, in recent elections in the 1990s and after. We also see it at the time of the sudden gubernatorial elections in 1978. Due to factional differences and the inability of one of the candidates to make up his mind, it took the LDP and its allies nearly two months to come up with a candidate, Lower House member Nishime Junji.83

The Nishime faction within the LDP called for his candidacy, but they were opposed by the Kokuba Kosho faction, which supported Ohama Hoei, then the chairman of the prefecture doctor’s association (Okinawaken Ishikai), as Nishime initially had stated he did not intend to run.84 Because of the intensity of the standoff that eventually emerged, it appeared (to at least one observer) that the party would actually split up, but subsequently Nishime’s candidacy was approved and the party did not break up.85 In order to solidify intraparty support, Nishime skillfully included representatives of the other factions to work in his campaign including Goya Hidenobu, who usually headed Kokuba’s campaign office.86

In retrospect, the confusion that emerged could probably have been avoided if Nishime had declared his desire to run early on. Kokuba,

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80 Masami, Contemporary Politics in Japan, p. 194.
81 The four-year term is spelled out in Article 140 of the Local Autonomy Law (Chiho Jichiho).
82 Taira was paralyzed on his right side and unable to speak clearly afterwards. He eventually required 6 months treatment at the hospital he was taken to in Shinjuku, Tokyo, and came to realize during this time that he would be unable to resume his duties as governor. His vice governor, Nojima Takemori, assumed the position of acting governor from late July to the elections in December. Nishime was traveling in Southeast Asia when he learned of Taira’s collapse. It reportedly came as a shock to him. The two had participated in the creation of the OSMP in 1950 and had been close friends. Nishime returned to Japan early from his trip abroad, and immediately visited Taira at his hospital bedside in Tokyo. Nishime would subsequently run on a platform critical of Taira’s policies as governor in the December gubernatorial election, although he initially was reluctant to run (due to Tanaka’s desire to see him continue in the Lower House and his own family’s opposition). See Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, pp. 247-248, and Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko Inkkai, ed. Dochaku no Hito, 246.
84 Toyama, Seiji no Butai Ura, p. 226, and Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 248.
85 Toyama, Seiji no Butai Ura, p. 226.
86 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, pp. 268-269.
for example, who eventually came to support Nishime’s candidacy, was strongly critical of Nishime’s lack of clarity regarding his intention to run. When he finally came around to supporting Nishime at a November 10 meeting of the leadership of the prefectural branch, he could not hide his anger, explaining that Nishime had caused all of this chaos. If he had simply said he was a candidate from the beginning, the animosity and problems that developed could have been avoided. Kokuba, to Nishime, added in front of everyone Don’t let this happen a second time.  

Ironically, this is precisely what would happen some 10 years later when Nishime decided to run a fourth time as governor, although he had said after his third election in 1986 that he would not be a candidate again. The process by which Nishime came to be selected as the candidate of the LDP in 1978 was extremely complex, involving discussions between and among Nishime’s individual supporters (such as Ie Tomoo, a fellow member of the Tanaka Kakuei faction from the Upper House), who encouraged Nishime to run when he invited him to dinner in Tokyo in early October, support group (koenkai), the Prefectural Branch of the LDP, the headquarters of the LDP in Tokyo, and the middle-of-the-road parties, such as the Shin Jiyu Kurabu Okinawa (New Liberal Club Okinawa Branch), Minshuto Okinawaken Rengokai (Okinawa Prefectural Federation of the Democratic Socialist Party), and the Okinawa Shakai Minshu Rengo (Okinawa Social Democratic Federation). Because the Prefectural Branch of the LDP was divided on naming a candidate and could not reach a consensus, the LDP in early November in

87 Ibid., p. 267.

88 Ie was the first Okinawan to be named minister, when he became Director of the Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency in November 1991 in the Miyazawa Kiichi cabinet (until August 1993). For more, see Ie, Daijin Nikki. Incidentally, Uehara Kosuke was the first Diet member elected from Okinawa to be named minister (also as Director of the Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency) during the subsequent Hosokawa Morihiro cabinet (August 1993-April 1994). Ie was elected to the Upper House in 1977 and comprised of Lower House) and a handful of followers in the wake of the Lockheed scandal affecting the LDP. By the summer of 1977, the NLC had become the third most popular party in the country but was racked with internal rivalries and other problems. It eventually rejoined the LDP in August 1986. For more, see Hrebenaif Political Party Proliferation, [pp. 213-222. In Okinawa, the NLC was headed by Onaga Suzukiro, father of the current mayor of Naha City, former vice governor under Nishime from 1989-1990, and currently President of the Rotary Club of Okinawa and Chairman of the Okinawa Environmental Technology Association (Okinawaken Kankyo Kagaku Senta), until it was disbanded in May 1983. For more, see Onaga Suzukiro, Watashi no Seijiron: Jichi no Kakuritsu o Mezashite (My Political Views: Toward the Realization of Local Autonomy), (Naha: Shinsel Tosho Shuppan, 1981).
Tokyo was asked to render its decision. Tanaka, the disgraced but still influential behind-the-scenes power broker, to whose faction Nishime belonged, held out the hope that Nishime would continue on as a Diet member and eventually become named as a Minister, finally agreed to support Nishime’s candidacy. Around this time, Ohama withdrew from the race on November 3, lamenting the confusion caused by Nishime’s inconsistent stance, but wishing him well.

The day before, representatives of the three middle-of-the-road parties, Onaga Sukehiro (the son of Onaga Josei) of the Okinawa NLC, Asato of the DSP, and Higa Kanichi of Shaminren, announced at a press conference that they would cooperate in supporting a joint candidate—Nishime.

Interestingly, the reformists had been similarly divided, and it took them even longer to field a joint candidate. In addition to the then Vice Governor (who was serving as Acting Governor in Taira’s absence) Nojima, Miyazato Masaho, who had served as vice governor from July 1972 to June 1976 under Yara and was at the time in private practice as a lawyer but had political ambitions, was also viewed as a potential candidate. Although some in the Socialist Party and the Okinawa Social Masses Party looked to Miyazato, he himself was reportedly favoring Nishime because, based on his own experiences as vice governor in dealing with the central government, he realistically recognized Nishime was the only one who could bring money to Okinawa. On the other hand, Nakamoto Anichi, secretary general of the OSMP and one of those tasked to coordinate with the other reformist parties on a joint candidate, favored Nojima. Nojima, however, withdrew his name from consideration. Next to be approached by Nakamoto was Naha City Deputy Mayor Maeda Takeyuki, who was also reluctant. Finally, after several appeals by Nakamoto and Higa Ryogen, director of administrative affairs for the same party (and later to break with the OSMP to become Governor Inamine Keiichi’s policy coordinator), Chibana Hideo, who was then speaker of the prefectural assembly and who had declined for health reasons, agreed belatedly to enter the contest.

Having the support of the LDP, DSP, New Liberal Club, and Shaminren, Nishime proceeded to point out the failing economy and unemployment, and called for improving Okinawa’s economic situation by inviting companies from outside the prefecture and by strengthening relations with central government, which had been strained over the years.

Chibana on the other hand criticized Nishime’s platform, arguing that the economic problems facing Okinawa were a result of the failed policies of the central government relating to and following reversion, and instead called for measures to support small and mid-size industries and to invite environmental friendly companies that could employ many local Okinawans. The reformists were also particularly critical of the apparent willingness of the Nishime camp to coexist with the bases, rather than to seek their removal and develop a truly peaceful Okinawa.

Results of 1978 Gubernatorial Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Stance</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nishime Junji</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>284,049</td>
<td>52.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibana Hideo</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>257,902</td>
<td>47.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In light of the numerous problems facing private meetings in October. In the spring of 1986, Miyazato officially joined the LDP, although his conservative leanings had become apparent well before this at the end of the 1970s in supporting Nishime.
Okinawa, voters indeed sought change. As a result, Nishime was elected in a close race, winning 52% of the vote to Chibana’s 48. While not a large difference, the election itself was significant in that this was the first time that the conservatives were to hold the governorship in 10 years since 1968. As the closeness of the results suggested, the reformists were not going to go down easily.

As is explained later, in the gubernatorial elections that followed in 1982, 1986, and 1990, the conservatives united and rallied around Nishime, although he ended up losing in the last contest (partly because even among the conservatives there were several who felt that Nishime was trying to create a dynasty and thus were eager to see Nishime step aside). At the Lower and Upper House levels, however, the factional politics of the LDP would continue as before, and indeed continue to this day. As pointed out before in the case of the 1977 Upper House contest, this problem was not a conservative one alone—the reformist camp was equally incapable of failing to unite at critical junctures.

Like his predecessor Taira (and successors Ota and Inamine), Nishime would be challenged to pick his administration to deal with the problems Okinawa was facing. Carrying on the tradition of having two vice governors, Nishime hoped to have regional balance among the top leadership. This meant, ideally, representation from the southern, central, and northern parts of Okinawa. He would also, of course, have to consider balancing factional requirements and administrative capabilities.

In the meantime, Nishime for a while had his eye on Higa Mikio, a professor of political science at the University of the Ryukyus and author of the still relevant 1963 study, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa.* Higa, however, was in the United States as a visiting scholar on the Fulbright program at the University of Arizona and had an obligation to fulfill his contract. Moreover, despite the factional connection, Kokuba, the father-in-law of Higa, appeared reluctant to agree to his son-in-law’s going into politics because he had such a promising career in academia. Subsequently, after Nishime’s persuasive lobbying efforts, Higa agreed to accept the position when Kokuba and other confidantes gave their blessings and encouragement during a trip home to Okinawa in the Christmas break.

For his other vice governor, Nishime hoped to tap the expertise of the Kudeken Kenji, the managing director of the Okinawa Electric Power Corporation (Okinawa Denryoku), or that of Yamazato Shoko, a professor of regional economics at the University of the Ryukyus who also had studied in the United States. When it became apparent that neither could accept, Nishime then decided to ask Nojima to stay on in order to see the budget through. However, after several people, including OSMP secretary general Nakamoto and Okinawa-born Yoshida Shien, president of the Tokyo-based Okinawa Association (Okinawa Kyokai), argued it was unwise to have someone of a different ideology in the administration, Nishime gave up. Eventually Nishime chose

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97 Ironically, the LDP had opposed the establishment of the two-vice governor structure initially under Yara, but with the start of the Nishime administration had come to give its blessing. Nishime, during questioning in the Prefectural Assembly by Odo Saburo, explained his view on the need for two vice governors as follows: ‘Okinawa has to deal with a great deal of administrative issues as a part of reversion that other prefectures simply do not have, and thus I wish to continue with having two vice governors.’ See Nishime, *Sengo Seiji o Ikite,* p. 289.


99 Nishime, *Sengo Seiji o Ikite,* pp. 283-290. Higa also consulted with future governor Ota Masahide, also then a Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University, who suggested he accept it because it is likely a good opportunity to reform the administration from the inside. (Ibid., p. 286.) Dr. Robert A. Scalapino, Higa’s mentor at Berkeley and a specialist on Northeast Asia, chimed in to urge that Higa take it as the vice governorship was a prominent position.

100 Ibid., p. 285.

101 Ibid., pp. 290-291.

102 Ibid., p. 291. The Okinawa Association (http://homepage3.nifty.com/okinawakyokai/) is the
Nishime’s primary focus was improving the prefecture’s economic situation, by stimulating investment and tourism, initiating large-scale development-focused infrastructure projects, and increasing economic support from the central government, but symbolic of the fact that the bases were also an important issue in Okinawa and would not easily disappear, Nishime was called away from this very first meeting with his newly chosen leadership to deal with a base-related problem near Camp Schwab, a Marine Corps base built in the late 1950s in the north and the site of the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station today. Ironically, when Nishime arrived on the scene of where stray bullets from a machine gun apparently hit the house of a resident of Kyoda village, he discovered that the owner of the home was none other than a relative by marriage, the grandfather of his daughter-in-law. Nishime told Nago City mayor Toguchi Yutoku that as this incident involved [the safety of] human life and should not happen…[he would] strongly protest it to the U.S. military and ask them to investigate.

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For more on Okinawa and Ogasawara, see Eldridge, Mr. Okinawa. 

Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 312.

An example of Nishime’s promoting of investment into the prefecture was a trip he made to the Kansai region and Aichi in the spring of 1979 to meet with mainland enterprises to invite them to set up operations in Okinawa. See Ibid., pp. 326-238.

Initially, the two largest projects Nishime sought were the creation of a industrial port facility in Nakagusuku Bay in the central-eastern part of the island (as Naha port, already handling passenger and cargo ships from the mainland, was limited due to the presence of the U.S. Army-run military port, and Tomari port handled traffic between Okinawa and the outlying islands) and the expansion of Naha Airport to include a second runway built on reclaimed land as its capacity was limited due to the presence of the Air Self Defense Force co-using the facility. On this latter point, Nishime, who was pro-SDF, felt that the use of the airport by the SDF presented problems for Okinawa’s economic development particularly if the runway was disabled for any reason. Ideally Nishime had hoped to see the creation of a civilian-use only facility but as that would be difficult, he called for the expansion of the number of runways to handle increased tourist and outgoing flights that would strengthen ties with the mainland and help the local economy. Much of the related recommendations came from the local business community. (See Ibid., pp. 297-290.) Another infrastructure project Nishime pursued was the creation of a monorail system, which finally began running in 2003. Nishime also subsequently took up promoting international exchange, such as increasing the number of foreign students, creating the Okinawa Kokusai Sentaa, or Okinawa International Center (a Japan International Cooperation Agency-built training center), in 1985 in Urasoe City and the Okinawa Convention Center in Ginowan City in 1987, and projects relating to promoting Okinawan culture and identity, such as the rebuilding of Shuri Castle (opened in 1992) and the creation of Okinawa Prefectural University of Arts (in 1986), just below the castle hill, to symbolize both the past and the future of Okinawan culture. (See Ibid., pp. 324-326; 381-386.) For an early treatment of the international exchange aspects, see Egami Takayoshi, Okinawa Kara Mita Kokusai Koryu (International Exchange as Viewed from Okinawa), in Shimabukuro Kuni and Higa Yoshimitsu, eds., Chiiki Kara no Kokusai Koryu (International Exchange at a Regional Level) (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1986).

Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, pp. 292-293.

Nishime visited Maj. Gen. Kenneth R. Robinson, then Okinawa Area Coordinator, on January 4, 1979, to protest the incident and to request that a full inquiry be conducted. After conducting their investigation, the U.S. side subsequently reported that the angle of the weapon had been incorrectly set. Ibid., pp. 293-294.
Senaga captured the essence of the politics of the bases in Okinawa, and probably formed the basis of Nishime’s later comment shortly after the start of his administration that he was not simply a conservative but instead a representative of the Okinawa Kenminto, or the Okinawa Prefectural People’s Party, a phrase that Inamine Keiichi would also use when he ran for the governorship in 1998.109

As part of this, during a trip to Tokyo in early January shortly after this, Nishime met with Yamamoto Ganri, Director of the Defense Agency, on January 8 to protest the misfire incident and visited U.S. Ambassador Michael J. Mansfield the following day to call upon the U.S. government to take measures to prevent the incident from happening again. Symbolic of the two dilemmas Okinawa faces—the bases and the economy—Nishime’s trip had originally been to appeal for increased economic support for Okinawa but also became a base-related journey as well.110

Nishime recognized the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance and need for SDF and U.S. bases in the prefecture and undertook direct protests to Japanese government officials and U.S. military/government representatives rather than organizing or participating in large-scale demonstrations, he has been portrayed as weak in dealing with the bases by critics at the time and by scholars later.111 However, after more careful examination of his time in office and the actions actually taken, as is discussed below and in the following section on the base problem, a more positive evaluation is probably necessary.

With a conservative in office, Okinawa now had a tri-pronged approach it could employ when dealing with the central government (Finance Ministry, Transportation Ministry, Defense Agency, Foreign Ministry, Health and Welfare Ministry, etc.). Namely, in addition to traditionally using the Okinawa Development Agency and Okinawan members of the Diet to lobby on its behalf, the OPG under Nishime could now employ the full resources of the headquarters of the Liberal Democratic Party to work on Nishime’s behalf.112 Nishime actively used his pipe to Tokyo, as seen in his efforts during the January 1979 trip to Tokyo. His efforts at appealing to the central government for an increase in the budget for Okinawa were not in vain. The budget, approved by the Cabinet on January 11, saw an increase for Okinawa of 21.4% over the last year, almost double the average increase seen in other parts of the budget (and across the country).113 Subsequently, Nishime began working toward securing a 10-year extension of the 1972 Okinawa Economic Development Program. The benefits locally, both

109 Symbolic perhaps of his taking a broad view of the administration of Okinawa, Nishime appointed Arakaki Takehisa, a former student of Yara and relative of rival Kyan, and someone known to have leftist leanings, to head the health and welfare division of the OPG despite opposition in some quarters. (Ibid., p. 314.) Another example of Okinawan politics being less a clash of reformist versus conservative could be said to have been seen when during the 1982 gubernatorial elections, Nishime’s campaign manager, Goya, met on a few occasions for dinner with Fukuchi Hiroaki, Kyan’s campaign strategist. Goya said the two did not mind meeting because in the end we are electing someone to represent Okinawa and there should be no bad feelings when it is over. See Ibid., pp. 401-402.

110 Ibid., pp. 302-303.

111 See, for example, Egami. Politics in Okinawa Since the Reversion of Sovereignty, pp. 835-836.

112 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 303. The same thing could be said, albeit to a lesser degree, when the Socialists were in power in 1993 to 1994, and again from 1994-1996, when Ota, who had the support of the Socialists, was in office as governor.

113 Ibid., p. 304.

114 On March 26, 1982, the OPG submitted its draft plan to the Prefecture’s Promotion and Development Deliberation Council and following its discussions during the spring, the OPG leadership approved the revised draft on June 30. The next day, Nishime submitted the prefectural plan to Okinawa Development Agency Director Tanabe Kunio. After debating the plan in the Prime Minister’s advisory panel, the Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Shingikai (Deliberation Council for the Okinawa Promotion and Development), the led by Dr. Kaya Seiji, the government approved the draft on August 5. For an English language version of it, see OPG, The Second Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan (August 1982).
economically and politically, of Nishime's pipe to Tokyo would increasingly be seen and would secure Nishime in his position as governor for more than a decade afterwards.

3. The 1979 Lower House Election

The 35th Lower House elections were held later that year on October 7, 1979 after then Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, believing that the LDP could capitalize on the conservative wave that had been sweeping Japan in the latter half of the 1970s alluded to above, chose to dissolve the House of Representatives and call elections. Contrary to expectations, however, the LDP won only 248 seats, which was less than a majority. The LDP gained a slight majority only after 14 conservative independents joined its ranks.115

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of 1979 Lower House Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Uehara Kosuke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Senaga Kamejiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Kokuba Kosho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Oshiro Shinjun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Tamaki Eiichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odo Saburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asato Tsumichiyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onaga Sukehiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokama Kiyotaka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Numbers in parentheses represent the % attained in last election.)

Locally, in Okinawa, 9 candidates emerged to contest the 5 seats of the medium-size constituencies still in use. These were: Asato (of the DSP), Kokuba (LDP), Senaga (JCP), Uehara (JSP), Hokama Kiyotaka (Rodo), Tamaki Eiichi (Komeito), Odo Saburo (LDP), Oshiro Shinjun (LDP), and Onaga (NLC). Because he had received the support of the DSP and the NLC in the gubernatorial election the year before, Nishime attended rallies for Asato (from the coalition partner DSP) and Onaga (who would later become his vice governor), but his main efforts at this time were obviously directed to get the LDP candidates elected and in particular Oshiro, who succeeded Nishime as head of the Tanaka faction within the Okinawa LDP.116 In the end, after the most heated battle ever, Uehara, Senaga, Kokuba, Oshiro, and Tamaki won, with Odo, the third candidate of the LDP losing. The high voter turnout of 80.03%, the highest since the first election in 1970 (which was 83.64%), seems to have been due in part because of this heated battle and the large number of candidates. Essentially, the balance of power—three reformists to two conservatives—was maintained.


Nevertheless, in a critical election on June 8, 1980, the conservatives won the majority of the seats in the prefectural assembly—24 to 22—reversing the pre-election ratio, helping to push forward Nishime’s agenda of economic development and cooperation with the central government.117 The OSMP lost two more seats, symbolizing the decline that the party had been experiencing due to desertions and other internal problems. It would not be for some

115 Masami, Contemporary Politics in Japan, p. 194. After graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1954, Higa worked for the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the U.S. consulate before attending the master’s and doctoral programs at his alma mater. While in the latter program, he completed the above book, earning his Ph.D. in 1962. After working at Tokyo University, Dr. Higa joined the University of the Ryukyus (established by the United States in 1950 during the occupation of the islands) in 1964. In 1969, he married a daughter of Kokuba Kosho, an influential politician and brother of business leader Kokuba Kotaro.


117 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 361. The LDP actually won 20 seats, and four independent conservatives joined with the LDP to support the Nishime administration, giving the ruling party the majority. See Okinawa Sengo Senkyoshi Henshu Iinkai, ed., Okinawa Sengo Senkyoshi, p. 55.
years before the OSMP could begin to recover its leadership role among the progressives within the prefecture. Voter turnout was also down to 79.1% as compared to that of 1976, perhaps as a result of the gubernatorial election happening on a different day. In any case, with a solid majority in the Prefectural Assembly backing him up, Nishime could now shift gears from defense to offense.

Two weeks after the Prefectural Assembly Elections, voters were asked to decide in two other important contests, the 36th Lower House and 12th Upper House elections.

Results of 1980 Prefectural Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Those Elected</th>
<th>Pre-Election Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14 6 20 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSMP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3 5 8 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5 1 6 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3 1 4 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 0 2 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 0 1 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indp</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2 3 5 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29 16 46 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the dissolution of the Lower House in May following the passing of a JSP-sponsored no confidence motion (which carried due to the absence of 73 anti-mainstream LDP members), elections were held on June 22, a mere 8 months after the last ones. In this race, seven candidates (Kokuba, Senaga, Uehara, Hokama, Tamaki, Odo, and Oshiro) took part in Okinawa, with the same five incumbents being reelected.

Results of 1980 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Uehara Kosuke</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>95,769</td>
<td>17.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Tamaki Eichi</td>
<td>Komei</td>
<td>93,575</td>
<td>17.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Kokuba Kusako</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>88,160</td>
<td>16.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Odo Saburo</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>87,794</td>
<td>16.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Senaga Kameji</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>87,140</td>
<td>16.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Oshino Maino</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>74,957</td>
<td>14.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokama Kiyouka</td>
<td>Rodo</td>
<td>7,039</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nationally, due to the untimely death of Prime Minister Ohira during the campaigning, the LDP did well, receiving several more thousands of sympathy votes and raising its presence in the Lower House to 284 seats. In one more contest that day for the Upper House, which was the first time that the Lower House and Upper House elections were held on the same day ever, voters in Okinawa had to choose between incumbent Kyan Shinei and Ohama Hoei, supported by the LDP and NLC. Kyan easily defeated Ohama in what was one of the few low tides in the conservative wave that had emerged.

Results of 1980 Upper House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyan Shinei</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>282,926</td>
<td>53.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohama Hoei</td>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>248,593</td>
<td>46.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The 1982 Gubernatorial Election and Upper House By-Election

The next major election in Okinawa was the 1982 gubernatorial race held in December. Nishime was challenged by Kyan Shinei, someone that Nishime described, in an allusion to the world of Japanese sumo wrestling, as the Yokozuna of the Reformists for his role as one of the key leaders of the reversion movement and the post-reversion anti-base, civic movements. Symbolic of the popularity of Kyan and the ability of his supporters to mobilize despite the conservative wave, this was the closest gubernatorial race in post-reversion history. Nishime won by only 13,000 votes of the near 600,000 cast, or 51.1 to 48.9%.

118 Masami, Contemporary Politics in Japan, p. 201.

119 In one more election that year, the Naha Mayoral race in November (16th), incumbent Taira Ryosho was re-elected for an amazing fourth time, defeating Arakaki Shikur by approximately 13,000 votes (out of 134,000 cast) and creating the base from which the reformists would continue to dominate Naha’s city administration until November 2000 (when Onaga’s son Takeshi was elected). In other elections in Ginowan, Urasoe, Nago, and Itoman, however, conservatives made wide gains.

120 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 396.
Several things helped Nishime in his victory. First was the conservative wave that had emerged in the prefecture seen in the elections as well as in public opinion polls at this time, the 10th anniversary of reversion to Okinawa to Japan, with 63% viewing reversion as having been a good thing (and 61% being satisfied with their lifestyles). Second was the strong backing of the business community and their mobilization through the electoral support group, Ashita no Okinawa o Tsukuru Kai (Association for the Building of Okinawa of Tomorrow), then chaired by former chief executive (1964-1968) of the Government of the Ryukyus, Matsuoka Seiho. Finally, third was the beneficial spin-off of internal problems that had emerged within the reformists over choosing a candidate to succeed Kyan after he resigned to run for governor. All of these factors, plus the general approval of Nishime’s job as governor during the first administration, worked in his favor.

In the by-election held that day for Kyan’s former seat, the strong, conservative candidate Oshiro, who had planned to run in a future Lower House contest and thus had initially been hesitant to enter the Upper House race eventually ran and defeated reformists Nakamoto Anichi, supported by the OSMP and JCP, and Miyazato Massho, supported by the JSP, Komeito, and labor groups. In the end, because the reformists were divided and their vote split, Oshiro’s election was made all the much easier. As the cunning Nishime had planned, having a major candidate such as Oshiro run also had the added benefit of taking some of the heat off of him in his battle against Kyan.

6. The 1983 Upper House and Lower House Elections

Following this contest, another race was emerging for the 13th Upper House elections held on June 26, 1983. In March that year, incumbent Inamine Ichiro announced he was retiring from politics making it an open contest. When Kyan, having lost the gubernatorial election, entered this contest, however, most conservatives did not wish to enter what was seen to be a sure defeat against the Yokozuna Kyan. Vice Governor Higa, asked on May 4 if he was interested, reportedly declined on the spot. Other promising candidates, including Nishida Kenjiro, later head of the LDP in Okinawa, were considered but had to withdraw their names when their support groups objected.

In mid-May, local LDP officials asked Nishime if he would allow his son, Junshiro, who was acting as his secretary, to let him enter the race. The governor objected, saying that he could be accused of trying to create a political dynasty and that the 33-year-old Junshiro was still too young. Another probable concern, not voiced, was the pounding that any conservative candidate would be expected to get in a race against Kyan. Eventually, after further efforts at convincing Nishime and Junshiro’s own willingness to run for the future of the LDP, Nishime gave his reluctant consent, which was no doubt an attempt at gaining political capital for the future.

As expected, Kyan won by a large margin, and did extremely well in the cities. Junshiro,

\[\text{Source: } \text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 395-397.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 396.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 399.}\]
who did his best, fairs well in the rural areas (where the LDP is traditionally strong in Okinawa and the rest of the country) to gain a respectable 230,000 votes with the help of the LDP machine. He would eventually be elected in the July 2001 Upper House election.

Results of 1983 Upper House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyan Shinei</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>309,006</td>
<td>57.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishime Junshiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>231,890</td>
<td>42.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some six months after the Upper House contest, the 37th Lower House elections were held on December 18. In it, the LDP took a battering nation-wide losing some 30 seats due to internal divisions and criticism over then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s connections with and dependence on the disgraced Tanaka Kakuei whom many felt should resign from politics.\(^{129}\)

Nishime’s own connections with Tanaka (having once been in his faction) probably did not help the local LDP’s candidates in the eyes of voters in this regard. But the LDP did maintain its 2 seats, although there was a slight change in the line-up, with Nakamura Seiji and Kokuba edging out Odo. Senaga of the JCP emerged with the largest amount of votes, jumping from last place in the 1980 contest. Uehara and Tamaki were also reelected.

Results of 1983 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Senaga Kamejiro</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>118,421</td>
<td>20.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Kokuba Kosho</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>107,525</td>
<td>18.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Uehara Kosuke</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>95,460</td>
<td>16.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Nakamura Seiji</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>90,577</td>
<td>15.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Tamaki Eiichi</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>83,800</td>
<td>14.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odo Saburo</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>78,641</td>
<td>13.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The 1984 Prefectural Assembly Elections

In the fourth post-reversion Prefectural Assembly elections held on June 6, 1984, the conservatives were able to build on the momentum of the 1980 victory, earning two more seats to increase their strength to 26. One observer of the elections noted the overwhelming ability of the conservatives to mobilize, which made the results somewhat predictable.\(^{130}\) The LDP itself secured 24 seats, and combined with the two conservative independents, gave the Nishime administration a safe majority. The DSP, on the other hand, lost its only seat continuing the trend that had begun in the late 1970s with Asato’s defeat in Lower House contest of 1979.

The reformists had coordinated well on their choice of candidates among the respective parties and districts, and were able to basically maintain their strength in Naha City, but did not do as well in the rest of the prefecture (although Komeito did gain another seat for a total of 3).

Results of 1984 Prefectural Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Those Elected</th>
<th>Pre-election Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSMP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indp</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of assembly seats up for grabs increased by one to 47, based on an increase in the local population. Because of reforms in the election law, as well as changes in the electoral districting, this was an unusual election for

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\(^{129}\) For more on this election, see Masumi, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, pp. 417-419. The first Nakasone cabinet was nicknamed the "Tanakasone" cabinet, combining the names of Tanaka and Nakasone to suggest his dependence of Tanaka.

candidates and campaign strategists. For example, the campaign period was shortened by two days, making the actual time to officially campaign only 9 days.

While Nishime was doing well politically, and winning victories on budget issues with the central government (such as securing a continued commitment of funds), one problem that kept appearing were base related issues (discussed in more detail in Part III). Throughout his first time and into the second, a series of base-related incidents with parachute exercises, live-fire training, and Harrier crashes had raised concerns in the prefecture about the bases. It was becoming clear to Nishime that there limits to the ability of the Tripartite Liaison Committee alone to deal with these issues.

Early in his administration (like Inamine 20 years later), Nishime had stated he would go to Washington if necessary to appeal the situation. Finally, on November 14, 1984, Nishime officially announced that he would visit Washington, D.C., the following summer to directly appeal to the Pentagon about the bases. Japanese (and no doubt U.S.) government officials were initially skeptical about this idea. Then Director of the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau Kobodo Tadashi stated although he understood the governor’s feelings, the government would have trouble approving a direct appeal to the United States without going through diplomatic channels. It is questionable what fruits will come of his efforts.

Nishime subsequently began seeking the help of the U.S. Consulate (headed by Edward M. Featherstone) and Ambassador Michael J. Mansfield, not to mention the LDP, Foreign Ministry, and Defense Agency, to assist in his planned visit, and in particular his desire to meet Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Nevertheless, about one month before the planned departure Nishime still had not heard whether he would be able to meet the Secretary of Defense, and began to lose hope. In mid-May, however, Nishime’s office got word that he would be able to meet Weinberger. What made this possible in the end seems to have been a call to an Okinawan-American living in Hawaii, Higashionna Ryokichi, explaining the governor’s predicament and asking his advice. Higashionna spoke with Senator Spark Matsunaga, who having served with the famous Nisei 442 Regimental Combat Team, exercised tremendous influence at the Pentagon. The call by Matsunaga seems to have provided the necessary push. The next day, the Foreign Ministry sent official word that Nishime would be able to meet Weinberger.

After arriving in Washington in early June, Nishime first met with Michael W. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department (and soon to be U.S. Ambassador to Japan), and William C. Sherman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and himself a long-time Japan hand, asking them to reexamine the basing situation and training exercises. The next day, Nishime went to the headquarters of the Marine Corps at the Pentagon to meet with General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Nishime requested that the live-fire exercises at Camp Schwab and Camp Hansen be stopped, that Futenma Air Station be returned, and that other issues, such as the enforcing of discipline among U.S. forces be

131 Ibid., p. 64.

132 Nishime, Senso Seiji o Ikite, pp. 432-433.

133 Ibid., p. 433. Okinawa has a tradition of its governors visiting Washington. Most recently, Nishime’s successors Ota and Inamine have gone to D.C. and elsewhere to plead Okinawa’s case. But there were precedents before Nishime. In the 1950s, then Governor Higa Shuhei went to the United States twice, and in March 1967, then Chief Executive Matsuoka Seiho also went to Washington.

134 Ibid., p. 433.

135 Ibid., p. 434. For more on the Senator, see Richard Halloran, Sparky: Warrior, Peacemaker, Poet, Patriot (Honolulu: Watermark Publishing, 2002). For more on the 442nd, see for example, Mike Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka: An American Saga (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1987). One person familiar with events said that Ambassador Mansfield’s role in arranging the visit was also probably quite significant.
undertaken and stopping of training in the Northern dam area. After a long lunch with Senator Matsunaga and a tour of Capital Hill, Nishime hosted a party that evening attended by Ambassador Matsunaga Nobuo (no relation to the Senator) and former U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) officials in the D.C. area. Early the next day, June 7, Nishime went to the Pentagon in the Japanese Embassy’s Cadillac, arriving there shortly before 10:30 a.m. Met by James E. Auer, the Japan Desk Officer at the Pentagon, an expert on the Japanese Navy and someone still intimately involved in U.S.-Japan relations as a professor at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee and active member of bilateral study groups, Nishime was taken to inside. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, currently Deputy Secretary of State, then met Nishime to bring him to the Secretary’s office. After requesting Weinberger’s cooperation in resolving outstanding issues, Nishime and his group went next door to Armitage’s office for an hour-long meeting on specific issues, followed by a luncheon hosted by Armitage. During their meeting, Nishime stressed to Armitage that As governor I have shown the greatest appreciation for the goals of the Japan-U.S. alliance and while strongly working toward maintaining the friendship and trust between our two countries, have also been taking into account base issues. Moreover, the bases are negatively impacting the lives of the people in the prefecture. Nishime left impressed with Armitage, who carefully took notes while speaking with the governor. Nishime concluded his visit to the United States by traveling to Atlanta and Hawaii, where he met with local Okinawan communities who came out in large numbers to meet him. Reflecting on his trip, Nishime told those traveling with him that he said what he had to say. If the problems are not resolved, I will come back and keep on coming back until they are resolved. As it turns out, he would have to come back again. But by that point, 1988, it was almost too late. The frictions had gotten far too out of hand, and would work against Nishime a couple of years later in the gubernatorial race.

7. The 1986 Lower House and Upper House Elections

Having not only successfully defended a conservative majority in the Prefectural Assembly but actually gained more seats, Nishime next sought to turn his attack to secure a majority of conservatives elected to the Lower House from Okinawa in the 38th Lower House elections held on July 6, 1986.

From the LDP, Odo, who lost his bid for reelection in 1983, Nakamura Seiji, and a former reformist who had been gradually moving to the right and had been popular among the conservatives, Miyazato Massho, stood for election.

Results of 1986 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odo Saburo</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>108,995</td>
<td>18.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uehara Kosuke</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>99,873</td>
<td>16.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyazato Massho</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>99,104</td>
<td>16.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaki Eiichi</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>95,837</td>
<td>16.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senaga Kamejiro</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>91,658</td>
<td>15.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakamura Seiji</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>91,583</td>
<td>15.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isagawa Noboru</td>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Miyazato was supported by Kokuba, and Nakamura had his own base of support already, Nishime decided to help Odo in particular who practically begged Nishime for his support on May 29 in a call on the governor at his residence. Impressed by his sincerity,

136 Although little known, Nishime was the first to officially request the return of Futenma Air Station.
Nishime agreed. If Odo won, Nishime calculated, then the conservatives could acquire the three Lower House seats they were after. In the end, Nishime seems to have worked too hard in Odo’s favor. Not only did Odo win by a huge margin, but he pushed Nakamura, who was shooting for reelection, out of the running. Voters, on the other hand, believed Nakamura to be a shoo-in, and did not turn out in the numbers his supporters had hoped.¹⁴₀ (He lost by 75 votes to 5ᵗʰ-place Senaga of the JCP.) Nishime’s goal of seeing a majority of 5 seats was not realized, but his hopes did not disappear.

In the 14ᵗʰ Upper House election held that same day, incumbent Oshiro for whom Nishime also campaigned hard, defeated Nakamoto from the OSMP by a margin of more than 15,000 votes. The downward trend of the OSMP was continuing, but it would not last forever.

Nishime was furious with the exercises during such an important election year.¹⁴³ Around the time of every election, Nishime pointed out to Kuniyoshi Shino, director of the governor’s executive office, that there is a U.S. military-related incident and the leftists go on the attack saying that these incidents will never go away as long as the Nishime administration is in office. Tell the U.S. officials in charge that [the exercises are] damaging to the elections. Is the U.S. military an ally of the reformists? I want them to stop the exercises before elections.¹⁴³ Nishime was able to have the exercises postponed, and also to do well in the elections, but he was not able to stop in the end the increasing number of base problems and frictions that were emerging. He was also not able to stop the flow of the tide emerging in Okinawa toward supporting the reformists as people sought change once again.

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¹⁴₀ Ibid., p. 476.

¹⁴¹ Since 1986, the election for governor has been held in November.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 478.

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp. 478-179.

1. The 1988 Prefectural Assembly Elections

In the next elections for the prefectural assembly in June 1988, the reformists stemmed the tide against them and started on the road to recovering their previous strength. The JCP received 6 seats as did the OSMP. The Komeito emerged the same with 3 seats, and the JSP lost a seat ending with 4. The reformists did not get a majority, but they were on a much stronger footing. The LDP lost 6 seats, which obviously put Nishime on a weaker footing.

Moreover, Oyadomari was reelected Mayor of Naha on November 20, 1988, and importantly, in the contest for mayor of Okinawa City, reformist candidate Arakawa Hidekiyo, defeated the incumbent Kuwae Choko and ending a conservative reign in one of Okinawa’s most important cities.

Results of 1988 Prefectural Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Incumbent</th>
<th>No. of New/former</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Strength Before Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSMP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7/0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18/4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The 1989 Upper House Election

In the 15th Upper House contest, held on July 23, Kyan was challenged by Dr. Higa Mikio, former vice governor in the Inamine administration, and Hamada Keiko, of the Green Party or Midori no To, a minor group formed in one of Okinawa’s most important cities.

Results of 1989 Upper House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyan Shinei</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>337,250</td>
<td>60.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higa Mikio</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>210,224</td>
<td>37.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamada Keiko</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>10,081</td>
<td>1.81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kyan ended up defeating his opponents by the largest margin to date, approximately 120,000 votes more than his closest rival. Although Kyan was an extremely popular figure, the introduction of the consumption tax that April by the LDP-led government no doubt influenced voters.

3. The 1990 Lower House and Gubernatorial Elections

In July 1987, Senaga Kamejiro, the JCP Diet member first elected in 1970 from Okinawa who most strongly symbolized the anti-base sentiment in the prefecture, announced that he would not stand for reelection in the next contest. With this, the Okinawa JCP decided...

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144 Here I use 1988 as the year when the conservative influence began to wane and the reformist wave started, with 1997 as the time when the reformists began to lose steam. The governorship was in reformist hands through 1998, but the momentum of the leftists and died down greatly by that point.

145 Hrebrenar, Political Party Proliferation, p. 228.

146 Furugen Saneyoshi, Nachi Kajiri: Furugen Saneyoshi Kaisoroku (Holding on to Life: The Memoirs of Furugen Saneyoshi), (Naha: Ryukyu Shimpo, 2002), p. 177. The life story of Furugen’s predecessor, Senaga, is an extremely interesting one, and somewhat tragic in the context of U.S.-Japan-Okinawa relations. In the prewar, he planned to emigrate to the United States to join his father (who had to leave the family when Kamejiro was 3 due to their poor economic situation) in Hawaii working on a sugar plantation, but was unable to go due to the passage of the reprehensible Japanese Exclusion Act in 1924 just when Senaga was about to board a ship in Kobe. This would change his life completely, as he went to high school in Tokyo where a classmate, Kyan Yasumasa, who was from Senaga’s village in Tokyo, turned him on to Marxist theory. Involved in student movements and workers’ rights movements in the late 1920s and early 1930s, he was arrested in 1932 under the 1925 Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iijiho). After serving 3 years in prison, he worked as a newspaper reporter in Okinawa, and then was drafted in 1938 and sent to China, working as a military newspaper reporter. He was in Okinawa at the time of the Battle, surviving in the northern mountainous area. In the immediate postwar, he worked as a deputy mayor in two communities in the north and south of Okinawa. During that time, he...
to support the candidacy of Furugen Saneyoshi, a lawyer by training who was first elected to the Ryukyuan Legislature (the predecessor to the Prefectural Assembly) in 1960 and continued as an assembly member for 28 years until 1988, for the Lower House to succeed Senaga. ¹⁴⁷

With Senaga out of the race, the LDP looked at the next election held on February 18, 1990 as their chance to finally capture 3 of the 5 Lower House seats.¹⁴⁸ However, it would not be easy.

Results of 1990 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Furugen Saneyoshi</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>131,992</td>
<td>20.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Nakamura Seiji</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>125,446</td>
<td>19.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Miyazato Massho</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>112,798</td>
<td>17.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Uehara Kosuke</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>99,378</td>
<td>15.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Tamaki Euchi</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>89,744</td>
<td>13.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishime Junshiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>82,894</td>
<td>12.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁴⁷ Furugen in turn supported the candidacy of Hokama Hisako, then a JCP member of the Naha City Assembly, to replace him in the Prefectural Assembly. Furugen, Nachi Kajiri, p. 177. She continues to serve today in 2004 at the time of this writing.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 184.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 190.
turned their attention to choosing a joint candidate. In the early spring, the reformists decided on asking Ota Masahide, the popular University of the Ryukyus professor of journalism, to consider running. He had been approached some four years before that in 1986, but turned it down due to his desire to continue with his research on the Battle of Okinawa. With only one year to go in his position at the university, and his strongly held concern for the future of Okinawa after 12 years of conservative administrations, Ota decided to accept the request by the reformist candidate to stand as their joint candidate in 1990. One can easily surmise that Ota used the time between 1986 and 1990 to think about the possible run and the policies he would pursue.

Ota applied two conditions on his accepting, suggesting that he had spent at least some of the past four years thinking about what he wanted to do as governor. First was Ota’s desire to run his own election campaign, not a professional politician’s version of it. Second, Ota wanted the right to decide his administration’s personnel, including seeing a woman in the top ranks. Intra-camp negotiations continued into the morning of April 6 and Ota finally announced his candidacy later that day at Yashioso in Naha.

Lucky for the pacifist Ota, the election in 1990 was held amid the crisis following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August and the build-up to the Gulf War (January-February 1991). For Okinawans, who were looking for a peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of another major war added a sense of anxiety and helplessness, particularly when U.S. bases and forces would be involved and thus entangle Okinawa and the rest of Japan. Appealing to the pacifist, anti-war sentiment of the people, Ota was able to defeat Nishime by a large margin (30,000 votes). The anti-bill Komeito also strongly mobilized in this campaign to push Ota over the top, with 70% of its members reportedly voting for Ota.

Nishime had complicated the situation for himself when Fuwa Tetsuzo, Chairman of the national JCP, on a visit from Tokyo to attend an election rally for Ota at Yogi Park (often the site of reformist gatherings) in Naha, released a copy of a questionnaire that the JCP had conducted with governors around the country. Of all 47 prefectural governors, only Nishime had voiced his strong support of the government’s UN Peace Cooperation Bill (Kokusai Rengo Heiwa Iji Katsudo ni Taisuru Kyoryokuhoritsu) and his willingness to send prefectural government workers if asked. According to Furugen, who helped organize the rally, the participants were outraged. The local LDP, unable to ignore the public’s opposition to the bill (national polls at the time showed that 50% opposed the bill and only 13% supported it), tried to repair the damage by announcing its opposition to the bill and even refusing an offer of electoral support from

150 Ota, Okinawa no Ketsudan, pp. 107-114.

151 Ibid., pp. 111-114.

152 Ota turned to Teruya Kantoku, a childhood school friend and then prefectural assembly member from the JSP, to head his support group. Teruya subsequently ran in the Upper House elections in the 1995, gubernatorial race in 2002, and in the Lower House contest in 2003. For more on Teruya’s views, see his Okinawa Kenri Sengen (Declaration of Okinawan Rights), (Ginowan: Sazan Press, 1997).

153 Yashioso, a small structure built in 1960 on the back roads east of the OPG in Matsuo, has special significance for Okinawans, particularly of the older generation.

154 Komeito was apparently not able to deliver the votes of its members for Kinjo in 1986, like it did for Ota in 1990. Another interesting dynamic in this election was the amount of support that Ota got from his native Kume Island. Usually conservative in their voting, people in Kume decided instead to vote for their native son. Oyama Tetsu, and 5 Anonymous Reporters, Kenchijisen ni Miru Okinawa Seiji Fudo no Tokushitsu (The Characteristics of Okinawa-style Politics as seen in the Gubernatorial Election), Shin Okinawa Bunka, No. 87 (Spring 1991), pp. 17-18.

155 Furugen, Nuchi Kajiri, p. 192.

156 The UN Peace Cooperation Bill failed to be passed in 1991, but it was passed in mid June 1992, and went into effect on August 10 that year. It is comprised of 27 articles.

157 Furugen, Nuchi Kajiri, p. 192.
Ozawa Ichiro, then the most powerful politician in Japan and someone identified with the bill.  
Their efforts were too late however, and after that the tide of the election turned against Nishime.  

**Results of 1990 Gubernatorial Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ota Masahide</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>330,982</td>
<td>52.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishime Junji</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>300,917</td>
<td>47.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another factor working against Nishime was that he was seen both among the voters and within his own party as having been in power too long. As alluded to earlier, he was accused of trying to create a political dynasty by having his son serve as his secretary and run for high elected office without any previous experience. Moreover, although he said he would not run a fourth time, Nishime ended up choosing to do so and thus created chaos within the conservative camp, much like he did in 1978. Nishime’s decision to stay on in many ways echoed or symbolized the grip of the national LDP and its unawareness of the increasing unhappiness of voters with the LDP throughout Japan due to the series of scandals involving it in the latter half of the 1980s (resulting in its loss of the Upper House elections in 1989).

Some observers at the time trace Nishime’s fall further back to the mayoral elections in Okinawa City on April 22, 1990 when Kuwae attempted (like Nishime) to run a fourth time and caused a great deal of anger and division among the conservatives. As a result, the reformists, united, were able to capture the mayoral seat of this important city for the first time in 12 years and used this victory to build their wave of support leading up to the gubernatorial contest.  

Similarly, the Ota camp also capitalized on the increasing frustration of new and small companies to the monopolizing by Nishime and his business allies of public works and other contracts from the central government. By voting for and even contributing to the campaign of Ota, who went around to these places to explain that he was not anti-business, these small-sized companies figured that they had nothing to lose and possibly something to gain by voting for Ota.  

Some have argued, and not incorrectly, that it was these and other internal problems of the Nishime/conservative camp that brought about their own undoing. In the author’s opinion, and particularly in retrospect as the years have gone by, what seems to be the more important factor, however, is the fact that voters in Okinawa at the time were also sympathetic to some of the objectives of Ota as announced as part of his campaign promises—1) fulfilling the ideals of the peace constitution in daily life; 2) removal of military bases; 3) working toward a resolution of the issues resulting from reversion; 4) creating a cosmopolitan city for international exchange; 5) increasing medical and welfare facilities; and 6) raising the status of women, among other items. In other words, in a bit of irony, thanks to the Nishime years, now that the economic welfare of Okinawans and the infrastructure of their prefecture had improved dramatically, voters were now interested in pursuing greater quality of life and were ready to seriously envision life without the bases, particularly when it became clear in the spring of 1990 that the United States (as is discussed in Part III) was considering major force reductions around the world. Okinawan voters decided that Ota would do more to capitalize on those trends as well as develop policies to improve the social welfare of the people of prefecture.

With the conservatives out of power, Ota, in order to be able to realize the goals of campaign, began with the selection of his top administration people. First, he wanted someone who had connections with Tokyo and who would be able to help Okinawa succeed...

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160 Oyama, □ Kenchijisen, □ p. 16.

economically. For this person, he tapped Nakaima Hirokazu, a former official in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry), and executive director of the Okinawa Electric Power Company (Okinawa Dennyokai Gaisha), as one of his two vice governors. For treasurer, he asked Miyahira Hiroshi, a Naha City official to assume the post. Finally, for his other vice governor, Ota attempted to live up to his campaign promise to see a female in office. He first proposed Uezato Kazumi, a 38-year old dentist who had strong ties to the Communist Party. Eventually, the General Affairs and Planning Committee (Somukikaku Iinkai) of the Prefectural Assembly vetoed her appointment because of her lack of administrative experience and reportedly partisan nature. The committee had been divided, however, and it took the chairman to cast the deciding vote against her. Eventually, Ota asked Sho Hiroko, a professor at the University of the Ryukyus, to take the position. It took Ota and his aides a long time to convince her however. As she was the wife of the late Sho Sen, who ran against Kyan Shinei in the 1974 Upper House race, she also felt obliged to check with the LDP informally to see if Nishime would oppose her accepting. He did not, and she was appointed to the position in August 1991, more than 8 months after Ota’s administration began.

Symbolic of the problem with the failed appointment of Uezato, Ota’s biggest challenge was dealing with the Prefectural Assembly, which was still dominated by the opposition. With his senior staff not confirmed, Ota was forced to deal with many issues literally on his own.

This would be especially difficult for him when he announced his decision on May 28 to agree to cooperate with the land leasing requests by the Naha Defense Facilities Bureau earlier that year. As is explained in Part III in more detail, according to the land expropriation law, which is similar to the right of eminent domain, without the cooperation of the local mayors and eventually the governor in the proxy statement the Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee (Ken Tochi Shuyo Iinkai) cannot begin its deliberations.

At issue was approximately 150,000 square meters (36.8 acres) of land on 14 U.S. facilities throughout the prefecture in 11 municipalities whose 576 landowners refused to renew lease contracts. Six mayors agreed to act as proxies, while the mayors of 5 communities of Naha, Ginowan, Chatan, Okinawa, and Yomitan did not, leaving 80,000 square meters (19.8 acres) which required proxy statements by the governor.

Ota eventually decided to act as the proxy in the matter because, as is discussed later, the central government agreed (in a secret message delivered by former Defense Agency Director General Yamazaki Taku) to carry out economic and administrative measures for returned land as well as to make progress on the scheduled return of bases. Ota also added at a press conference that day the following reasons for agreeing to act as proxy: 1) as head of the prefectural government, he had to seek practical solutions for several problems at the

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162 Nakaima, who clashed with Ota on a number of issues, stayed in office until June 1993 when he left to become vice president of the Okinawa Electric Power Company. He was replaced by policy coordinator Yamauchi Masanori in September.

163 Author’s interview with a former confidante of Vice Governor Sho, March 24, 2004. Naha. Sho was also related to Ie Tomo, who was first elected to the Upper House on the national ticket in 1977 after a long career as a managing director of Japan National Railways (JR), subsequently became Director General of the Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency the same year Sho was appointed vice governor.

164 Because of the delay in the appointment, Tokyo Metropolitan Government became the first prefecture to appoint a female vice-governor when it did so in May.


166 Of these, a majority were the so-called Hitotsubo Anti-war Landowners, described in Part III.
same time, not just one, even if his ideals are different; 2) the issue concerned an announcement and is not a decision, and thus the governor is not in position to judge the issue; 3) the new administration did not have enough organization to fight the issue in the courts; and 4) if he opposed the central government, it would be difficult to obtain the cooperation of the central government for Okinawa’s economic development and a resolution of the base issues.\textsuperscript{167} Despite these convincing reasons, Ota’s decision caused a huge backlash among his supporters, who described it as \textsuperscript{167}breaking his election promise.\textsuperscript{168}

During the 3 months prior to his decision, Ota was approached every day by leftist support groups to request he announce that he would not cooperate with the central government on the issue. \textsuperscript{167}It was the toughest decision I ever made,\textsuperscript{168} he later said.\textsuperscript{169}

But this did not mean that Ota had given up on the base issue. In mid-July, on the eve of his departure for the U.S. to appeal for a reduction in bases in the prefecture and measures to prevent base-related problems (in what would be the first of 7 such annual visits by him), Ota and his staff visited Kadena Air Base, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, the Urban Warfare Training Center (in Onna Village), the No. 302 Range at Camp Hansen, and the Blue Beach Training Area in Kin Village.

A few days later on July 19, Ota and his delegation, which included the mayors of Okinawa City and Kin Chatan, and Yomitan villages and some of their assemblymen, delegation departed for New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Hawaii.\textsuperscript{169} In D.C., the group paid their respects at the newly built Vietnam War Veteran’s memorial (whose wall of names was likely one of the inspirations for Okinawa’s \textit{Heiwa no Ishiji}, or Cornerstone of Peace, dedicated in Mabuni in June 1995), and met with former Ambassador to Japan, Michael J. Mansfield, Desaix Anderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East-Asia, who was responsible for implementing the first \textit{East Asia Strategic Initiative} and drafting the second report known as the \textit{East Asia Strategic Review}, both discussed in Part III.\textsuperscript{170} The delegation also met with Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO), Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Military Installations. According to newspaper accounts, despite his appeals made with \textsuperscript{169}fervor,\textsuperscript{168} the reaction Ota received in D.C. was \textsuperscript{169}far from what he had expected. \textsuperscript{168}Nevertheless, Ota announced at a press conference on their return on August 3 that although they could not get a \textsuperscript{169}clear [and favorable] response, it was a good opportunity to raise the understanding and interest [of the American government] and in that sense our initial goals were realized.\textsuperscript{171}

Perhaps as a realization that more work was necessary, Ota subsequently announced in February 1992 that a second trip was planned for later that year, although it was not realized.\textsuperscript{172} Likewise, the OPG announced in October a couple of months later that it was planning to establish a liaison office in D.C. to be headed by Nakachi Masao, formerly the Director of Public Relations at the United

\textsuperscript{167}Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., \textit{Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tatakai}, p. 43. A couple of months later, Naha’s mayor Oyadomari led a delegation of city officials and assembly members to D.C. to call for the return of Naha military port, meeting again with Anderson, McDevitt, and congressional members. See \textsuperscript{167}Oyadomari Returns from Washington, \textit{Weekly Times (Okinawa Taimusu)}, Vol. 2, No. 36 (October 14, 1991).


\textsuperscript{169}Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., \textit{Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tatakai}, p. 43.
Nations and an Okinawan native. The idea had originally been proposed by the Nishime Administration, which liked informal diplomacy and networking, and the Okinawan community in Los Angeles had petitioned the OPG to locate it there. Eventually Ota chose to open it in Washington, D.C., in light of the importance of the base issues.

The bases, however, was not the only issue facing Ota at the start of his administration. The flip side to the challenges facing Okinawa, namely economic matters, was equally pressing. In particular, the Third Economic Development Plan was scheduled for drafting and approval during FY 1992. Ota announced at the beginning of 1992 that he was hoping to see budgets for park projects around Shuri Castle, whose renovation was near complete, and the development of the outer islands (such as Kume Jima where Ota was from) as part of industrial promotion.

In addition, as 1992 was the 20th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa, the central and prefectural governments had several commemorative events planned, including a ceremony on May 15, which was attended by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi and Vice President Dan Quayle representing President George H. W. Bush. Due to the number of issues having to be dealt with, an overworked Ota was hospitalized in late February and did not return to work until April 15. When he was able to get back to the office after a rest of 54 days, he immediately was faced with getting ready for the Prefectural Assembly elections that June.

4. The 1992 Prefectural Assembly and Upper House Elections

The June 7, 1992 Prefectural Assembly elections were held a few weeks after the commemoration ceremonies for the 20th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion and a few days before a controversial vote on the PKO Bill in the Diet in mid-June. Some 79 candidates vied for the 47 seats of the assembly, with Ota and the reformists hoping to overturn the 25-22 majority of the conservatives.

In addition to rendering judgment on the Ota administration’s handling of the base issue and the economy, one problem that was going on at the time and would continue for years was over the construction of a new commercial airport in Ishigaki (Shiraho, which remains unrealized) with local residents divided on the issue and the question about the clash between tourism and destruction of the natural environment being voiced by people throughout the prefecture.

In what came as major challenge to the Ota administration, the conservatives rallied to capture a relatively large majority of 27 seats to 21 for the reformists, with the JCP losing 4 seats alone in Naha, Okinawa, and Itoman cities. If Ota thought his first year and a half was difficult with the opposition leading the Prefectural Assembly, he was in for even


174 1992 to Be Signpost Year for Ota, “Weekly Times (Okinawa Taimusu),” Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 6, 1992). The OPG submitted its draft of the development plan to the Director of the ODA, Ie Tomo (from Okinawa), on August 11. After deliberations by Yamano Kokichi, Chair of the Okinawa Economic Development Deliberative Council (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Shingikai) who had long involvement with Okinawa since before its reversion, the plan was approved on September 28. (See Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tatakai, p. 52.) For more on the 3rd Development Plan, see the homepage of the Okinawa General Bureau (Okinawa Sogo Jimukyoku) within the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for the final drafting and implementation of the plan at http://www.ogb.go.jp/sinkou/sinkou.htm.

175 Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tatakai, p. 47.

176 As mentioned earlier, the bill subsequently passed. From Okinawa, Diet members Miyazato, Nakamura, and Tamaki supported the bill, with Uehara and Furugen opposing it.

177 The World Wildlife Fund eventually became involved symbolized by the visit of its president, the Duke of Edinburgh in early March 1992. The planned construction of the commercial Ishigaki Airport was as heated and divisive an issue as the Futenma relocation has been.

tougher times ahead.

Ironically, in other races, such as the Upper House election (discussed below) and local mayoral elections in Naha and Ginowan, the conservatives were to produce similar results, with the incumbent Oshiro defeated in the Upper House contest and the LDP unable to come up early enough with candidates in the other local contests.

A month later, Okinawan voters went to the polls again to elect a candidate in the 16th Upper House elections held on July 26. Shortly after the prefectural assembly elections, the Upper House passed the PKO bill, an issue heavily covered in Okinawa. The race turned out to be more intense and closely fought than usual. Reformist candidate Shimabukuro Soko, chairman of the OSMP, ran against incumbent Oshiro, who had first been elected in 1989 on the LDP ticket.

Shimabukuro, who served for 4 terms in the Naha City Assembly (including as Speaker) and 2 terms in the Prefectural Assembly, had the backing of the OSMP, JSP, JCP, and Komeito. Charged up with the anti-PKO mood and sensing the need to make up for their defeat in the prefectural assembly elections the month before, the reformists mobilized to elect the strongly anti-base, anti-U.S.-Japan alliance Shimabukuro. In one of the closest national elections ever, Shimabukuro defeated Oshiro by a mere 341 votes out of nearly 490,000 cast.179

With his victory, the reformists now had control of both Upper House seats from Okinawa, and they were in a better position to re-elect Ota in 1994.

5. The 1993 Lower House Election

On June 18, 1993, a no-confidence motion was passed against the Miyazawa Kiichi Cabinet, which had come into being in November 1991. Although the LDP still had a majority in the Lower House, the motion successfully passed due to the support of the Hata Tsutomu faction, which had been unhappy with the pace of political reform within the LDP and had voted in favor of the motion.

Rather than have the Cabinet resign en masse, Miyazawa decided to dissolve the House of Representatives, as is the right of the prime minister per Article 69 of the postwar Constitution. In the ensuing contest, the 40th Lower House election held on July 18, the LDP lost 52 seats, ending up with 232. Seven opposition parties and one political grouping, with the exception of the JCP, came together to support the nomination of Hosokawa Morihiro of the Japan New Party as prime minister and the Hosokawa administration was launched on August 9.

This was the first national administration in 45 years of which the JSP was a member.180

179 Shimabukuro was the first OSMP candidate to win at the national level since Asato Tsumichiyo’s victory in 1972. Because the OSMP, a local party, did not have any representation at the national level, Shimabukuro joined the Independent Club (Mushozoku no Kai), a group formed in the 1980s for non-affiliated members of the House of Councilors. The question of where Itokazu Keiko, an OSMP candidate in the 2004 Upper House contest, would affiliate with were she elected has created problems in coordination among her support groups.

180 The last time was in 1948, when the Socialist Party was in a coalition government headed by Ashida Hitoshi of the Democratic Party (formerly the Progressive Party, or Shinpoto). The administration immediately prior to Ashida’s was headed by Katayama Tetsu, Socialist Party chair, and supported by the
For Okinawa, the birth of the first non-LDP administration since the creation of the so-called 1955 System 38 years before, would provide the chance to have another of its native sons, Uehara Kosuke, become minister, following Ie Tomo, as Director General of the Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency.

Uehara was successfully re-elected in the 40th Lower House elections held on a hot July 18, as was Furugen, from the JCP. However, in a major upset, the conservatives were able to realize their long-held dream and capture 3 seats. Indeed, which side—reformist or conservative—would capture the prized 3 giseki (seats) had been the major focus of the battle.181

In another surprise turn of events, Nishime Junji had decided to run for a seat in the House of Representatives, a place he had last been a member of 15 years before. Although he had lost his popularity following his defeat in the 1990 gubernatorial elections, he ended up capturing the most votes in the Lower House race. Miyazato Massho, the reformist-turned-LDP member, was also re-elected, coming in 5th place.

The three conservative seats were not all held by the LDP, however. Nakamura Seiji (formerly of the Tanaka, Takeshita, and then subsequently Hata factions), had left the LDP in the Ozawa Ichiro-led mass exodus of 44 seen earlier on June 22 (1993) to create the Japan Renewal Party (Nihon Shinseito) in 1993. After Ozawa’s failure in later years to maintain the momentum saw numerous defections from his movement and efforts by LDP members to bring Nakamura back into the fold, Nakamura would rejoin the LDP in 1998 and become President of its Prefectural Branch in the summer of 2000.182

Two other candidates had run unsuccessfully. They were Shiraho Taiichi, from the Komeito, and Shimaizhi Noboru, a young member of the Japan New Party (Nihon Shinto), a break-off party from the LDP created in May 1992 by future prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro.183 The Komeito camp was in shock over the defeat of its new candidate, Shiraho, who had replaced Tamaki Eiichi, particularly in light of the fact that Komeito had held the seat for 6 terms for a total of 17 years.184

Socialists, Democrats, and centrist National Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyodoto). The Katayama administration lasted from May 1947 to May 1948, and the Ashida cabinet continued from then until October 1948.

181[] Hokaku[] 3 Giseki Oga Shoten (Focus on 3 Seats by Conservatives and Reformists), [] Okinawa Taimusu, July 18, 1993.

182 One person involved in these efforts to recruit

Results of 1993 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Nishimine Junji</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>111,196</td>
<td>18.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Nakamura Seiji</td>
<td>JRP</td>
<td>107,432</td>
<td>17.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Uehara Kosuke</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>100,420</td>
<td>16.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Furugen Saneyoshi</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>86,188</td>
<td>14.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Miyazato Massho</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>83,955</td>
<td>13.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiraho Taiichi</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>83,243</td>
<td>13.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimaizhi Noboru</td>
<td>JNP</td>
<td>34,945</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nakamura admits that Nakamura requested a high position if he were to return.

183 When the JNP dissolved to form the New Frontier Party (Shinshinto) in December 1994 (see below), Shimaizhi became a member of the New Harbinger Party (Shinto Sakigake), formed in June 1993, which joined the coalition government with the LDP and JSP in June 1994. Shimaizhi subsequently joined the Democratic Party in 1998 and is its representative in Okinawa today. He unsuccessfully ran as candidate in the Lower House from District 1 in November 2003. Currently he has been busy orchestrating electoral cooperation among the anti-LDP parties in Okinawa around the candidacy of Itozoku Keiko (of the OSMP) for the July 2004 Upper House election.

184 [] Okinawa no Tatakai [] Hyoka (Evaluation of [] the Fight in Okinawa []), [] Okinawa Taimusu, July 20, 1993; [] Okinawa Turns Right, [] Weekly Times (Okinawa Taimusu), Vol. 4, No. 28 (July 26, 1993). Shiraho lost to Miyazato by 712 votes. In light of this defeat, and larger pressures throughout the rest of Japan, Shiraho’s Komeito joined in December 1994 with the Japan Renewal Party, Japan New Party, and Democratic Socialist Party to form the Shinshito, or New Frontier Party, which became the largest party since the LDP to be formed in the postwar. The Komeito was kept in place at the local level and in part of the Upper House. The NFP eventually dissolved due to personality, factional, and policy differences in January 1998. See Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, pp. 192-195.
The victory of the conservatives in Okinawa was somewhat ironic in light of the larger trends in the rest of Japan, with party members and voters abandoning the LDP in record numbers in favor of the new parties that had been emerging. It was probably a reflection of not only the ability of the LDP to mobilize (which they did after some self-reflection in light of their losses in the second half 1992\(^{185}\)), but also of the uncertainty of the direction of the Ota administration and the reformist camp as a whole, particularly in light of the recession that was setting in nationwide and within the prefecture.

In light of the need to restructure the top leadership of the OPG, Ota appointed Yoshimoto Masanori, the policy coordinator in the governor’s office and someone respected for his practical approach to issues, to the post of vice governor.\(^{186}\) Yoshimoto would continue until September 1998, adding stability to what was clearly a tumultuous period for Okinawa.\(^{187}\)

The following year in March 1994, continuing with his promise to see capable women assume leadership positions in society, Ota appointed Tomon Mitsuko, a former Japanese teacher for the Department of Defense schools in the prefecture and senior managing director of the Okinawa International Exchange Foundation, to become vice governor to replace Sho, who had stepped down in mid-February.\(^{188}\)

At the same time, to push the U.S. government to work more toward resolving the base issues, Ota met with U.S. Ambassador Walter F. Mondale on December 14 (1993), followed by meetings with Prime Minister Hosokawa on February 1 (1994).\(^{189}\) While Hosokawa did not venture to Okinawa, Mondale did, visiting there in mid-April (1994) for a look at the situation himself. This was an especially busy time for Mondale to have visited—Hosokawa, who was seen as “clean” and had launched a reform-minded administration, had announced his resignation at the end of the week before on April 8 due to a loan-related scandal himself. It was also, as is discussed in Part III, the week after a series of plane and helicopter-related accidents—events that raised tensions in the prefecture.

### 6. The 1994 Gubernatorial Election

The 12-month period between 1993 and 1994 saw four cabinets come and go—those of Miyazawa, Hosokawa, Hata Tsutomo, and subsequently Murayama Tomiichi. Japan’s citizens began the same period with a great deal of hope and anticipation, and ended it more dissatisfied than ever. In the November 1994 gubernatorial contest, which took place against the backdrop of the local repercussions of the Lower House election in the prefecture and the larger political realignment going on, the OSMP, JSP, JCP, and Japan New Party supported the reelection of Ota, who easily defeated Onaga Sukehiro, supported by the LDP and local business community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Stance</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ota Masahide</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>330,601</td>
<td>60.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onaga Sukehiro</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>217,769</td>
<td>39.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{186}\) Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., *Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tatakai*, p. 62.

\(^{187}\) On October 17, 1997, a motion of no confidence was passed against Yoshimoto, by a vote of 21 to 20, with one abstention. The Communists supported the vote because they were unhappy with Yoshimoto’s efforts at practically resolving some of the base issues, such as moving the Naha military port to Urasoe. Yoshimoto, who was seen as high-handed, was replaced by Treasurer Yamauchi Tokushin, a close ally of Ota’s.

\(^{188}\) Tomon is currently a Lower House member representing the 3rd district of Okinawa.

However, as scholar Egami notes, the fluid situation in national politics had an impact on the traditional way reformists conducted gubernatorial campaigns.\(^{190}\) Namely, beginning in 1968, the reformists would field a joint candidate as part of the united front Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi, but in the gubernatorial contest of 1994, candidate Ota signed policy agreements on an individual basis with the reformist parties and organizations that lent their support. In this way, according to Egami, the 1968 Nen Taisei, or 1968 System that he has used to describe the head-on clash between the conservatives and united reformists,\(^{191}\) collapsed.\(^{192}\) While in retrospect it did not collapse as Egami asserts, it definitely weakened. It would not collapse at the gubernatorial level until 2002, when, as described below, the reformists ended up fielding rival candidates and losing the contest altogether to Inamine Keiichi.\(^{192}\)

One of the reasons for this policy-agreement approach was that the JSP, now named the Japan Social Democratic Party (Nihon Shakai Minshuto), had entered the unexpected arrangement of a coalition government with the LDP on June 30 (1994) and in the process officially declared an end to its long-standing policy of opposition to the Self Defense Forces (created in 1954) and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the treaty for which was first signed in 1951 and revised in 1960. In Okinawa, the JCP was particularly hostile to this new stance as well as the coalition governments of Hosokawa (August 1993-April 1994) and Hata (April-June 1994). Furugen, for example, described the Hosokawa administration as no more than a second LDP line in national affairs and not changing anything.\(^{193}\) In his memoirs, Furugen also implied that Uehara’s joining the Hosokawa cabinet was selling out.\(^{193}\)

In light of the trends seen in the post-Cold War period toward troop reductions, the LDP, interestingly also began to call for a reexamination of the U.S.-Japan alliance and a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the prefecture (rather than simply their reduction), which as Egami suggests, led to a blurring of the policy differences between the conservatives and the reformists, and thus by implication, an end to the 1968 Taisei.\(^{194}\) Eventually, this new approach by the LDP did not gain the support of other conservatives in the DSP or Japan Renewal Party, and actually may have led to the LDP losing ground to these other conservative parties.\(^{195}\) In the Lower House elections held in 1996, for example, the LDP would lose in all three districts, with two seats going to Shinshinto and the remaining to Uehara of the renamed SDP.\(^{196}\)

Governor Ota in any case was not to going wait for national politics to settle down before there was to be a resolution to some of the base issues. He was determined to make sure the central government was going to live up to its commitments with regard to the base conversion and reutilization issue that had been of concern to the prefecture since the 1970s and had been part of the quid pro quo reached in 1991 when he agreed to go ahead with the proxy leasing arrangements.

For Ota and many in the prefecture, measures to deal with land that was scheduled to be returned was the key to Okinawa’s economic planning for the future and to get

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\(^{190}\) Egami Takayoshi, 55 Nen Taisei no Hokai to Okinawa Kakushin Kensei no Arikata (Reformist and Conservative Divide in Postwar Okinawan Politics), Nihon Seiji Gakkai Nenpo (1996), p. 186.

\(^{191}\) Ibid.

\(^{192}\) For a short analysis of the 2002 gubernatorial contest, see Robert D. Eldridge, Inamine Faces Challenge of Realizing First-term Objectives, Daily Yomiuri, November 21, 2002. As is explained below, the united front further broke down in 1997 during the Upper House election when the reformists again fielded rival candidates.

\(^{193}\) Furugen, Nuchi Kajiri, p. 197.

\(^{194}\) Egami, 55 Nen Taisei, p. 186.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.

\(^{196}\) Due to the new electoral system employed at the time of this election, the LDP did capture one seat in the proportional representation, Kakazu Chiken, from Uehara’s district.
landowners, dependant on income from land leasing to the central government, to feel economically free enough to think about alternatives to that situation. The measure or law to do that was known as Guntenpo.

Officially known as Okinawaken ni Okeru Gunyochi no Tenyō Oyobi Gunyochi Atochi no Riyo Sokushin ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochiho (Law on Special Measures Relating to the Use of Former Military Land and the Conversion of Military Land in Okinawa), Guntenpo was first raised in the 1970s during the Taira Koichi administration.197 At the time Taira took office in late 1976, only 16.4 sq. kilometers of land had been returned during the four years between the reversion of Okinawa and his inauguration. Of that area, only 2.1 sq. km, or 13%, could be put to use again immediately.198 Essentially, the land was returned in a haphazard way and it took time to determine the proper boundaries and legal ownership. A law that granted compensation for a longer period to allow the clarification of property ownership and time to develop plans for conversion of the land was clearly necessary. Subsequently, members from the Komeito, Socialist Party, and Communist Party raised the issue of Guntenpo in the Diet on numerous occasions but the attempts failed due to insufficient attention and discussion. 199 Because it was yet to be realized, Ota had vowed to pursue it as part of his electoral platform during the 1990 gubernatorial race.

Simply put, Guntenpo sought to continue with the land rental fees paid, or a considerable portion of them, during the time it took to convert the land being returned into property that could be properly utilized. It also called on the government to inform the owners as early as possible of the return of their land so that they could begin to develop plans for converting it. By securing financial assistance for their continued livelihoods, and giving them a certain timetable for which to plan the land’s conversion, the owners would be able to deal with whatever adjustments would have to be made in their daily lives due to the dependence on the rent from the land for military use or the displacement that the forced leasing originally caused. Reformists were especially in favor of this legislation from early on in that it would both psychologically and financially empower the landowners and embolden them to call for more dramatic base reductions. Now, due to the reductions of bases following the end of the Cold War, it was no longer simply an issue that the reformists were concerned with, but the conservatives and the 30,000-member Tochiren as well, because of the need to develop viable plans to use the land that was to be returned with the base closures.

The bill, which included a compromise on the number of years in which compensation would continue to be awarded, eventually came into being on May 19, 1995 during the administration headed by Murayama Tomiichi, chairman of the Social Democratic Party. The passed bill guaranteed a period of three years compensation, but the OPG had desired 7 years. Increasing the length of the grace period would eventually be one of the goals of Ota’s successor, Inamine, and was realized in 2002.

As another example of his aggressively pursuing the base issue, Ota went ahead with visits to the United States during the remaining years of his first administration, although the busy schedule of 1992 prevented him from going that year. Ota’s second visit to appeal for reductions was undertaken in May 1993 and on this trip, which included a visit to Guam, the governor was joined by Yamauchi Tokushin, mayor of Yomitan Village, who had come with him on the first trip, and other mayors and assembly members. 200 Having had an English-language pamphlet and video prepared, Ota made a point of working the Congress, including Senator Daniel K. Inouye and others. Ota also met again one of his heroes, former

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197 See footnote 54. Also see Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 67 and 159; Taira Koichi Kaisoroku Kanko linkai, ed. Dochaku no Hito, p. 169.

198 Arasaki, Jinushi, p. 80.

199 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 159.

200 Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tatakai, p. 60.
Senator (D-Arkansas) J. William Fulbright, who created the Fulbright Program in which Ota participated in the late 1970s.

Subsequently, Ota went to D.C. again in June 1994. It was perhaps during this trip that Ota was hitting his stride. The media was starting to pay more attention to Ota, including writing a large story on him in the *Honolulu Advertiser* (June 10, 1994). Moreover, the OPG took out a second large advertisement in the *Washington Post* entitled "Why Okinawa Calls for the Reduction of U.S. Bases" on June 16, 1994. Having been a professor of journalism, Ota understood the power of the media. While in Washington, Ota went out of his way to appeal especially for the following 3 important issues (3 jian) that OPG most desired: the return of Naha Military Port, the stoppage of parachute exercises at and return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the ending of live-fire exercises over Prefectural Road 104.

One of the main reasons for this was that the base consolidations and reductions plan agreed to at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting of June 19, 1990, which had approved the release of 23 places at 17 facilities (for a total area of almost 1000 hectares), had only seen the realization of half of the area by 1995. The OPG believed if the return of the major facilities represented in the above requests could be realized, then the release of the remaining areas would proceed more smoothly.

Ota would continue with this message and with a list of other desired returns in his follow-up visit to the United States between May 17 and June 2, 1995. These included the shared use of roads through Kadena Air Base, to help ease traffic congestion, and the return of two exercise areas (Blue Beach and Ginbaru) in Kin. The less-than-warm receptions he received in D.C. did not discourage him, it seems, as Ota believed it important to continue to push the base issue where and when he could.

One of the most dramatic and bold initiatives Ota undertook, however, was the announcement of the Base Return Action Program in January 1996, which sought the planned and gradual return of [all 40] existing U.S. military facilities in Okinawa by the year 2015. It was announced in the months following the attack on the schoolgirl and two months after the establishment of the Saco process.

Two-thousand fifteen was the target year for the realization of Okinawa’s "grand design for the 21st Century" known as the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept, by which Okinawa would serve as the international exchange hub for the region, in the same way that Okinawa was a bridge of nations (bankoku shinryo) in history.

The OPG’s plan to see all the bases returned was divided into three phases. Phase 1 would cover the years until 2001, with 10 sites, including Futenma Air Station, Naha Military Port, and Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, to be returned during that stage. Phase 2 covered the years from 2002 to 2010 and was to have 14 sites returned. Phase 3, the final stage, covered the years from 2011-2015, and would see the final 17 U.S. facilities returned.

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201 The first one was entitled "An Appeal for Peace From Okinawa" and appeared in the *Washington Post* on May 25, 1993. A third one appeared in the May 22, 1995 edition of the *Post* at the time of his 4th visit to D.C. Ota would also have the OPG aggressively use the internet (still new at the time) to introduce the situation in Okinawa and promote its agenda.

202 Ota Kensei 8 Nen o Kiroku Suru Kai, ed., *Okinawa Heiwa to Jiritsu e no Tataki*, p. 76.


205 Okinawa Prefectural Government, *Base Return Action Program* (Proposal), January 1996. One base, Camp Kuwae (Foster) would be returned in 2 stages, phases 1 and 2, and thus represents 2 facilities in the chart the OPG included in the proposal.

206 Okinawa Prefectural Government, "The Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (Draft Plan): Grand Design for New Okinawa Aiming at the 21st Century" (undated). This plan was much more dynamic than anything seen in the past, including the OPG’s 60-page "Basic Plan for the Site Utilization of the Lands Currently Used by the U.S. Military in Okinawa" (March 1993).
The OPG noted that it took the following factors into consideration when drafting the Action Program proposal. First was the relevance to the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept. Second related to the requests/demands made so far for the return of certain bases. Third was the degree to which the plans for the returned use of land were developed by local municipalities. And the fourth consideration was based on other ideas and plans the local communities had. This was the first time that the OPG had created and publicized a detailed plan spelling out the return of bases and the timetable for that in the quest to see an "Okinawa without Bases (Kichi no Nai Okinawa)." Needless to say, the plan’s calling for the complete removal of bases by 2015 caused more than a few sets of eyebrows to be raised, and invited a great deal of criticism that the plan was unrealistic. By this proposal of January 1996, and the governor’s decision not to cooperate in leasing arrangements a few months before that in the fall of 1995, Ota had attempted to make an unprecedented stand and challenge the central government to seriously deal with the issues that he felt it had long overlook.

Ota’s proactive approach on the base issues would also be seen in his efforts at promoting the peace theme and remembering history as seen by the creation of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives and in the creation of the Cornerstone of Peace. Indeed, the opening ceremonies for the two places were held in June, just after Ota’s return to Okinawa and both in time for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa and the end of the Pacific War.

7. The 1995 Upper House Election

Elections for the Upper House were held amid this reflective mood, and symbolic of the Ota administration being at the height of its popularity, a close ally of Ota, Teruya Kantoku, was elected, defeating his rival incumbent Oshiro. At the same time, some problems were seen in reformist politics that could not be ignored.

The changing political dynamics, both nationwide and locally, within the reformists would be most visibly seen in the 19th Upper House elections, held on July 23, 1995. In this contest, one pillar of the united front collapsed—namely, the inability to field a joint candidate.207 As alluded to above, the second pillar of the united front was the ability to field a joint candidate in the gubernatorial race. (This second pillar, which weakened in 1998 when Uehara left the SDP and actually considered running as a candidate for governor, came crashing down in 2002 with the introduction of two reformist candidates into the campaign.)

A second symbolic characteristic of this election was the retirement of Kyan Shinei, who had served five terms as a member of the House of Councilors beginning in 1970. In many ways, his retirement suggested a passing of the mantle on to the next generation. But when he did so, he probably was not happy with the direction in which the reformists were heading especially in light of the inability to field a joint candidate.

Incumbent Oshiro Shinjun, who was first elected to the Upper House in 1982, was challenged by lawyer-turned-politician Teruya, a two-term member of the prefectural assembly from the SDP and close friend of Governor Ota, and JCP-supported Hokama Hisako, also a two-term prefectural assembly member (having replaced Furugen in 1988). In the end, Teruya emerged victorious, beating Oshiro by some 26,000 votes and Hokama by 140,000.

### Results of 1995 Upper House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party Support</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teruya Kantoku</td>
<td>JSP+</td>
<td>111,196</td>
<td>34.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshiro Shinjun</td>
<td>LDP+</td>
<td>107,432</td>
<td>33.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokama Hisako</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>100,420</td>
<td>31.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the LDP’s candidate was defeated in this contest, the real loser was the reformist camp. The damage to it would prove near fatal and near impossible to fix in the long run as seen in the lack of cooperation in subsequent elections.

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207 This inability would continue again in the 1998, 2001, and 2004 Upper House elections.
This is particularly ironic as the elections took place on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and Okinawans (as well as the peoples of all of Japan and the United States and other countries) were in a reflective mood. Specifically, in Okinawa, Governor Ota had unveiled the new commemoration memorial in southern Okinawa known as the Cornerstone of Peace just days before and the tragedy of war and calls for peace, themes that the reformists always called for, were heard in strength at this time.

Shortly after this, on September 4, the tragic rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen sent shock waves throughout the prefecture and bilateral relationship, leading to stronger calls for peace and opposition to the bases, and bringing together once again not only anti-base activists and reformists, but conservative groups as well in a show of unity not seen in decades. However, ironically, as discussed in detail in another article208, when this anger shifted to actively pursuing a removal of the bases by raising the issue in a prefecture-wide (non-binding) referendum, inherent divisions within these groups once again emerged.

8. The 1996 Prefectural Assembly and Lower House Elections

The Prefectural Assembly elections held 9 months after this tragic attack reflected the mixed feelings in the prefecture.

Campaigning for the elections officially began on May 31 with 78 candidates running for the 48-seat assembly. The LDP fielded 21 candidates and its conservative rival, the New Frontier Party, which was at this time the leading opposition party at the national level (but ideological partner of the LDP in Okinawa against the Ota administration), fielded ten. Meanwhile, the OSMP had nine candidates in the race, the JCP fielded eight, the SDP seven, followed by the Komeito with two, and Shinto Sakigake with one candidate. In addition, there were 20 independent candidates.

The outcome of the elections, held on June 9, was expected to affect Ota’s position on the bases, by strengthening his resolve to take on the central government over the land-leasing issue (see Part III) if his supporters won. While all parties were calling for a reduction of the bases in the prefecture, their stances toward the security treaty and the degree of reductions and consolidations differed greatly (particularly when compared to Ota’s Base Return Action Program, described above, which called for the total elimination of all U.S. facilities by 2015. They were also divided over economic revitalization measures and the OPG’s plan to seek the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept on the former base sites once it had achieved the full return of land used by the military in 2015. Despite (or because of) these differences, the Ota camp emerged victorious, recapturing the assembly.

The minority, anti-base faction, including the SDP and JCP, gained four seats in the elections to garner a total of 25. The major opposition parties, the LDP and NFP, together captured only 23, losing two seats and thus their majority in the assembly. Significantly, this was the first time since 1980 that the reformists captured a majority in the body.

The results can thus be interpreted as reflecting support for the Ota’s standoff with the central government and his efforts to bring national and international attention to the Okinawa problem, as well as a reflection of the desire of Okinawan residents to see the issues surrounding the bases resolved once and for all.

The Hashimoto government, which had been carefully watching the elections, was forced to admit defeat or at least serious concern, telling reporters that as I expected, it was a severe outcome.209 Meanwhile, Ota told a press conference following the election, since we have received almost the same number of votes we had forecast, we don’t have any particular sentiment that we have dramatically overturned the ruling-opposition


209 antibases faction gains okinawa assembly seats, Japan Times, June 11, 1996.
The calmness of this statement was betrayed, however, by the smile on his face.

Results of 1996 Prefectural Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Those Elected</th>
<th>Pre-Election Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inc.</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSMP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ota would not be able to capitalize on this momentum in the Prefectural Referendum on the bases later that year (in September) nor in the gubernatorial election two years later, however.

For the 41st Lower House elections held on October 20, a new electoral system had been introduced as part of the political reform process in the 1990s (and as a way to speed up political party realignments). Somewhat confusing in nature, it combined single-seat and proportional representation in one election (with people voting for a candidate in their district plus a party as a whole), with the net result being a reduction in the number of number of Lower House seats from 511 to 500 in 1996, and then to 480 in 2000.210

Okinawa was divided into three electoral single-seat districts (since 2003, it is now four), from which one individual would be chosen. This meant a net loss of two seats from the 5 that had been apportioned in the medium-size constituencies used until then. However, if a candidate also chose to run on the proportional ticket and ranked high enough on his or her party’s list of candidates, that person could be elected.211 As a result, if enough votes were had for the respective parties and the candidate from Okinawa was allotted a high position in each party’s list, representation from Okinawa could increase above 3 and go beyond the allotted five of the previous system. In the end, the Okinawa was able to send a total of six representatives to the Lower House when two from the LDP and one from the JCP were elected through proportional representation.

Results of 1996 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Candidate and Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>Shirahata Taichi (NFP)</td>
<td>52,975 (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Furugen Sayemoshis (JCP)</td>
<td>47,379 (proportion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shimoji Mikio (LDP)</td>
<td>44,488 (proportion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nishathin Junichiro (Jiyu)</td>
<td>23,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shimajiri Noboru (Sakigake)</td>
<td>7,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>Nakamura Seiji (NFP)</td>
<td>56,421 (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nakamote Anichi (OSMP)</td>
<td>51,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinjo Hiroshi (Jiya)</td>
<td>18,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinjo Kuni (LDP)</td>
<td>18,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asato Junichiro (Sakigake)</td>
<td>5,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>Ushara Kouke (JSP)</td>
<td>60,534 (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanaiz Chikken (LDP)</td>
<td>45,591 (proportion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Takasawa Yoshina (Jiyu)</td>
<td>24,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Furugen Muneosshi (JCP)</td>
<td>20,532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 14 candidates had emerged in this contest. In District 1, the hardest fought of

210 Of these 480, 300 are elected from single-seat constituencies, and the remaining 180 are chosen by proportional representation (in which Japan is divided into 11 electoral blocs which according to size return between six and 30 members). Initially, as per the 1994 revision of the Public Offices Election Law (Koshoku Senkyoho), the new system was used in the October 1996 election for the Lower House. At that time, 300 were elected from single-seat constituencies and 200 by proportional representation. After another revision, the number members elected by proportional representation was reduced to 180 where it currently stands.

211 As a result of this procedure, rivals for a seat within the same party would have to build support for their candidacy among the party leadership. Most wish to run for the single-seat itself, but the party headquarters or prefectural branch may decide for seniority reasons, name value, funding purposes, and overall popularity on a different candidate. In that case, the person who loses the intra-party debate is given the option (usually) to have one’s name listed in the party list for proportional representation. In that case, he or she would want their name to be as high as possible in the list to ensure that they will be given a seat. A second battle then emerges over ranking on the list. If the person is dissatisfied with the rank given, he or she can either go along with it, or as sometimes happens, run as an independent or under a different party name. Okinawa, particularly among the numerous ambitious conservatives, has had many of these problems with candidate coordination.
them all as it includes Naha, incumbent Furugen from the JCP was challenged by Shirahō (NFP), Nishime Junshiro (Jiyu Rengo), Shimoji Mikio (LDP), and Shimajiri Noboru from Sakigake. Utilizing the support of the Soka Gakkai and Komei organizations, the electoral cooperation of the SDP and labor organization Rengo Okinawa, and the electoral machine support of his ally in District 2, Nakamura Seiji (NFP), who is strong in Naha as well, Shirahō was able to defeat his numerous rivals.212

In District 2, which includes Urasoe, Ginowan, Nishihara, and the southern areas, Nakamura was able to utilize in full the advantages of being an incumbent, mobilizing conservative voters in the district to defeat his four rivals, Kinjo Hiroshi (a doctor from Jiyu Rengo), Kinjo Kunio (LDP), Asato Jinichiro (Sakigake), and Nakamoto (OSMP).

In District 3, which includes the central and northern parts of Okinawa, a traditional bastion of support of Uehara Kosuke, the SDP candidate and former Minister of the Okinawa Development Agency had no problems winning re-election for the 10th time, particularly as he enjoyed the support of Komei and Soka Gakkai. His opponents included Kakazu Chiken (LDP), Furugen Muneyoshi (JCP), and Takaesu Yoshimasa (Jiyu Rengo).

In districts 1 and 3, LDP candidates who lost in the single-seat contests, Shimoji and Kakazu, were ranked high enough to permit their rebounding to be chosen from the proportional representation. This was reportedly due to the strong interest in Okinawa that LDP President Hashimoto Ryutaro (also Prime Minister) had and thus making sure that their election would be realized.213 Despite the agreement to support one another’s candidates in districts 1 and 2, the respective candidates of the JCP and OSMP were unsuccessful, but Furugen Saneyoshi of the JCP was selected on the JCP’s national ticket for proportional representation. As a result, as mentioned above, the total number of Okinawan representatives increased to six—four conservative and two reformists. The results of this election would symbolize the beginning of the conservative shift that would end up with electing once again a conservative governor two years later.

D. Accommodation, or the Return of the Conservatives, 1998-2002

1. The 1998 Upper House and Gubernatorial Elections

The July 1998 Upper House election took place amid this tense atmosphere with the standoff over the relocation of Futenma and the worsen. The election represented, for both camps, the upcoming gubernatorial election in miniature, and thus a judgment on Ota.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of 1998 Upper House Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimabukuro Soko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishida Kenjiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinjo Hiroshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinjo Hiroyuki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matayoshi Mitsuo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Symbolic of the interest in the election and the efforts of both camps to get out the vote, voter turnout actually rose by 3.72 to 58.98 % (from 55.26% in 1992). Likewise, representative of the division of opinion in the prefecture on the base issue, Shimabukuro won by only 5000 votes out of some 280,000 cast against his LDP- and NFP-sponsored opponent, Nishida Kenjiro, former President of the prefectural branch of the LDP.

The 1998 gubernatorial race took place against the backdrop of the plans to relocate Futenma Air Station to Nago City. As the election followed a city-wide referendum on the base relocation (on December 21, 1997) and a mayoral by-election on February 8, 1998, which also saw a debate on the relocation issue,
we can call the 1998 gubernatorial contest the 3rd plebiscite on the relocation.

With Ota’s official announcement on June 15 to run for election a third time, numerous movements on the conservative side began to be seen. Several potential candidates had been mentioned by then, including Uehara’s initial exploration of a run on a center, center-right ticket (backed by the LDP), similar to Asato’s in the 1976 gubernatorial election. But the one whose name had been mentioned most consistently in the past, Inamine Keiichi, emerged as the strongest. Although Inamine was not by background a politician, he did have wide experience as a business leader and,

214 Both the national LDP and local branch encouraged Uehara’s run, hoping to see the left vote split. Hashimoto even met with Uehara on May 20 at the Prime Minister’s residence. See Okinawa LDP wants SDP Man to Run, Japan Times, March 16, 1998. In early May, Uehara sponsored a 21st Century Okinawa Policy Study Group (Mirai 21: Okinawa Seisaku Kenkyukai) symposium in which he announced his plan which criticized Ota’s policies as shortsighted and suggested that U.S. bases on Okinawa could be reduced to half rather than trying to completely eliminate them. Relations became tense between Uehara and local SDP officials, traditionally dogmatic, as a result of Uehara’s call for a more realistic approach toward the base problem. (Telephone interview by author with official from Okinawa Prefectural Chapter, Social Democratic Party, May 15, 1998, and interview with Uehara Kosuke, May 18, 1998). As a result, on June 19, in addition to announcing that he was considering running for governor, Uehara stated that he was leaving the SDP due to increasing differences with the party leadership over defense issues. His announcement came three weeks after the SDP’s decision to leave the coalition government and symbolically four days after Ota’s own announcement to run on August 19. Inamine officially announced his candidacy on August 26 by criticizing Ota’s all or nothing stance on the bases. Symbolic of the fact that those once close to Ota, like Uehara, had distanced themselves from his policies which were seen as a dead-end, the president of Inamine’s support group was Nakaima Hirokazu, formerly Ota’s vice governor. Likewise a policy advisor to Inamine was Higa Ryogen, formerly a central figure of the OSMP.

Results of 1998 Gubernatorial Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Stance</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inamine Keiichi</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>374,833</td>
<td>52.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ota Masahide</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>337,369</td>
<td>47.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matayoshi Mitsuo</td>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inamine succeeded in capturing more than half the vote in the three-way contest ending Ota’s 8-year reign. (The third, insignificant, candidate was someone who seems to enter every race he is eligible to run in.) Although he knew he was fighting an uphill battle, Ota’s defeat nevertheless came as a great disappointment to him. He lamented later that his calls later for Okinawans to not sell their pride spirit (damashii), heart (kokoro), and pride (hokori) went unheard. 216

215 Inamine’s father Ichiro had befriended Obuchi when the latter was a student in Tokyo. Obuchi and Keiichi eventually became friends, and he visited Okinawa on several occasions.

2. The 2000 Prefectural Assembly and Lower House Elections

The wave would continue to be seen in the victory of the conservatives in the Prefectural Assembly elections on June 11, 2000, capturing with their Komeito and independent allies a total of 30 seats and dwarfing the 18 that the reformists managed to hold on to. This tsunami, for lack of a better word, was the largest gap ever in a Prefectural Assembly election. Taking place on the eve of the G-8 Summit that was scheduled to be held in Okinawa in mid-July (the first-ever summit in Japan to take place outside of Tokyo), the results were no doubt of great relief to the Japanese and U.S. governments.

Despite the fact that the world was beginning to turn its attention to Okinawa, voter turnout in the election was low, 65.23% or 1.13 percentage points lower than the previous time, which had been the lowest voter turnout to date.

Seventy-six candidates had vied for the 48 seats of the assembly. Going into the contest, the conservatives (LDP, NFP, independents) held 26 seats versus 22 for the reformists (SDP, OSMP, JCP, Komeito, independents). However, because the Komeito and LDP were now allies, the real ratio was 28 versus 20.

The main issues of the election dealt, as with most elections in Okinawa, the bases and the economy. Specifically, as this was the first election held after the 1998 gubernatorial contest and subsequent decision by Governor Inamine to accept the relocation of the functions of Futenma Air Station within the prefecture, voters were consciously or unconsciously being asked to render judgment.

In the end, the LDP won 15 seats (out of 18), and saw 4 more whom it sponsored win seats, giving it a total of 19. Komeito won four seats, including those sponsored as well as officially endorsed, to double their representation. Conservative independents and related groupings won a total of 7.

Two weeks later, Okinawans went to the polls again, this time for the Lower House elections. In early April, after then Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo collapsed with a stroke, Mori Yoshiro was chosen in both houses to form a cabinet (based on three-party coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito-Reformers’ Network, and New Conservative Party). However, Mori was in general quite unpopular, and there was strong public pressure to have an election to approve this turn of events.

In Okinawa, Mori was strongly distrusted. In addition to having made a comment while Secretary General of the LDP that the local newspapers were all communist, Mori had few connections to Okinawa, unlike his two predecessors, Obuchi and Hashimoto. Public dislike of Mori would present a challenge to the LDP nationally and in particular locally.

Despite this, the LDP did well, building on the success of Prefectural Assembly elections, sympathy votes for Obuchi’s passing in May, and the high public expectations for the upcoming summit. As in 1996, this election combined the 3-single seat constituency and the proportional representation system. Okinawan candidates won a total of six seats. The LDP captured 3 seats and its Komeito ally, one. The opposition parties SDP and JCP captured one each, and the JDP lost its representation.

Results of 2000 Lower House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Candidate and Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>Shiraho Tsuichi (Komeito)</td>
<td>86,255 (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Akimine Seiken (JCP)</td>
<td>50,709 (proportion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maeda Kyotaka (Jiyu)</td>
<td>27,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>Nakamura Seiji (LDP)</td>
<td>88,544 (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shimajiri Noboru (DP)</td>
<td>30,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinjo Hiroshi (Jiyu)</td>
<td>30,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nakanishi Tsuiko (JCP)</td>
<td>29,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>Tomen Mitsuako (JSP)</td>
<td>68,378 (elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nishida Kenjiro (Ind)</td>
<td>52,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kakazu Chiken (LDP)</td>
<td>48,622 (proportion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uehara Kosuke (Democratic)</td>
<td>32,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Furugen Mameyoshi (JCP)</td>
<td>10,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 12 candidates ran in the contest for the 3 seats, 2 from the LDP, one from Komeito, 3 from the JCP, one from the SDP, 2

217 Shimoji Mikio was elected from the Kyushu regional block.
from the *Jiyu Rengo*, and one from the Independents.

Of the three constituencies, District 3 was the hardest fought, with five candidates running in the central and northern part of Okinawa. Because Uehara had broken with the SDP in 1998 over his frustration with its policies and due to his initial bid to run for governor, the SDP went with former vice governor and school teacher, Tomon Mitsuko, who succeeded in not only defeating Uehara in his own area, but in defeating her LDP rival, Kakazu Chiken. Being the first female elected from Okinawa, Tomon was able to take advantage of the female vote in addition to the traditional anti-base vote. Another important factor helping her election was the inability of the LDP to reign in conservative Nishida Kenjiro, former president of the Prefectural Branch of the LDP, who left the party to run as an independent in this race. Having two conservative candidates in the contest Kakazu Chiken from the LDP and Nishida ended up splitting the vote to all but guarantee Tomon’s election. SDP officials and reformists, however, interpreted Tomon’s victory as a statement that Okinawans were opposed to the relocation of Futenma within the prefecture.218

### 3. The 2001 Upper House Election

With the question of the Futenma relocation yet to be resolved, three candidates ran in the July 2001 Upper House elections, which were viewed as a judgment on the Inamine Administration. As in the last race in 1998, voter interest was reportedly high but perhaps reflective of the difficult choices involved and uncertainty as to how Okinawa should proceed in the future, voter turnout actually dropped slightly to 58.36% (-0.62 percentage points as compared to turnout in 1995). In this contest, the 19th Upper House election, 3 candidates were vying for the one seat from Okinawa. Two were from the reformist camp—Teruya Kantoku and Kayo Sogi, a former teacher and Prefectural Assembly member from the Communist Party.

As discussed earlier, the electoral cooperation among the reformists in sponsoring a joint candidate for the Upper House contests had effectively ended in 1995 when the SDP and the JCP ran different candidates. In that contest, the SDP candidate, Teruya won, but now in 1998, the conservatives had their eyes on the prize—the governor’s seat later that year—and were determined to capitalize on the momentum created by victory in the Nago City mayoral election earlier in the year. Because of this strong desire, and the division of the reformists, the conservatives won easily to defeat Teruya (who, although he ran as an independent, was supported by the Democratic Party, SDP, Liberal Party (*Jiyuto*)219, OSMP, New Socialist Party, and the Sports and Peace [*Supootsu Heiwato*] Party) by more than 20,000 votes. Had the reformists cooperated behind one candidate, the story would have been different. In addition to Teruya’s 245,375 votes, Kayo received 46,401. Together, that would have given the reformists 25,000 more than the conservative candidate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nishime Junshiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>265,821</td>
<td>47.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teruya Kantoku</td>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>245,375</td>
<td>44.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayo Sogi</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>46,401</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Results of 2001 Upper House Election

As their candidate, the LDP sponsored Nishime Junshiro, the vice president of the prefectural branch and first son of the ailing former governor. In addition to the LDP, Nishime received the support of the Komeito—a huge electoral machine—as well as the support of the *Hoshuto* (Conservative Party), which had emerged in early 2000 as a

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218 Shiraho, Nakamura, Tomon Shi ga Tosen Hatsu no Josei Daigishi Tanjo (Shiraho, Nakamura, and Tomon Elected Birth of First Female Diet Member [from Okinawa], *Ryukyu Shimpo*, June 26, 2000.

219 The Liberal Party was one of six parties formed when the New Frontier Party was disbanded at the end of 1997. *Jiyuto* was headed by Ozawa Ichiro, who had been challenged for leadership of the NFP earlier that year by forces close to leadership in the Democratic Party of Japan. *Jiyuto* eventually entered a coalition with the LDP in January 1999.
breakaway from Liberal Party. Like his father years before, Junshiro and his supporters appealed to voters by drawing attention to his ability to act as a pipe between Okinawa and Tokyo, although these connections were not nearly as big as those of his father.

Like Okinawan voters, former governor Ota had come to realize that there were some issues that could not be dealt with at the local level and had to be addressed at the national level and stood for election in the list of candidates in the proportional representation section for the SDP. Knowing Ota’s dislike of Tokyo, the author was surprised that Ota ran in the Upper House contest (having turned down running in the Lower House race the year before after resisting strong pressure from Doi Takako’s SDP), but in reading Ota’s subsequent comments, it seems his intention is to get his colleagues in the Diet to think about the so-called Okinawa Problem as not simply an issue that Okinawa had to deal with, but one that the entire country faced. In a comment after the vote was in at his campaign headquarters in Ameku, Naha City, Ota criticized the LDP by saying, Is [the continued dominance by the LDP] good for Japan? Prime Minister Koizumi [Junichiro] claims that there all areas of administration are to be opened up to review and will not be protected, and yet he does nothing about the base problem. I want to get the people of Japan to think about moving away from this dangerous direction.

4. The 2002 Gubernatorial Election

The conservative wave would continue at the November 17, 2002 gubernatorial contest, which saw Inamine easily defeat (actually crush) his three opponents—the most candidates to run in a gubernatorial election to date—and be reelected for another four-year term. Importantly, Inamine’s victory was aided by the fact that the reformist camp had split and ended up running two different candidates.

This was the ninth gubernatorial election since reversion in 1972. Going into this contest, the conservatives and reformists had each won four elections, so the local media and other observers viewed this election as a judgment on the post-reversion period, particularly as 2002 represented the 30th anniversary of Okinawa’s return to Japan. An Inamine re-election would signify satisfaction with reversion; a reformist victory would mean that voters were unhappy with reversion and that there was still much to do.

Even Inamine, however, was aware that a victory for him could not be interpreted as comfort with the status quo. Rather as his camp stated throughout the campaign, the job that the administration started in late 1998 was only partially complete, and much remained to be done.

In particular the base issues and poorly performing economy continued to require careful attention—issues that have traditionally been at the heart of local politics. Put another way, these issues represent different sides of the same coin, with one usually getting more attention than the other in policy platforms. Inamine was reelected perhaps because his administration promised to deal with both issues, following up on his efforts during the first term. As Inamine himself said, the next four years are to be devoted to helping the seeds planted during the first administration to sprout and grow.

Inamine, supported by the LDP, Komeito, and New Conservative Party (Hoshuto), was most strongly challenged by former vice governor (1993-1997) Masanori Yoshimoto, who while independent, was able to acquire 148,401 votes (or 26.3%) due to the support of the Social Democratic Party, the Okinawa Social Masses Party, and the Liberal League.

He would have done better had not the reformist camp split in the run-up to the start of the campaign, with the Communist Party and its related organizations supporting Arakaki.

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221 Hoshuto was formed in April 2000 as a breakaway party from the Liberal Party. It renamed itself the Hoshu Shinto in December 2002, after members of the Democratic Party left the DP to join Hoshuto (now renamed New Conservative Party). After losing seats in the November 10, 2003 elections, it disbanded and joined the LDP on the 21st of that month.
Shigenobu, a dentist by background and executive director of the Okinawa Medical Cooperative Association, after talks failed to reach an agreement on a joint candidate in September. Significantly, this was the first time in a gubernatorial election that the reformists failed to field a candidate jointly and instead ended up being bitterly divided among themselves. While the anti-base Arakaki camp proudly described itself as the true bearer of the reformist torch in a dig at Yoshimoto, the mere 30,000 to 35,000 votes it possesses organizationally suggested that the Communist Party, by adhering to orthodoxy, was quickly making itself irrelevant in an increasing and diversified population.

In addition to policy differences, as reflected in their respective campaign pledges, a legacy of friction existed between Yoshimoto and the Communists, who abstained in a vote of no-confidence against him in October 1997 when he was serving as Vice Governor in the reformist Ota Masahide administration due to their unhappiness over his relatively practical stand on the base issues and his close ties with the central government. The motion passed by one vote and Yoshimoto had to resign, crippling Ota and binding him further to the agenda of the irreconcilables.

**Results of 2002 Gubernatorial Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Support</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inamine Keiichi</td>
<td>LDP, Komei, CP</td>
<td>359,604</td>
<td>64.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshimoto Masanori</td>
<td>SDP, OSMP, Jiyu</td>
<td>148,401</td>
<td>26.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arakaki Shigenobu</td>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>46,230</td>
<td>8.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matayoshi Mitsuo</td>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>4,330</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even without this division in the rival camp, Inamine’s victory was large by any standard, and indeed he received more than twice as many votes as Yoshimoto and nearly eight times as many as Arakaki. Importantly, he was able to maintain essentially the same level of support (374,833 votes in 1998 to 359,604 this time) despite the all-time low voter turnout (57.22%).

While still too early to tell over the long-term, the victory by Inamine may represent a gradual shift in public opinion that sees the base problem, the traditional rallying cry of the reformist camp, as just one of many issues that require practical, comprehensive solutions rather than the sole issue. This is not to say that the base issue was not a major one in the election or that it does not remain so today (as discussed in Parts III and IV). Indeed, voters in an opinion poll just before the election answered that after the economy, the base problem was an important consideration for them when going to the polls. In particular, as with the 1998 gubernatorial election, the Futenma relocation issue attracted a great amount of attention. In contrast to Inamine’s willingness to accept Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture on certain conditions, including an agreement on a 15-year limit on its use (prior to the start of construction), both Arakaki and Yoshimoto called for relocation outside of the prefecture, with the former urging relocation to the United States and the latter urging possible relocation to mainland Japan. In the end, voters went with Inamine’s approach, first spelled out in the election four years ago, viewing the latter two positions unrealistic as actual policy options at the moment.

The economy, however, was an especially large consideration for voters. Unemployment, then at 9.4%, was actually worse than it was in 1998 when Inamine took office, despite the temporary boom of the G-8 Summit in 2000 and the economic stimulus packages. Despite these continuing problems, Inamine’s victory represented an endorsement of his achievements during the first administration, along with high expectations for the next.

**E. Politics after 2002: Beyond the 30th Anniversary of the Return of Okinawa**

1. **The 2004 Prefectural Assembly and Upper House Elections**

Two thousand four promises to be another exciting election year filled with contests over seats for the prefectural assembly, Upper House,
and Naha mayoral elections.

The first of these contests, the Prefectural Assembly elections, is to be held on June 6. Seventy-two candidates are to contest the 48 seats of the assembly. Of these, 36 are incumbents, 32 are new challengers, and 4 are former assembly members trying to recapture their seats. Of the 32 new candidates, approximately 20 have experience as assembly members at the village, town, or city levels. Company officials, local government officials, and representatives of labor unions make up the remaining 9. Of the 72 candidates, 46 are pro-Inamine conservative or center-right politicians. One conservative has yet to make up his mind on his affiliation. Twenty-four are from the opposition parties. Going into the elections, the pro-Inamine parties hold 28 seats with the opposition at 18. Two seats are currently vacant.

The prefectural assembly elections are seen, along with the July Upper House elections, as part of the same battle this summer for the hearts and minds of the voters in Okinawa, as well as a prelude for the always important Naha mayoral elections this fall and the gubernatorial election two years hence.

In an unprecedented move, an advertising agency was hired to help get voters out, in an effort to surpass the 65.23% voter turnout in 2000, which as Appendix 48 shows was the lowest in history. It is uncertain whether the goal will be reached in light of postwar, and post-reversion trends, but there is no doubt that unemployment still high (7.0%), the war in Iraq highly unpopular locally, and numerous base issues still unresolved and new ones emerging, interest is high.

For the Upper House contest, the reformists decided quickly on Itokazu Keiko, a popular 3-term member of the Prefectural Assembly from Naha and one of the half-dozen women currently serving (the largest of any time in the postwar period). Getting an early start, Itokazu’s OSMP and its allies, the SDP and the JDP signed a 3-party policy accord comprised of 10 sections on March 13. Itokazu, who visited Washington in early February to appeal for a reduction of the bases in the prefecture, subsequently announced her candidacy on April 30 at Yashioso.

Prior to her announcement, her camp had been busy trying to get the cooperation of the Communist Party and Jiyu Rengo in an effort to resurrect the near deceased Kakushin Kyoto Kaigi, which had been increasingly getting weaker since the 1990s, when external realities highlighted the internal differences. The JCP, unhappy with the fact that the policy accord reached above did not call for the abandonment of the U.S.-Japan alliance unlike the policy accord reached in 1998 by Itokazu’s predecessor Shimabukuro Soko, also of the OSMP, demanded that Itokazu continue with Shimabukuro’s approach and not retreat on this issue. Because agreement could not be reached initially, the JCP decided to support Furugen Muneyoshi, the party’s secretary.

With the reformists running two rival candidates however, neither was certain to win against the combined electoral might of the conservatives. As a result of this realization, more efforts were put into reaching an agreement. Amazingly, one was reached and announced on May 1. In doing it, Itokazu agreed to oppose the U.S.-Japan alliance that is a slave to the U.S. and that she would be an independent in the Upper House (as opposed to joining the Democratic Party which the

222 Kengisen Rikkoho Yoteisha wa 72 nin (72 Candidates are Expected in Prefectural Assembly Elections), Ryukyu Shimpo, February 9, 2004.

223 Five current members of the assembly are expected to retire at the end of this term.


225 Ibid.


Communists were afraid of).

The conservatives, on the other hand, chose Onaga Masatoshi, a two-term prefectural assembly member from Naha and policy affairs chairperson for the local branch of the LDP, early on.228 A former secretary to then Diet member Oda Saburo, Onaga found himself initially in competition with Oda Jun, the son of Saburo and currently a prefectural assembly member from Okinawa City, who also wished to run in the Upper House election, and Nishida Kenjiro, who has struggled over the years to get LDP endorsements.229 The others have promised to cooperate to help get Onaga elected, but it is hard to tell whether voters will so easily endorse him and not go with the chance to elect their second female Diet representative, particularly one who is popular among voters.


229 "Jiminto Raika Saninsen ni Onagashi o Konin Suisen (LDP Officially Endorses Onaga for Next Year’s Upper House Election)," Ryukyu Shimpo, December 6, 2003. Just when things appeared to settle down, another candidate emerged—Speaker of the Prefectural Assembly Iramina Takayoshi. His emergence, as well as the others, dramatically suggest that strong leadership in the prefectural LDP is lacking, and that the times of having one political boss, such as Nishime, who could quell such rivalries are long over.
III. The Okinawa Base Problem and U.S.-Japan Relations after Reversion

Despite the clear historical significance of the reversion of Okinawa in U.S.-Japan relations and in world history, namely the peaceful return of territory seized in war, Okinawans themselves in fact perceived little improvement in their lot with regard to the bases in their prefecture in 1972.

Put another way, when U.S. and Japanese officials spoke of reversion of Okinawa as "kaku nuki, hondo nami" (on par with the mainland without nuclear weapons), this simply meant the application of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and related Status of Forces Agreement to Okinawa—basically a normalization of the extremely unusual situation that had existed for 27 years in which the United States was administering the territory and one million inhabitants of its most important ally in the Asia-Pacific.

To many Okinawans, however, "kakunuki hondo nami" meant not only the above, including especially the removal of American nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the time of reversion, but also the reduction of U.S. bases within the prefecture to the level of those on the Japanese mainland. (A more vocal element argued for, and would continue to call for, the complete removal of all bases as well.)

Instead, Okinawans found their concerns about the bases increasing, or at the least, not having gone away: the continued presence of the bases, the regular appearance of B-52s, the frequent occurrence of accidents, crimes against Okinawan residents, racial tensions among U.S. forces, and other anti-social behavior, such as prostitution and drug use, and other incidents (particularly in the wilder years of the Vietnam War), the start of live-fire training over Prefectural Road (Kendo) 104 in the Central-Northern part of Okinawa, the belated knowledge of the existence of then secret agreement on base usage in the prefecture (the so-called 5/15 memo), and the forced leasing of land for military use. As alluded to in Part II, these issues increased just as the Okinawans were expecting them to lessen with reversion. It was this basic difference in expectations and perceptions that would dominate the post-reversion period, and particularly the 1970s.

A. U.S. Bases at the Time of Reversion

U.S. bases in Okinawa have almost always occupied a large presence since the first ones were built in April 1945 following the landing of U.S. forces in the Battle of Okinawa. Their scale (as a reflection of the ratio to the dense population) would increase in the early years as the population increased following repatriation and the introduction of better health care created a growing local population. In addition, base expansion projects (much done through the forced acquisition of land) in the 1950s added to this large presence.

At the time of reversion in May 1972, U.S. facilities occupied 286.6 square kilometers, or approximately 27.2% of the main island of Okinawa, giving rise to the description of Okinawa as being not so much an "island of bases," but rather an island inside a large base ("kichi no naka no Okinawa"). With roughly 19% of the main island of Okinawa still used for U.S. military purposes today in the early 21st century, the description is equally accurate now as it was 30 years ago.

Because of this fact, as well as the actual ability of the U.S. military (then at a strength of roughly 45,100\textsuperscript{230}) to reduce its presence and consolidate its facilities as a result of the reversion of Okinawa and arrival of the SDF (which, as discussed below, would be responsible for most island and area defense functions, as per the Kubo-Curtis arrangements\textsuperscript{231}), the reversion agreement of

\textsuperscript{230} The numerical breakdown as of 1971 was as follows: Army, 12,800; Marine Corps, 18,900; Air Force, 11,800; and Navy, 1,600. See \textit{Summary of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and Related Arrangements}, in Records of the Army Staff, RG 319, United States National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

\textsuperscript{231} For a recent, detailed study of the arrangements worked out at this time, see Ishibe Shun, \textit{Okinawa Henkan, Jieitai Haibi to Nichibei Kankei: Kubo-Curtis Kyotei no Kosho Katei} (The Reversion of Okinawa,
June 1971 included a Memorandum of Understanding on the bases.

Within this MOU were three charts (appearing as Appendix 4) that introduced the 134 bases existing at the time and their planned disposition. Chart A listed 88 facilities that were to be retained for use by the U.S. military and not returned. Chart B listed 12 facilities that could be returned at an appropriate time in the future. Chart C was a listing of those 34 places that could be returned immediately.

Recognizing the political, practical, and operational need to realize these returns, both governments considered further consolidations of bases in both mainland Japan and Okinawa and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, at the January 6-7, 1972 summit meeting with President Richard M. Nixon at the latter’s private residence in San Clemente, California, requested that the U.S. government see that U.S. bases in Okinawa be realigned or reduced to the extent possible, particularly those in areas densely populated or closely related to industrial development. In response, Nixon promised to take these factors...fully into consideration in working out after reversion mutually acceptable adjustments in the facilities and areas consistent with the purpose of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

As part of this process, the 14th session of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee met the following year on January 23, 1973 to formalize the Japan Facilities Adjustment Plan (JFAP). As per the organization of the SCC, the meeting was attended by Ambassador Robert S. Ingersoll, representing the United States, and Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi for Japan.

Ingersoll had been appointed ambassador to Japan in 1972 and visited Okinawa in June immediately after its reversion. He had been concerned about both the particularly shocking crimes of U.S. forces in the prefecture during his tenure--the departure of our military personnel while off-base--and the extensive use of land on Okinawa for our military, issues that would continue to frustrate U.S. ambassadors to Japan over the years. With regard to the latter problem, Ingersoll described the following situation (that could have been written today) in his memoirs:

The Okinawans were forced to live in very crowded areas. They could see the expansive lawns, golf courses and other recreational areas


Prefectural officials have accused officials of the central government and U.S. military of playing a numbers game at the time. For example, in order to give the impression that the number of bases to give the appearance of there being a greater number of facilities and areas consistent with the purpose of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 233

233 Prefectural officials have accused officials of the central government and U.S. military of playing a numbers game at the time. For example, in order to give the appearance of there being a greater number of facilities and areas consistent with the purpose of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 233 Prefectural officials have accused officials of the central government and U.S. military of playing a numbers game at the time. For example, in order to give the impression that the number of bases to give the appearance of there being a greater number of facilities and areas consistent with the purpose of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

234 Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 236. The SCC was created in 1960 at the time of the revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in accordance with Article IV of the new treaty. The article states: The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. At its 12th meeting, held in December 1970, a draft consolidation plan for U.S. facilities in mainland Japan was agreed upon. Subsequent discussions in the SCC were based on this draft.


236 Ingersoll, American Embassy, p. 137.
occupied by the Americans. Each of our military services had their own bases, airports, entertainment facilities and PX’s. Again, I was the butt of the Japanese government’s efforts to reduce our use of land. To convince our military commanders and their staffs that it would be to their budgetary benefit and to the American diplomatic advantage to consolidate some of these facilities and thus release some of the land areas we were occupying to civilian Okinawan use was very difficult and in some cases impossible. I spent considerable time while on Okinawa on this subject and followed up from Tokyo through my staff during the balance of my tour in Japan. Some progress was made, but the issue continued to confront me and my successors.237

As alluded to by Ingersoll, U.S. and Japanese officials had been working on the issue in fact prior to the reversion of Okinawa, and stepped up their work following it.

The JFAP addressed facilities both in the mainland and in Okinawa. The former was known as the Kanto Keikaku, or Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, and the latter as the Kadena Relocation and Consolidation Plan, or Kadena Kichi Iten Shuyaku Keikaku.238

The Kanto Plan focused on the release of more than 6,000 acres of high value real estate at numerous facilities (primarily Air Force) through a major realignment of U.S. forces in the Kanto area into the Yokota Air Base.239 This came about as a result of pressure to reduce land use in the Tokyo area due to a rapid increase in population, as well as the ability to return facilities no longer necessary, particularly in light of the scale down of U.S. forces in the region after the Vietnam War and in light of dramatic budget cuts.

Hints of the contents of the Kanto Plan were given as early as January the previous year, when Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo returned from San Clemente and announced that he and Secretary of State William P. Rogers agreed that U.S. bases in the Tokyo area should be consolidated into Yokota Air Base within three years time.240 As part of that process, the headquarters of U.S. Forces Japan and the Fifth Air Division were relocated to Yokota in November 1974 and Fuchu Air Base, Camp Asagumo, Tachikawa Base, Kanto Mura Housing, Johnson Housing, and the Mito Range were all subsequently closed or relocated to Yokota.241 Implementation of the plan took longer than expected, however, but by 1982 the realization of the Kanto Plan was 100 percent complete, at a total cost of 82.5 billion yen.242

The Kadena Plan, likewise, went relatively smoothly probably because the consolidations planned in 1973 were smaller in number—three, totaling 480 hectares. Unfortunately, as is discussed below, the greater the size and number of reductions and consolidations, it seems, the harder they became to realize.

With the Kadena Plan decided on, the SCC met again on January 30, 1974 for its 15th session to approve the first phase of the Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan (OBCP) or Okinawa Kichi Seiri Togo Keikaku. Attended by Ohira and Acting Ambassador Thomas J. Shoesmith243, the two sides agreed on the return of 48 facilities for a total area of 2,788 hectares.244

In an oral history, Shoesmith noted that while his staff had encountered problems with individual base commanders, the Embassy worked well with the then commander of U.S. forces in Japan, Gen. Persley, and Maj. Gen. Lawrence F. Snowden, a Marine Corps officer serving as the deputy commander, both of whom showed very good leadership from the

237 Ibid.

238 Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 236.

239 Ibid. Also see partially declassified State Department Briefing Paper, U.S. Military Presence in Japan (August 1972). Implementation of the plan would reduce the Air Force presence by 50%.

240 Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 238.

241 Ibid., pp. 236-238.

242 Ibid.

243 Ingersoll had been asked by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to return to Washington to assume the position of Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and the Pacific in mid-October 1973 and his replacement had yet to be named. Eventually, James D. Hodgson was nominated on March 16, 1974 and arrived in September.

244 Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 237.
top. Without this leadership, the returns and consolidations could have actually taken more time (at a greater risk to the relationship in the long term).

As a result of this cooperation, the U.S. side was able to agree on the following categories of bases being designated: 1) Facilities and Areas for Release without Relocation, 2) Facilities and Area, Release of Which Will Be the Subject of Further Discussion. Progress was made on the former relatively quickly, and to a lesser extent with the latter, although several bases such as Camp Boone, Zukeran Communication Site, Camp Mercy, and Kashiji Army Annex were eventually released unconditionally after further discussions.

As a result of these talks and in light of further consultations between the two sides for a further plan for realignment and consolidation developed in accordance with the desires of the people of Okinawa Prefecture over the past several months, the SCC, at its 16th session official meeting held on July 8, 1976 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to approve the next phase of base consolidations and returns in Okinawa. Attended by Ambassador James D. Hodgson and Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, the two sides agreed to the return of 12 facilities for a total area of 2,478 hectares.

The areas designated for unconditional release (without the need for relocation of their functions) were parts of the Northern Training Area, Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen, and the Army POL Depot, and “The Facilities and Areas for Release Contingent upon Agreement on Relocation Arrangements and Their Implementation” included: all of Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and parts of Yaedake Communication Site, Camp Schwab, Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Torii Communication Site, Camp Zukeran, and the Army POL Depot.

Decisions on Okinawa Base Returns, 1973-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCC Mtg</th>
<th>No. of facilities to be returned</th>
<th>Total area(hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>About 480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>About 2,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>About 2,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of these 3 rounds of talks between 1973 and 1976, as seen in the table above, some 63 facilities in Okinawa were marked for release, totaling 5746 hectares. For reasons explained below, progress in some of these returns (and in their re-utilization) went slowly. Of the 63 facilities, 29 (totaling approximately 3000 hectares, or more than half the area to be released) were not unconditional but subject to relocation and other requirements. As result, several facilities, including Naha Military Port and Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield have still not been returned. By the late 1980s, when the next major round of force reductions and consolidations would be discussed; however, it should be noted that 25 (totaling 1300 hectares) of the 29 conditional returns had in fact been realized.

This chart is based on a similar one in Japanese appearing in Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 237.

One of the largest returns (of 410 acres) was of Makiminato Housing Area, in the northern part of Naha City. It was officially released on May 31, 1987, but took a decade for land ownership to be clarified and a basic plan for its redevelopment to be agreed upon. Over the past few years, it has seen a great deal of construction projects, including the relocation of several companies from the more congested downtown


247 Ibid.

248 Hodgson had formerly been Secretary of Labor in the first Richard M. Nixon Administration (1969-1973) and an executive for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation before that. Author’s interview with James D. Hodgson, June 4, 2001, Beverly Hills, California. For more on his appointment, see his self-published book Giving Shape to a Life: A Backward Look written in 1990, particularly chapter 9.

249 Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 237.
There were several reasons for the relatively slow return of the land (as compared to the swift implementation of the Kanto Plan). Many of these reasons can be seen in the following comments by individuals responsible for drafting and implementing the plans.

In the late 1980s, for example, in response to questioning by Diet member Kyan Shinei, then with the Niin Club252 and a former leader of the reversion movement, at a meeting of the Upper House Budget Committee (Sangiin Yosan Inkai) on May 13, 1987, Director General of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency Shishikura Muneo gave two reasons for the lack of process, on this the eve of the 15th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa. First, he explained, was the difficulty in selecting a site for relocation, for the bases to be retuned on the condition that an alternative site be found within Okinawa (or Japan).253 The second reason cited was the fact that the opinions of the landowners [who opposed the return of their land because of the loss of the rental income] made realizing the returns problematic.254

DFAA officials added other explanations, showing the complex situation and differences in the reduction plans. In the Kanto Plan, many of the facilities, Suzuki Akira, Director of the Facilities Department (Shisetsubu), stated, were for leisure and not absolutely essential. The bases in Okinawa, on the other hand, were vital, which explains the need for conditions (such as a relocation site) being placed on their return.255

Relocating housing is relatively easy. It is simply a question a moving it to an existing facility. But moving housing is much different from moving vital bases. There are special bases in Okinawa that have been identified as returnable on condition that a relocation site be found. They are special because alternative sites that can handle their functions are limited. The problem with Naha Military Port and Ie Jima airfield are a case in point—it is necessary to match the operational requirements with the agreement of the [local community of the] relocation site. Although the military port is literally at the entrance to Okinawa, it is a tough issue.256

To summarize, the following reasons therefore can be given for the real or perceived delays in the reduction and realignment of U.S. facilities in Okinawa in the early post-reversion years, although they apply equally well to the situation today. First, the bases in Okinawa were generally judged to be strategically vital and thus more important than many of the U.S. facilities in mainland Japan, and thus, while facilities in other parts of the country could be closed or realigned, those in Okinawa would be considered the very last ones that could be closed.

Second, and similarly, because of the importance of the facilities, many could not be released unless their functions were maintained in some way (such as a relocation site or a consolidation somewhere). Identifying a relocation site and getting the approval of local landowners and communities for hosting a new facility (or even an increased presence at an existing facility) would prove extremely problematic, as we have seen in recent years with the Futenma relocation.

Third, most of the land in mainland Japan for which base consolidations took place was nationally owned, which meant the government was legally and administratively free to pursue realignments as there were no landowners to consult. On Okinawa, on the other hand (as seen in the chart below), much of the land identified for return was privately and locally

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252 The Niin Club is a political party formed in 1983, led by Upper House members. It started in 1953 as a political grouping (kaiha) in the Upper House in 1953. Since 1998, it has been unsuccessful in electing any of its members to the Upper House.

253 Testimony in Budget Committee cited in Kikumura and Kinjo, Doko e Iku, p. 235.

254 Ibid.

255 Ibid.
owned, and it was necessary to both clarify the property rights, and then gain the support of landowners and local communities in any reductions and consolidations. This was not an easy task.

### Types of Land Ownership in Okinawa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ownership</th>
<th>U.S. Military Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Area (Thousand ㎡)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Owned</td>
<td>81,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>156,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items of Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture Owned</td>
<td>8,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality Owned</td>
<td>69,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Owned</td>
<td>78,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>237,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, Okinawa was home to the largest number of ground troops—the U.S. Marines Corps—and thus facilities were necessary to support their presence, something that was not necessary in mainland Japan where there was no heavy ground presence. (This of course leads to arguments for greater burden-sharing among Japanese prefectures to host U.S. forces, which both Ota and Inamine have called for.)

Whatever the reason, Okinawans in the 1970s hoped for the return of the more troublesome bases and facilities that were inhibiting economic and physical development in the prefecture. They were then and now particularly critical of the conditions, such as relocation of the functions within the prefecture, that have been applied to several of the returns over the years. Applying such conditions from the beginning while saying that the fault with the delay in the returns lies with the local residents is both hypocritical and irresponsible, critics have argued. Indeed, due to the less than rapid progress in the returns and consolidations in the 1970s, many in Okinawa came to feel that the reversion of Okinawa was yet to be completed. In other words, until all the privately owned land was returned to the original owners, Okinawa was not yet truly free of U.S. control and thus had not been reverted.

### B. Ensuring Land Usage—the Repeated Crises over Legislation for Compulsory Leasing

This feeling was most dramatically felt in the standoffs over land usage that continues today and is a particularly emotional issue.

In order for the U.S. military to be able to continue to use its bases in Okinawa following reversion (these facilities of course would revert to the Japanese government which would then make them available to use by the U.S. side), the GOJ prepared controversial legislation known as the *Okinawa ni Okeru Koyochito no Zantei Shiyo ni Kansuru Horitsu* (Law Concerning the Temporary Use of Public and Other Land in Okinawa) in November 1971, some six months before the actual return of the islands, for passage by the Diet to go into effect on May 15 (1972).

Eventually on December 14, the Diet passed it and other 31, along with three other reversion related bills such as the Reversion Agreement, the Special Measures Law relating to Reversion (*Fukki ni Tomonau Tokubetsu Sochi ni Kansuru Horitsu*), and the Special Measures Law on Okinawa Promotion and Development (*Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochiho*) the Diet passed them in a near riot situation. Because these bills relating to Okinawa’s reversion were being considered at the time, the Diet session was known as the Okinawa Diet and convokes strong feelings among the older generation in Okinawa because it represents an incomplete and unpopular reversion.


258 Symbolic of one of the contradictions that make up the Okinawa problem is the fact that some land-owners have preferred to lease their land and thus strongly resist attempts to have their plots returned. This side of the story is often under-reported. For more on the landowners, see...

259 An example of the feelings held at the time can be found in the following article by Kyan Shinei entitled...
Some three weeks before on December 9, the so-called Hansen Jinushikai, or Antiwar Landowners Association, was formed by those opposed to cooperating with the central government on land leasing. At the time of its formation, there were 396 landowners who were against leasing their land but not everyone joined the above association. (Indeed, some 30% or more than 100, did not do so, either not knowing about its creation, or simply being against participating in a social movement.) According to one of its most ardent members, scholar-activist Arasaki, the association at the time of its founding was comprised of people of all ideological, professional, and social backgrounds and ages. If it had not before already, it would subsequently take on an increasingly stronger antiwar color. The 1971 bill was seen by landowners to be in violation of the postwar Constitution, whose Article 29 protected private property, Article 14 guaranteed equality under the law, and Article 95, which stated a special law could not be applied to one area without a referendum of its citizens. Despite these criticisms, the

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260 The official name of the organization is Kenri to Zaisan o Mamoru Gunyochi Jinushikai, or the Association of Military Landowners for the Protection of Rights and Property.

261 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 39.

262 Ibid. Also see Arasaki, Okinawa: Hansen Jinushi, Rev. Ed. (Okinawa: Anti-war Landowners), (Tokyo: Kobunken, 1986).

263 As seen in the chart below, there are approximately 3100 anti-war landowners, but of these, only a little more than one hundred make up the original anti-war landowners. Approximately 3000 therefore are the Hitotsubo Anti-war Landowners, introduced later, who act as a support group. Of these three thousand, almost half (1450) are based in or from mainland Japan.

264 Article 29 states: (1) The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. 2) Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. 3) Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor. (2) The related section of Article 14 states: (1) All of the people are equal under the Law Concerning the Temporary Use of Public and Other Land in Okinawa went into effect on May 15, 1972 and would continue until May 14, 1977. During this time, the central government reportedly pursued different approaches to get those not cooperating to go along and lease their land. The first of these tactics was psychological. According to a history of the association, pressure was put on the landowners to sign by aggressively contacting them at their work sites and homes, and interfering with their search for employment. The second approach was done through positive and negative economic incentives. Large rental fees were (and are today) paid to induce them to agree to lease the land. For those that did so willingly, an additional payment for cooperation was given. For those that did not agree, rents were paid in lump sums and then taxed heavily.

In order to protest these actions and support the antiwar landowners, as well as to promote the anti-base movement as a whole, the Koyochiho Iken Sosho Shien Kenmin Kyoto Kaigi (Council to Protect the Constitution from the Unlawful Use of Land For Military Purposes) was formed on February 16, 1976 by 18 organizations, including the Communist Party, Socialist Party, Komeito, and OSMP. A year later on March 8, 1977, the antiwar landowners brought a lawsuit against the central government arguing that their rights, as guaranteed in the Constitution, were being violated.

With the law about to expire on May 14 that year (1977), the government began to explore the creation of a new bill that would permit the continued use of the military land.

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265 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 40. Arasaki describes Iken Kyoto as the successor to Fukkikyo, formed in 1960, to promote the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, and basically it was, although Fukkikyo in its early years more pro-reversion than anti-base as it became in later years.
Perhaps realizing that it would be impossible to get such a law passed on time or perhaps even ever, it instead sought a law that would call upon the central government to clarify the property delineations of the respective plots and during that time, continue to exercise administration of the land. Such an effort had actually been necessary for a while and often requested by the Prefectural Government because of the need to clarify property rights to allow the quick and proper re-utilization of the land once it was returned (as well be discussed in more detail later). However, because it was limited to only land used by the military, it was quickly apparent to not only people in the prefecture but to the opposition parties in the Diet that the bill was simply a way to buy time for the central government. The prefectural government proposed its own draft to counter the government’s draft, but it was not seriously considered by the central government. The Socialist Party, Komeito, and Communist Party subsequently submitted a joint bill, based on the prefectural government’s draft.\footnote{Arasaki, \textit{Jinushi}, p. 91.}

Eventually, because the central government assented to expanding the scope of the investigations beyond that of the bases to include the entire prefecture (as desired by the OPG and opposition parties), the opposition parties agreed to compromise and support the bill that included the extension of the \textit{koyochiho} for an additional 5 years.\footnote{Arasaki, \textit{Okinawa Gendaishi}, p. 59.}

The news of this, as reported in the press in late April, came as a big surprise to the delegation of anti-base groups from Okinawa and mainland Japan who had gathered in Tokyo to hold a rally against the new bill’s deliberations in the Diet that spring.\footnote{Arasaki, \textit{Jinushi}, p. 92.} The April 26 gathering, attended by 7000 according to organizers, was the first large-scale rally on the Okinawa problem since reversion.

In any case, the vote was not conducted until May 18 and the bill (\textit{Chiseki Meikakuka Ho}, or Law on Clarifying Land Boundaries\footnote{The official name of the law is the \textit{Okinawa Ken no Kuikinai ni Okeru Ichi Kyokai Fumeichikinai no Kakushitsu no Tochi no Ichi Kyokai no Meikakukato ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochiho} (Special Law Concerning the Clarification of Land Boundaries in Areas whose Borders are Unclear in the Region of Okinawa Prefecture).) would not become effective until the next day, several days after permission for land use had expired. As a result, these four days in which the central government was using the land without legal foundation are described locally as the time in which a gaping hole existed in the U.S.-Japan security treaty (\textit{Anpo ni Kazeana o Aketa}), a scenario that threatened to repeat itself some twenty years later when the central government found itself pressed to create revised legislation in mid-1997. During these four days, several hundred landowners on more than a dozen U.S. facilities entered their property to have picnics and plant crops to symbolically reclaim their land, with the newspapers describing the central government as guilty of being in violation of an illegal occupation.\footnote{Arasaki, \textit{Okinawa Gendaishi}, p. 56, and Arasaki, \textit{Jinushi}, 101. The JDA was reportedly quite concerned with the turn of events, and set up a special crisis room called the \textit{Okinawa Boei Shisetsu Rinji Taisaku Honbu} around this time to deal with the problem.}

With the passage of the new bill on May 19, the administrative means to oppose the government were temporarily exhausted, although the legal battle would still go in the courts.

The subsequent work at clarifying property rights and boundaries by the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau began to be seen as no more than an effort to stall and continue to be able to use the land. Eventually, the number of landowners deciding not to cooperate increased. Realizing that it would likely be impossible to extend the \textit{koyochiho} again, particularly in light of its possibly anti-constitutional nature, the government began exploring the possibility of applying the \textit{Beigun Yochi Tokubetsu Sochiho} (Special Measures Law on U.S. Military Land), first enacted in 1952 for U.S. facilities in mainland Japan, to Okinawa. The fact that a conservative
administration (that of Nishime’s) had taken over the governorship in Okinawa, made that bill’s application all the more attractive as explained below.

The special measures law had five steps to be taken in order for the land to be leased. First, the prime minister had to approve which land would be used for U.S. facilities. Second, the director of the Naha DFAB would ask each landowner to sign the report based on an examination of the land and assets. If the landowner refused, then the mayor of the village, town, or city that the land is located in would be asked to sign instead. If the mayor refused, then the governor would be requested to sign. Third, after this was completed, the director of the DFAB would submit the report to Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee (Ken Tochi Shuyo Inkai) for its decision on whether to permit the use of the land. Upon accepting the application, the land committee would request the mayor of the town in which the land was in to place the request on public display and notify the affected people. If the mayor refused, then the governor could be requested to do so. Fourth, after notification was completed, the prefectural land committee would hold kokai shingi or public deliberations, in which the director of the DFAB and the affected landowner would speak. Fifth, following these public hearings, the land committee would make its final decision.

Importantly, as noted in Part II, the 1980 Prefectural Assembly elections saw the LDP and independent conservatives securing a majority and thus the composition of the membership of the above land committee becoming conservative.271

As seen from the above, there were two stages when the mayor and/or governor might become involved—step two, at the time of signing, and step three, at the time of notification. If the governorship were in conservative hands, the process would (theoretically) eventually run smoothly, but if it was in reformist hands, such as in the 1990s under Ota Masahide, things could become problematic if the governor refused to cooperate. This is precisely what would happen in 1995 and 1996, necessitating the 1997 amendment to the law, which provided for: 1) continued temporary use as long as an application has been made by the last day of the period of use (even if a final decision has yet to be reached) and 2) continued temporary use while the land committee deliberates.

In any case, in November 1980, DFAB representatives in Okinawa began the process of securing continuation of land usage against landowners that had not already agreed to cooperate.272 In line with step one described above, then Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko approved the need for land held by 150 anti-war landowners in January 1981. On March 20, the director of the Naha DFAB asked the land committee to approve a five-year extension on use of that land. Some six public hearings were held between August 4 that summer and February 27, the following year. On April 1, 1982, the land committee approved the 5-year extension requested by the DFAB, effective May 15. The government had successfully secured another five years in which to provide bases.

During this time, small numbers of representatives from Iken Kyoto and other anti-war groups mobilized and sat in on the hearings but were unable to prevent the proceedings from being carried out. A conservative mood had set in, Arasaki writes. Indeed, May 1982 represented the 10th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa. Opinion polls at the time suggested that the Okinawan public had come to view the reversion positively by almost a three-to-one ratio as compared to 1972 (see discussion in Part II). Namely some 63% saw reversion as a

271 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 85.

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272 Ibid., p. 86.

273 Suzuki would visit Okinawa later that year on September 14. It was the first time that a current prime minister had visited Okinawa in post-reversion period. Suzuki had traveled with then-Prime Minister Sato Eisaku at the time of his historic visit to Okinawa in August 1965 when he declared on the tarmac of America’s Naha Air Base that the postwar would not be over until Okinawa was returned.
very good thing. (This number would continue to grow to 88% in 1992, the 20th anniversary of the return.) Reasons given included the fact that health care and welfare had expanded, infrastructure had improved, and exchanges with the mainland had increased. Generally speaking, a majority of the people felt that their daily lives had improved after reversion.

But this did not mean that the anti-base, anti-war movement was completely dead. In June that year, a new movement known as the Hitotsubo Hansen Jinushi, or One Tsubo Anti-war Landowners was born. The movement was the brainchild of Hirayasu Tsuneji, then president of the original anti-war landowners association, and owner of property inside Kadena Air Base. According to the plan, a small parcel of Hirayasu’s land, about 3.3 m², or one tsubo in Japanese measurements, would be purchased for 10,000 yen and could then register as its owner as a show of solidarity for the anti-war landowners and to complicate the leasing process by increasing the number of landowners opposed to the leasing. Initially, the association was limited to people in or from Okinawa, but because many with a connection or affection for Okinawa appealed the restriction, it was opened up. Eventually, several thousand people would join from both within and outside of Okinawa, dwarfing the number of original anti-war landowners (and exposing the movement to criticisms that it was made up of outside agitators).

Land leasing would become more problematic and heated as time went on, new controversial methods employed, and the number of actors increased. Not taking any chances, the Japanese government began the process of preparing for the next extension to start in May 1987 as early as November 1984 by sounding out landowners. On August 5, 1985, the director of the DFAB in Naha asked the Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee to consider extensions again after 1987, this time not for 5 years, but for 20 years until 2007.

Owners of Land for Military Use in Okinawa 1972-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those signing leases</td>
<td>27,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Koyochi Law)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those not signing leases</td>
<td>2,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Special Measures Law)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitotsubo Anti-War Landowners</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Mainland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five-year extensions were already considered unusually long, as compared to those done on the mainland, which were normally one to two years. A lease of twenty years was unprecedented and raised opposition. The DFAB’s argument for doing so was that Article 604 of the Civil Code permitted the extension of rental rights up to 20 years, and thus its continuing of land leasing until 2007 would not be inappropriate. In response, it was pointed out that such a law was based on the consent of the renter; in the case of the forced leasing of land for base use, it was being done against the wishes of the landowners.

The first of the public hearings by the land expropriation committee was held on February 16, 1986. Some eight hundred people were in attendance, including many of the members of Iken Kyoto and the Hitotsubo Anti-war Landowners.

274 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 88.

275 As Arasaki notes, technically speaking, because the price of land at the time was 60,000 yen for one tsubo of land within the base, the owners actually became 1/6th tsubo owners.

276 Ibid., p. 137. A non-official translation of Article 604 reads: 1) The period of a lease shall not exceed twenty years. If a lease has been made for a longer period, it shall be reduced to twenty years. 2) The period mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be renewed; however, it cannot exceed twenty years from the time of renewal. See Hiroshi Oda, Basic Japanese Laws (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 130-131.
Landowners Association who had come down from Kanto, Kansai, and other parts of mainland Japan. In order to present a united front, the landowners and their supporters formed a five-party association comprised of the Antiwar Landowners, the Hitotsubo Antiwar Landowners, Naha City, Iken Kyoto, and a Naha City-based civic organization.

A total of 11 hearings were held thru mid-December, when according to a participant at the time, they were forcefully brought to a conclusion. During the hearings, a heavy police presence and at the last session on December 12, one of the participants was injured in a scuffle with plainclothes police when he came to close to the committee members. Eventually on February 24, 1987, more than a year after the hearings began, the committee approved a ten-year extension of the land leases, the longest to date. The opposition by Gov. Ota Masahide to the continuation of these leases prior to their expiration in 1997 necessitated the amendments introduced earlier. As can be expected, Okinawans were unhappy with the amendments, leading to a strengthening of the feeling that Okinawa is continually sacrificed to the greater interests of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

C. The Arrival of the Self Defense Forces

Another issue in which Okinawans felt that their concerns were subjugated to those of the alliance was in the dispatch of the Self Defense Forces to Okinawa in late 1972.

As part of the process of reverting Okinawa to Japanese administration and the related assumption of defense responsibilities by Japan for the island and immediate area, the U.S. and Japanese governments held intensive discussions in early 1970 on the latter issue. Bilaterally, agreement was reached in which Japan would initially introduce 3200 SDF personnel to Okinawa over several stages, eventually reaching 4600. Subsequently, in light of Okinawan sensitivities toward the SDF, the successor to the Japanese Imperial Army that was responsible for both the fate that befell Okinawa as part of national policy at the time of World War II, as well as many of the atrocities that occurred on the island by individual Japanese forces against local civilians, the Defense Agency decided to scale back its initial dispatch to 3000, with another 1300 coming later in the year. It also chose an officer originally from Okinawa to be its first commander, Maj. Gen. Kuwae Ryoho.

Despite these efforts, Okinawan opposition to the arrival of the SDF was strong and local activists, organizations, and communities put up strong resistance to accepting them into the prefecture. Different methods were employed to make life unpleasant in Okinawa for SDF personnel, such as physical violence, psychological threats, refusing to register their residency cards (juminhyo), refusing to allow 20 year olds to attend the coming-of-age ceremonies (seijinshiki), refusing to register their children in school, refusing to permit participation in

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278 Ibid., p. 140.


280 In the first year, 1972, the size of the personnel deployment was as follows: 1800 from the Ground Self Defense Force, 500 from the Maritime SDF, and 2000 from the ASDF. Thirty years later, the current numbers are: 1850 (GSDF), 1150 (MSDF), 3250 (ASDF) for a total of approximately 6,250. For the distribution of SDF facilities in Okinawa and other information, see the homepage of the Okinawa Liaison Office of the SDF at: http://www.okinawa.plo.jda.go.jp/.

281 According to an Asahi Shim bun opinion poll taken in late August 1971 after the reversion agreement had been announced, 56% of Okinawans were opposed to the dispatch of the SDF to their prefecture upon reversion. This compared to 54% in mainland Japanese who were in favor of it. See Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 42. The dispatch of the SDF led to a reexamination of the war and a series of books about the battle of Okinawa and Okinawa’s relations with Japan.
community sporting events, refusing to cooperate with recruitment in the prefecture. These were clearly violations of the civil and human rights of the individual SDF personnel and their families, and the actions represent a negative mark on Okinawa.

During the 1970s and since then, the SDF has attempted to gain the trust and confidence of the people of the prefecture by providing, in addition to national defense, help in disaster relief, search and rescue, evacuation of sick people in outlying islands, and the disposing of unexploded ordnance from World War II. These attempts would begin to pay off eventually over the years. On the eve of reversion, for example, polls taken by the Ryukyu Shimpô showed that 47.4% of the people in the prefecture were opposed to the dispatch of the SDF to Okinawa with only 16.6% in favor, but by 1987 at the time of 15th anniversary of reversion, some 64% had come to support the SDF. Despite these efforts, it would not be until the start of the Nishime administration in late 1978 before a real change would be seen at the administrative and political levels and the OPG would begin to more openly embrace the SDF. The first visible sign of this new stance was seen on January 14, 1979, when Nishime

282 Naha City, led by a reformist mayor Taira Ryosho, announced its refusal to cooperate in the issuing of residency on December 5, 1972, arguing that its authority did not include those inside the bases. When the GOJ recognized that the jurisdiction of local authorities did include residents of the bases, it began to register them. Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 44. Regarding the issue of cooperation in SDF recruitment, Okinawa was the only prefecture not to do so. This continued until 1979. Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 44. Also see Ishikawa Mao, Okinawa to Jietai (Okinawa and the SDF), (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1998).

283 The SDF in Okinawa has recently produced a history in CD-ROM format of their activities in Okinawa since 1972. See Rikujo Jietai Naha Chutonchi, Soritsu 30 Shunen Kinenshi (A History on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of its Founding).


286 Nishime was joined by Kokuba Kotaro, president of the Prefectural Defense Association, and Lower House member Kokuba Kosho.

287 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 308.

288 Ibid., pp. 346-347.
following week, representatives presented Nishime with a resolution that the rally had passed, calling the decision to open recruitment an administrative act disloyal to the victims [of the Battle of Okinawa] and a reactionary policy. 289

Nishime did not budge. We are required by law to do so...The SDF was established by law and is not there to wage war. There is nothing wrong [with what I am doing]. 289

Nishime was backed up by the 36 members of the Jiyu Shakai o Mamoru Okinawaken Shichosoncho Kai (Mayors of the Cities, Towns, and Villages of Okinawa Prefecture Dedicated to Preserving a Free Society), and in particular its president, Kuwae Choko, Mayor of Okinawa City and relative of the first SDF base commander (Kuwae Ryoho), who sponsored a rally on July 23rd in support of Nishime’s decision. The two camps had clearly drawn their lines.

When Nishime decided on July 31 to go ahead with the start of recruitment the following day, the prefectural branch of the labor union Jichiro (Zen Nihon Jichi Dantai Rodo Kumiai, or All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union), supported by with Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan or Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyo Kyogikai), created a headquarters to fight the start of recruitment and issued orders to its members in the union to participate in opposing it. 290 In 41 places throughout Okinawa, prefectural workers who belonged to Jichiro demonstrated prior to the start of work (until 8:29 a.m.) on August 1 to show their opposition. Recruitment went ahead but when Nishime proposed a supplemental budget of 1,400,000 yen to the Prefectural Assembly in September to pay for the recruitment, the reformist-dominated assembly defeated it, as it did a second budget request in December. 291

The victory of the conservatives in the Prefectural Assembly elections in June the following year (1980), providing Nishime with the chance to try again. During assembly deliberations and questioning later in the year in December 1980, opponents of the bill attempted to disrupt the proceedings and physically prevent Nishime from attending the sessions by blocking the halls. Eventually, on December 18, the police were called in. Because the opposition ended up boycotting the session of the Planning Committee, the bill was taken up in the main assembly meeting on December 24. Two thousand union activists and other opponents attempted to physically show their opposition. Pro-SDF groups also showed up to add to the general chaos of the day.

In the middle of the vote, Tonaki Fujiko, a first-term member from Ginowan, left the hall to abstain from the vote resulting in a deadlock of 22 to 22. Speaker of the Assembly, LDP member Ota Masachi, a cousin of Ota Masahide, had to cast the deciding vote, which he did in favor of the new budget that included expenses for SDF recruitment. Beginning in January 1981, recruitment began once again in the OPG and 18 local communities.

D. Base-related Frictions in the 1970s

Nishime’s support for the SDF, described above, and the U.S.-Japan alliance was not unconditional, however. As governor, he was committed to seeing that the interests and welfare of the prefecture and its people were being protected. Continued incidents and frictions in the post-reversion era, described below, made it necessary for him, his predecessors, and successors to all take a strong position on these problems. Correctly or not, the recurrence of these issues also suggested to Okinawans that little had changed from the pre-reversion years.

One important change was emerging economically, however, which would also have implications for the prefecture’s stance on the bases. Namely, beginning in Fiscal Year 1978, revenue from tourism (mostly from the Japanese mainland) began to exceed base-related income. Thanks to the fact that Okinawa was now administratively a part of Japan in fact as well as in name, and efforts to promote travel to Okinawa had been coming

289 Ibid., p. 347.
290 Ibid., p. 348.
291 Ibid., p. 370.
Along, tourism-related revenue more than tripled as compared to 1972.\(^{292}\) Okinawa was starting to move away from its still large dependence on the bases, one of the so-called three “k’s” that make up Okinawa’s economy—*kichi* (bases), *kokyo jigyo* (public works), and *kanko* (tourism)—and, one might add, other islands that have a large military presence such as Hawaii and Guam.\(^{293}\) Because of this, even conservative Okinawans began as early as the late 1970s to see the bases as a serious impediment to growth. As a result, in the OPG-proposed draft of the Second Okinawa Economic Development Plan (for the years 1982-1992), Nishime requested the inclusion of a clause calling for the consolidation and reductions of U.S. bases, which are an impediment to autonomous growth, and the adoption of fiscal measures to promote the efficient use of military land no longer necessary.\(^{294}\) In the end, the Okinawa Development Agency did not agree to include it in the final draft, and in 1992 and 2002, the base clause would end up getting more attention as a litmus test of how sincere the central government was in dealing with the base issue.

The lack of progress in base reductions in their prefecture continued to frustrate Okinawans throughout the post-reversion period. In a public opinion poll taken at the time of the 5th anniversary of reversion in May 1977, for example, 36% viewed the alliance as necessary, but by 1982, the 10th anniversary, that number had dropped to 28%, with 26% saying that it was unnecessary (a rise from 19%).

The presence of the bases would in turn lead to related frictions over training, noise pollution, accidents, and personnel-related crimes and accidents during the 1970s, and continuing to a lesser extent today. But because the tolerance for these incidents has continued to dropped dramatically over the years—due in part because of the inability to resolve many of the issues earlier on in a responsible, timely, and sometimes courageous manner—U.S. and Japanese officials have to be extra vigilant today.

The first of these problems that emerged in the early 1970s was the continued, and in some cases, increased use of Kadena Air Base by B-52s beginning immediately after the reversion of Okinawa. On May 19, for example, a group of 13 B-52s flew in from Guam to avoid an approaching typhoon. Subsequently, later that year, more and more of the Stratofortresses arrived on the island as they would in years to come. Their occasional visits were of particular concern for the islanders in light of the fact that one plane crashed in November 1968 when trying to takeoff at Kadena.\(^{295}\) It led to massive protests against the bases at the time. As Yara explained in early 1971:

\[^{292}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 431.\]

\[^{293}\text{According to various economic statistics, base-related income in the Okinawan economy currently represents 5% of revenue, down from a high of 41% in 1955 at the height of the base expansion years. However, a study by the Nansei Shoto Industrial Advancement Center entitled the \textit{Influence of U.S. Military Bases on the Regional Economy and Countermeasures}, conducted in March 1999, the figure is actually 10%. For more on military-related spending in the prefecture, see US Forces Japan, Okinawa Area Field Office, \textit{Okinawa's Economy and the Impact of U.S. Forces}, May 2000, particularly Chapter 2.}\]

\[^{294}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 391.\]

\[^{295}\text{In addition to two crewmembers who were severely injured, 5 local residents were hurt and 300 nearby homes were damaged. This was one of several accidents that happened in the 1960s, which followed the tragic F-100 jet fighter crash into Miyamori Elementary School in June 1959 in which 17 children died, 21 were injured, and the much of the school and nearby community buildings and homes damaged. The results of the investigation were never released to the public, inviting distrust. In addition to this distrust, and the general fear of another crash by the B-52s (called locally “Black Terror”), Okinawans were unhappy with the fact that the B-52s were directly participating in the bombing during the Vietnam War, and thus they were a party to the conflict. This feeling would see itself repeated at the time of the Gulf War and other conflicts, when U.S. forces stationed and materials stored in Okinawa were dispatched.}\]
The B-52s stirred up a deep fear of war among the people of Okinawa. In particular, the people of Okinawa wondered what would happen if one of the B-52s, carrying a huge load of bombs, were to crash, as a result of an accident, on a densely-populated part of Okinawa. Judging from past accidents in Okinawa involving U.S. military planes, the possibility of such a crash or other accidents could not be completely ruled out.296

The most heated of the problems perhaps, however, was the start of live-fire training exercises over Prefectural Road 104, which began on March 30, 1973 and continued on and off until the SACO agreement in 1996 approved the relocation of training to outside of the prefecture on mainland Japan (and realized in April 1997). In addition to local protesters, antifar labor unions, and political party supporters, students and radical members of different organizations became involved dramatically escalating the standoffs that emerged.297

The training took place at Camp Hansen, a Marine Corps base built in the 1950s bordering the northern Okinawan communities of Nago City, Ginoza Village, Kin Town, Onna Village. Artillery live-fire exercises were conducted primarily by the 3rd Marine Division, which has been headquartered in Okinawa at Camp Courtney since departing Vietnam in November 1969.298

The target area was approximately four kilometers away, on the Onna mountain range, and with the 155-millimeter shells passing over Prefectural Road 104, which had to be closed during the firing practice because about 3.7 km, or two-fifths, of the prefectural road passed through Camp Hansen. Legally, there was no problem with the closure. According to the agreement reached at the time of reversion, known as the 5/15 Memorandum, local residents could pass through the facility on the road only so long as it did not interfere with the activities of the U.S. military. But, politically, these measures were seen as being another example of Beigun yusen or giving priority to the military.

As a result, violent opposition emerged quickly to these exercises. First, the inconvenience caused by the closing of Prefectural Road 104, an 8.3-km road that linked the East and West coasts of Okinawa, was cited. Secondly, the dangers that the exercises posed to the local residents. During the exercises, which took place at a fairly regular pace, rounds would occasionally miss their targets causing damage in nearby Igei Village to the south and west. Thirdly, the environmental damage was cited due to number of brush fires and extent of environmental damage that began to emerge over the years.

Much of the opposition in the early years, it should be pointed out, was led by outside groups and agitators, in particular, radical factions associated with the Socialist and Communist parties respectively.299

In any case, the first of the rallies against the exercises took place on August 16, 1973. The Socialist Party and their allies took up positions in Igei, while the Communist Party and their supporters staged protests in front of Gate 1 of Camp Hansen. The protests came to be known as the Kisenbaru Antiwar Struggle

297 Okinawa would have its share of problems with radicals in these and other protests. For example, when the then Crown Prince (now Emperor) Akihito and Crown Princess (now Empress) Michiko visited Okinawa on the eve of the International Ocean Expo on July 17, three radicals threw a Molotov cocktail at him while he was paying his respects in front of the Himeyuri monument in the southern part of Okinawa. He was unhurt, but visibly shaken up. See Okinawa Prefecture, ed., Okinawa: 50 Years of the Postwar Era (Naha: Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1995), p. 307.
298 The 3rd Division had been in Okinawa before between March 1956 and May 1965, when it left for Vietnam.
299 Ryukyu Shimpo, ed., Kotoba ni Miru Okinawa Sengoshi 2 (Postwar Okinawa History as Seen in Words, Vol. 2), (Naha: Niraisha, 1992), p. 204. Observers at the time cite the fact that local residents had become accustomed to the presence and exercises, and perhaps believed that protests were futile, as reasons for not more strongly resisting and instead letting outsiders come in and lead the opposition.
(Kisenbaru Hansen Toso), for the area of Okinawa in which the training was being held. They began to draw attention the following year when radicals managed to enter the firing range on February 20, 1974, despite the presence of riot police. A total of 8 illegal entries were made over the next couple of years, necessitating the cancellation of a number of the exercises. When exercises were restarted on July 1, 1976, for the first time in almost a year and a half, one of the radicals inside the training area was injured. Arrests took place in the middle of September when the police applied the Keitokuho, a law dealing with crimes related to U.S. installations that was created to permit the smooth implementation of the Security Treaty, for the first time against protestors from the Gensuibakukinshi Okinawaken Kyogikai (The Okinawa Prefectural Council of Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, or Gensuikyo) who had entered the property.300 Following this, the rallies eventually died down. At the same time, as a precaution, U.S. and Japanese authorities decided not to announce the contents of the exercises.301

The live-fire exercises would continue over the years, as would cases of inconvenience, injuries, property damage, and environmental damage. During a visit to Washington in June 1985, then-governor Nishime requested Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage to end all life fire exercises at Camp Hansen and Camp Schwab (farther to the north), without success.302 As we will see below, Nishime’s successor, Ota, took it up as one of the three most pressing base issues facing the prefecture. Eventually, the SACO Final Report of December 1996 permitted the relocation of the exercises.303 A 23-year battle had finally come to an end.

One battle that did not end, however, was over base-related accidents, incidents, and crimes. In the 1970s, in the heyday of the Vietnam War, a number of shocking crimes occurred which highlighted the already high statistics. In 1972, for example, 2 women were killed by strangling in separate incidents (on August 4 and December 1) by 18 and 19-year-old servicemen, followed by shootings, hit-and-runs and other incidents. In August 1975, in Kin, which was the scene of the 1995 rape, an American serviceman raped two junior high school girls. With no end to the incidents, the number of personnel involved in criminal and other cases jumped to 396 in 1977, the highest in the post-reversion period and about 6.5 times the number of those in 1995.

In addition to these violent and other crimes against local residents, base-related training accidents added a sense of urgency to problems. In July 1969, before reversion, a gas leak at Kadena Air Base which hospitalized some two dozen base personnel forced military authorities to admit that the Army had been storing poisonous gas on the island (eventually evacuating it in January 1971). Combined with the nuclear weapons that had been stored in their backyard and presumably removed in 1972, these incidents with weapons and other

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300 The official name of the law is Nihonkoku to Amerika Gasshukoka to no Aida no Sogo Kyoryoku Oyobi Anzen Hoshu Jojaku Dairokkai ni Motozaku Shisetsu Oyobi Kiku Narabini Nihon Koku ni Okeru Gasshukoka Guntai no Chii ni Kansuru Kyotei no Jisshi ni Toemonau Keiji Tokubetsuho. Its Article 2 makes it a crime to unlawfully enter a facility used by the U.S. military in Japan, enacted in 1960, was applied to Okinawa upon its return in 1972. The defendants were found guilty in 1980 and given 3-month sentences. Keitokuho law was not applied against the landowners who entered their own property the following year in May 1977 during the 4 days when the old legislation permitting the government to lease the land and the new legislation was being debated. Gensuikyo was formed in September 1955, but in 1963, the Socialists left the organization and formed the Gensuikabu Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi, or Gensuikin (Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) in 1965. As a result, the Communists ended up controlling Gensuikyo, and the Socialists, Gensuikin.

301 Ryukyu Shimpo, ed., Kotoba ni Miru Okinawa Sengoshi 2, p. 207.

302 Ibid., p. 209.

303 Prior to the SACO agreement, the 3rd Marine Division had managed to relocate 60 to 80 days of its live-fire exercises to the two Fuji ranges. Under SACO, another 35 days of training was divided between five training ranges in Japan, from Oita to Hokkaido. Live-fire exercises in Okinawa ended in April 1997.
materials plus accidents made Okinawans extremely nervous about the bases, and unhappy with the lack of control they had over what went on inside.

Nishime, for example, as introduced in Part II, was challenged by these problems almost immediately after his inauguration when he learned of the firing range accident in Nago and went up there to see for himself. As any governor would be, Nishime was unhappy with events like that and all other activities that potentially endangered the citizens of the prefecture.

During his subsequent first trip to Tokyo as governor, he met with Amb. Mansfield and Defense Agency Director Yamashita Ganri to protest the incident. Nishime also proposed the signing of a base usage agreement with the U.S. military, in a January 8 meeting with Yamashita. Yamashita, who had also assumed his duties recently (on December 8, 1978), was a member of the Tanaka faction of the LDP, the same faction to which Nishime had once belonged.

It is not clear what answer Yamashita gave, but Nishime went ahead the following week on January 13 and publicly called for the creation of a trilateral committee comprised of representatives of the prefectural and central government and U.S. military. Nishime believed that his pro-alliance stance would permit an improved working relationship with both the central government and the U.S. military to better deal with the problems relating from the daily use of the bases and to develop solutions to prevent the reoccurrence of such problems. In particular, Nishime hoped to see the eventual signing of a base usage agreement for facilities used by the U.S. military within the prefecture based on the so-called 5/15 Memo, which the U.S. and Japanese governments negotiated to determine the rights of usage for facilities in Okinawa and the existence of which had first come to light in March 1973 with the start of the live-fire exercises.

Vice governor Higa Mikio, who worked for USCAR and the U.S. consulate in the 1950s, strongly supported the idea explaining that the tendency in the U.S. military to give the commanders in the field all necessary authority to make decisions locally and thus they might be able to try this new approach to resolving base issues. Subsequently, Oharna Kenei of the Base Affairs Section (Kichi Shogaika) External Affairs Division (Shogai) began gathering information from other base sites around the country such as North Fuji Maneuver Area, or NFMA, and East Fuji Maneuver Area (EFMA), in Yamanashi and Shizuoka Prefectures respectively.

Drafting such a document however would take some time, and indeed, it was uncertain

305 For several years after the revelation of its existence, the 5/15 Memo remained classified and not open to the general public or even the representatives of the local governments, despite calls for it. Following the use of a Harrier pad for landing and take-off practice on July 2, 1977, the issue emerged again. As a result, in February 1978, Governor Taira called on the central government to release the contents of it. Under pressure, in May that year, a summary of the agreement concerning 22 facilities was made public. One year later, in May 1979, Nishime called for the full release of the document (including the conditions on the use of the respective facilities) in a meeting with Defense Agency Director Yamashita Ganri. See Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 341. It would not be released until 1997, however, almost 20 years later when Gov. Ota requested its release following the revelation of the use of Tori island for target practice with depleted uranium shells.

306 Ibid.

307 For more on these facilities, see Camp Fuji’s official homepage at http://www.fuji.asmc.mil/about/history.html. The Base Affairs Division of the External Affairs Division, which came into being on April 1, 1974 (having formerly been the External Affairs Section [Shogaika] of the General Affairs Division [Somabu]), eventually was reconstituted as the Base Affairs Office (Kichi Taisakushitsu), or literally the Base Countermeasures Office, in April 1993, and continues to this day under that name.
whether the U.S. and Japanese governments would even go along with the idea. In the meantime, Nishime saw the need for discussions to take place in line with his belief that a better working relationship was not only necessary but possible. On March 17, Nishime officially proposed the three-party committee to Brig. Gen. Mackenzie, Chief of staff for U.S. Forces, Japan, following a briefing by the U.S. military. The U.S. side concurred, and beginning in May, representatives from the prefecture, U.S. military, and Naha Defense Facilities Bureau, met at the working level to discuss the creation based on the prefecture's proposal.

The first meeting of the Tripartite Liaison Committee (Sansha Renraku Kyogikai), as it came to be called, took place on July 19, 1979 in a conference room at the Prefectural Government building in downtown Naha attended by Nishime, Maj. Gen. Calhoun J. Killeen, the Okinawa Area Coordinator, and Nemoto Takeshi, Director of the Naha DFAB. (Subsequently, the TLC, as seen in Appendix 42, has met a total of 24 times as of 2003), or about once every year. Despite efforts to reduce frictions, it has not fully succeeded in eliminating the problems (nor, perhaps, could it) that existed at the time and would grow in years. Symbolic of this was the stoppage of the TLC in 1995 due to disagreement among the participants over the scope of the jurisdiction and scope of the committee. It began again in 1999 with the start of the Inamine administration but in recent years it seems to be more of a scripted platform for the OPG to simply bash the U.S. military and Japanese government than to seriously try to resolved issues involving all three sides at the local level. The presence of the press at the beginning of each session seems to add to the level of the grandstanding, as does the number of people currently participating, which likely leads to discussions that is more reserved and less productive.

E. Base Related Frictions in the 1980s

The issues seen above in the 1970s would continue into the 1980s, and a number of new problems would emerge at that time as well. The biggest ones had to do with problems over noise pollution, the construction of a Harrier Jet practice landing site, the construction of an urban warfare training center, and parachute practice, to name a few. Reflecting just how heated the frictions became during this time, one recent study has confirmed through empirical research, that the mid-1980s saw the largest number of collective action (rallies, demonstrations, and strikes), in the entire postwar period, including after the 1995 rape incident. Nishime would have his hands full, and this period would foreshadow the problems leaders in Okinawa, the central government, and the U.S. government would have in addressing the dilemma of bases (security) versus local feelings.

1. Kadena Noise Pollution Suit

With the stationing of Harrier Jets, one of the noisiest aircraft in existence due to its higher frequency range and focusing of its exhaust to the ground, and the increase in the number of regional training exercises beginning in the late 1970s came an increase in the number of flights in and out of Kadena Air Base. As a result, in February 26, 1982, 601 residents near the base brought a lawsuit against the central government calling on it to stop nighttime flights and demanding compensation for the noise pollution to date. Subsequently another 300 residents from the communities of Kadena Town, Chatan Town, Okinawa City, Yomitan Village, Ishikawa City, Gushikawa City joined the group (known as the Kadena Kichi Bakuon Boshi Jumin Kyoto Kaigi, or Joint Struggle Committee of Residents Preventing Noise

308 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 342.
309 Ibid., pp. 342-343.
310 Ibid., p. 343.
Pollution at Kadena Air Base) civil action suit, bringing the total to 907 people.\footnote{Matsuda Yoneo, ed., Sengo Okinawa no Kiiwaado: Ō Kichi no Shima Ō no Naritachi to Ima (Keywords in Postwar Okinawa: How it Came to Be the Island of Bases and Now), (Gushikawa Shi: Yui Shuppan, 1998), pp. 190-191, and Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 81.} 312

The lawsuit demanded the following items be addressed: 1) flights and engine testing be banned between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.; 2) noise over the level of 65 decibels would be banned in the areas where the residents live; 3) compensation amounting to 1,150,000 yen would be paid out to each resident who had problems with the noise pollution in the past; 4) residents would be paid another 33,000 yen per month until flights are stopped and noise prevention measures are put in place.\footnote{Matsuda, Sengo Okinawa no Kiiwaado, p. 191.}

The action seems to have been based on a similar lawsuit brought by residents near Yokota Air Base and Atsugi Naval Base in 1976.\footnote{Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 81.} In the case of Yokota and Atsugi, however, the U.S. and Japanese governments in the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee had agreed early on to introduce restrictions on night flights from the bases.\footnote{The bilateral committee, known in Japanese as the Nichibei Godo Iinkai, was established in 1960 under Article 25 of the Status of Forces Agreement, and is concerned with the implementation of issues relating to that agreement.} Such restrictions did not exist at Kadena at the time nor were full measures introduced to limit the negative effect of the noise, such as soundproofing, that had been used in the communities near Yokota and Atsugi since 1975.\footnote{One could note that the different functions and planes at the different facilities would account for much of the reasons behind the difference in restrictions.} Okinawans felt that the difference in treatment was discriminatory. It would take until the 1996 SACO agreement before similar restrictions were agreed to.\footnote{Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 81.}

A judgment in the case was not made until February 1994, more than a decade later.\footnote{While recognizing the plaintiffs’ argument that there had been some noise pollution over 80 decibels and that the central government had a responsibility to compensate the residents, the court denied the ability to determine the exact health affects. It also rejected demands for future compensation as they could be influenced by unpredictable events and thus not possible to judge at that point. Moreover, the court shot down the demands to restrict flights as they were out of the court’s jurisdiction because they applied to a third party. Needless to say, the plaintiffs were unhappy with the judgment and appealed, basing their arguments on the following reasons. First, the setting of 80 decibels was higher than the decision of 75 for the Yokota case. Second, compensation was 15% lower than had been requested. Interestingly, both the plaintiffs and the defendants (the central government) appealed the decision of the Naha Branch of the Court. The central government’s criticism was centered on the argument that residents who had moved on their own accord to the area affected by the noise pollution should be denied compensation (as they chose to move there). The plaintiffs countered that on such a small island, when land had been seized in the past and where compulsory leasing was still being applied, people moved to wherever they could find available land and as such the central government was thus doubly at fault for permitting such a situation to begin with. On May 22, 1998, the Fukuoka Branch of the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on the appeal.\footnote{Ibid., p. 193.} It agreed that the setting of 80 was too high and lowered it to 75,\footnote{The difference between 75 and 80 is not simply 5 decibels, but in fact represents a sound that is 5 times larger because decibel is logarithmic in nature. A sound of 85 decibels can cause hearing loss.} and threw out the government’s argument against those residents who had moved to the area. On the other hand, judge Iwatani Kenichi decided that the court did not have the authority to place restrictions on flights and explained that such}
an appeal should have never been brought to the courts in the first case—a curious decision. The court also decided that it was not possible to know with certainty that hearing problems and other health concerns such as the increased rate of births of unusually small children (under 2.5 kg or 5 pounds) were caused by the aircraft.\textsuperscript{321} In the end, with each side winning some of their arguments in the case, both decided not to appeal the decision.

In the meantime, as described below, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, or S\textsuperscript{2}ACO, which had been created in late 1995 following the rape incident, had undertook immediate actions to deal with the noise problem. Specifically, the SCC approved the construction of noise reduction baffles on the north side of Kadena Air Base (to be finished by the end of March 1998) and the introduction of limitations on night flight training operations at Futemna Air Station\textsuperscript{3} to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{322} Unfortunately for many Okinawans, these measures were at least twenty years too late. Indeed, in most cases, the introduction of such measures earlier on could have reduced possible friction on other related problems, such as the Harrier Jet training practice that started in the late 1970s and would restart in the late 1980s.

2. The Harrier Jet Problem

In the mid-1980s, the Pentagon decided to replace its aging A-4 Skyhawk fighter planes with more versatile AV-8B Harrier jets during FY 1989, and rumors had it that the planes would be sent to Iwakuni Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture where the 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Aircraft Wing is based. At the same time, the Marine Corps began looking for a site within Okinawa Prefecture in which it could conduct practice with the jets that were capable of vertically taking off and landing in close coordination with ground forces (hence, Okinawa where some 21,500 Marines were then stationed).\textsuperscript{323} After discussions with the Naha DFAB, a decision on a site was reached early in 1986 but not announced at the time, probably due to the upcoming gubernatorial election and concerns about the opposition the plan would cause.\textsuperscript{324}

A decade before, in 1977, several Harrier jets had been assigned to Kadena Air Base from Iwakuni and they used areas on Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen for their landing and take off practice, but the frequency of accidents and noise pollution made them highly unwelcome. On November 28, 1977, for example, a pilot was injured when his plane crashed trying to take off, and the next day, during night flying practice, an identical plane crashed in to the sea northwest of Kadena.\textsuperscript{325} Subsequently in February 1979\textsuperscript{326}, after these crashes and other problems (such as the discovery of training sites on existing facilities) with the Harrier, the Prefectural Assembly passed a resolution opposing the continued training without an investigation into the reasons for the crashes. The OPG also requested training that be cancelled.\textsuperscript{327} In late 1981, an attempt was made to build a training site in Takae in Higashi Village along Prefectural Road 70, but opposition from the local community prevented it.\textsuperscript{328} Training was continued at the other sites,

\textsuperscript{321} For more on the effect on health of noise pollution and other matters relating to life near Kadena written from the perspective of an elementary school in the area, see Yamamoto Takashi, \textit{Kichi ni Kakomareta Gakko} (A School Surrounded by a Base), (Naha: Okinawa Kenminkan Kyoiku Kenkyusho, 1996).

\textsuperscript{322} See \textsuperscript{3} S\textsuperscript{2}ACO Final Report \textsuperscript{3} in Appendix 12.
but subsequently for operational reasons the Harrier squad was relocated outside of Okinawa.

Despite this situation, a decision was made by the Pentagon in the mid-1980s to go ahead with pursuing the construction of the Harrier site. The U.S. side sought a site near the Aha Dam, located within the Northern Training Area in Kunigami Village. U.S. officials explained that the construction of the facility would not lead to deforestation or other environmental problems, as it would be built on the unused after-construction site of the dam some years before. A prefectural government official conditioned the construction on proper measures being taken for the area and that the concerns of the local residents be considered.

In early January 1987, a dump truck carrying crushed coral and other building materials stopped to ask a villager the way to the site, and when questioned about his reason, the truck driver told the villager about the pending construction by the Sea Bees, or the Navy’s Construction Battalion. The Aha part of Kunigami Village, where the resident was from, is a 74-household residential area totaling 280 people (at the time). It is located only 1.7 km from the planned construction site, and soon all of the residents of the small community became aware of the construction.

On January 9, the Kunigami Village Assembly held an extraordinary session and unanimously passed a bipartisan resolution calling for the canceling of the construction. Villagers feared not only for the disruption to their daily lives, but were also concerned about the likely environmental impact on the nearby dam’s drinking water and rare birds in the jungle-like area. Later that week on the 12th, residents of Aha turned out for a rally at the community center to protest the construction. Accepting a request by the Aha district residents, Kunigami mayor Miyagi Isamu, a conservative, became head of an anti-construction council set up to develop measures within the community to prevent the construction.

Around this time, Nishime asked a long-time friend and supporter, Yogi Yukimasa, Speaker of the Kunigami Village Assembly, to come to the OPG to talk. Nishime promised that he would not inconvenience the villagers and that he would demand the prevention of flights over residential areas. He then asked Yogi to seek the acceptance of the facility noting that the Harrier practice would only be 4 or 5 times a year and that in the future it would definitely be relocated. Nishime added that if it was accepted, an appropriate amount of money would be provided for Kunigami’s development. Yogi apparently gave some thought to the proposal. We could use a new municipal center and agricultural support, he told an interviewer later, but a mayoral election was scheduled that year and the mayor could not easily or openly embrace the construction.

Any chance of a deal was essentially lost, however, the following week. After a delay of almost 10 days (since January 8) due to bad weather (and likely bad publicity), the U.S. military restarted construction on January 17. Some 80 villagers who had been watching the site from a nearby prefabricated shed attempted to stop the construction, breaking through the Military Police line that had been set up on the perimeters. Four other villagers managed to work their way into the construction site from the hills. The clash with MPs armed with rifles was widely reported in the news and shown on the evening news. The Foreign Ministry

329 Tottoribe, 87-91 Nen Ripooto, p. 33.
330 Ibid., p. 34.
feared that it could easily become a major diplomatic problem.336

With tensions high, Nishime went to Tokyo at the end of January to speak with the Director General of the DFAA, Sassa Yukio, and Director of the Division of North American Affairs, Fujii Hiroaki, to request that the construction of the training facility be postponed, and on the 28th, Nishime met with Takeshita Noboru, then Secretary General of the LDP to also request the LDP’s support in getting the construction postponed.337 Takeshita had been a fellow member of the Tanaka faction and a close follower of Okinawan affairs, having traveled with Sato Eisaku to Okinawa during his historic visit in August 1965.338 Takeshita, soon-to-be Prime Minister, was at the height of his influence.

The next day, January 29th, Nishime was scheduled to meet with III MEF Commander Maj. Gen. Godfrey to ink an agreement permitting Okinawans to attend U.S. colleges located on the bases as one of the more successful examples of a Tripartite Liaison Committee Meeting. Symbolic of the bases having a negative side as well as a potential benefit (such as the U.S. college presence), Nishime met Godfrey at Camp Kinser to discuss the Harrier problem before the signing ceremony.339 Specifically, Nishime requested

altercation between local residents and the U.S. military following a parachute-training incident at the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in which someone landed on a farming plot within the airfield that was owned and being farmed by local residents with the consent of the U.S. military. Tottoribe wrote to the author later (on March 29, 2004) to explain that his own assertion that the Kunigami incident was the first clash was thus incorrect.

336 Tottoribe, 87-91 Nen Ripooto, p. 85.
337 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 482.
338 Takeshita subsequently served as the chairman of the Committee for the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa, which sponsored several days of events in Tokyo in mid-May 1992 with U.S. and Japanese participants to celebrate the reversion.
339 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, pp. 484-485.

that construction of the facility be delayed until after the 42nd National Athletics Tournament to be held in October that year in Okinawa to celebrate the 15th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. Godfrey refused, arguing that they should not give in to violent protestors. Their meeting ended after an hour, with no agreement reached.

Nishime’s office later learned through the general’s interpreter Fujita Tatsuo, who was not well-liked among the locals, that Godfrey was angry that prefectural police had not removed the protestors, and as a result, the international news was carrying a story that the U.S. military gave in to protestors.340 Nishime, on the other hand, was dissatisfied that Godfrey had not been willing to temporarily stop the construction. The year before, the U.S. military had halted live-fire exercises until after the gubernatorial election and Nishime wondered why the military could not or would not do it again.341

In any case, Nishime met Godfrey again three weeks later on February 20 to see if an understanding could be reached on a new construction site or delay in the construction. Eventually, after some 30 minutes, Godfrey agreed to a delay—the U.S. military would not begin construction until after the athletics meet in October.342

One of the main reasons that Nishime had been so concerned about the success of the national meet was that the Emperor and Empress would be in attendance and it was their first visit to Okinawa. Because of the atrocities committed during the war by Imperial

340 For a critical account of frictions in the 1980s, and in particular what was described as a throwback to the occupation days of the U.S. military phenomenon and someone who was an unpolitical political advisor, see Dan Fox, The Mysterious Mr. R, Weekly Post, August 1987. Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 486.
341 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 486.
342 The secret understanding was later reported in the press, but Nishime denied it in questioning by Shirahito Taiichi, a member of Komeito, in the Prefectural Assembly in December that year. See Tottoribe, 87-91 Nen Ripooto, p. 95.
Army troops in the name of the Emperor, not to mention the destruction that befell Okinawa as a result of the war (that Emperor Hirohito did not or could not prevent) and the decision to fortify Okinawa and make an unwinnable stand there against invading U.S. forces, Okinawans had extremely complicated feelings toward Emperor Hirohito. Nishime did not want anything to happen that could jeopardize Hirohito’s visit, possibly his last chance to visit due to his increasingly poor health.343

Another issue was the compulsory leasing for military land that was up for extension that year and which would become even more politically charged if the Harrier problem got out of hand. The reputation of the DFAB, which was responsible for seeking the extension, was already low in the prefecture, and the attitude of then-director Kobodo Tadashi, created new problems with the community in Kunigami. When representatives of the village handed Kobodo a copy of the resolution, he reportedly told them that they were becoming too emotional and were not in a position to request a stop to the construction in the first place.344

In any case, with construction stopped on Godfrey’s orders (following the governor’s request), Nishime secretly flew above the area on August 19, 1987 in Godfrey’s helicopter at the latter’s suggestion.345 This trip probably confirmed for him that it was going to be problematic to build the new facility.

In December 1987, following the National Tournament, just as construction was about to begin construction, the local villagers protested and managed to stop the construction. Subsequently, Nishime announced in the Prefectural Assembly that he would ask the central government to reconsider.346

In early January 1988, Tomita Osamu, Director of the Naha DFAB, visited Nishime.347 When Tomita asked Nishime if he realized the diplomatic consequences of his actions and that he was breaking his promise if he continued to oppose the construction, Nishime responded that in any case he was still opposed to it. The following week, Nishime traveled to Tokyo and asked Director General of the DFAA Tomofuji Kazutaka to stop the planned construction in a meeting on January 12.348 Although the details are unknown, Tomofuji reportedly agreed. On the 18th, Sassa Yukio, then Director General of the Cabinet Security Affairs Office, and several officials from Tokyo visited Okinawa to coordinate policy in light of Nishime’s continued opposition to the construction.349

Nishime subsequently met with Maj. Gen. Norman H. Smith, Godfrey’s successor as Okinawa Area Coordinator, on January 20 to urge that they give up on the Aha site. Godfrey, who was unfairly nicknamed the god of disasters (using a play on his name in the local dialect), was furious.350 The governor does not

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343 As it turns out, the Emperor fell ill in September and had surgery later that month, preventing his traveling to Okinawa. In his place, the Crown Prince, the current Emperor Akihito, and Princess attended. The tournament was disrupted by Chibana Shoichi, later of Elephant Cage fame in the mid-1990s, who pulled down and burned the Hinomaru flag on October 27, during the opening ceremony of the Youth Softball Competition held in his village of Yomitan. For more on this story, see Chibana Shoichi, Burying the Rising Sun: From Yomitan Village, Okinawa Islands of U.S. Bases (Kyoto: South Wind, 1992), which is the translation of the original Japanese version. Also see the discussion of him in Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century’s End (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), pp. 33-104.

344 Tottoribe, 87-91 Nen Ripooto, p. 56.

345 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 486.

346 Tottoribe, 87-91 Nen Ripooto, p. 103.

347 Ibid., p. 96.

348 Ibid., p. 87.

349 Ibid., pp. 96-97. Nominally, the visit was made to investigate an incident that happened on the 9th of that month in which an ASDF interceptor fired a warning shot at a Soviet reconnaissance plane (Tu-16 Badger) that had flown over Okinawa. This was the first time the ASDF had fired a warning shot since its creation.

350 Ibid., pp. 103, 117. Tottoribe wrote the articles that were combined into the book cited here with a particularly strong bias, it seems, against Godfrey. One reason for this may have been the fact that until Godfrey’s time, the commanding officer of III MEF and the Okinawa Area Coordinator were different individuals, but with Godfrey, one person became
keep his promises, he reportedly said in what probably explains the frustration Lt. Gen. Earl B. Hailston felt when writing his famous e-mail about another conservative governor and prefectural leadership 13 years later.\textsuperscript{351}

Despite all of the discussions, no decision was forthcoming. As a result, Nishime decided to travel to Washington again in April 1988 for his second visit to request a reduction in the bases on the eve of the Prefectural Assembly elections—one in which the conservative wave was stopped (indeed, the LDP lost 6 seats) and the reformists held their ground. A series of incidents in which stray bullets were found in residential areas in October and November, a CH-46 helicopter crash in Kunigami on October 31 (killing four U.S. personnel), a tear gas bomb explosion on Gimbaru training area (being used by tacit farmers) on November 20, and friction over training a reservoir of Fukuchi Dam, made the remainder of 1988 quite heated.\textsuperscript{352}

The following January, Nishime went to Tokyo again and met individually with Tazawa Yoshiro, Director of the Defense Agency, and Ikeda Hisakatsu, Director General of the DFAA, to ask them not to pursue construction of the Harrier Pad at Aha.\textsuperscript{353} The night before, January 7, Nishime met privately over dinner with Ikeda at a restaurant in Akasaka and berated him for forcing the construction when the residents were clearly opposed to it. According to those present, Ikeda sat quietly and did not respond, probably in a state of shock that Nishime was really going back on his willingness to permit construction after the 1987 games.\textsuperscript{354}

Nishime had the Okinawan members of the Diet work on his behalf as well. Oshiro Shinjun, who was at this time also the president of the Prefectural Branch of the LDP, and several others went to Tokyo to meet with the Secretary General of the LDP, Abe Shintaro (father of the LDP’s current Secretary General, Abe Shinzo), and request the LDP’s help in getting the construction stopped.\textsuperscript{355} Abe, after promising to have the LDP’s defense committee look at the question, called Ikeda in front of everyone to ask for his support. Ikeda, who had once worked as then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s secretary, knew what this meant.\textsuperscript{356} Namely, the LDP was having a very tough time politically. In early 1989, the LDP lost in a by-election in Fukuoka to the JSP because of the Recruit stock-for-favors scandal and the decision to introduce a 3% consumption tax. Because Lower and Upper House elections were scheduled for that year, as was the gubernatorial contest in Okinawa for 1990, the LDP was reluctant to anger voters any more, particularly with the Harrier problem. Out of political necessity, the plan to start

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\textsuperscript{351} "All Nuts and a Bunch of Wimps," Ryukyu Shimpo Weekly News, February 19, 2001. The Internet version contains a reproduction of the e-mail at (http://www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp/english/enews/e000219.html#enews_01). According to one former U.S. Consul General interviewed by the author who worked with Nishime, one of the reasons he most liked Nishime was because he kept his promises. He did what he said he would do. Perhaps this difference in perception suggests that the issues/protest had become so intense in the latter 1980s that Nishime had to break his word, and/or that with 1988 being an election year for the Prefectural Assembly (and one in which the LDP lost 6 seats), Nishime was more cautious than usual.

\textsuperscript{352} Tottoribe, 87-91 Nen Ripooto, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., December 25, 1988.

\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., pp. 101-102.

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., p. 104.

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., p. 105.
construction in March 1989 was abandoned.

U.S. officials were quite unhappy. In a March 4 luncheon sponsored by the American Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, Lt. Gen. Smith (who was critically viewed by Okinawans as similar in outlook to Godfrey) stated if the Okinawans really loved liberty, they would accept the need for the construction of the Harrier pad. If the issue had reportedly become a big problem in Washington, and officials back in the capital were wondering why it was taking so long to complete the construction.

As an alternative to the Aha site, U.S. and Japanese officials had been exploring the expansion of an existing Harrier pad on Takae hill in Higashi Village, near Camp Schwab. There were at least two problems with the site, however. One had to do with the fact that some 800 million yen would be required for the extensive work involved (and thus the Finance Ministry was opposed). The second reason was the environmental impact—a large number of trees would need to be cut down to accommodate the planes (and thus the Forestry Agency was opposed, not to mention the likely criticism from environmental groups). In any case, when it was reported in the local press that Takae was being looked at, the Higashi Village Assembly passed an immediate resolution against the construction, thereby essentially heading it off before it went anywhere.

Subsequently, officials from the prefectural, central, and U.S. governments began to look at Ie Jima, where an auxiliary airfield was located, as the best alternative site. In the summer of 1988, officials from the Naha DFAB started exploring with leaders of Ie Village the possibility of relocating the training to their island. A year later in June 1989, after intense discussions, Mayor Shimabukuro Kiyotoku (who is still mayor in 2004) announced that he had decided to accept the Harrier training on the island on approximately ten conditions, including: 1) the construction of a large pond for agriculture use; 2) the expansion of sound-proofing measures in the village; and 3) the construction of a health and welfare center for the village. We do not desire the base per se, Shimabukuro recalled, but in order to help this island [Ie Jima] become more self-sufficient in the future. It was a tough choice. In November 1989, the Harrier training site was completed on Ie—the same Ie Jima that led the Okinawa-wide disputes (shimagurumi toso) of the 1950s against the seizure of land by U.S. military authorities and whose village continues as the symbol of the anti-base movement today (due to the presence of the Ahagon Shoko, the landowner in Ie who was called the Gandhi of Okinawa until his passing in March 2003 at the age of 102, and the Anti-War Peace Museum he created there known as the Treasure House of Life Itself). Ie Jima, which lies 10 km off the coast of Motobu peninsula off northwestern Okinawa, represents in many ways an Okinawa Problem within an Okinawa Problem. In other words, as mainland Japan (both the central government and people) tend to desire that Okinawa bears the base problem, Okinawans themselves tend to push off some of the base problems (such as training or construction of relocated facilities) to the north and less-crowded parts of the prefecture. In this...

357 Ibid., p. 132.
358 Ibid., p. 490.
359 Ibid., p. 490.
360 Ibid., p. 490.
361 Ibid., p. 490.
362 Ibid., p. 490.
363 For more on Ahagon and Ie Jima, see Ahagon Shoko, The Island Where People Live: A Photo Documentary of the Troubled Land of Ie Jima, Okinawa Islands (Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia, 1989), and Ahagon Shoko, Inochi Koso Takara: Okinawa Hansen no Kokoro (Life is the Most Precious Treasure: Okinawa’s Anti-War Spirit), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992).
case, Ie Jima, less developed and with a population of less than 6000, is sometimes the recipient of unwanted public goods. Conservative mayor Shimabukuro, who was first elected in 1988, is often torn between the need to seek economic support for developing the island and the opposition of many people whose lands were taken in the 1950s by U.S. forces or who have been inconvenienced in other ways by bombing target and parachute practice.

Shimabukuro’s conditional acceptance of the Harrier training pad was made within the dilemma that Ie village (and Okinawa as a whole) faces, as symbolized by the conditional acceptance by current governor Inamine and Nago City Mayor Kishimoto Tateo of the functions of Futenna Air Station to Nago’s Henoko. Shimabukuro was concerned that the village would lose the revenue generated by the base on the island if returned, revenue that amounted to 700 million yen per year, or a quarter of the village’s annual revenue (plus all the public works the USMC engineers do for the community and the rest of the island). Moreover, an additional 5.5 billion yen was expected to come in over the next ten years related to acceptance of the base (as conditioned by Shimabukuro). Although initially, a large number of those attending rallies in the areas closest to the proposed construction site passed a resolution opposing the arrival of the Harriers, unity among the opponents gradually declined due to the above economic incentives and implementation of measures to reduce noise pollution.

The safety issue would not go away, however. In January 1990, during the first training exercise on Ie Jima, a Harrier jet crashed offshore, leading the Village Assembly to pass a unanimous resolution calling for the cancellation of the practice that was delivered to the governor, Director General of the DFAA, and Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole, Commander of Marine Forces in Okinawa. Residents in Nishizaki ward, closest to the training area, sent a letter of protest to Mayor Shimabukuro as well, criticizing him for not living up to his promises to prevent training at night and near residential areas.

The decision to relocate the construction of the Harrier site (and before that target practice) on the small island of Ie would continue to test the patience of residents over the years. It would also provide the backdrop to the 1996 SACO decision to relocate the parachute drop exercises from Yomitan to Ie described below, exercises that had grown more controversial in the 1980s.

3. Thê Battle ÏOver the Urban Warfare Training Center

Around the time that protests were going on with regard to the planned Harrier pad construction in Kunigami, the construction of an Urban Warfare Training Facility was presenting another point of friction in the relationship.

The U.S. Army and the Defense Department as a whole, preparing for conflicts of the future such as urban conflict, planned to begin construction of an urban warfare facility in the summer of 1988, appropriating approximately $250,000 for its construction within Camp Hansen’s training area. It was to be made of four wooden buildings, a helipad, and some other structures, with different types of weapons to be used. Special Forces would have top priority in using the facility to train, with the Marine Corps also using it presumably when available.

The DFAA initially thought the Northern Training Area would be the more appropriate site, but U.S. military authorities sought another site. While discussions continued between the two governments that fall, stray bullets from one of Camp Hansen’s range landed on the property of some residents in nearby Igei district. Nishime, who had just returned from his second trip to Washington the year before where he appealed for the end to

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364 Ahagon, Inochi Koso Takara, 167.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid., p. 171.
367 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 529.
live-fire exercises, subsequently requested the Defense Agency and DFAA to reconsider construction if live rounds were to be used.\textsuperscript{368}

In addition to a concern for the public safety, Nishime was also influenced by public opposition that had been building. In September 1988, the mayor of Onna Village, Higa Shigemasa, was alerted to the construction of the facility near Range 21 of Camp Hansen and he asked the DFAB to look into it.\textsuperscript{369} After receiving an answer on December 12 that the U.S. Army was in fact building the facility, villagers, led by their mayor, created the Tokushu Kunrenjo Kensetsu Oyobi Jitsudan Enshu Hantai Onnason Jikko Iinkai (Onna Village Council to Protest the Construction of a Special Training Facility and the Use of Live Rounds) to protest the construction and set up camp near the gate. They cited safety and environmental reasons, as well as the negative impact it could have on the village’s plans to develop tourism.\textsuperscript{370} The Prefectural Assembly, in which reformists had made some gains in the previous elections, passed a resolution against the facility on December 23, 1988. On January 13, 1989, U.S. authorities announced that construction, temporarily stopped in December, would be postponed.

In mid-April that year (1989), Nishime invited the mayors of the villages in the north, including Higa, to have dinner at the Governor’s official residence and to discuss the base problem. There, Higa explained that “[t]he live firing exercises [over the years] have caused great trauma to the residents. Onna village is a tourist destination and we won’t accept any further base construction [in our community].”\textsuperscript{371} Nishime, who had secretly visited the construction site five months before on December 15, did not doubt Higa’s resolve or the beauty of the beaches and sea off Onna.

When looking at a resort hotel during the visit, Nishime reportedly told Ishikawa Hideo, then director of the Governor’s Executive Office (later Vice Governor under Inamine) who accompanied him, “I fear what will happen to this place if live rounds are to be used.”\textsuperscript{372} During a visit to Okinawa by U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle in September 1989, Nishime used the opportunity to express his concerns that the planned construction of the Urban Warfare Training Facility in Onna village is causing uneasiness among the people of the prefecture.\textsuperscript{373}

Nevertheless construction, which had been stalled since December 1988, began again on September 6 under police protection.\textsuperscript{374} On October 7, however, when riot police began to physically remove some of the more than 300 villagers who were demonstrating against the construction during a sit-in, two protestors who fought back were injured and taken away in an ambulance.\textsuperscript{375} Just as in the situation with the Harrier Pad protests and live-fire exercises, villagers had clashed with police. For Nishime, the worst was beginning to happen again. After hearing a report from his new director of the governor’s Executive Office, who had gone to take a look at the situation, Nishime said that he would “[h]ave to take it up with the LDP headquarters in Tokyo and request that the central government cancel the construction, no longer just do it on the condition that there be no usage of live rounds. ”\textsuperscript{376} Nishime subsequently went to Tokyo in October, visiting the Foreign Ministry’s North American Affairs Division and the DFAA, as well as meeting with his former colleague, Ozawa Ichiro, who was then Secretary General of the LDP. He requested the government either give up or find a new place in which to build.

Ozawa seems to have taken Nishime’s request seriously, either based on personal

\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., p. 530.
\textsuperscript{370} Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 530.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., p. 531.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., p. 529.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., p. 531.
\textsuperscript{374} Okinawaken Somubu Chiji Koshitsu Kichi Taisakushitsu, ed., Okinawa no Beigun Kichi, p. 242.
\textsuperscript{375} Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 531.
loyalty, or more likely due to the fact that the LDP had been taken a pounding both nationally (in the Upper House elections) and locally, within the prefecture, losing or standing still in the different contests seen such as the Upper House, Prefectural Assembly, and Naha mayoral elections. The government realized, remembered one participant in events at the time, that any more chaos on the eve of the gubernatorial elections [in 1990] was not good and decided to ask the U.S. side to reconsider.

During 1989, a series of base-related problems, such as a jet fuel spill, a helicopter crash, a parachute training mishap, and an emergency landing at Naha airport, had raised tensions within Okinawa and between the OPG, U.S. military, and central government, which Nishime began to publicly criticize the government’s weak stance on Okinawa’s concerns.

One incident in particular had sent shock waves through the prefecture. In the May 8 (1989) edition of Newsweek, a story reported that an A-4E Skyhawk carrying a hydrogen bomb had fallen off Navy aircraft carrier the USS Ticonderoga into the sea off Okinawa and was not recovered. After the Base Affairs Committee of the Prefectural Assembly passed a unanimous resolution calling for the aircraft to be removed on May 11, Nishime went to Tokyo to meet with then Foreign Minister Uno (soon to become Prime Minister) on May 17 to request the government fully investigate the report and take measures to guarantee the safety of the people of the prefecture. As seen from recent declassified documents, the ministry appears to have made the study.

While in Tokyo at this time, Nishime also requested that the Foreign Ministry consider posting officials in Okinawa as a way to expedite the sharing of information and to get MOFA to more seriously address Okinawa’s concerns. With no response coming, Nishime went up the following month after the Uno cabinet had been created and met with Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, the new Foreign Minister, to make a similar request.

While doing all of this, Nishime’s administration was still attempting to deal with the urban warfare training center issue. In the end, the U.S. military completed construction of the facility in March 1990 and began training on May 8. Because it was visible from nearby residences and resort hotels in the area, and was potentially dangerous to those nearby, the prefectural government and community representatives of Onna Village requested that practice with loaded weapons not be done there. In addition, in March 1991, Governor Ota visited Tokyo to request the Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro and Director General of the Defense Agency Ikeda Yukihiko have the center closed. Ota made a similar request when he

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376 Ibid., pp. 532-533.
377 Ibid., pp. 526-527.
378 Ibid., p. 526.
379 According to an undated in-house study conducted by the Defense Department on mishaps involving American nuclear weapons, the incident is described simply as follows: December 5, 1965/A-4/At Sea, Pacific An A-4 aircraft loaded with one nuclear weapon rolled off the elevator of a U.S. aircraft carrier and fell into the sea. The pilot, aircraft, and weapon were lost. The incident occurred more than 500 miles from land. See Department of Defense, Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1980, pp. 28, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bikini Hisai Jiken no Hosho Mondai ni Kansuru Nichibei Kokan Kobun to Ikken (Official Japan-U.S. Documents relating to Problems on Compensation for the Bikini [Atomic] Incident and other matters), File 01-460, p. 031, Japanese Foreign Ministry Records Office, Tokyo. For some reason, the Navy report, cited above, was different from the log books of the desk officers, which were checked by researcher William Arkin, an expert on security issues. The research found that the accident happened 80 miles from the closest point on the Ryukyu Island chain, and 200 miles from the main island of Okinawa. For related stories, see U.S. Violating Japanese Ban on N-Arms: Analyst, Japan Times, May 10, 1989; Bomb Can’t Go Off, Hasn’t Polluted Sea, U.S. Assures Japan, Ibid., May 16, 1989.
381 Ibid., p. 49.
visited Washington that July.

Subsequently, in May 1992, during a visit to Japan for the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa in May 1992, Vice President Quayle announced that the U.S. military would end training and close the facility (which it did in July).382

4. Yomitan and the Parachute Exercises

One type of training that did not end and caused friction with the local communities was parachute exercises by U.S. forces in the prefecture including those of the Army’s Green Berets, who had relocated to Okinawa (Torii Station) in October 1984.383 Because of requirements for parachute qualifications and other operational needs, this training was considered necessary by U.S. officials leading to problems then and now with regard to the practice in the densely populated prefecture.

One community in particular with which the friction increased was Yomitan Village, where Torii Station was located, and where the parachute training took place. Its mayor (and later Treasurer of the OPG during the latter half of the Ota administration) Yamauchi Tokushin, was known for his, for lack of a better word, creative approach to base issues, at times directly writing U.S. presidents James E. Carter (February 7, 1977) and William J. Clinton (January 25, 1993) when not satisfied with the progress on Okinawa’s demands, and in general being a thorn in the side to both central government and U.S. officials.384 In addition to Torii Station, Yomitan also hosts four other U.S. facilities, including Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, which had been built by the Japanese military between 1943 and 1944 as North Air Field (Kita Hikojo) and was the site of some of the parachute practice. Currently 45% of the village’s land is U.S. military-used; in 1972 it was as high as 73%.

Most of the airfield is on nationally owned land, or Kokuyuchi, which eliminates one of the major points of friction with many local residents who otherwise would be forced to lease their land to the central government.385 On the other hand, because land rental fees are not paid for that land, there is less of an incentive in seeing the land used as a base, and thus one of the vested interests is removed. There are, however, approximately 199 owners of land that the U.S. expropriated when it expanded the original airfield. At the time of the major friction over the parachute training in the early 1980s, these landowners received a total of approximately 60 million yen for their land (total).387 Without an alternative source of use, landowners, some of whom can live quite well on the income from the land rentals (depending on the size of the land and rent paid), tend to prefer the status quo. (The status quo is desired all the more when combined with

382 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Yike, p. 533. Some Facilities to be Returned, More Wanted, Weekly Times (Okinawa Taimusu), May 18, 1992.

383 In late October 1984, the Green Berets arrived at Torii Station in order to activate the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group. It was the first time in 10 years that the Army’s elite Special Forces (Airborne) were stationed in Okinawa, and today, the 1/1 SFG, as they are known, are the only forward-deployed special forces unit in the Far East. They were placed under the command of 9th Brigade at Camp Zama, which in turn is responsible to a higher command at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.

384 Yamauchi Tokushin, Sakebi Uuttae Tsayukeru Kichi Okinawa: Yomitan 24 Non Sonmin Gurumi no Tatuki

385 Yomitan actually housed two airfields until 1976. The second one, Bolo Point, was used primarily for target practice. It was returned in the mid 1970s.

386 This point can be disputed. The Japanese government, which had expropriated the land in 1943 for purposes of building the airfield, had apparently promised the local residents would be given back the land after the war was over, but Yomitan was one of the first areas to be seized by U.S. landing forces in April 1945 and the Japanese government has not made good on its promise.

the practice of mokunin kosaku in which farmers and/or landowners are permitted to continue to farm or otherwise use the land tax-free and without paying a fee for doing so as part-time renter-farmers would in other parts of Japan or in other societies. However, in Yomitan’s case, the then-mayor Yamauchi Tokushin, a former high school teacher elected in 1974, was able to bring in resort developers as well as create a cultural village there by restoring Zakimi Castle and inviting Okinawan pottery, glassmakers, and other arts and crafts makers to the town. As these alternatives for the future became a reality, the village increasingly viewed the bases in the town as an impediment to economic development, not to mention an intrusion into their daily lives and source of possible danger.

On this latter note, one of the major points of friction was the use of the airfield for parachute drop training exercises. Since the exercises were first begun, approximately 30 incidents occurred including the death of a school girl (and injury of three friends and family members) on August 2, 1950 when a fuel tank fell into their yard, and a June 11, 1965 accident in which a trailer landed off target crushing a fourth grade school girl who was playing in the family yard. When a spotter parachute weighing 16 pounds went off target and fell in a residential area on November 6, 1979, Yamauchi had had enough. He and community leaders formed the Council to Demand the Ending of Parachute Drop Practice by the U.S. Military and an Immediate Withdrawal of the Training Facility (Beigun Rakkasan Koka Enshu Chushi Narabini Enshujo no Sokujii Tekkyo Yokyu Jikkoinkai) with Yamauchi as its head. The committee called on the government to relocate the dangerous parachute training, specifically requesting the Naha DFAB to have the issue taken up at the bilateral level.

As a result, the U.S. side announced that parachute drop practice of articles would be discontinued after November 1979, although personnel would still continue to practice. In the meantime, a special working group under the Facilities Special Committee of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee was created on October 9, 1980 to study the possibility of relocating the training. The working group held its first meeting in February 1981. Subsequently, based on the working group’s recommendations, the Naha DFAB requested funds in its FY 1982 budget to investigate the following possible relocation sites: 1) two places within Kadena Ordnance Area; 2) Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield; 3) Onna Communications Site; and 4) four places on Ukibaru Jima Training Area.

At the same time, the Japanese government made clear that the relocation was only of the parachute training, not of the facility itself, and thus Yomitan Auxiliary Air Field would not be returned. In response, Yamauchi stated that Until the land being used at the air field is returned, the problems of the postwar will never be resolved. This comment by Yamauchi perhaps best illustrates what the Okinawa problem is to every resident and every local leader in the prefecture. Namely, until the local communities see removed the vestiges of the U.S. occupation and administration (1945-1972), and in some cases, the reminders of the war such as the

388 Then mayor Yamauchi Tokushin took mokunin kosaku one step further and was able to get the U.S. and Japanese governments to approve the construction of a sports field complex and town hall, in what we can probably call for lack of a better term, mokunin kensetsu. A similar approach was taken in the creation of the nearby Chatan Town Office, built within Camp Kuwae (Lester) in 1997, under Article 2 paragraph 4(a) of SOFA, which allows joint use of the area.

389 Okinawa Taimusu Sha Kichi Mondai Shuzaihan, ed., Okinawa no Kichi, p. 163.
Imperial Army’s construction of the air field on their land, Okinawans will not consider the postwar truly over.

In the middle of this exchange, another training incident occurred further angering on April 21, 1981 when three servicemen missed their target and landed on the grounds of Furugen Elementary School, one of the 8 schools in the village, during its morning assembly. Later that year on October 28, two rounds of jumps were made in the same day, one in the morning with 20 servicemen and the other in the evening (between 6:12 p.m. and 7:40 p.m.). The lateness of the hour made visibility difficult and could have caused, villagers argued, an accident.

In light of these problems, parachute training was suspended for close to a year in 1982. On August 1983, however, it was restarted. Timed with the beginning of the exercises, Naha DFAB Director Kubota Minoru announced on August 4 that the study on the relocation had narrowed down the sites to Ie Jima and Kadena Ordnance Area and that the government decided to complete the relocation after the 1987 National Athletic Tournament. This did not go as planned because of opposition to the relocation by neighboring communities and local residents, greatly adding to the level of friction over the continued parachute training, which had been as high as 24 times in 1981.

As a result of the delay, and the fact that some 10 incidents (including where personnel landed outside the training area and near homes) in the community between 1986 and 1991, the Yomitan Village Office prepared a bilingual petition entitled ‘Request for the Early Return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield’ in July 1991 for submission to the administration of George H. W. Bush.

Eventually, after numerous protests and requests by Yomitan and the prefectural government, especially Gov. Ota during his many trips to the United States, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee restarted the Yomitan Auxiliary Air Field Special Working Group on June 16, 1994. Subsequently, the December 1996 Saco agreement approved the relocation of the parachute exercises, which had been discontinued on July 19 that year, to Ie Jima. Eventually, after local consultations, the mayor of Ie Jima announced in March 1998 that he would accept the relocation of the parachute practice on Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and the parachute training began on October 21, 1999. Other sites exist, but as they are off the main island of Okinawa with no ferry access, and often subject to bad weather and high winds, it is difficult, according to military representatives familiar with the training, to retrieve jumpers and items dropped.

Because of stringent requirements based on mission and billet, parachute qualifications, such as altitude and frequency, needs to be practiced on a monthly basis, with others on a quarterly basis. When a training exercise takes place, and particularly if a mishap occurs, local residents and authorities will protest the training.

Protests, like the ones above, against the parachute exercises and other base-related problems, as well as the presence itself, would generate greater attention to the base problem within the prefecture. It would also lead to new forms of demonstrations.

One of these was ‘tent-ins’ on the airfield in Yomitan during an exercise which simulated the destruction of the runway by a nuclear bomb in the summer of 1988. Mayor Yamauchi and about 100 villagers built tents on

398 Legally, there is no requirement for the central government to have the leaders of local communities accept the practices, bases, etc., but following Saco, it has become politically necessary. Prime Minister Hashimoto and subsequent administrations said that they would not go over the heads of local communities and force them to accept things that they do not desire.
the runways to prevent the exercise. Eventually, about 40 riot police removed the protestors and the tents.

Another type of protests was the Hands around Kadena rally of June 21, 1987. Held amid heavy rain during the rainy season that envelopes the Japanese archipelago in late spring and early summer, some 25,000 protestors nevertheless turned out for the event. The idea to create this ningen no kasari, or human chain, around the 17.4 km of fence surrounding Kadena was raised a couple of years before this by activists in the central part of the prefecture (where Kadena is located), many of whom belong to labor unions there. The prefectural workers labor union then took the lead in organizing it in time for the 15 anniversary of reversion, with the reformist mayors and leaders of different civic and labor groups lending their support.

These voices would be the ones who formed the basis of calls for Okinawa to be able to share in the Peace Dividend after the end of the Cold War, discussed next.

Base Frictions in the 1990s

1. Seeking the Peace Dividend

On the eve of the end of the Cold War, residents in the prefecture found that little had changed with the composition of the bases. Numerically, the number of facilities had dropped dramatically from 87 at the time of reversion to 45 as of March 1989. However, the land area the bases occupied had decreased only 3635 hectares (or by 13.7%) to 25,216.

Watching the unfolding of events in Eastern Europe leading to the end of the Cold War, Okinawans, too, hoped to share in the peace dividend that was beginning to be seen. In a public opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister’s office in November 1989, only 5.9% of Okinawans believed that U.S. bases were necessary for Japan’s security, with 23.6% saying they could not be helped. Some 25.6%, on the other hand, said U.S. bases were not in Japan’s security interest, and 35.1% said they were actually dangerous.

Following the collapse of the symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, on November 9, 1989, and the statement by Gorbachev and U.S. President George H. W. Bush declaring an official end to the Cold War, the United States began speeding up its review of overseas presence in the Asia-Pacific. Hints of this began to appear immediately in the press. For example, a Japanese newspaper correspondent based in Washington, D.C. reported on December 16 that according to sources at CINCPAC, the U.S. government was in the process of reexamining its force structure in the Asia-Pacific region due to defense-related budget cuts and the improving of relations with the Soviet Union. Specifically the article stated that the Marines would be relocated to Hawaii by 1995. Public affairs officers for the U.S. military in Okinawa denied the report, but

400 This figure is according to organizers, who usually place the number higher than lower. For more on the rally, see Yoshimoto Masanori, Ima, Naze Kichi Hoi Ka (Why [a] Hands-Around-the Bases [Protest]. Now?), Shin Okinawa Bunka, No. 73 (Fall 1987), pp. 34-42, and Shogen Kichi Hoi no Rin ni Sanka Shite (On Participating in the Hands Around the Base Circle), Ibid., pp. 62-69. Yoshimoto later served as policy advisor and then Vice Governor in the Ota administration until he came into conflict with the JCP over his more flexible position on the bases.

401 Another dynamic involved was the pressure by Congress for allies to share more of the financial burden had been building over the decade as America’s economic problems become apparent. The pressure was intense toward Japan to pay more into the alliance, commensurate with its huge economic might, as it was seen as pursuing mercantilist trading practices at America’s expense. In 1978, Japan began paying expenses for base labor (of Japanese employees), facilities improvement, and training relocation. In 1991, after a new agreement was reached (in light of the above pressure), Japan began paying for the utilities costs. For more on Host Nation Support, see the DFFA’s website at: http://www.dfaa.go.jp/enlibrary/index.html.

402 Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, p. 144.
it gradually became known that a major review was indeed going on. Needless to say, it generated great interest in Okinawa—with Governor Nishime Junji saying in a room filled with the press and prefectural government officials “Everyone, it looks like the Marines will be completely leaving...It is a wonderful thing for Okinawa—and great expectations.” Détente had come to Okinawa, or so Okinawans believed.

Reflecting these changes, Governor Nishime took up the issue of base consolidations during questioning in the Prefectural Assembly later that month explaining that the prefectural government, in close cooperation with local authorities, was in the process of planning use of the land after the bases were returned. In light of these movements, the Base affairs Section of the External Affairs Office decided to strengthen its capabilities effective April 1, 1990 by including the staff responsible for promoting the reutilization and conversion of military land within the Planning and Development Division (Kikaku Kaihatsubu). In addition, it sought to have someone from the Foreign Ministry be sent to the OPG in order to gather information as early as possible on base consolidations.

As part of this process of examining overseas presence, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney visited East Asia in February to consult with Japanese officials and with U.S. military and diplomatic officials in Japan. He also included on his itinerary a trip to Okinawa, being the first Secretary of Defense to visit Naha in more than 30 years. Meeting with U.S. military commanders, such as Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole, and Governor Nishime on February 20 at the just completed Prefectural Government office building, Cheney promised to “be able to positively respond after consultations with the Japanese government...in response to the governor’s request for base reductions and consolidations and land returns in order to permit development.” Nishime, as we saw in the previous chapter, had made similar requests in his two trips to Washington in 1985 and again in 1988.

While in Tokyo, Cheney announced at a National Press Club speech the thinking behind the review. According to Michael H. Armacost, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan at the time, who paraphrased the remarks in his memoirs, "Maintaining the security treaty did not mean that U.S. force levels were sacrosanct. On the contrary, a receding Soviet threat and growing U.S. fiscal deficit made some reductions inevitable."

Several weeks after Cheney’s visit to East Asia, and a mere five months after the dramatic conclusion to the Cold War, the Pentagon released A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim to outline the transformations that the U.S. military would make in its force structure in response to this event.

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405 Ibid., p. 192.
406 Ibid., pp. 191, 193.
407 Ibid., p. 211.
408 Ibid., p. 213.
410 Nishime, Sengo Seiji o Ikite, p. 533.
412 The report was officially titled A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, but is unofficially known as the 1990 East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) East Asian Strategy Report. This EASI was followed by a second one in July 1992, a third in February 1995, and a fourth in November 1998, all available in the appendices. The latter three will be discussed in this and later chapters. A new report is supposedly currently being prepared.
Submitted to Congress on April 19, 1990 by Cheney, the report (see Appendix 6), commonly known as the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI), reflected these international changes and the expected peace dividends. While noting that the traditional aspect of our military presence in the region—the role of regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor—will assume greater relative importance to stability, and thus, over the next decade, as a new global order takes shape, our forward presence will continue to be the region’s irreplaceable balancing wheel, the size, disposition, and rationale for our forward deployed forces will be increasingly scrutinized. A phased approach, capable of responding to global and regional reactions would be introduced in 3 stages over 10 years for forces in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.413

During Phase 1, the first 1-3 years, the existing force structure would be thinned out and security relationships would be rearranged...without jeopardizing its ability to meet security commitments. During this time, the 135,000 forward-deployed forces would be reduced by up to 15,000 personnel.

In Phase 2, years 3-5, forces would be reduced and restructured, with the focus being on combat forces.

Finally, in Phase 3, which covers the years 5-10, further force reductions would be undertaken as circumstances permitted.414

Regarding Okinawa and the rest of Japan, the report stated that the DOD see[s] a continued, substantial air and naval presence in Japan, but with possibly measured reductions of ground and some support air forces, particularly in Okinawa. On mainland Japan, we envision little change in current deployment patterns. We will maintain USAF forces at Misawa and a forward-deployed carrier at Yokosuka. We will rationalize use of our bases and facilities on Okinawa with the aim of returning property to improve civil-military relations.

The report specifically noted personnel reduction of about some 5,000-6,000, including possible reductions in Okinawa during Phase 1. Efforts to consolidate facilities and areas continued are proceeding through the bilateral Facilities Adjustment Panel (FAP) process...and the U.S. and Japan are acting to resolve them as quickly as possible. It also noted that although U.S. forces in Okinawa have the strong support of the national government in Tokyo, local political pressures are taken into consideration by the FAP.

Reactions in Okinawa to the U.S. announcement were positive.415 Miyagi Hiromitsu, Vice Governor from July 1987 to December 1990, welcomed the report in comments to the press, but noted that efforts to speed up the conversion of the land as well agreement with the United States in late 1991 and subsequent withdrawal from Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, and operation/budgetary reasons that led the U.S. Navy to homeport additional ships at Sasebo in 1992. Armacost, Friends or Rivals, p. 86.


414 Three issues would later affect the scale down, according to Armacost: the North Korean nuclear development program, which came to a head in 1993-1994, the Philippine Senate’s rejection of the base

415 Symbolic of the dynamics of the base problem, central government officials were in general worried about too many cuts, while Okinawan officials were worried (at least publicly) about too few cuts. According to the ambassador’s memoirs, from his perspective in Tokyo, The cuts occasioned little adverse Japanese reaction, either officially or through the press. All in all, the Japanese appeared reassured that the initial adjustments would be modest, that their views would be taken into account, and that the pace and scope of future reductions would be based on the regional security situation rather than on U.S. budgetary politics. Armacost, Friends or Rivals, p. 86.
were necessary. An editorial in the Okinawa Taimusu welcomed it as well, echoing Miyagi’s comments of the necessity to reutilize the land. The editorial also called on the OPG not simply to wait for unnecessary bases to be returned, but to actively call for their return as well.

It would now be up to the representatives of the two governments to actualize the strategy announced in the EASI. The plan was announced fairly quickly afterwards, in mid-June. As part of America’s intention to incrementally scale down its overseas presence, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee decided to conditionally return 23 areas at 17 U.S. facilities in Okinawa at its meeting on June 19. This number represented an area of 1000 hectares, or 4% of the total land area. The sites to be returned included: Onna Tsushinjo, Chibana Site, and the Awase Golf Course, conditioned on a replacement golf range to be built with the Kadena Ammunitions area.

There was some praise, but mostly criticism that the returns offered would not lead to reduction in noise or training which were a major problem throughout the 1980s. Nishime, who was in Hawaii at the time, released a statement saying it was not all that Okinawa had hoped for. This would eventually lead his reformist successor, Ota Masahide, to focus on the three most important base problems (the so-called juyo sanjian, or three important issues), facing the prefecture—1) the return of Naha military port, 2) the ending of parachute training at Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield and the return of that facility, and 3) the ending of live fire training over Prefectural Road 104.

In the middle of this optimistic period, the harsh reality of international affairs set in with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. President Bush and other world leaders immediately condemned the aggression and annexation, saying that it would not stand. In the build-up to defend Saudi Arabia and other U.S. interests in the Gulf region known as Operation Desert Shield, some 8000 troops left from Okinawa for region. Marines from Okinawa eventually participated in the liberation of Kuwait in late January 1991 in Operation Desert Shield. All troops sent from Okinawa returned safely.

The increased use of Okinawa during the Gulf War inevitably led to greater unease about the bases in Okinawa due to noise pollution, fear of accidents, and fear of Okinawa being attacked due to its hosting U.S. facilities. (The same was true after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.) It may have also tipped the balance in favor of the anti-base candidate, Ota, in the gubernatorial elections held that year.

That summer, a number of anti-base demonstrations occurred. The biggest of these rallies was the August 5 (1990) human chain, around Kadena Air Base, planned well before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but happening just a few days after it. There, some 25,000 people joined hands along the 17.4 km of fence in the afternoon to Appeal to the World to Know about the Situation in Okinawa.
Okinawan peace groups also held a number of symposiums celebrating the end of the Cold War and offering suggestions as to what this meant for Okinawa. That summer in June, as well, Okinawa had commemorated the 45th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa, with Prime Minister Kaifu participating for the first time. Anticipations were high that the end of the Cold War was going to bring quick returns—a peace dividend—to Okinawa. They were both right and wrong.

2. Problems at Kadena and Futenma

For most Okinawans, the announced reductions could not have come soon enough. In retrospect, however, the consolidations were still modest, with more steps needed to be taken, as events were to show a few years later.

In addition to Okinawans’ feeling that still much had to be done, a series of accidents and other problems at Kadena Air Base, one of the most important military assets in the region for the United States (and hence the U.S.-Japan alliance), in the early 1990s also challenged relations between the military and the prefecture.

First and foremost had to do with the relocation of the 353rd Special Operations Wing (581 personnel, 4 C-130 and C-141 transport planes and helicopters) to Kadena in June 1991 following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo on June 12—by chance the Philippines Independence Day—in what was the second largest volcanic eruption in the 20th century. The deployment was described as temporary at first in light of the natural disaster which covered Clark Air Base with ash (some of it reached the Indian Ocean), but after the closure of Clark Air Base in November due to the damage to the facility (and the fact that the Philippine Senate rejected a new basing arrangement that September), the U.S. began the process of relocating its assets in the region, while consulting its allies like Japan.

In February 1992, U.S. officials at Kadena announced the 353rd’s deployment in Okinawa would continue until a permanent base could be found. At the same time, it announced that 18 F-15s, first assigned to Okinawa during the period between late September 1979 and March 1980 (following the Iranian revolution, Chinese invasion of Vietnam, and on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), would be relocated (including the reduction of 491 personnel).

Local mayors released their own
statements following the announcement. Kadena Mayor Miyagi Tokujitsu welcomed the noise reduction that would result in the relocation of the F-15s, but did not see a great change in the functions of the base. He also expressed his concern about the status of Japanese base workers who might lose their jobs in any reductions. Mayor Arakawa Hidekiyo of Okinawa City on the other hand expressed his anger that the C-130s would remain and not be relocated and said that the reorganization was only a functional change and not a reduction in the bases as Okinawans hoped for.

The 353rd, which is the Air Force's special operations air arm of the Honolulu-based U.S. Pacific Command, is responsible for conducting air support missions for joint and allied special operations forces in the region, including disaster relief. In order to be able to fulfill their mission, sustainment training is required, such as parachute practice. In late July 1993, a problem with the practice emerged when a special operations unit flying out of Kadena parachuted in a public sea area off of Yomitan village, without informing the OPG and DFAB, which is responsible for notifying the concerned local authorities. A fisherman was in the area of the drop at the time causing the Yomitan Village Fishing Association to complain about the incident.

Shortly after this on September 1, a freak accident happened on Kadena when the main and tail rotors of an Air Force helicopter taxying on the ground crossed, scattering debris which killed an American airman maintenance worker (Technical Sergeant Robert Dale Wade), and injured the pilot and four-man crew of the HH3, a long-range rescue operations helicopter that could be refueled in air. Kadena was preparing to replace the HH3s, which were used during the Vietnam War with HH60s, a new type of rescue helicopter, that fall. The mishap, which did not involve local residents, nevertheless became of source of concern for them, especially with the reason accident not known.

A year before that in October 1992, a Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter, used for the airlift of assault troops and equipment, belonging to the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262, turned over while taxiing from a helicopter pad after returning from routine training. While none of the crew or any base workers were injured, this was one of 20 cases involving the CH46. As a result, the Ginowan City Assembly passed a resolution demanding the closure of Futenma.

This and other incidents would form the background to the strong protests seen against flights out of Futenma and Kadena in the spring of 1994.

On April 4, an Air Force F-15C jet fighter plane crashed near the Kadena Ammunitions Storage Area (on farmland owned by local residents and farmed by them but leased by the Japanese Government) about 500 meters north of Gate 3 after mechanical failure forced the pilot to eject.

Before the shock of that crash at Kadena had a chance to wear off, another accident two days later on April 6 at Futenma involving a CH-46E Marine Corps helicopter occurred during routine emergency landing practice, breaking in two after hitting the tarmac.

The next day, Gov. Ota went to Tokyo to complain to Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu, Defense Agency Director Aichi Kazuo, and DFAA Director Yoneyama Ichiro and impress upon them the potentially disastrous consequences. Ota gave the same message to U.S. Ambassador Mondale, who visited Okinawa the following week. Subsequently, some 2500 people gathered in Okinawa City to protest the crashes and call for a closure of the

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433 The CH-46 helicopter is heavy in the front and back due to the position of the engines and weak in the middle, and is known to split apart if it hits a surface (land, deck, tarmac, or water) too hard. The exercise was simulating a landing and evacuation from the aircraft when it hit the tarmac harder than planned.


bases.\textsuperscript{436}

While the group, the \textit{Okinawa Heiwa Undo Sentaa} (Okinawa Peace Movement Center), leading the protests may have only been speaking for itself and its supporters with regard to the closure of the bases, public opinion polls taken at the time showed that some 70% of Okinawans desired restrictions on or abolition of all military exercises.\textsuperscript{437}

Specifically, the poll, conducted by the Shimpo’s public opinion study group of 200 men and women in 10 different communities, 36% saw the need to apply restrictions and 33.5% said that all exercises should be stopped.\textsuperscript{438} In a further question on the causes behind the series of accidents, 34.5% of the respondents answered that they thought it was because the agreements reached with regard to training were unclear and that they gave the U.S. a free hand. Other answers included that the U.S. had \textit{senryo ishiki}, or an occupation mentality (16.5%), public opinion was not loud enough (3.5%), and that the central and prefectural governments were weak vis-à-vis the U.S. military (20.5%).

In another question on what should be done with U.S. bases from now, 44% answered \textit{withdrawal (zenmen tekkyo)}, 36% responded \textit{reduce (shukusho)}, and 11% answered \textit{relocate a part to the mainland (ichibu o hondo e utsusu)}. Only 6% answered that bases should be kept the way they are.

3. OPG-Central Government Frictions

A comment by the Director General of the DFAA, Hoshuyama Noboru, then on a visit to Okinawa to \textit{coexist (kyosei)} with the bases raised the tensions that had been simmering with these accidents to a new level. His comment symbolized for Okinawans in one word or phrase the huge gap (\textit{ondo no sa}) in understanding between the central government and the people of Okinawa over the base problem and Okinawa’s history.\textsuperscript{439}

Hoshuyama made his comments at the Naha office of the DFAB in a press conference on September 8. According to newspaper reports, he urged Okinawans to accept the bases and make efforts to coexist with them. He also suggested that Ota adopt a more realist policy, considering that even the Social Democratic Party had changed its longtime opposition to the SDF and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty when its chairman, Murayama, became Prime Minister in a cabinet supported by the SDF, LDP, and \textit{Sakigake} parties that summer.\textsuperscript{440}

Ota was incensed, as was public opinion as a whole.\textsuperscript{441} At his regularly held press conference the following week on September 12, he criticized Hoshuyama’s comments and then directed OPG Policy Advisor Takayama Choko (who once worked for NHK) to meet with the director general to clarify his remarks.\textsuperscript{442} Hoshuyama basically repeated the same thing when they met, but did not retract his statement as Takayama had requested on the OPG’s behalf.

In the meantime, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly’s Special Committee on U.S. Base Affairs, established in 1974, met to discuss Hoshuyama’s remarks, with result being the passing of a resolution criticizing the comments.


\textsuperscript{440} The change in stance of the national SDP, and in particular of Murayama, had been heatedly criticized by the prefectural branch of the SDP. See \textit{Local Socialist Criticizes PM, Shimpo Weekly News}, August 10, 1994.

\textsuperscript{441} For the opinions of Inamine Keiichi, Ota’s successor as governor, while he was president the Prefecture Business Owners Accociation (\textit{Kenkeishakyokai}), see \textit{Genjo o Itsudatsu Shitsugen (Comment Does not Reflect Reality)}, \textit{Okinawa Taimusu}, September 18, 1994.

\textsuperscript{442} Hoshuyama Statement Draws.
and strongly requesting that responsibility be taken. Numerous local assemblies passed similar resolutions.

Okinawan representatives to the Diet and local party officials also visited offices of the central government and ruling parties to get Hoshuyama to withdraw his remarks, resign, or otherwise apologize to the people of Okinawa.

As the political problem of the Hoshuyama Affair escalated, Hoshuyama issued an apology to the people of Okinawa at the end of September, but that was not enough for his critics, who wanted him to withdraw the phrase “co-exist with the bases.” In light of local criticism and pressure, as well as displeasure from Prime Minister Murayama and Defense Agency Director Tamazawa Tokuichiro, the minister responsible for the bureau he headed, Hoshuyama withdrew the problematic phrase on October 5. He did not resign, however, which angered some of his opponents. There was still much work to do, particularly in light of the loss of more than a month’s time dealing with the fall-out to his comments.

In retrospect, the frustration that Hoshuyama (representing many in the Japanese government and among the ruling parties) likely felt when he made those comments appears to be quite similar to those that Lt. Gen. Hailston (representing many on the U.S. side) made in early 2001. One positive thing that may have resulted from the remarks by Hoshuyama, at least, was the clarification of the difficult nature of the issues at hand and the gaps that exist, and the need for more efforts on all sides at resolving the issues.

At the minimum, it certainly suggests the need for franker discussions as well as greater mutual understanding. Such forums for discussion and actual plans for resolution to issues would be particularly necessary after the tragic rape incident in September 1995.

One forum that had been created during the Hosokawa Cabinet in October 1993, a year before the Hoshuyama remarks, was the Okinawaken ni Shozai Suru Beigun Shisetsu-Kuikito ni Kansuru Shomondai ni Tsuite no Kankeishocho Renraku Kaigi (Coordinating Committee for Ministries and Agencies Dealing with the Problems Relating to U.S. Military Facilities and Areas in Okinawa Prefecture), comprised of division directors of the different agencies. According to Okinawa Diet member Uehara Kosuke, who became Director of the Okinawa-Hokkaido Development Agency in August 1993 and had taken the lead in creating the above committee, the need for it was great because the Japanese government, particularly with regard to the Okinawa base issue, was stove-piped (tatewari) and lacking coordination.

Hoshuyama’s comments would get him in trouble again a year later. Frustrated with the Murayama Cabinet’s approach to the Okinawa base problem, in particular the standoff between the central government and the Ota administration over leasing arrangements, Hoshuyama called the prime minister’s handling of the issue stupid in off-record remarks and was fired in October 1995.

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443. The resolution drafting did not go smoothly, however. The ruling parties, in particular the SDP, wanted to call for Hoshuyama’s resignation, but the SDP headquarters vetoed that, as did the opposition parties in Okinawa (comprised of the LDP, which was a coalition partner at the national level), which argued that personnel issues were a matter for the national government to decide. See Hoshuyama Hatsugen ni Kogi Ketsugi (Resolution Critical of Hoshuyama Remarks), Okinawa Taimusu, September 23, 1994.


446. Uehara, Renritsu Seiken, p. 72-29.
result, the smooth resolution of issues was near impossible. During Uehara’s short time in office, the committee met four times, starting on October 29, 1993. One issue that Uehara hoped to see movement on was the OPG’s request for a resolution of the 3 jian, introduced earlier. However, the committee, according to its guidelines, was not allowed to deal with any one specific issue, despite its having been created to overcome the lack of coordination between the agencies. As a result, Uehara (coordinating ahead of time with Sato Yukio, then the Director of the North American Affairs Division of MOFA) intervened personally by inviting the ministers from the two other ministries concerned, Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu and Defense Agency Director Aichi Kazuo, to meet in mid January 1994 at the Okura Hotel. Having gotten their agreement to raise the issue at the next meeting on the 27th, the committee requested the Foreign Ministry to deal with the issues at the next Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting. As a result, the U.S. and Japanese sides created the working group on the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, mentioned above.

As this example shows, having the SDP in power now provided the Ota administration with a channel to the central government that it did not have in past, in the same way that Nishime used his LDP connections in Tokyo during the 12 years of his administration.

Yet another example is perhaps the role of Iwatare Sukio, an SDP Diet member from Kanagawa who was made Environment Minister in the Murayama, and successor, Hashimoto Cabinets light of his involvement in the environment movement. Iwatare learned that the Okinawa issue was not included in the talking papers prepared for the first summit meeting between Murayama and Clinton scheduled for January 1995. Iwatare asked officials from the Foreign Ministry and Defense Facilities Administration Agency, including Hoshuyama, to be sure to take up the issue, in particular the return of the Northern Training Area, the ending of live-fire exercises over Prefectural Road 104, and the return of Naha Military Port. Hoshuyama subsequently went to the U.S. to coordinate these issues, and Clinton expressed his recognition that the Okinawa issue is important when Murayama raised it.

Reflecting the difficulty of being able to quickly resolve the issues, despite the potential for cooperation between the OPG and central government, the Okinawa issue was not, for reasons unclear, raised in the press conference held on January 11 by Murayama or Clinton. Indeed, Murayama’s commitment to firmly maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements was interpreted in Okinawa to mean no change in the status quo, which infuriated some in the

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449 Ibid., pp. 73, 76.
450 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
451 A year later on January 18, 1995, following the Clinton-Murayama summit, the DFAA created the Seiri Togoto Tokubetsu Suishin Honbu (Special Headquarters to Promote the Reduction and Consolidation [of U.S. bases in Okinawa Prefecture]. The establishment appears to have been the result of the summit, as Murayama directed Defense Agency Director General Tamazawa on the 17th to do so. There is a chance that it may have also had to do with the Hoshuyama comment to show the sincerity of the DFAA toward addressing the issues, a summit-related result, or as part of the efforts Uehara began to get the respective agencies to work toward the common goal of reducing the burdens in Okinawa. See Seiri Togoto Tokubetsu Suishin Honbu, Boei Shisetsu Koho, No. 634 (February 10, 1995), p. 7.
452 Ota, Okinawa no Ketsudan, pp. 155-156.
453 Ibid., p. 156.
454 Ibid.
SDP and those further to the Left in the anti-base movement.

The appearance of the continuation of the status quo was further seen a month later when the Defense Department released the 1995 East Asia Strategy Report, otherwise known as the Nye Report. The report (see Appendix 8) called for the continued forward deployment of 100,000 troops in the region in light of instability on the Korean Peninsula (in particular North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program) and the Taiwan straits (that would heat up over the next year), and other growing responsibilities, such as preventing weapons proliferation. The only mention of Okinawa in the report was in connection with the continued presence of the III Marine Expeditionary Force.

For Ota, the release of the report meant that there would be no change in the status quo, and it became the biggest reason (saidai no riyu) why he refused later that year to cooperate in the land-leasing. Writing in his memoirs, Ota said that when he read the report, he wondered if Nye, one of America’s most respected scholars of international relations (at Harvard University), ever thought about the impact that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa would have on the daily lives of its citizens.

A huge debate opened up among Okinawa, mainland Japanese, and Americans interested in the security relationship. U.S. scholar of Asian affairs, and a friend of Ota, Chalmers Johnson, blasted the report in an article entitled East Asian Security: The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy, while Nye defended it in the same issue of the influential Foreign Affairs with the famous phrase, Security is like oxygen. You tend not to notice it until you lose it.

As this debate continued, Ota explained to U.S. Ambassador Mondale (on the eve of Ota’s departure to the U.S. for his 4th visit as governor) in May and the new Director of the Naha DFAB, Kohama Sadakatsu, in June, and that he would probably not be able to cooperate with leasing if things remained the same with the bases. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve, and actually worsened with the brutal kidnapping and rape of a local 12-year-old schoolgirl a few months later.

**G. The 1995 Rape Incident and Aftermath**

On September 4, 1995, three U.S. servicemen kidnapped and sexually assaulted a 12-year-old schoolgirl returning home from a shopping errand in the village of Kin. Unlike previous crimes committed by U.S. personnel in Okinawa, which numbered about 4800 incidents between 1972 and 1995, this crime, due to its particular brutality and age of the victim, drew immediate shock and anger throughout the prefecture, and indeed in Japan and the United States. U.S. Ambassador Mondale and President William J. Clinton were quick to offer apologies to Japan, and American Consul General Aloysius M. O’Neill, who served in Okinawa between 1994 and 1997, personally visited Governor Ota to apologize as well.

Public opinion in Japan in general, and Okinawa in particular, grew more incensed with the crime and subsequent perceived delay in turning over the three suspects (a Navy seaman and two Marines) to Japanese authorities. As is explained below, friction arose the implementation of Article 17 of the SOFA (see Appendix 9), which prevented the three suspects from being turned over to Japanese authorities until they were indicted. Viewing this as an injustice and a violation of

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455 Ibid., pp. 159-160.

456 Ibid., p. 160.


459 Much of the following pages draws from the author’s previous writings on Okinawa, including The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions and Okinawa and the Nago Heliport Problem in the U.S.-Japan Relationship. Where necessary, revisions and updates have been added.
the sovereignty, resolutions of protest against the rape incident and failure to produce the suspects were passed by local assemblies and eventually adopted in all 53 Okinawan assemblies.

The OPG, in the meantime, prepared a petition to the central government to revise Article 17 to allow Japanese authorities to take U.S. SOFA personnel into custody, a request made in person by Ota during a visit to Tokyo when he met with Foreign Minister (and Deputy Prime Minister) Kono Yohei on September 20. However, the Foreign Minister refused to consider asking the U.S. government to revise the SOFA, saying that the debate was getting too far out ahead.\(^460\)

Ota was extremely bothered. No apology, nothing. I was shocked by the coldness of the Foreign Minister’s attitude.\(^460\) (This was in contrast, Ota writes, to the heartfelt apology of Ambassador Mondale, whom Ota had also met that day to protest the rape, as well as official apologies by U.S. government.) Even LDP members in Okinawa were dissatisfied with Kono’s handling of the situation, with the soon-to-be-president of the local branch saying that Kono’s response was poor and weak and only added fuel to the fire. We had expected more sincerity action from the national government.\(^460\)

As a result of the rape, and the government’s handling of the situation in the subsequent weeks after it, Ota had now decided to announce his opposition to the land-leasing arrangements that he was expected to sign. He did so at a special session of the Prefecture Assembly on September 28, setting in motion a court battle that would last for the next 11 months.

A few weeks later, the largest single gathering of Okinawans in decades took place in Ginowan City, near Futenma Air Station. Sponsored by 18 key labor and citizens groups, \(\text{Okinawa Kenmin Sokekki Taikai}\) called for the acceleration of the reduction and consolidations of the bases, the complete doing away with of crimes committed by U.S. personnel and the strict enforcement of discipline, the expeditious revision of the SOFA, and the expeditious and proper handling of compensation and apologies to victims of crimes committed by U.S. personnel and their dependents.\(^462\) Attended by some 85,000, the gathering received domestic and international coverage, raising both interest and the stakes in the “Okinawa problem.”

This momentum led to several groups, especially the labor umbrella organization \textit{Rengo Okinawa}, to organize the first-ever prefecture-wide referendum on the bases the following year. Following a signature drive by \textit{Rengo Okinawa} and like-minded supporters, the Prefectural Assembly approved the referendum proposal on June 21 in a vote of 26 to 17.\(^463\) It was not the smooth sailing that organizers had hoped for or expected, suggesting that there were many for economic, ideological, and procedural reasons against holding it.

Symbolic of the mixed feelings with regard to the referendum, only 59% of voters turned out for the September 8 vote, which attracted nation-wide if not international attention. Of those participating, 89% voted in favor of reducing the bases in the prefecture and reviewing the SOFA. Taken together, this meant that only 53% of Okinawan voters were in favor of the above points. While still a majority, it was not the high number that organizers had expected. The 41% percent abstention rate was quite high for an issue that everyone was expected to be in favor of.

Nevertheless, it was quite clear that the Okinawa issue was high on the minds of those in the prefecture had could not be left unresolved. The holding of the referendum only

\(^460\) Ota, \textit{Okinawa no Ketsudan}, p. 174. Interestingly, Kono’s son Taro, as a Diet member from Kanagawa, is one of the leaders of the SOFA revision movement within the Diet today.


\(^462\) Ibid., p. 883.

reconfirmed this in the eyes of the U.S. and Japanese governments.

Following the explosion of outrage against the rape and the general situation in Okinawa that permitted it, the Japanese and U.S. governments responded in several ways to this new atmosphere, all of which are discussed later in detail. First, the two governments studied and agreed to the improvement of the implementation of Article 17 of the SOFA. Second, they established a bilateral committee to examine base reductions and other measures to reduce the burden in Okinawa. And third, both governments, but especially the Japanese government (as the Okinawa problem was as much a domestic problem as it was a bilateral one), put a new emphasis, not seen since the pre-reversion days of the Sato Eisaku administration (1964-1972), to dealing with Okinawa’s concerns. All of these actions were inter-related, albeit haphazard, and were necessary toward successfully improving the situation locally and stabilizing the bilateral relationship.

Okinawa-Central Government Policy Coordination for Okinawa

In addition to the establishment of the SACO process, discussed in detail below, several other coordination mechanisms for Okinawa policy were established in Japan.

The first was established on June 18, 1996 within the LDP headquarters directly under Hashimoto (as president of the LDP). Known as the Special Study Committee on Measures for the Overall Development of Okinawa (Okinawa Sogo Shinko Taisaku Tokubetsu Chosakai), it was chaired by LDP Secretary General Kato Koichi, who has been viewed as both sympathetic toward Okinawa and the LDP’s former Socialist coalition partners.

A second group established shortly afterwards in August 1996 as an advisory panel to Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku was the Discussion Group on Problems of Villages, Towns, and Cities in Okinawa Hosting U.S. Military Facilities (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Shozai Shichoson ni Kansuru Kondankai). This group consisted of 11 members (five from Okinawa, six from the mainland) and was headed by Shimada Haruo, an economics professor from Hashimoto’s alma mater, Tokyo’s Keio University, and vice-chaired by Inamine, who later replaced Ota as governor.

After working with the local LDP and economic associations, these two groups eventually recommended 154 projects to boost the prefectural economy and employment situation. Further requests followed in 1997 by local economic and political leaders, which included the creation of a national technical college, a national telephone directory was also created around this time between the LDP, SDP, and Sakigake to help coordinate policy. From the LDP, Yamazaki Taku, Nakayama Taro, Nonaka Hiromu, and others attended, with Uehara and Teruya Kantoku, among others, representing the SDP.

464 Some politicians and alliance-managers would argue, and have argued, from their respective positions that too many concessions have since been given to Okinawa at the expense of other regions (the politicians’ perspective), and at the expense of operational needs (the military perspective).

465 Similarly, a Ruling Party Discussion Group on the Okinawa Problem (Yoto Okinawa Mondai Kondankai) and Shimada’s group was concerned with the economic gap between the north and south. He writes Even in Okinawa, there is a very big economic gap between the north and the south. If Okinawa’s inherent potential is to be fully realized, then the north must be developed in balance with the south. See Shimada Haruo, Okinawa Kusa no Ne no Koe o Kike (Hear the Grassroots’ Voices of Okinawa), Chuo Koron, May 1997, p. 68. Also see his paper, The Significance of the Okinawa Issue, presented to the 1997 Tokyo Conference for Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Security Relations (sic), Volume 7, pp. 25-41, available from the Okazaki Institute, Tokyo. Shimada’s essay (subsequently titled The Significance of the Okinawa Issue: The Experience of the Okinawa Problem Committee) and some of the other conference papers were later published in Cossa, ed. Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance, pp. 83-97.

466 Author’s telephone interview with Shimada Haruo, July 7, 1999, and Letter from Shimada Haruo to Rust Deming (November 13, 1996). Shimada’s group was concerned with the economic gap between the north and south. He writes Even in Okinawa, there is a very big economic gap between the north and the south. If Okinawa’s inherent potential is to be fully realized, then the north must be developed in balance with the south.

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information center, a recreational facility, and measures to improve Nago's infrastructure, all together running into the billions of yen.

A third group, and perhaps the most significant and symbolic of the central government’s newfound attention to Okinawa, was the Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai). Proposed by Hashimoto at a meeting between him and Governor Ota on September 10, 1996, it was approved by the Cabinet the following week on September 17 and held its first meeting on October 4 at the Prime Minister’s Office. It was comprised of all of the Cabinet ministers (with the exception of that for the Hokkaido Development Agency) and the Governor to promote actual projects relating to Okinawa policy, incorporating the recommendations from the above two groups. It has met a total of 22 times through 2003, averaging 3 times a year (see Appendix 43).

Fourth, in December 1996, Hashimoto appointed former diplomat Okamoto Yukio as his Special Adviser to the Prime Minister for Okinawa Affairs, a sub-cabinet level post just below the rank of minister. Okamoto served in that position until March 1998, and during that time sought to act as a bridge between the OPG and the Prime Minister’s office. In this capacity, he traveled to Okinawa some several dozen times, helping to arrange many of the 17 meetings that Hashimoto had with Gov. Ota prior to the governor deciding not to agree to the acceptance of the relocation of Futenma in early 1998.

Finally, the central government created in late 1997 the position of Ambassador in Charge of Okinawan Affairs, something that Nishime had proposed many years before, to relay information of interest to the Prefecture to and from Okinawa, as well as to help coordinate policy locally among central government organizations and the U.S. counterparts. The first ambassador, Harashima Hideki, turned out to be quite popular among Okinawans and has since settled in Okinawa after his retirement (see Appendix 18). One Ambassador for Okinawan Affairs later commented it is quite likely that had this position been created seven years before (in 1989) when Gov. Nishime had first proposed it, the problems that later forced the central government to establish such a position in 1996 would probably have never gotten to that level in the first place.

It should also be pointed out that the U.S. military in Okinawa, albeit belated, put greater efforts into its public affairs and community relations efforts. The Yoki Rinjin Seisaku (as it is known officially), is an outreach program begun by the Marine Corps Community Policy, Planning, and Liaison Office in 1997 and involves increased discipline, visible contributions to local communities (such as the donating of clothing, food, and toys), volunteering in the schools, extending support to orphanages, welfare centers, hospitals (through organ and tissue donations), and many other important programs.


470 For more on Okamoto’s involvement in Okinawa, see Funabashi Yoichi, An Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 183-186.
(A chart listing the number of activities between 2001 and 2003 appears as Appendix 46.471) Although unfortunately not widely reported, these programs have been well received both by those benefiting from them as well as those participating in them.472

H. The SACO Agreement and Its Implementation

Recognizing, somewhat belatedly, the need to address the so-called Okinawa Problem, the U.S. and Japanese governments established the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) on November 2, 1995, giving it a one-year mandate to study and recommend ways to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.473 Created as a working group under the Security Consultative Committee, SACO was to develop recommendations...on ways to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. In this, as in other reduction/consolidation plans we have seen to date, a fundamental dilemma existed: the ability to reduce the impact of U.S. bases while fully maintaining the operational capability and readiness of U.S. forces in the region, or in another sense, finding the balance between military/strategic requirements and political/diplomatic considerations.

The committee, comprised of less than a dozen senior officials from the Foreign Ministry, Defense Agency, Defense Facilities Administration Agency, Joint Staff Council of the SDF, State Department, Defense Department, Pacific Command, USFJ, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Embassy, first met on November 20 at the Foreign Ministry, followed by subsequent meetings on February 15, (1996) in Tokyo, February 28 (Washington, D.C.), March 7 (Tokyo), and March 22 (Washington, D.C.), before the Interim Report (Chukan Hokoku) was released at the time of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in Tokyo when the Security Consultative Committee (comprised of William J. Perry, Walter F. Mondale, Ikeda Yukihiko, and Usui Hideo).474

Hashimoto had wasted no time in addressing the Okinawa problem. As a young, rising member of the Lower House (House of Representatives) in the 1960s, Hashimoto witnessed at close range the process of the reversion of Okinawa, which his mentor, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, realized in 1972. Upon becoming prime minister himself in early January 1996, Hashimoto immediately grasped the significance of the present problem and placed Okinawa high on his cabinet's agenda, as did his Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kajiyama Seiroku, who was given the added responsibility of directing Okinawan affairs for the government and under whom several of the coordinating mechanisms were placed.475

The new coalition accord reached by the LDP, the SDP, and the center-Left New Party Sakigake (Harbinger) on January 8, 1996, offered the first insights into Hashimoto's official agenda for Okinawa when the three parties stated that the new cabinet would

471 The author has suggested on numerous occasions that the OPG also introduce these or similar figures regarding the number of volunteer activities and community relations programs on its homepage, but for reasons not clear, it has not done so. See Eldridge, Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations in the 21st Century, p. 28.

472 For more, see David P. Rann, Winds of Change, Marine Corps Gazette, April 1999, pp. 54-55, and David P. Rann, Okinawa Update, Ibid., February 2000, pp. 48-51. Col. Rann led the program throughout much of its first several years.


474 Declassified memos (overviews, press briefings) of the SACO meetings are available now at the Foreign Ministry’s Records Office in Tokyo (01-127-1 to 01-127-13).

475 Author’s interview with Hashimoto.
promote the realignment and reduction of [U.S. facilities in Okinawa] while maintaining a balance within the aim of the bilateral security treaty. Furthermore, the accord continued, the government would make exerted efforts to get visible results within a year based on the requests made by [the Prefecture of] Okinawa in the newly formed bilateral special action committee.  

The Decision to Return Futenma

Less than 10 days after the formation of his cabinet on January 11, he sent his Foreign Minister Ikeda to meet with U.S. President William J. Clinton, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Secretary of Defense Perry, and other high U.S. officials to push for moving in a certain direction regarding Okinawa. Meanwhile, Hashimoto pursued his own domestic diplomacy by meeting with Governor Ota for the first time on January 23 at the Prime Minister's Office to discuss the base issue.

One month later on February 23, seeking a visible way of demonstrating that the U.S. and Japanese governments were committed to solving the Okinawa problem, Hashimoto broached the issue of the return of Futenma, a base symbolic of the Okinawa problem and an issue which Ota had particularly hoped would be addressed, during talks with Clinton in Santa Monica, California. Importantly, as well, this meeting gave the two leaders a chance to get to know each other before Clinton's state visit to Japan in mid-April, which was set to herald in a new era in U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

No public announcement of a decision on the bases emerged from these talks, however, as working level meetings of SACO continued in Washington and Tokyo amid the backdrop of the trial of the three servicemen, the courtroom showdown between Governor Ota and the central government, and the missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits—three issues that dramatically captured the political and security essence of the Okinawa problem. Neither government therefore was optimistic about Futenma's return; Hashimoto even reportedly told Ota not to get his hopes up.

476 (Abridged) Text of Policy Accord Reached by Coalition, Japan Times, January 9, 1996. Hashimoto likewise followed up this pledge with the following statement in his January 22 policy speech to the Diet: On the question of the U.S. military facilities and areas in Okinawa, I am determined to make every effort and to proceed with the realignment, consolidation, and reduction of these facilities and areas and to achieve tangible improvements in noise, safety, training, and other issues in the recently established Special Action Committee and other fora in harmony with the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty so as to further enhance the bonds of trust between Japan and the United States as well as to find a solution paying maximum consideration to the sorrow and suffering of the people of Okinawa over the years. See Prime Minister's Policy Speech, Japan Times, January 23, 1996.

477 Clinton Aims to Construct Rapport with Hashimoto, Japan Times, January 21, 1996.

478 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 24. Okinawa Prefecture had specifically requested, along with several other sites, Futenma's early return for several years because it accorded the city's development and posed danger to the local residents. (OKINAWA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT, REDUCTION AND REALIGNMENT OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IN OKINAWA, MAY 1995). Reportedly when asked by a special messenger what he would wish for if he had one request to the prime minister, Ota responded although he hoped to address three other pressing matters, the return of Futenma is the most important. That message was relayed in person to Hashimoto at a meeting at the LDP Headquarters shortly thereafter. (Funabashi, An Alliance Adrift, pp. 39-42.) The other three matters hinted at by Ota were the return of the land area occupied by the Naha Military Port facility, the relocation of parachute drop training at Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the termination of live firing exercises over Prefectural Highway 104. These points were eventually agreed to in the Interim Report as well. For an LDP-partisan view of Hashimoto's decision and party reaction, see Tamura Shigenobu, Nichibei Anpo to Kyokuto Yuji (The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and East Asian Contingencies), (Tokyo: Nansosha, 1997), pp. 103-137.

479 See Appendix 10.

Both Clinton and Hashimoto and their immediate staffs, nevertheless, put high priority on the Okinawa problem. Their personal attention to it was critical for an agreement to be worked out. As a result, a dramatic and symbolically important agreement for the return of Futenma and ten other sites (approximately 21% of the present land area used by the U.S. military in Okinawa) was reached immediately prior to Clinton's visit to Tokyo after late-hour discussions on April 12 between Ambassador Mondale and Hashimoto, who had met with the ambassador and U.S. military officials more than five times in the preceding two weeks. That same evening Hashimoto, with Mondale standing beside him, announced at a press conference the unexpected agreement to return Futenma. Mondale, addressing reporters, added that we did everything within our power to meet the real concerns of the Okinawan people.

This agreement was then formally decided upon by the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (attended by Perry, Mondale, Ikeda, and Usui) meeting in Tokyo three days later. With this agreement in hand, as well as other ones for SOFA (described below), the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), and for a review of 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the summit was labeled a major success and U.S.-Japan relations, particularly in the security area, were put on track again after drifting for several years. Although the Futenma agreement was not specifically mentioned in the joint declaration at the end of their summit, the two leaders announced their satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through [SACO] and welcomed the far-reaching measures found in the SACO Interim Report.

Implementing the agreement would prove harder than originally anticipated, as is discussed below. One of reasons for this had to do with the fact that the centerpiece of the agreement, the return of Futenma, was conditioned upon the selection of a replacement facility within Okinawa. But at a deeper level, Okinawans were disappointed about the lack of consultation in the SACO process (other than what took place in secret between the prime minister’s office and Governor Ota). The lack of transparency and ability to give input was for Okinawans yet another example of Okinawa’s destiny being decided in a way that was outside of their control.

Phase 1: A Land-based Heliport?

While the summit was viewed a success and the return of Futenma (as well as other SACO recommendations) applauded, the real work now had to begin. Given the high degree of distrust in Okinawa historically toward the central government, implementing the Futenma agreement would be far more difficult than the decision to return the air station, a point seemingly overlooked or at a minimum underestimated by planners and policy-makers.

In late May 1996, the SACO working group officially began their discussions on


482 Japan, U.S. Reach Deal. The clause relating to the return of Futenma Air Station reads as follows: Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed. The airfield's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained through relocations of facilities. This will require construction of a heliport on other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa; development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base; transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base; and a joint U.S.-Japan study on emergency use of facilities in the event of a crisis.

483 See Appendix 11.

484 For this reason, the author has recommended in earlier studies that in any future base realignment planning (such as a SACO II process), representatives from Okinawa (OPG, local communities) be brought in from the very beginning. This would both give Okinawa a stake in the agreement, but also require it to help implement any agreement to which they were a party. Such a format could save unnecessary headaches and wasted time in future arrangements.
implementing the agreement to return Futenma and designate an alternative site at a meeting in Hawaii. Here, the Japanese side explained that they had established a Working Committee to Resolve the Different Issues involved in the Return of Futenma Air Station (Futenma Hikojoto no Henkan ni Kakawaru Shokadai no Kaiketsu no Tame no Sagyo Iinkai). The U.S. had its own issues to work out too requiring inter-departmental coordination, particularly with regard to possibly co-locating the functions of Futenma on Kadena Air Base or in the nearby Ammunition Storage Area.

U.S. representatives reportedly had suggested the relocation of Futenma to an unused plot of land in the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, a massive area bordering Kadena Air Base, in central Okinawa. The Japanese side, aware of local resistance due to environmental and safety concerns, instead sought the relocation of the heliport in the form of its consolidation within Kadena Air Base itself, where for example it was suggested that the former sites of military housing (to be replaced by apartment buildings constructed elsewhere) could be used. Two other northern sites, both U.S. Marine Corps bases, Camp Hansen in Kin, and Camp Schwab in Nago City’s Henoko district, were also suggested in June by the United States during the course of discussions.

Opposition in Okinawa immediately arose against the planned relocation within the prefecture. Four days after the Futenma agreement was announced, the Kadena Town Assembly passed a unanimous resolution against the transfer to Kadena. Likewise in mid-May, citing shared environmental concerns, safety hazards, and noise pollution, approximately 5,000 people from Yomitan and Onna villages protested the proposed construction of the heliport in Kadena munitions area, which lies between their two villages, being led by Mayor Yamauchi of Yomitan. Moreover on June 28 farther north the Nago City Assembly passed a unanimous resolution against the construction of a heliport in their area and on July 10 the first Nago citizen’s rally against the heliport construction (Nago Shiiki e no Daitai Heripoto Kensetsu Hantai Shimin Sokekki Taikai) was held (followed by a second one on November 29).

In the meantime, Ota personally led the opposition to the proposed Kadena site by visiting Washington in mid-June, one week after his anti-base supporters overthrew the conservative majority in the prefectural assembly elections. In order to strengthen Ota's hand in his stand-off with the central government, the anti-base majority of the prefectural assembly subsequently passed a resolution on July 16 opposing the relocation of Futenma within the prefecture, stating that "Relocation within the prefecture would not only strengthen the functions of the bases, but also go against (the purpose of their) consolidation and reduction." This resolution came on the heels of the prefectural assembly’s June 21 vote to hold the non-binding prefectural referendum on the reduction and consolidation of the bases and a revision of the SOFA later in September.

The existence of this study is now public knowledge, but it is unclear whether U.S. policy-makers based their proposals on this 1966 study.

485 The runway for the new heliport is set to be approximately half the length of the present one at Futenma, which is 2800 meters. Meanwhile as part of the deal for the return of Futenma, the transfer of KC-130 Hercules refueling aircraft to the Marine Corps Iwakuni base in Yamaguchi Prefecture (western Japan) was agreed upon, with the construction there of a 8000-feet runway (now expected to be completed in 2009) and possibly to be shared use with the local community. City and prefectural officials in Yamaguchi claim that they had not been consulted before and protested the decision, which if true, suggest that the central government still had many lessons to learn about dealing with the feelings of local residents and municipal authorities. See Yamaguchi Officials Decry Base Shift Plan, Japan Times, April 17, 1996.

486 In the latter 1960s, the U.S. Navy had done a study of possibly constructing an air station off of Camp Schwab, but eventually abandoned it due probably to the impending reversion. The site and construction plans appear to be almost identical to the current plans.

487 Flak from Kadena, Japan Times, April 17, 1996.

488 Assembly Votes Against Base Shift in Okinawa, Japan Times, July 17, 1996.
By this time, it became clear to both the United States and Japanese governments that gaining the acceptance of local residents would not be easy. In light of this local resistance, the Japanese government in early July formally conveyed its opposition to the American proposals, and on July 2, the U.S. and Japanese officials announced they were dropping the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area from its list of possible relocation sites. At the same time, the Japanese government continued to push the United States to consider consolidating the heliport functions at Kadena Air Base, a plan not accepted at the time by the American military, due to space limitations and related safety problems expected with the takeoff and landings of jet fighters, heavy transport planes, and helicopters together, but one nevertheless that continues to occasionally pop up. With no final decision made on a relocation site during the summer of 1996, the relocation problem remained unsettled as the Japanese and U.S. governments braced themselves for Okinawa's prefectural referendum on the bases.

Phase 2: An Offshore Heliport?

It was in the middle of this local opposition and during Hashimoto's first visit to Okinawa as prime minister in the week following the prefectural referendum that he revealed the U.S.-proposed idea of a floating, offshore heliport as a compromise solution to the impasse with Okinawa (as well as between the American and Japanese negotiating teams). Aware that for the Okinawans, the relocation of most of the functions of Futenma within the prefecture was not in fact lightening their burden to the extent the prefecture desired, Hashimoto believed he could gain the understanding of the people of Okinawa by having the heliport constructed offshore. He attempted to sell the plan by explaining that once the offshore heliport was no longer needed it could be removed, thus suggesting that the heliport did not have to be a permanent structure as had been feared by a number of people in the prefecture. Hashimoto also stressed that the environmental impact would be reduced by construction of an offshore heliport. In the September 17 speech in Ginowan City, site of Futenma Air Station, Hashimoto explained that earlier that same day the U.S. side had officially proposed the floating (and mobile) heliport concept at the SACO meeting in Washington. Hashimoto, who himself had reportedly been interested in such a project when he was Minister of Transportation in the third Nakasone Yasuhiro cabinet (July 1986-November 1987), stated that the technological possibility of the construction of a removable, offshore base by the United States and Japan is to be studied, adding that there were still many problems [to] be overcome but it is an option worth considering.

According to the Washington Bureau Chief of the Asahi Shimbun, Funabashi Yoichi, who authored a popular book about the alliance

489 Kadena Ammo Site Cut From Heliport Transfer List, Japan Times, July 4, 1996.
490 Hashimoto, in a further, but somewhat belated effort to secure the support of Governor Ota and the Okinawan people, reportedly suggested in December 1997 that a deadline on its use could be set for the year 2015. See Hashimoto to Offer Nago Heliport Deal, Term of Use Would Expire in 2015, Japan Times, December 24, 1997.
491 Shusho Tekkyo Kano ga Riten, Kankyo e no Hairyo Kyocho, (Prime Minister Says Selling Point is its Removability, Emphasizes Consideration for Environment), Asahi Shimbun, September 18, 1996. This article contains an outline in Japanese of Hashimoto's speech. Also see Offshore Heliport Idea Floated, Japan Times, September 18, 1996. In his speech, Hashimoto also noted that As a nation Japan should frankly admit and feel remorse for not trying hard enough to deeply understand the historical burdens and feelings of Okinawa, which has served as a keystone of the military balance and peace in Japan and Asia. Hashimoto also praised Ota for finally cooperating with the base land lease arrangements (following the denial of his appeal in the Supreme Court hearing one month prior and the relatively low turnout at the prefectural referendum). See Eldridge, The Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions, pp. 888-890. Regarding Hashimoto's interest in this offshore construction plan, the Japanese government had employed an offshore construction facility near Japan's southernmost island, Okinotori, in the late 1980s.
at this time, the recommendation for a floating heliport came during a September 6 meeting between Ambassador Mondale, Perry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dr. Kurt E. Campbell and other high Defense Department officials at the Pentagon. Campbell, reportedly after visiting the megafloat test site off of Yokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo Bay in mid-August and then meeting later in the month with former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard L. Armitage, a highly respected security expert, suggested the floating heliport proposal to the officials gathered. When told of the plan, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, not apparently knowing of industry’s involvement and Hashimoto’s previous interest in the offshore facility, initially hesitated and requested that the U.S. proposal have the concurrence of the related military authorities. With that, Campbell tackled the problem of getting the agreement of the military branches (no easy task) and then officially made his proposal to the Japanese side the following week on September 13 at a bilateral meeting of high officials in Tokyo at the Foreign Ministry.492

Following this and other sessions, the Two Plus Two group of two high officials from the respective diplomatic and military agencies (Perry, Christopher, Ikeda, Usui) agreed at their SCC meeting on September 19 that the various proposals for a floating heliport would be studied, along with the earlier two suggestions for Kadena Air Base and Camp Schwab, for their environmental effects, noise levels, U.S. operational ability, and Japanese financial outlays. It was also decided that one of the three proposed sites would be agreed upon by the end of November when SACO’s one-year mandate expired.493

Phase 3: The Offshore Heliport (2)

Due to continued negative local political reactions to the land-based relocation sites, the less-intrusive offshore heliport proposal began to take precedence over the other two land-based consolidation plans for Kadena and Schwab in the weeks prior to the SACO Final Report. Discussions in the SACO working group thus focused on what type of offshore heliport should be designated for construction. Initially, the following four heliport plans were put forward.

The Japanese side first proposed a quick installation pier/platform (QIP), which was the simplest plan from a construction point of view and the one reportedly favored by Hashimoto.494 It initially envisioned the use of

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492 See Funabashi Yoichi, Domei Jushi, Gun o Settoku (Attaching Importance to the Alliance, [by] Convincing the Military), Asahi Shimbun, November 19, 1996; Kato Yoichi, Bei to Hocho, Kanryo Oshikin (Keeping in Step With U.S., Overriding Bureaucrats), Asahi Shimbun, November 20, 1996; Ikeuchi Kiyoshi, Gyokai no Omowaku An ni Ketsujitsu (Industry’s Calculated Plan Bears Fruit), Asahi Shimbun, November 21, 1996; also see Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, pp. 225-238. Campbell’s proposal, according to Funabashi, was based on the following five merits: 1) the needs of the Marine Corps would be met; 2) no problems relating to noise levels would emerge if the heliport were at least five miles out to sea; 3) the heliport is not meant to be built as a permanent facility; 4) no environmental problems would emerge; 5) U.S.-Japanese technical cooperation and [industrial] leadership would be demonstrated.


Representative of the economic stakes involved, Nissho Iwai Corporation, one of the largest Japanese trading companies, was the main backer of this project. It, along with seven steel, shipbuilding, construction, and heavy industry companies, formed the Okinawa Kaiyo Kukan Riyo Gijutsu Kenkyukai (Okinawa Marine Space Utilization Study Group) in March 1995. It subsequently grew into a 19-member consortium of 6 shipbuilding, 5 steel companies, 3 construction firms, 3 marine construction companies, Nissho Iwai, and the American multi-industry firm, Raytheon. See the homepage of the Study Group at <http://www.qip-ok.com>, created in July (1998) and first accessed shortly after that. Okinawans in general, and the local construction firms in particular, however, were concerned that mainland companies would profit at Okinawa’s expense and became suspicious of these plans. In addition to the general fears of the overpowering strength of mainland companies compared to smaller Okinawan ones, which was particularly strong at the time of reversion two decades before, there had been specific examples when
4000 to 7000 pillars anchored into the sea bottom (roughly 15 to 20 meters apart) with a runway, control tower, and other structures attached some meters above sea level (New York's La Guardia Airport was given as an example of a functioning QIP). Technically speaking, there are actually two types of QIP structures being considered for the offshore heliport. One design shows a structure built inside the reef area 1.6 kilometers off of the eastern coast of the northern part of the main island of Okinawa (see below) in shallow waters of 2 to 3 meters. The second QIP plan is based on construction of the heliport in deeper waters (20 to 40 meters), approximately 2.8 kilometers from shore. The shallow water location for the QIP was the one favored by the consortium responsible for studying the project, which argued that its proven technology, quick construction, relatively low costs, limited environmental and noise effects, and the fact that the heliport can be removed when no longer needed were all strong selling points. Industry representatives stressed these last two points as having been in line with Hashimoto's economic interest in this project as well, the practice float was built by a consortium called the Technological Research Association of Mega-Float (sic) (Megafuroto Gijutsu Kenkyu Kumiai) made up of 17 shipbuilding and steel-making firms and launched in April 1995 with a backing of approximately $30 million. Its Cho-ogata Futai Sogo Shisutemu Kenkyukai (Consolidated Systems Research Group for Extra-Large Floating Structures), made up of 18 firms (many already involved at the same time with Nissho Iwai project), is studying the possibility of constructing a heliport off of the eastern coast of Okinawa. (See http://www.dianet.or.jp/mega-float/WELCOME.htm, accessed 1998). Reportedly, representatives from the megafloat project team of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries initially had suggested to Defense Agency officials in mid-July 1996 that the megafloat should be considered an option for the Futenma relocation. However, defense officials at one point concluded that the megafloat would not meet the needs of the U.S. military and temporarily withdrew the plan from official consideration. While the technology has yet to be fully realized, helicopter landings were practiced on a smaller structure (300 meters by 60 meters) in Tokyo Bay in mid-October (1996). Likewise, symbolic of the literally a floating structure similar to a large pontoon, its basic technology had been in use since World War II and the Vietnam War. However a large structure, such as the size required for a semi-permanent offshore heliport, had never actually been built. Still, the megafloat project team believes it can join floating units of 100 meters by 20 meters, already designed and tested, together to form a facility large enough to handle the heliport traffic. It was described to be viable option because it would limit the negative environmental effects that land-reclamation (or even the QIP) would entail. In actuality, however, in addition to one (or several) mooring dolphins, a semi or fully encircling breakwater wall would also need to be constructed (at a large economic and environmental cost) to prevent the rough seas in the area from impairing the functions of the heliport. Military engineers and officials familiar with the project were not enthusiastic about the megafloat, however, and consider its floating state to be like a constant earthquake. Indeed, in the words of one officer familiar with helicopters, it would be a maintenance nightmare due to the corrosion, cost in man hours, and possibility of accidents due to the
challenges presented if this type of extra maintenance is not realized. It was also potentially the most expensive of the different plans under consideration, with some estimates running at close to ¥500 billion ($3.8 billion). It was questionable therefore whether Japan, in the middle of its worst recession in the postwar period, could afford to pay for it. In response to these proposals, the U.S. side suggested two heliport plans, somewhat similar to each other, of its own. The first one is known as the floating offshore facility (FOF), which has been used in offshore drilling platforms for oil wells. It envisioned a semi-submersible structure with large legs or hulls secured underneath the platform (but unattached to the sea bottom) which would act to stabilize the heliport in the water. The facility thus could be moved or towed away when no longer needed. Unlike the Japanese proposals (since revised), it also envisioned a hangar for the helicopters built inside the structure itself underneath the runways.

Finally, the second proposal from the U.S. side, and the fourth offshore heliport proposal overall, was the mobile offshore base (MOB), similar to the design for the FOF, but mobile and therefore easily moved (like an aircraft carrier in the inaccurate words of some of its critics in Japan and nearby Asian countries). Since only small models have been built to date and no working structure actually exists, questions arose over its technological feasibility and potentially prohibitive costs—costs, once again, made even more prohibitive by Japan’s poorly performing economy. Importantly, as well, the MOB’s functional ability would be reduced in rough seas or bad weather, like its FOF relative, leading possibly to flooding or sinking. Both of these plans eventually were dropped from serious consideration, leaving the two Japanese heliport proposals on the table.497

Phase 4: Failure to Designate a Site

In the meantime, while debate continued over the technological feasibility of each of the four offshore heliport structures, other discussions began on the possible site of the proposed heliport, a politically sensitive issue and one guaranteed to be more problematic than the decision on the type of heliport itself.498 Initially, the Japanese Defense Agency suggested two possible sites each based on the respective designs. For the Japanese-proposed QIP design, officials recommended the sea to the west of Urasoe City, south of Futenma Air Station, because of its low water depth, proximity to Camp Zukeran (where many of the Marines working on Futenma presently live), and the fact that the Naha Military Port facilities are also expected to be moved into that area in the near future (as taken up in the Interim Report). The United States however was reportedly unhappy with this proposal pointing out that the heliport, being on Okinawa’s western coast, would not be easily defendable and thus would be exposed to attack.499 Meanwhile, regarding the U.S.’ MOB

497 Although the GAO report, cited above, notes that three proposals were under consideration (two floating facilities and one supported by columns), the Japanese Defense Agency’s brochure entitled Kaijo Kichi: Kurashi o Shizen o Kangae (The Offshore Heliport: Consideration of Living and the Environment, November 1997) introduced only two proposals (made by the Japanese side). Its ten-page brochure appeared on the JDA’s Internet homepage at http://jda.go.jp/policy/SACO/heliport.html, accessed June 1998. In an interview, officials from the Okinawa Kaiyo Kukan Ryokou Gijutsu Kenkyukai consortium expressed unhappiness with the caption under their QIP proposal reading futai koho (floating construction) on page 3 in the brochure, claiming that it misleads readers into thinking that the structure itself is a floating one, which it is not.

498 In October (1996), a Technical Support Group made up of specialists from related agencies and ministries was set up along with a Technical Advisory Group of outside specialists to study the technological feasibility of an offshore heliport. These two groups concluded that a heliport was possible by today’s construction capabilities. See Boeicho (Defense Agency), Heisei 9 Nendo Boei Hakusho Yoyaku (Defense of Japan, 1997), on the Defense Agency’s homepage at http://www.da.go.p/pab/def97/def97.hta>, accessed June 1998.

design. U.S. and Japanese officials considered Nakagusuku Bay, off of the Marine Corps’ White Beach Training Area, because it is also near Camp Zukeran and, being off the east coast of Okinawa, more easily defendable.

Opposition emerged from Governor Ota who argued that its construction would hinder development of the area, which had already been designated by the prefecture as the site for a distribution center to be constructed on a large landfill there. Opposition also emerged from local residents near the bay and fishermen who argued that their livelihood would be destroyed and the local economy greatly affected (in recent years, roughly 47% of Okinawan fisheries output comes from coastal fishing) were a heliport built.500

It was at this point that Camp Schwab in Nago City re-emerged as a potential site, this time for an offshore heliport. On November 16, two weeks before the SACO mandate was to expire, newly appointed Defense Agency Chief Kyuma Fumio, a former bureaucrat and prefectoral assemblyman from Nagasaki, announced to reporters during a visit to Okinawa that the open sea off Camp Schwab is a strong candidate.501 However, as with the plan for Nakagusuku Bay, opposition by local fishermen, fishery workers, and residents immediately arose (while the usually vocal governor chose to remain surprisingly silent). On November 18, two days after Kyuma’s statement, the Nago City Assembly passed its second unanimous resolution announcing its opposition to construction of a heliport in the area, this time directed against the offshore heliport plan.

Opposition against the offshore heliport increased to such an extent that Hashimoto ordered Kyuma to retract his statement, warning him that citing a specific name for a new site can itself become an obstacle to a solution to this issue.502 Hashimoto cautiously added that while he himself did not know which of the proposed offshore sites would be best, it was important to respect both the wishes of the Okinawan residents and the need to maintain the U.S.-Japan security relationship.502 Hashimoto’s concern over local reaction was further shown when at Japan’s insistence, the U.S. representatives to the SACO group were forced to agree that the proposed site for an offshore heliport would not be named in their final report.503

Phase 5: Releasing the Report


501 Camp Schwab is Likely to be Site of New Heliport, Japan Times, November 18, 1996. A few days earlier at a press conference at the start of the new cabinet, Kyuma expressed his interest in an offshore heliport, describing it as a novel idea and said [relocating the heliport] offshore seemed more feasible and sounded more convincing. See Defense Chief Focuses on Bases, Japan Times, November 13, 1996.

502 Plan to Move Heliport Still Deadlocked, Japan Times, November 27, 1996. Interestingly, shortly afterwards there were hints from Ota that conditional acceptance of the offshore heliport plan was possible if a timeline were set for the bases. In an interview with correspondents from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Japan’s Wall Street Journal, Ota reportedly said, the Prefecture’s basic position is that it is ridiculous to construct [a heliport] on our small [island of] Okinawa. However, no matter how much idealistic talk is made, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is a recognized treaty and we in Okinawa are not the authorities in charge. If we do not get the help of the [central] government, the base problem in Okinawa cannot be solved. The prefecture has drawn up the Base Return Action Program, which calls for all of the bases to be gone by the year 2015. If the prefecture’s wishes are shown [in the central government’s plan for a heliport], then it will be possible to consider. See Isetu Mondai Nanchakuriku Mezasu (Relocation Problem–Aiming for a Soft Landing), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 30, 1996.

503 A Japanese newspaper reported that while the U.S. side was insisting that the relocation site had to be identified, a senior Japanese official had explained his government’s reluctance by stating we are in an extremely sensitive situation as to whether we can include the name [of the relocation site] in the final report. As a result, the Japanese side suggested the compromise phrase waters off the eastern side of the main Okinawa island. See Report On Okinawa Military Bases Nears Completion, Mainichi Daily News, November 25, 1996.
The degree to which the relocation of Futenma Air Station had become as much a political problem as a technical one was perhaps best symbolized by the fact that the seven-page SACO Final Report, returning eleven facilities and areas, and released on December 2, 1996 at the SCC meeting in Tokyo, included an extra three-page supplement relating specifically to the Futenma return/relocation agreement.504

Comprised of five parts, this supplement, entitled the SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station, reaffirmed the necessity to find a suitable replacement site for the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The report next stated that the offshore heliport (called a sea-based facility, or SBF, here) was considered the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces and thus an implementation plan would be developed. Recognizing the political difficulties in getting the residents to accept the presence of the heliport, the report added that the offshore heliport would function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and [could] also be removed when no longer necessary.

The third part, Guiding Principles, stressed the following six items (summarized here) as critical for the implementation of the return of Futenma and the relocation of its functions: 1) The operational capabilities (of Futenma) are to be maintained; 2) Futenma's operations and activities are to be transferred to greatest extent possible to the SBF. Where operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility are not supportable by a shorter runway on the SBF, functions are to be fully supported elsewhere; 3) The SBF is to be located off the east coast of Okinawa Island and expected to be joined to land by a pier or causeway, with the selection of a location to be based on operational requirements, air-space and sea-laned confliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient access by personnel to other U.S. military facilities and housing; 4) The design of a SBF is to incorporate adequate measures to guarantee platform aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion, safety, and platform security, support to include reliable fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other necessities. The SBF is to be fully self-supporting in short-period contingency and emergency operations; 5) The Japanese government is to provide the SBF and other relocation facilities; 6) The Japanese government is to continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of progress of plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation. Despite the technical and logistic difficulties of the first five requirements, the last point, informing the people of Okinawa, which also involved convincing the local residents and authorities, would prove the most problematic to the Japanese government.

In order to implement the return of Futenma and the relocation of the offshore heliport, the SCC agreed to establish the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG) to be under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC). Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, FIG had representatives from the Joint Staff, the Marine Corps headquarters, United States Forces-Japan, the Pacific Command, the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment, the Office of Japanese Affairs, State Department, and the Political-Military Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. It was to develop a plan for implementation by December 1997. FIG would also work with the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee.

While it was not practical or possible diplomatically to leave the site for the 1500-meter facility undetermined for long, the

504 See Appendix 12a.
political risks of revealing the site name weighed heavily for the Japanese side. Yet time was of the essence. In particular, the central and prefecural governments both feared that the personnel changes accompanying the end of the first Clinton administration in early 1997 could cause negotiations to drag on, repeating delays seen in years past with the Naha Military Port and other facilities.\footnote{Secretary of Defense Perry and Secretary of State Christopher were two Cabinet members who left the administration, making room for William S. Cohen and Madeleine K. Albright respectively. Meanwhile, Ambassador Mondale stepped down in December (1996) to be temporarily but ably replaced by Charge d’Affaires Rust M. Deming, himself having spent part of his youth in Okinawa with his diplomat father, Olcott H. Deming, the U.S. Consul General in Naha in early December, Hashimoto met again with Ota in an effort to seek his support and that of the people of Okinawa to turn the SACO report into reality.} Likewise, financing the relocation would also be a problem, particularly in the middle of Japan's recession and budget crunch. Once a site was decided upon, a feasibility study would need to be conducted followed by the development of an implementation plan and budget proposal. Hashimoto thus sought a decision on a site, as early as possible, and by January 1997 at the latest.

Phase 6: Tokyo-Okinawa-Nago Standoff

Two events happened in December following the announcement of the SACO report that helped Hashimoto. First of all, during his second official visit as prime minister to Okinawa in early December, Hashimoto met again with Ota in an effort to seek his support and that of the people of Okinawa to turn the SACO report into reality.\footnote{In response Ota reportedly stated that since it was the prefectural government that had made the request for the return of Futenma, he would work hard to obtain a settlement, suggesting, at least, that he would act as a go-between for the central government and the communities concerned, if not support the project more fully. Likewise, Hashimoto reemphasized that he would not force them to go along with the government's plans, explaining during a meeting later that day with the heads of the municipalities concerned that the State [would] not force [them] to accept a specific site without winning the approval of the representatives of the local residents.} The second event of consequence, a local proposal to accept the heliport (or a variation of it), reflected Okinawa's somewhat divided opinion on the problem and provided a chance for the central government to gain the acceptance of the local communities and the prefecture as a whole. In this proposal, local proponents of the heliport construction made their presence felt when they announced on December 24 that they would conditionally accept a heliport to be built near Cape Henoko in eastern Nago City, presenting their own plan for it.\footnote{Nago City was formed in 1970 through the amalgamation of one town (Nago-cho) and four villages (Hanechi, Kushi, Yabu, Yagaji). The area of Kushi, near the site of the proposed heliport, is itself made up of 13 districts, of which Henoko is closest to the proposed heliport and would be the most affected.} This proposal had been developed by

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\footnote{Ibid. Three days earlier, Hashimoto similarly stated at a press conference that the site for the heliport would not be decided unilaterally without the understanding of those concerned. See Shusho Kenmin no Rikai Yusen (Prime Minister, Understanding of the People of the Prefecture a Priority), Asahi Shimbun, December 3, 1996. When asked in an interview about this comment, particularly whether Hashimoto thought it would be possible to gain the consent of all the residents, a high LDP official from the Policy Affairs Council stated that that was not the intention of Hashimoto's remark. What Hashimoto intended, the official argued, was the gaining of the agreement of the representatives of the people, i.e., the heads of the districts, villages, towns, and cities concerned. Author’s interview with Tamura Shigenobu, May 15, 1998, LDP Headquarters, Tokyo. Tanaka Hitoshi, a Foreign Ministry official involved in the SACO negotiations, stressed the importance of the democratic process in gaining the acceptance of the local residents. Author’s interview with Tanaka Hitoshi, Japanese Consulate, San Francisco, June 9, 1998.}
economic leaders in the central and northern areas of Okinawa and the local Shokokai (Chamber of Commerce). It was forwarded to the central and U.S. governments through the local LDP, whose supporters include many of the same economic leaders. The design of the heliport in this proposal interestingly was not one of the three types originally considered by SACO. It was rather one of a heliport built on reclaimed land (similar to a study commissioned by the Navy in 1966), connected by a long pier, with port facilities constructed for commercial and military use, possibly even including the functions of Naha military port (whose return has been stalled since the mid-1970s due to local resistance and the inability of the Japanese government to provide a replacement site).

The proposal by the local economic leaders was made in recognition of local needs—employment, investment, and infrastructure—and the fact that the four proposals for an offshore heliport were designed and made by large mainland-based companies, offering little to the local economy in the immediate future. Direct benefits to the local economy would be felt, the local leaders argued, if local workers and local contractors were used, particularly in the plan for land reclamation. Without these benefits to the Okinawan economy, they argued, it clearly would be difficult to gain the support of the local residents and businesses. (Officials from the Nissho Iwai-backed consortium challenge this, arguing that there would actually be larger benefits to the local economy through their project, in which contracts would be spread out over many different types of local businesses.) Moreover, precisely because the offshore heliport was first promoted as removable, i.e. not permanent, local business leaders feared that once the heliport was no longer needed by the United States it would be disassembled, leaving nothing for Okinawa. What these local economic leaders called for therefore was in fact the construction of a permanent facility (at the central government’s expense) since the local residents would be bearing the burden of the physical presence of the base, which could be used jointly once built, or if that were found impossible, after the U.S. military no longer has need of it. With the gaining of a local airport (a transportation hub), business leaders felt that the economy of the northern part of Okinawa, long neglected at the expense of the southern and central parts of the island, would therefore finally begin to grow. The central government announced at the end of December that it would also consider the local plan in addition to its official proposals if the local and prefectural governments agreed to it.

along with neighboring Toyohara and Kushi villages. Henoko already hosts Camp Schwab, a Marine base conditionally invited to the area in 1956 to prevent the forced acquisition of land in Henoko and the surrounding areas as was seen occurring in the southern and central parts of the island at the time as well as to promote the economic development of the area. Henoko’s population stood at 480 people in the 1950s, blossomed to approximately 3800 in the 1960s, and after the Vietnam War has continually dwindled to the present 1442. Henoko was in many respects a ghost town, particularly when compared to even some of the other lonely areas making up Nago City, until recently but has seen a lot of investment and new construction over the past few years.

510 Shuwabu Oki Umetate (Land Reclamation off of Schwab), Nihon Keizai Shim bun, December 25, 1996.

511 Okinawa Hokubu Hojinkai (Northern Okinawa Association for Corporate Bodies), Futenma Daitai Heripoto Isetsu Sokushin ni Kansuru Seimei (Declaration on Accelerating the Replacement Heliport for Futenma), December 24, 1996, provided to author in personal interview with Shimabukuro Katsu, representative of the Henoko Kasseika Sokushin Kyokai (Council for Promoting the Revitalization of Henoko), May 20, 1997, Nago City, Okinawa. Shimabukuro, who was head of Henoko district from 1980 to 1988 and later director of the corporate bodies in the northern part of Okinawa, officially formed the promotion council on April 24, 1997.

512 Due to local opposition, the land-reclamation plan did not gain the momentum hoped for and remains curiously only in the background of discussions. A variation of the above plan did emerge 16 months later from the LDP which envisions a runway shared with the local community built within Camp Schwab, but discussion of it does not seem to be progressing. Beigun Kichinai ni Shinkasoro Kensetsu, Sankei Shim bun, April 8, 1998. A visit to Camp Schwab will show that the small, hilly base would not be the most practical of locations for a large runway. Anti-heliport leader Miyagi Yasuhiro and Ryukyu Shimpo newspaper editor Miki Ken in separate personal interviews.
Despite a somewhat promising close to 1996, Hashimoto's good luck did not hold out and his efforts to seek local cooperation bore little fruit in the new year as local residents, fearful for the community's safety and effects on the environment, increased their opposition.

Hashimoto sent his newly installed aide on Okinawa problems, former career diplomat Okamoto Yukio, to Okinawa in mid-January (1997) to seek the cooperation of the prefecture in allowing a preliminary feasibility study to be done of the waters off of Nago City's Camp Schwab. Ota, changing his previous stance, announced that the prefectural government was no longer the authority concerned and thus would not mediate between the central and local governments. Ota added that since different municipalities take different stances on (the U.S.) bases, it would be unreasonable for the prefectural government to tell municipalities to do this or that, a stance which local fishing industry association chief Terukina Choshin criticized as completely strange because the prefectural government has been advocating the reduction of the bases all along. Nishida Kenjiro, then-chairman of the prefectural chapter of the LDP, was more critical: avoiding responsibility (like the Governor has) for solving the problem between the central government and the people of Nago is not what we find acceptable in a leader.

The central government was forced by this turn of events to make its intentions clear and begin talks directly with local authorities. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama, the government's top spokesman and the one of the key players with regard to Okinawa-related issues, announced the following three points at a January 16 press conference: 1) the waters off of Camp Schwab were considered the most suitable; 2) the central government would officially request the Nago City authorities to permit the feasibility study as early as possible; 3) an implementation plan would be drawn up by the end of the year. Defense Agency Chief Kyuma followed up this announcement two days later by stating at a press conference that the government was still considering the waters off of Nago City conditionally and that a request to permit the feasibility study would be submitted to Nago City officials at the beginning of the following week.

Nago City Mayor Higa Tetsuya passed the ball back to the central and prefectural governments (where he felt the debate originally belonged) during a morning meeting on January 21 with Shimaguchi Takehiko, Director of the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, who following Kyuma's statement, had submitted the central government's request to the Nago mayor. Higa in turn responded that since it was a big decision (affecting the entire prefecture), representatives of the prefecture should also be present in a three-way forum, thereby expressing at this point his refusal in principle.
to accept the request for a feasibility study.\footnote{Shuwabu Oki o Kyohi, Seifu Yosei ni Ken Fukumu Kyogi Motome (Waters off of Schwab Refused, Prefecture Should be Included in Talks Regarding Government's Request), \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, January 21, 1997.} After the meeting, Higa showed his frustration at both the central and prefectural governments with the planned relocation to the north by reportedly stating that the northern part of Okinawa should not be considered a rubbish dump, a feeling shared by many Okinawans in the north who already host a dam and a large Marine training facility and feel that the southern part of the island prospers at their expense.\footnote{Interview with Higa.}

The standoff between the central, prefectural, and Nago City governments continued for several months. Other events in the meantime added fuel to the fire. The first one was the disclosure in early February (1997) of the firing of 1520 depleted uranium bullets by Marine AV-8B Harrier jets (based in Iwakuni) at Tori Shima gunnery range, an uninhabited coral island approximately 100 kilometers west of Okinawa, between December 1995 and January 1996. Governor Ota correctly criticized the Foreign Ministry for failing to have notified the prefectural authorities of the incident and the United States for not openly having informed the Japanese government as mentioned earlier, Hashimoto revealed the contents of the 5/15 Memo, a secret agreement signed at the time of the reversion of Okinawa from U.S. to Japanese administration on May 15, 1972, setting the conditions for use of military facilities in the prefecture by U.S. forces. This was something that the OPG had been requesting for 24 years since it first found out about its existence in 1973.

The passage by both houses of the Japanese Diet (by both the major ruling and opposition parties) of a bill to amend the 1952 Law on Special Measures for Land for the U.S. Military in mid-April further eroded confidence between the prefectural and central governments.\footnote{For a look at the role of Social Democratic Party, which did not cooperate with its LDP coalition partner in the passage of the special measures bill, see Fukushima Yoshikazu, Beigun Yochi Tokubetsu Sochiho Kaisei to Shakai Minshuto (The Law on Special Measures for Land for the U.S. Military and the Social Democratic Party), \textit{Seisaku Kagaku Kokusai Kankei Ronshu} (Ryukyu University Review of Policy and International Relations), Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 151-186.} The bill was sponsored by the government because, with the expiration on May 14, 1997 of leases held by several anti-war landowners, so-called for their refusal to cooperate in leasing arrangements for military facilities) on a total of 36 hectares of land within 13 U.S. military facilities, the Japanese government (and hence the U.S. military) would lose the legal right to occupy or use the land. Hashimoto, scheduled to meet with Clinton in late April in Washington, feared a replay of the previous year's clash with Ota and the anti-war landowner of a small plot of land in the Sobe Communications Facility, Chibana Shoichi. (Chibana himself was arrested along with 20 demonstrators in the afternoon of April 17 after a scuffle broke out in the gallery of the Upper House as the councilors were set to vote on the bill.) Public support nationally however was reluctantly with Hashimoto, with one poll showing approximately 50% saying that the bill was unavoidable. Polls taken in Okinawa revealed more complex feelings however:

As a result of this incident,
roughly 60% voiced their opposition while 36% described it as unavoidable. Only 5% actually supported the bill.\textsuperscript{521} In recognition of Okinawa’s situation and unhappiness with the amended law, the Lower House adopted the following week a resolution calling for the government to work harder towards the goal of consolidating, reducing, and relocating the U.S. bases in Okinawa.\textsuperscript{522} Importantly, this was the first Diet resolution on the bases in Okinawa since 1971, despite there being a committee within the Diet dealing specifically with Okinawan affairs.\textsuperscript{522} Coming immediately prior to Hashimoto’s talks with Clinton in Washington, D.C. on April 25, this was also perhaps a bargaining tool for Hashimoto to seek continued U.S. flexibility on the Okinawa problem.\textsuperscript{523} As events would show in Okinawa, greater flexibility on all sides would be needed.

Phase 7: Feasibility Study Acceptance

It was in the middle of the review of the land law that Mayor Higa of Nago announced after meeting with local residents and fishermen at the Henoko Community Center on April 9 that he would accept the central government’s plan for a feasibility study to be conducted. He added that his acceptance was on the condition that local communities and the fishermen most affected agree to the study and the prefecture took responsibility for it, which Higa pointed out Governor Ota had yet to do. Higa relayed his decision to accept the study the following day during a meeting with Ota on April 10 to which Ota responded that he would respect Nago’s decision, and thus, in effect, allowing the feasibility study to take place.\textsuperscript{524}

Nago City officials next conducted a series of explanatory meetings with the heads of the other 12 districts near the proposed heliport, including Kushi on April 11, Toyohara on April 12, and the ten communities north of Henoko on April 15—the last group being so unhappy with Higa’s decision that they actually boycotted the explanation session in the end. Although many local residents opposed Higa’s agreement to accept, the fishing associations of

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\textsuperscript{521} Tokusoho, Yamu o Enai: Go wari (50% Believe Special Measures Law Unavoidable), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, April 23, 1997; Polls Show Okinawans Oppose Lease Bill, \textit{Japan Times}, April 12, 1997.

\textsuperscript{522} The Special Committee on the Problems of Okinawa and the Northern Islands (\textit{Okinawa Yoobi Hoppo Mondai ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Inkai}) is the name of a committee found in both the Upper and Lower Houses dealing with Okinawa and the Northern Territories. The respective committees were first established on February 17, 1967 during the 55\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Diet, and was known as the \textit{Okinawa Mondaito ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Inkai}, or The Special Committee on the Okinawa Problem and Other Matters, which dealt with developing policies for Okinawa and other Japanese territories. On March 30, 1968 (during the 59\textsuperscript{th} Diet Session, three months before the return of the Ogawarama (Bonin) Islands to Japan, the name of the committee was changed to \textit{Okinawa Mondai Yoobi Hoppo Mondaito ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Inkai}, which was changed a few months later on August 3 (during the 59\textsuperscript{th} Extraordinary Diet Session) to its current name. In addition, a special committee was established during the 67\textsuperscript{th} Extraordinary Session of the Diet (known as the \textit{Okinawa Diet}) on November 5, 1971, to deal with the Okinawa reversion agreement by the name of the \textit{Okinawa Henkan Kyotei Tokubetsu Inkai} (Special Committee on the Okinawa Reversion Agreement).

\textsuperscript{523} In Washington, Hashimoto and Clinton discussed the Okinawa problem and related security matters, including the ongoing Guidelines review. Specifically, the two leaders reaffirmed the need to see the implementation of the SACO agreement carried out. Clinton stated that the United States is very aware that our presence...has imposed burdens on the people of Okinawa (and promised to carry through if I) good faith—

\textsuperscript{524} Mayor Reluctantly Accepts Heliport Study, \textit{Japan Times}, April 11, 1997; Kichi Shukusho, Ketsugi de Mi Toru (Base Reduction by Resolution Bears Fruit), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, April 11, 1997; Okinawa Ken, Chosa Ukeire (Okinawa Prefecture Accepts Study), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, April 11, 1997.
Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture did give their conditional consent to the study on April 17 and April 18 respectively (in exchange for the expectation of promotional and other measures). With this lukewarm approval, Higa officially announced his decision on April 18 to cooperate with the study.\(^525\) It was not an easy decision for him, Higa stated at a news conference, because he felt that he was being forced by the prefecture to make a decision in isolation and because he himself was basically against construction (of the heliport).\(^525\) It was also not an easy announcement for the near 70-year-old mayor to make—local residents from Henoko and their supporters staged a temporary sit-in protest outside Higa's office.\(^526\)

Phase 8: Three Plebiscites on the Relocation

These anti-heliport residents were not going to take Higa's decision to accept the study sitting down, however. The local outrage at the mayor's about-face was severe and his decision was labeled an act of treason. Higa countered these criticisms by repeating that he was against the heliport in principle and explained that his acceptance of the study did not mean that he supported the construction of the heliport.\(^527\) But to the opponents of the heliport, acceptance of the feasibility study was the same thing as allowing construction of the heliport.

As the author discussed in detail elsewhere, a city-wide non-binding plebiscite was subsequently organized and held on December 21 that year (1997), which saw 52% of participating voters reject the proposed construction of the offshore heliport.\(^528\) Nevertheless, Higa, meeting with Hashimoto at the Prime Minister’s Office on December 24, 1997, announced his acceptance of the heliport to Nago. At the same time, he explained that he was resigning as mayor, an office he had held for three terms, throwing the community (and base relocation plans) into further chaos.

In the mayoral election subsequently held on February 8, which was another close vote and can be considered as the second plebiscite on the base, deputy mayor Kishimoto Tateo, supported by the conservatives, defeated 6-term Prefectural Assembly member Tamaki Yoshikazu by a little over 1100 votes. Kishimoto still had to watch what the OPG would do, but the central government no doubt breathed a sigh of relief at his election.

By this time, Ota had made his views on the Futenma relocation known. During the mayoral campaign, Ota had given speeches for Tamaki, an opponent to the relocation, and thus his position was clear to observers and the central government. On February 6, Ota officially announced that he would reject the heliport as the (Nago) plebiscite results clearly indicated that more Nago City voters disapproved (of) the construction of the offshore heliport in their municipality and the prefectural government would honor the results because it is a basic rule of democracy to respect the will of local residents, which was clearly shown in the December plebiscite.\(^529\)

Hashimoto was the most disappointed with Ota's decision to reject the heliport plan. From December 1997 until Hashimoto's resignation on July 13 (following the LDP's poor showing in the Upper House elections) the two did not meet, the longest they went without speaking face-to-face. Hashimoto and those close to him said on occasion that they were not

\(^{525}\) The preliminary study of the area by the central government was launched approximately three weeks later in the beginning of May. Four government-assigned firms conducted research on local marine life and airspace/sea lanes and completed their study in the fall.


\(^{528}\) Eldridge, \textit{Okinawa and the Nago Heliport Problem}, pp. 144-147.

\(^{529}\) Chiji Kaijo Kichi Hantai o Hyomei: Seron Fumae (Governor Announces Opposition to Offshore Base, Based on Public Opinion), \textit{Ryukyu Shimpo}, February 6, 1998.
interested in meeting with Ota just to hear him say "no" again. Thus, in the words of one Japanese newspaper, a delicate distance was being maintained between the central and prefectural governments. This distance was seen as well by the resignation of Hashimoto's special assistant for Okinawa problems, Okamoto Yukio, in early March 1998, out of frustration with the prefectural government and due to the feeling that his voice was no longer being heard in an administration focused on the country's economic difficulties and no longer patient with the Okinawa problem.

The LDP too, as described above, which had a truce of sorts with Ota, began to act quite coolly toward Ota and the prefectural government. Okinawa's then-treasurer, Miyahira Hiroshi, was not received by officials at the LDP headquarters when he visited Tokyo to make his formal greetings after his appointment in late January. Locally, the LDP began looking at running a moderate candidate from Ota's camp against him in the upcoming gubernatorial election, and interpreted victories in local mayoral elections in Okinawa City and Gushikawa City in late April as victories against Ota, who campaigned on behalf of the progressive candidates. In both elections, large majorities were had by the nominally independent but LDP-supported candidates. Symbolic of the large interest in these elections, forces on both sides of the issue mobilized their supporters to the extent that the Gushikawa election saw record-breaking turnout, this in a time of trends showing dramatic decreases in voter participation in politics. Likewise both conservative and progressive forces mobilized heavily for the July 12 House of Councilors elections in which 126 (50 to be based on proportional representation) seats were up nationwide for election. A victory here by the local LDP, where the former head of the prefectural chapter, Nishida Kenjirō, was running would have been seen as another vote against the governor. Ota then, his opponents hoped, would thus be clearly vulnerable in the gubernatorial elections. Not being able to change his stance on the heliport issue, Ota would be ousted, the scenario went, by voters concerned over the stalled Futenma reversion agreement, poor economic prospects, and the tense political climate vis-à-vis the central government. However, that scenario was upset, at least temporarily, by the victory of the progressive Upper House candidate, Shimabukuro Soko, over Nishida in a hard-fought election in which both candidates were not afraid to bring the heliport problem prominently into the debate. In fact they welcomed it.

The conservative candidate who eventually emerged, Inamine Keiichi, in any case, was able to take advantage of the impasse between the prefectural and central governments, portraying himself as someone who could get the dialogue going. Although not by background a politician, Inamine, the son of Inamine Ichiro, did have wide experience as a business leader and importantly was well connected in Tokyo because of his having served as vice-chair of the Shimada group (described above) and his long-time friendship with the new prime minister, Obuchi Keizo.

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530 Kuni to no Bimyo na Kyori Chijisen Made Tszukuka (Delicate Distance with State, Will it Continue Until the Gubernatorial Elections?), Ōsahi Shim bun, March 8, 1998.

531 Incumbent Shimabukuro, supported by the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, New Socialist Party, Clean Government Party, Sports and Peace Party, and the New Party Peace, argued that he would definitely not accept construction of the heliport and attained a total of 243,488 (out of 535,623) to LDP candidate Nishida's 238,330, who argued that the heliport should be looked as a temporary measure [and that] without acceptance of the heliport, economic stimulus packages for Okinawa would not be forthcoming. Shimabukuro countered in a post-election interview that such an argument actually had the effect of angering the people of the prefecture. The acceptance of the heliport and economic stimulus (packages) are separate. The people have recognized that the heliport can not be accepted. See Kichi Mondai ni Zenzryoku [Saisen no Shimabukuro Soko ga Hofu 8 (Utmost on the Base Problem: Re-elected Shimabukuro is Ambitious)], Ryukyu Shimpo, July 13, 1998. Representative of the economic concerns as well as the heavy degree of mobilization, in Nago voters chose Nishida over Shimabukuro by a difference of 10,539 to 9,618 respectively.
His acceptance of the relocation—a big gamble, which Ota had not been willing to do—was the key to restarting the dialogue. At the same time, he could not simply toe the central government’s line. About three weeks after announcing his candidacy, Inamine stated at a September 21 press conference unveiling his platform that he would urge the central government to revise its plan for the offshore heliport, unveiled a substitute proposal of his own for the relocation.533

The facility would be built on land (rikujō) in the northern part (hokubu) of Okinawa to be shared by the U.S. military and local civilian airlines, which is already done at Misawa, for example. Inamine also called for a time limit of 15 years on its use (a request that the U.S. military was understandably strongly against due to the potential of sending wrong signals to the region and its negative impact on deterrence).534

Inamine’s substitute proposal was very much interrelated with his focus on the economy, particularly the northern part of the island, where his family’s hometown is located.

532 Author’s interview with Kakazu Noriaki, March 4, 1999, Naha, Okinawa; author’s interview with Inamine Keiichi, March 5, 1999, Naha; author’s telephone interview with Shimada Haruo, July 7, 1999; Okinawa Samitto o Kimetta Takeda Memo (The Takeda Memo Which Decided the Okinawa Summit), Chuo Koron, Vol. 114, No. 7 (July 1999), p. 77. Obuchi took over as Prime Minister in July 1999 following the LDP’s losses in the Upper House elections.


534 Author’s interview with Pentagon Officials, June 19, 1998, and January 27, 1999, Arlington, Virginia; Military-Civilian Airport Proposal Worth Considering, U.S. Official Says, Daily Yomiuri, July 24, 1999; Cohen Urges Haste on Air Base Move, Daily Yomiuri, July 28, 1999. Author’s interview with Inamine Keiichi, March 5, 1999, Naha, Okinawa; Author’s interview with U.S. officials familiar with Japan policy, January 26, 1999, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. During these interviews, the author received the impression that these officials did not take Inamine’s platform seriously, with one saying that he would retract the 15-year limit after the election, to which I expressed my doubts. Almost 6 years later, he has yet to do so, although some possible compromises do exist.

By building the facility on land, rather than offshore (where it was feared that only the mainland steel and construction companies would benefit), Inamine sought to bring more tangible benefits to the island in the short, medium, and long-term. People may be reluctant to just transfer the whole [air] station to yet another facility, Inamine told a newspaper in an interview, but they might find it more attractive if the transfer brings about support industries related to the airport and promotes development of the northern part.535

Indeed, Inamine, pointing out that the economy was stagnating, unemployment high, and a fiscal deficit for the prefecture was continuing for its third year, attempted to stress the economic benefits that the new facility could bring.

Tokyo and Washington carefully watched the debate in Okinawa in the run-up to the election, which can be described as the third plebiscite on the relocation. On November 1, three days after the official campaign began, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that the United States would be willing to review the heliport proposal if the central and prefectural governments could agree on an alternative, thereby showing that Inamine’s proposal, which had been dismissed by Ota and his supporters as unrealistic, was in fact possible.536

Cohen also took the time reemphasize that the Marines stationed in Okinawa would not be redeployed from Okinawa to Guam or Hawaii, thus outright rejecting Governor Ota’s calls for their removal.

With Cohen’s announcement, the spokesman for the Japanese Government, Nonaka, stated at a November 2 press conference that it too would likely review the heliport plan, although it still believed that the offshore facility was the best option.537 The


537 Alternatives to Heliport Plan Eyed, Daily Yomiuri, November 4, 1998; Heliport Deal Eyed After Okinawa
Japanese Government made its views clearer the following week just days before the election when Prime Minister Obuchi, while stressing that he wanted the base to stay within the prefecture, stated that the government would abandon the offshore heliport plan because the government would not be able to carry out the plan without the understanding and cooperation of the local citizens. 538 A joint *Asahi Shimbun/Okinawa Times* poll published the morning of the prime minister’s announcement probably solidified his thinking: only seven percent of residents in Okinawa were found to be in favor of the heliport being offshore.539 Other polls showed similar results. They also suggested that it was going to be a very close race.540

As looked at in Part II, voters eventually decided to go with Inamine in what was widely seen as a realistic choice in light of the standoff with the central government.

**Phase 9: Okinawa’s Acceptance**

Inamine’s first priority, as explained earlier, was to get the dialogue restarted and the economy moving. When he was confident that those issues were moving forward in mid-1999, he finally turned toward seeking a consensus on the base issues, which by design, had been left in the background. It was like taking a detour in order to get to one’s destination, a close confidante of the governor confided to this author. 541


542 Inamine himself, aware of the opposition’s criticism that the summit was another example of the carrot and stick method of dealing with Okinawa and that Clinton’s statement simply proved it, had said the summit should not be linked with the bases although he too was forced to play Clinton’s announcement down at first.

In any case, the U.S. and central governments made clear their desire that a site be selected as soon as possible in order to begin...
making arrangements for the relocation. This was made clear during a visit to Japan in late July that year by Secretary Cohen. He took the opportunity to push for a solution to the relocation problem in his talks with Defense Agency Director Norota Hosei and other officials. Both sides recognized that with preparations for the G-8 Summit, as well as the domestic political schedules of both countries, including a Presidential election in the United States, and a House of Representatives and Okinawa Prefectural Assembly election coming up in Japan, there will be no time for discussions on base issues. Inamine, however, had his own time-table—namely, the realization of a certain consensus, whenever that happened, including after the summit. Realizing that pushing it any further, the central government decided to publicly take a wait-and-see attitude, waiting for the consideration of Governor Inamine, while continuing to prod the prefectural, carefully and government behind-the-scenes.

Inamine responded by taking a two-track approach. Track one involved negotiating directly with the central government—the Prime Minister, the Okinawa Development Agency, the Defense Agency, and other agencies and organizations involved with Okinawan affairs. Inamine and his associates made it clear that he had to have the full backing of the central government in order to proceed. On August 19, Inamine flew to Tokyo and in a meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka, who also served as Director General of the Okinawa Development Agency, told him that he would not announce a relocation site unless the central government develops concrete plans to assist in the relocation. For example, because some of the major concerns of Okinawans involve the development of land after reversion and the related high rental fees that until then had been paid out by the central government through the DFAB, Inamine presented a six-point written request to Nonaka, two of which dealt with special administrative financing measures dealing with the use of vacated land and the establishment of government-sponsored implementation agency, as well as four points which dealt with revision of Guntenpo to allow owners of land to receive rental fees for seven years after reversion instead of the then three.

At the same time, Inamine proceeded on a second track at the prefectural level, speaking with concerned parties and requesting that studies be done on candidate sites. In early August, an 11-member brain group of political policy advisors completed a report on possible sites and submitted it to Inamine and his two vice-governors. The recommendation reaffirmed that the area around Henoko was the best of the sites looked at.

The report, which suggested three possible construction methods—(1) a structure built on a combined offshore and reclaimed land, called the hybrid proposal; (2) a structure built completely on reclaimed land; and (3) a megafloat structure—was believed by observers to influence Inamine, as its drafters were also deeply involved in developing Inamine’s campaign platform.

A month later, with the report used as a reference, prefectural officials announced that they were considering the Nago-Henoko district in their studies and that they had three different construction methods in mind—(1) a facility built completely on land; (2) a hybrid facility built partly on land and partly on reclaimed land; and (3) a facility built partly on land and partly on QIP-style dock. When

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544 Cohen Urges Haste on Air Base Move.
545 Okinawa Base Site Selection Likely This Year, Daily Yomiuri, August 2, 1999.
548 Henoko Chiku ga Saiteki, Ryukyu Shimpo, September 2, 1999.
549 Ibid.
550 Futenma, Shuwabu Jiku ni 3 Koho (Futenma, 3 Methods Revolve Around [Camp] Schwab), Ryukyu
addressed on September 3 by some 40 people from Henoko and two other community anti-base organizations to stop the government’s plans for relocation. Oyakawa Seiichi, Director of the Governor’s Office, who had just announced for the first time that the prefectural government was including the Henoko area in the sites being considered, explained that he interpreted the December 1997 Nago plebiscite as a vote on the construction of a heliport on public coastal waters as in the plebiscite ordinance. This interpretation, while convenient, invited a great deal of protest during the meeting in which the anti-base forces reportedly responding that the vote showed the people were against all heliport bases. The Prefecture should respect that. Oyakawa replied that the prefecture would take into consideration the results of the plebiscite and that while it is looking at sites in the entire prefecture, it was still a blank sheet as to what sites will be finalized. This response was not what the opposition groups wanted to hear and the local media correctly noted that opposition would grow.

Later that same afternoon, the Okinawa Peace Movement Center (Okinawa Heiwa Undo Sentaa) sponsored an emergency meeting attended by the three organizations above, as well as other citizens’ groups and progressive local politicians. The meeting’s sponsors, fearing that Inamine would announce a site officially prior to the upcoming Ordinary Prefectural Assembly Session scheduled for September 24, called for the organizing of a Kichi no Kennai Isetsu Hantai Kenmin Kaigi (Prefectural People’s Council Against the Relocation of the Base Within the Prefecture) before that to oppose the relocation of Futenma and Naha Military Port as well as call for the revision of the SACO Agreement. Despite Inamine’s having proceeded slowly and carefully, opposition to the base relocation obviously remained, as was reflected in the Henoko local administration vote at the end of September on a resolution against accepting the base built on land or reclaimed land, and the Nago City Assembly’s vote a few days later against the early construction of the relocated facility.

After these two defeats, the ruling parties in the Prefectural Assembly sought to lend their support to Inamine, perhaps realizing that the window of opportunity was closing and any further delay would conflict with the assembly elections the following summer as well as preparations for the G-8 Summit, not to mention possibly threaten relations with the central government. On October 12, the parties submitted a resolution supporting the SACO agreement and calling for the early relocation of Futenma within the prefecture. After a heated debate and an extension of the session, the resolution was approved on October 15. Buoyed by the vote of support for the relocation, as well as an earlier vote in August by the Ginowan City Assembly supporting the relocation (out of their community), Inamine stated that the central government would have to implement ways to address the economic needs of the prefecture, as well as its concerns over the use of the facility, before he would make his final decision on naming a relocation site.

The issues Inamine raised were discussed at the 13th Okinawa Policy Council held on November 19 at the Prime Minister’s Office, and the following week, on November 24, Inamine formally Nago as the prefecture’s choice for the relocation site.

Phase 10: Nago’s Acceptance

With the OPG’s decision made, the ball went back to Nago City Mayor Kishimoto. Inamine asked Kishimoto at a December 3 meeting to accept the facility, adding that he regretted...
having to ask the citizens of Nago to shoulder the burdens that must accompany the construction, but I believe that the new airfield will lead to development of the area and I ask for their understanding and support.

Following this meeting with the governor, Kishimoto began formal discussions with various groups in Nago, including the Fishery Association and the Henoko local administration. In the meantime, against the backdrop of the government’s announcement of a ¥100 billion-stimulus package for the northern part of the prefecture, the Nago City Assembly began its discussions on the base relocation. Although there was dissatisfaction inside and outside the assembly with the prefecture’s lack of disclosure regarding its choice of Henoko as the relocation site and lack of detailed plans for the facility and its location, the ruling parties submitted a condition resolution supporting the relocation to the shores of Henoko and eventually passed it on December 23, a little more than two years to the day since voters in the plebiscite had rejected its relocation.

Following the assembly’s vote of 17 to 10, Kishimoto announced his conditional acceptance, stressing that a time limit of 15 years, as originally suggested by Inamine, should be set and that assurances should be secured that steps are to be taken to minimize the adverse effects of the facility on the environment and the lives of nearby residents. Despite these conditions, criticism remained of the lack of debate and quick decision on the part of the assembly and the mayor, leading to an unsuccessful attempt to recall Kishimoto.

Phase 11: Toward a Basic Plan

The next day, December 28, the Cabinet agreed to seek the relocation of the facility to Nago (as originally planned) and to support the ¥100 billion package. Subsequently, following the summit, the central government established the Council on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station (Futenma Hikojo Daitai Shisetsu ni Kansuru Kyogikai), comprised of the ministers of concerned agencies and representatives from local communities in Okinawa affected by the relocation, such as the Prefecture, Nago, Higashi Village, and Ginoza Village, to discuss the size, construction method, and actual site of the facility. The Council would subsequently meet a total of 9 times, between August 25, 2000 and the summer of 2002.

On July 29, 2002, the Council approved the Basic Plan on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station (Futenma Hikojo Daitai Shisetsu no Kihon Keikaku). In the same month, the central government approved it that same day.

Phase 12: Implementing the Basic Plan

Some six months later, on January 28, 2003, the Daitai Shisetsu Kensetsu Kyogikai (Council on the Construction of the Replacement Facility) was created, holding its meeting that day in Tokyo. This council, chaired by the Minister in Charge of Okinawan Affairs, is also comprised of many of the same members as the above council, but is more geared toward the technical aspects and environmental concerns of the replacement facility. Its second meeting was held some 11 months later in late December 2003, to discuss the status of the construction plans and environmental assessments (expected to take a few years). That month coincided with the end of the original timeline set in the SACO agreement, that relocation would take place between 5 to 7 seven years. At the time of this writing, more than 8 years have passed since the Interim Report was released. Recent statements by U.S. officials suggest that patience is running thin on the U.S. side, with some calling for the abandonment of the plan to build a replacement facility in Henoko for Futenma, and instead relocate it to Kadena Air Base (or to other facilities in Japan). Currently, with the U.S Defense Department reexamining its global force posture, and no clear time table ahead for the completion of the SACO implementation, many observers and insiders are taking a wait and see attitude when it

comes to Futenma. Indeed, as environmentalists and anti-base civic groups increase their networking capabilities and campaign against the relocation, it is safe to say that things still remain up in the air, although the central government seems committed to seeing the plan through.

One of the major stumbling blocks still remains the 15 year issue. Politically, it is nearly impossible that Inamine can or will back down from that stance, although some conservatives have criticized his position. It is unlikely, in this writer’s opinion, that he will cave in. Instead, several scenarios which the author introduced in an earlier study (Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations in the 21st Century, pp. 18-19), are possible as to how a compromise can be reached, including the signing of a carefully negotiated agreement in which the U.S. reserves the right to request an extension after 15 years or another replacement facility. Of course this does not mean that the U.S. would actually make such a request, nor does it mean that the Japanese side has to consent to granting an extension or replacement facility if it decides after consultations not to do so. The very signing of an agreement at the minimum should satisfy Okinawan demands, although it would require strong political leadership by the U.S. and Japanese governments to make grant such a concession to the prefecture.

I. The SOFA Problem

The Futenma relocation issue, which has slowed down other related relocation projects, is not the only problem that ignited (or re-ignited) at the time of the 1995 rape incident. A second one was the demands of the Prefectural Government for the revision of the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement, which many in the prefecture see as discriminatory and a violation of Japan’s sovereignty. In particular, the jurisdiction was a heated issue that remains boiling hot.

The response of the Japanese Government under then-Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi to events following the 1995 rape incident was initially very weak. Perceived delays in the handing over of the three suspects to Japanese custody and the overall handling of the implementation of SOFA by the central government drew serious criticism throughout Japan and in particular Okinawa, as mentioned above. Indeed some Okinawans felt that the Foreign Ministry was more concerned with preserving the U.S.-Japan relationship than in protecting their rights.

Although Foreign Minister Kono cautioned Gov. Ota that the OPG’s petition for revision of SOFA were premature, the Foreign Ministry and the State Department had opened up discussions on improving the implementation of Article 17 of the SOFA regarding criminal jurisdiction, which was the immediate problem at hand. As a result, on October 25, the two governments agreed at their biweekly Joint Committee meeting that the United States would give sympathetic consideration to any request for the transfer of custody prior to indictment of the accused made by Japan in cases of heinous crimes of murder or rape.

But this would not be enough for Okinawans. On November 4, shortly after the creation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, the OPG presented the central and U.S. governments with a 10-part petition requesting a reexamination of the SOFA.

The SACO working group took up some of these issues, as seen in the Interim Report released on April 15, 1996 (see Appendix 11). The report explained that the committee was

555 Officials close to Inamine have been concerned that a misunderstanding exists that the 15-year time limit would be applied to all facilities. They make clear that it is only on the Futenma replacement facility.

556 While the governments of Japan and the United States had already likely entered discussions by this point, the governors of 14 prefectures hosting U.S. facilities announced on October 13 that they were issuing a statement requesting the review of SOFA. This was something that could not easily be ignored. See Governors Want Pact Revision, Shimpo Weekly News, October 24, 1995.

expanding ways to:

- Establish new procedures to provide timely information on US military aircraft accidents.
- Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Review and publicize guidelines for access to US facilities and areas.
- Implement agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces official vehicles.
- Expand education programs for voluntary automobile insurance.
- Review and publicize quarantine procedures.
- Publicize guidelines on removing expended munitions at Camp Hansen.

To make sure their demands were being heard and to keep the pressure on the two governments, Okinawans participated in a prefecture-wide, non-binding referendum later that year on September 8. In it, 89% of Okinawan voters called for the revision of the SOFA.

Three months later, on December 2, the SACO Final Report was released (see Appendix 12). In it, the two governments detailed the commitments they had made and/or were ready to make to improve the procedures of the SOFA, along the lines introduced in the Interim Report.

The Cabinet as well, in late December 1998, following Inamine’s election, expressed its willingness to address with sincerity, and work, where necessary, toward improving the procedures of the SOFA.

Despite these measures, the OPG remained dissatisfied with the fact that they only addressed unyo kaizen, or improving the procedures, rather than a fundamental review (bapponteki ni minaosu) and revision (kaitei) of SOFA.

Subsequently, in late August 2000, following the passage of a resolution on July 14 by the Prefectural Assembly calling for the review of the SOFA, and a similar resolution on July 27 by the Okinawa Municipal Council for Military Land Conversion and Base Problems, the OPG and the Council jointly addressed a formal petition with the revisions it wished to see undertaken to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Agency Director, the DFAA Director, and the U.S. Ambassador, and the Commander of U.S. Forces, Japan.558

When a rape was reported in late June 2001 in Chatan’s American Village, a popular shopping and entertainment area for young people, tensions between the three sides over the jurisdiction issue of the SOFA boiled to the surface.

A U.S. serviceman, later identified as an Air Force senior staff sergeant based at Kadena, was accused of the crime.559 Through a combination of inaccurate reporting, speculation, incorrect public statements by Japanese officials with regard to the timing of a U.S. decision to hand over the suspect prior to indictment, and public outrage, this alleged crime became one of the biggest incidents in the six years since the September 1995 rape, and became a major point of friction between Okinawa, Japan, and the United States, as well as within the respective governments.560 Eventually the suspect was handed over on July 6 (four days after the arrest warrant was issued but two weeks before he was actually indicted, as per an understanding reached on October 25, 1995 regarding jurisdiction, described above, in which in cases of alleged heinous crimes, such as murder and rape, the U.S. government would extend sympathetic consideration to any request by Japan for the transfer of custody of the accused prior to indictment.561


Nevertheless, feelings were bruised and the handling of the SOFA issue continues to be a point of contention between Okinawa, the central government, and the United States.\footnote{Prisons, published in 1992 by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (Nitchibenren), Japanese police can hold an arrestee for up to 48 hours before the suspect has to be brought to a prosecutor. The prosecutor then has 24 hours to bring the suspect before a court to ask for a detention order. The court can give its approval for an additional 10-day period of detention for questioning if so requested by the prosecutor. For certain crimes, an additional 5-day extension can also be approved. Thus investigators can hold suspects for interrogation for 23 days, or in special cases, up to 28 days. Even before they are indicted, the report states, unsentenced detainees, in principle, should be held in detention facilities under the authority of the Justice Ministry, not the investigators. However, in almost all cases they are detained in police station cells, that is, daiyo-kangoku. The main reason that prosecutors ask for detention in daiyo-kangoku is that it is most convenient for the police interrogators. Extremely prolonged interrogations are conducted. Records tell of interrogations conducted day after day for over ten hours per day. Police interrogations may be accompanied by violence and threats, or, conversely, by enticements…to obtain the cooperation of the suspect. In these ways, daiyo-kangoku becomes a hotbed for coerced or otherwise false confessions. Likewise, state-appointed attorneys are not provided prior to indictment (they must be located and paid by the defendant), and in reality, according to the report, very little defense activity is carried out. A report by the U.S. Department of State (Japan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2001, available at: \url{http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8319.htm}), notes the concerns of the above bar association and other human rights groups, suggesting that the U.S. government too is very concerned with the protection of civil rights in Japan (and in particular the rights of soldiers—presumed innocent until proven guilty—stationed in Japan not of their own free will but by the orders of the Defense Department and their respective Services). For more on the criminal justice system in Japan, which despite the above are more positive accounts, see L. Craig Parker, Jr., The Japanese Police System Today: An American Perspective (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), and David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

This became apparent when a Marine Corps officer was accused of a rape by a Filipino bar maid at the officers club on Camp Courtney in Gushikawa City. She claimed (in a statement later retracted) that the incident happened in the car after she had offered him a ride home on November 2, 2002. She reported to military police at the gate that he attempted to rape her, but as it happened off base and out of their jurisdiction, the gate MPs called the local police. Despite the fact suspicious testimony of the accuser, Brown was advised to cooperate with investigators. On December 3, the National Police Agency informed the Foreign Ministry that it had issued an arrest warrant that day for the suspect. On December 4, the Japanese government representatives on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee requested that Brown be transferred to Japanese custody, prior to indictment. In the evening of December 5, however, at a hastily arranged meeting of the same committee, the U.S. side told their Japanese counterparts that:

The reasoning behind the decision was not given but appears to have been the testimony of immediately handed over (and then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo repeatedly made statements to that effect), but the agreement states only that U.S. authorities would simply extend consideration to such a request. In other words, it did not require the U.S. government to do so. Anger seemed to grow exponentially in Okinawa (and in Japan) for each day it took for the suspect to be handed over. The decision was apparently delayed due to the need to resolve the concerns (noted in the above footnote) and to get a final decision from Washington.

\footnote{\textit{Chatan Rape Trial Draws to a Close}, \textit{Ryukyu Shimpō Weekly News}, February 25, 2002. One of the problems that emerged had to do with the gap in expectations caused by the phrase \textit{sympathetic consideration} appearing in the above agreement. Okinawans expected that the suspect would be expected to appear in court immediately handed over (and then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo repeatedly made statements to that effect), but the agreement states only that U.S. authorities would simply extend consideration to such a request. In other words, it did not require the U.S. government to do so. Anger seemed to grow exponentially in Okinawa (and in Japan) for each day it took for the suspect to be handed over. The decision was apparently delayed due to the need to resolve the concerns (noted in the above footnote) and to get a final decision from Washington.

\footnote{\textit{Press Release: GOJ Request for Pre-Indictment Transfer of Custody in Alleged Attempted Rape Case in Okinawa}. See \url{http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-pr20021206a1.html}.

\[126\]
the accuser and the fact that the accusation was for attempted rape and not actual rape, and thus not technically covered by the October 1995 agreement to improve procedures. The decision, however, invited criticism from the National Police Agency and Governor Inamine, who happened to be in Tokyo for the start of the 21st Okinawa Policy Committee on December 6. Inamine decried the fact that the question of sympathetic consideration is left to the discretion of the U.S. government, and said that it was clear that SOFA had to be revised through a national movement. Similarly, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko said it was necessary to clarify the situations when special consideration would be given, while Defense Agency Director General Ishiba Shigeru called the decision unfortunate. The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly on December 10 echoed the governor’s anger by passing a unanimous resolution against the incident and calling for the immediate handover of the suspect and for the SOFA revision.

Brown was subsequently indicted on December 19, and turned over to Japanese custody that day. The year 2002 closed out with the political clash of this issue over with, but the legal side being taken up in the courts. The accuser subsequently recanted her testimony on May 13, 2003, but the trial continued based on the prosecutor’s case, albeit extremely weak, and continues now in 2004.

Shortly after the recantation, on May 25, a Lance Corporal from the Marine Corps reportedly raped and beat a 19-year-old woman in Kin, shifting focus from Brown’s case temporarily. On June 16, a warrant was issued for his arrest, that evening a meeting of the Joint Committee was held in Tokyo. On the 18th, at a subsequent Committee meeting, the U.S. side agreed to surrender custody of the accused prior to indictment and he was handed over to Japanese authorities that day. Also, agreement was reached that day to discuss procedural measures that the U.S. had requested since the fall of 1995 in which the human rights of defendants would be addressed, a problem in Japan’s criminal justice system (see footnote above). A deadline of 45 days was set at that time, but even after intense and useful discussions in July in Tokyo, Hawaii, and twice in Washington late July and early August, substantial differences between the two sides remained. A further round of negotiations took place in late March 2004, and agreement was reached in improving procedures (such as: allowing a U.S. official to be present during questioning prior to indictment, and increasing the types of crimes such as the speeding up of transfer of custody on April 2 at a Joint Committee meeting. But because the final decision on whether to turn the accused over still rests with the U.S. side, the OPG immediately announced its disappointment saying that fundamental revision is still necessary.

Many in Okinawa felt that original agreement to improve the procedures on SOFA in 1995, did little more than paper over the significant differences over this issue. Inamine and other leaders in Okinawa wish to see a full reexamination and revision of SOFA, publicly stating that simply improving the implementation of SOFA (which the Japanese and U.S. governments prefer to do for the time being) is no longer enough (genkai ga aru, or it has its limits). That is why, a petition to the U.S. government in August 2000 stated, the prefectural government has taken every opportunity to ask the government of Japan and the United States to revise the SOFA. In

564 Yogisha Hikiwatashi Chiiji ga Zenkakuryo ni Yosei, Kenmin Taikai Kento mo (GovernorAppeals to Cabinet Ministers for Handing Over of Accused, Studying Prefectural People’s Rally Too), Ryukyu Shimpō, December 6, 2002.

565 Chii Kyotei Motome Ketsugi Kengikai (Prefectural Assembly), Ryukyu Shimpō, December 10, 2002.

566 The 1996 SACO agreement took up nine issues to be addressed with regard to improving the procedures
light of the actions that Inamine and his administration has taken over the past several years (working with the National Governors Conference, or Zenkoku Chijii, Nihon Seinen Kaigi (Junior Chamber International, or Jaycees), the Diet, and Cabinet ministers calling for revision of SOFA with regard to jurisdiction issues, environmental concerns, and other matters, it is likely that the pressure will continue as he tries to make into a national movement.

There is obvious room for improvement if not revision in the SOFA, a document negotiated and signed 44 years ago. However, it is important to note that it is not only Okinawa/Japan that have frustrations with it; the U.S. side as well has some concerns too. Any negotiations will involve some tough choices for all sides that may bring about less merits than more on some issues. Because of this, the central government has been reluctant to fully push the issue and instead to work quietly on improving the SOFA procedures on a number of issues rather opening up the can of worms that a full-blown revision represents.

Nevertheless, public pressure literally grows week-by-week, with the LDP, a bipartisan group in the Diet, and a bipartisan NGO in Okinawa (Nichibei Chii Kyotei Kaitei no Jitsugen Suru NGO, NGO To Realizing the Revision of the Japan-U.S. SOFA), created on April 25 this year, increasing their discussions and activities on this issue.

In light of this, it will probably be wise for the two governments to take the lead in any future discussions, rather than let public opinion sway the tone of any talks.

If and when such negotiations begin, this writer has called in the past for the following three guiding principles to be adhered to: 1) that the process of any revision be one that strengthens the U.S.-Japan relationship and not damage it; 2) that the revisions be done in a way that seeks the highest standards in law, human rights (of both the victim and the accused), and environmental policy, and not be simply a formula for bureaucratic compromise or Least Common Denominator; and 3) that the interests of local communities that host the bases be given the greatest consideration possible to institutional their concerns and rights to know, rather than it being of an ad hoc nature.

It is unlikely that 100% satisfaction will be reached on all the issues for Okinawans (nor can there be). However, if the process is transparent, it will go a long way to educating the general public to the complexities of the SOFA arrangements (which Japan, due to the dispatch of its SDF forces to the Middle East, has worked on for its own forces) and to put the U.S.-Japan relationship on a more stable footing.
IV. Conclusion

This study has looked at in some detail the history and dynamics of post-reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations. It is not a complete examination and is not intended to be at this stage. A full study will only be possible when all of the official records are declassified and when more interviews can be conducted. While trying to piece together and recreate the post-reversion history, the author was always conscious of the fact that there were limitations to knowing the whole story.

In addition to the lack of documentation and oral histories, two things were particularly challenging when writing this study.

First was the state of the research on post-reversion Okinawa, or better said, the lack of it. No one study of post-reversion Okinawa exists that combines the political, policy, social, and economic dynamics of Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan relationship. What studies that do exist are for the most part one-dimensional and outdated. This is true of academic works, as well as those intended for general readership.

Okinawan academics, newspaper writers, and other opinion leaders need to fill this huge gap that should have already been filled if they want the Okinawan perspective on their postwar and post-reversion historical experience better understood by their fellow citizens and those of other countries, rather than just the issues that are in the news at the moment. One type of project that is necessary for academics to work on is a post-reversion series with books on the economy, the bases, society, politics, literature, tourism trends, culture, education, etc., rather than one-time books on a timely issue that often are repetitive and incomplete. A second project is that which combines scholars and policy-makers from Okinawa, mainland Japan, and the United States to create a history that not only bridges differences in cultural perspectives but those between policy-makers and academics.

Similarly, if the Okinawa Prefectural Government and local governments in the prefecture wish for a greater appreciation of Okinawa's history, there will need to be much greater efforts than are seen today to get the histories of their communities out and available to researchers in and outside of Japan, such as on the Internet. With the exception of a few communities, such as Yomitan Village and Okinawa City, the websites of the towns in Okinawa and the OPG remain undeveloped and lacking explanation and documentation. Complaining that Okinawa is not understood while at the same time not providing accessible information is inconsistent and shortsighted.

Despite this lack of reference material, of an academic as well as official nature, this manuscript has shed light on the history of the past three-plus decades and identified many of the trends and actors, and identified the concerns that each party (Okinawa, the United States, and Japan) holds. It will be necessary to for this writer and hopefully others as well to build on it in the future.

The second challenge with writing the study was the contradictory (and frustrating) nature of the dynamics of the Okinawa problem and the inability to realize solutions that can easily accommodate the concerns of the three sides involved (Okinawa, central government, and U.S. side). While the purpose of this study was not to find a solution to the knot that the Okinawa problem truly is, the study has perhaps at least shown what some of the strings making up this knot are. Of course there are many more inside that we have not even begun to touch on.

While the study is meant purely to provide extensive historical background and context, the policy implications and applications were never far from this writer’s mind. The author was constantly aware of both the need to and difficulty in realizing good policy that moves the issues forward instead of just simply keeping a lid on it or keeping the peace and out of the press.

The author leaves this study somewhat more pessimistic about the situation than he was a couple of years ago when he released the set of policy recommendations (Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations in the 21st Century: Bilateral and Trilateral Approaches to a Sounder Okinawa Policy) in early 2002, even after the difficult year 2001 was both in
Many issues remain, such as the Futenma relocation, the realization of the remaining items of SACO agreement (dependent on the cooperation of all three parties--the central government, the OPG, and the U.S. government), the SOFA issue, and future challenges emerging, such as the construction of a new urban warfare-training site and the global posture review, and it seems that the different sides continue to take fairly inflexible positions on them publicly (which make maintaining a consensus difficult and finding a compromise more difficult). One can only hope that privately the dialogue is continuing in a sincere manner. Without this dialogue, the paths to a solution can easily become closed.

Rather than policy prescriptions, this study has attempted to introduce the post-reversion history of Okinawa. It has shown that for Okinawans, the post-reversion period has been not only a time spent trying to reintegrate into Japan economically, and administratively, but also a journey to raise awareness about the different challenges the prefecture has faced over the past 30 years. The challenges were social, fiscal, and political in nature, and above all, related to the bases. A widely held feeling exists that Okinawa has been taken advantage or victimized by mainland Japan as most of U.S. exclusive use facilities were concentrated in Okinawa. In the discussions that are going on today and in the future, Okinawans not only hope, but in a new-found confidence following the 1995 rape incident, now demand that in this process their concerns are being fairly considered. It will be the obligation of the governments of Japan and the United States to see that these concerns are met. If not, the magma of prefectural frustration of which Inamine has spoken in the past will very likely spill over. This would be in no one’s interest, especially if the alliance—which has been the foundation of the peace and prosperity of the region for the past 50 years and for both countries in particular—is endangered, not by external dangers but by internal challenges. As this study has shown, there have numerous efforts, some successful, some sincere, to address the numerous challenges facing Okinawa. But much more probably needs to be done on all sides.

On this note, one important trend that needs to be reintroduced here concerns public opinion (which will be the subject a future study in the Center’s *U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Series*). Namely, overall trends suggest that while citizens in Okinawa may be more realistic about the international situation and recognize the importance of the alliance, they are also becoming less and less tolerant about base-related accidents, incidents, and crimes. As norms in civil society against anti-social behavior (such as crimes) and military-caused incidents (noise pollution, mishaps) become stronger, pressure and restrictions on the bases will increase. Likewise, as we saw in the late 1970s for example, as the potential for alternative sources of income (such as eco-tourism and resort development) increases, so will the view of the bases as a hindrance to economic development rather than a central feature of the local economy, a role the bases have played throughout the postwar. It will be critical to explore more ways for the bases to be seen as an asset to the prefecture.

Second, while conservatives generally support the Japan-U.S. alliance, their support is not unconditional. It is and has been based on the understanding that U.S. and Japanese commanders of the respective facilities, and government leaders, would expeditiously and adequately deal with problems that emerged to their satisfaction and that of their constituents, if not ideally introduce more preventative measures to prevent incidents and accidents from happening in the first place. The larger the constituency, such as an entire prefecture in the case of the governor, the larger the concerns that he holds.

Similarly, calls by conservatives for base reductions in Okinawa are not simply a political ploy (to protect themselves in the public eye or to get more from the central government) as is so often dismissed by observers (of course this aspect cannot be denied). Instead, conservatives, particularly governors such as Nishime and Inamine, were

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569 See footnote 5.
equally concerned about the issue of the bases as the welfare and lives of their constituents were at stake. Hence, efforts to reduce the exercises and the military presence are issues that they and their supporters are indeed concerned about. In other words, as this study has demonstrated, the positions taken by the OPG, whether reformist or conservative, in the post-reversion period vis-à-vis base reductions are more similar than previously thought. A better historical understanding and appreciation of the positions the OPG has taken in the past would have shown that whether conservative or reformist, the OPG is still representing the people of the prefecture and will likely continue to take be vigilant on the issue of the bases, especially when it sees the central government and the U.S. government as less than so. Central government and U.S. officials were thus mistaken to have considered the current governor as easy-going on base issues and thus amenable. (Witness the surprises shown by officials and the delays in implementing agreements over the past six years.) It is not too late, however, to work toward gaining his trust and cooperation and building a better future.

This certainly does not mean that current administration is faultless when it comes to lack of efforts to create a better working relationship with the central government and U.S. military/U.S. government on some issues. For example, when Nishime, outgoing and confident in personality, was in office, he used both official (including public) and unofficial (private) channels to address issues. These two pillars built a fairly stable relationship, supported by other human networks. Inamine, however, seems to only use one, the official/public one, and that only for protesting rather than dialogue. As a result, the other important pillar of the relationship has been left in a state of disrepair and the relationship is less stable than it would be with the two pillars. A greater emphasis at networking and liaisoning appears to be critically necessary. This is extremely unfortunate, both for Okinawa and for the U.S.-Japan relationship, and one of the reasons that this writer is a little bit pessimistic.

With that said, Inamine, as does his predecessor Ota, deserve praise for putting Okinawa, long forgotten or given up on, at the top of the agenda in the bilateral relationship and in domestic policy matters. It is probably highly unusual to refer favorably to both governors of different backgrounds in the same sentence, but in fact they are more similar than first thought (most clearly in that neither was a professional politician), as are all of the post-reversion governors.

In fact, each of them, as do their predecessors, deserves praise in his own way for their respective policies, as introduced in this study as they guided Okinawa in the post-reversion period from the American era to the Japanese one. In some cases, they succeeded in the public eye to a point, and in other instances, they met criticism. Most built on the work of their predecessors, and so in that sense, one can see a clear, almost linear development of policies among a changing domestic, bilateral, and international environment. Considering that much of the local writing on the administrations often is ideological in nature, a more objective analysis of these governors and their policies is clearly necessary.

Too often, the writings about postwar and post-reversion Okinawa have been ideologically tainted. Indeed, the policy debate too is emotional, lacking dialogue, and without a clear direction.

The author hopes this study will begin to help move the dialogue forward rather than in circles.
Appendix 1

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America
(Signed on January 19, 1960, Washington, D.C.)

Japan and the United States of America,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to
uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of
economic stability and well-being in their countries,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the
Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in
the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,
Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes
in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security
and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so
that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations
by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon
which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will
seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their
capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the
request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East
is threatened.

ARTICLE V
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration
of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack
and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
ARTICLE VI
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII
This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been ex-changed by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX
The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR JAPAN:
Nobusuke Kishi
Aiichiro Fujiyama
Mitsuijro Ishii
Tadashi Adachi
Koichiro Asakai

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Christian A. Herter
Douglas MacArthur 2nd
J. Graham Parsons
Article 1
In this Agreement the expression-
(a) "members of the United States armed forces" means the personnel on active duty belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of the United States of America when in the territory of Japan.
(b) "civilian component" means the civilian persons of United States nationality who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying the United States armed forces in Japan, but excludes persons who are ordinarily resident in Japan or who are mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 14. For the purposes of this Agreement only, dual nationals, Japanese and United States, who are brought to Japan by the United States shall be considered as United States nationals.
(c) "dependents" means
(i) Spouse, and children under 21;
(ii) Parents, and children over 21, if dependent for over half their support upon a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component.

Article 2
1. (a) The United States is granted, under Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the use of facilities and areas in Japan. Agreements as to specific facilities and areas shall be concluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee provided for in Article 25 of this Agreement. "Facilities and areas" include existing furnishings, equipment and fixtures necessary to the operation of such facilities and areas.
(b) The facilities and areas of which the United States has the use at the time of expiration of the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, shall be considered as facilities and areas agreed upon between the two Governments in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.
2. At the request of either Government, the Governments of Japan and the United States shall review such arrangements and may agree that such facilities and areas shall be returned to Japan or that additional facilities and areas may be provided.
3. The facilities and areas used by the United States armed forces shall be returned to Japan whenever they are no longer needed for purposes of this Agreement, and the United States agrees to keep the needs for facilities and areas under continual observation with a view toward such return.
4. (a) When facilities and areas are temporarily not being used by the United States armed forces, the Government of Japan may make, or permit Japanese nationals to make, interim use of such facilities and areas provided that it is agreed between the two Governments through the Joint Committee that such use would not be harmful to the purposes for which the facilities and areas are normally used by the United States armed forces.
(b) With respect to facilities and areas which are to be used by United States armed forces for limited periods of time, the Joint Committee shall specify in the agreements covering such facilities and areas the extent to which the provisions of this Agreement shall apply.

Article 3
1. Within the facilities and areas, the United States may take all the measures necessary for their establishment, operation, safeguarding and control. In order to provide access for the United States armed forces to the facilities and areas for their support, safeguarding and control, the Government of Japan shall, at the request of the United States armed forces and upon consultation between the two
Governments through the Joint Committee, take necessary measures within the scope of applicable laws and regulations over land, territorial waters and airspace adjacent to, or in the vicinities of the facilities and areas. The United States may also take necessary measures for such purposes upon consultation between the two Governments through the Joint Committee.

2. The United States agrees not to take the measures referred to in paragraph 1 in such a manner as to interfere unnecessarily with navigation, aviation, communication, or land travel to or from or within the territories of Japan. All questions relating to frequencies, power and like matters used by apparatus employed by the United States designed to emit electric radiation shall be settled by arrangement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. The Government of Japan shall, within the scope of applicable laws and regulations, take all reasonable measures to avoid or eliminate interference with telecommunications electronics required by the United States armed forces.

3. Operations in the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces shall be carried on with due regard for the public safety.

Article 4

1. The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration.

2. Japan is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for any improvements made in the facilities and areas or for the buildings or structures left thereon on the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier return of the facilities and areas.

3. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to any construction which the Government of the United States may undertake under special arrangements with the Government of Japan.

Article 5

1. United States and foreign vessels and aircraft operated by, for, or under the control of the United States for official purposes shall be accorded access to any port or airport of Japan free from toll or landing charges. When cargo or passengers not accorded the exemptions of this Agreement are carried on such vessels and aircraft, notification shall be given to the appropriate Japanese authorities, and their entry into and departure from Japan shall be according to the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. The vessels and aircraft mentioned in paragraph 1, United States Government-owned vehicles including armor, and members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be accorded access to and movement between facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces and between such facilities and areas and the ports or airports of Japan. Such access to and movement between facilities and areas by United States military vehicles shall be free from toll and other charges.

3. When the vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 enter Japanese ports, appropriate notification shall, under normal conditions, be made to the proper Japanese authorities. Such vessels shall have freedom from compulsory pilotage, but if a pilot is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates.

Article 6

1. All civil and military air traffic control and communications systems shall be developed in close coordination and shall be integrated to the extent necessary for fulfillment of collective security interests. Procedures, and any subsequent changes thereto, necessary to effect this coordination and integration will be established by arrangement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments.

2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or established in the facilities and areas in use by United States armed forces and in territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity thereof shall conform to the system in use in Japan. The Japanese and United States authorities which have established such navigation aids shall notify each other of their positions and characteristics and shall give advance notification before making any changes in them or establishing additional navigation aids.

Article 7

The United States armed forces shall have the use of all public utilities and services belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the Government of Japan, and shall enjoy priorities in such use, under
Article 8
The Government of Japan undertakes to furnish the United States armed forces with the following meteorological services in accordance with arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments:
(a) Meteorological observations from land and ocean areas including observations from weather ships.
(b) Climatological information including periodic summaries and the historical data of the Meteorological Agency.
(c) Telecommunications service to disseminate meteorological information required for the safe and regular operation of aircraft.
(d) Seismographic data including forecasts of the estimated size of tidal waves resulting from earthquakes and areas that might be affected thereby.

Article 9
1. The United States may bring into Japan persons who are members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, subject to the provisions of this Article.
2. Members of the United States armed forces shall be exempt from Japanese passport and visa laws and regulations. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be exempt from Japanese laws and regulations on the registration and control of aliens, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territories of Japan.
3. Upon entry into or departure from Japan members of the United States armed forces shall be in possession of the following documents:
   (a) personal identity card showing name, date of birth, rank and number, service, and photograph; and
   (b) individual or collective travel order certifying to the status of individual or group as a member or members of the United States armed forces and to the travel ordered.
   For purposes of their identification while in Japan, members of the United States armed forces shall be in possession of the foregoing personal identity card which must be presented on request to the appropriate Japanese authorities.
4. Members of the civilian component, their dependents, and the dependents of members of the United States armed forces shall be in possession of appropriate documentation issued by the United States authorities so that their status may be verified by Japanese authorities upon their entry into or departure from Japan, or while in Japan.
5. If the status of any person brought into Japan under paragraph 1 of this Article is altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States authorities shall notify the Japanese authorities and shall, if such person be required by the Japanese authorities to leave Japan, assure that transportation from Japan will be provided within a reasonable time at no cost to the Government of Japan.
6. If the Government of Japan has requested the removal from its territory of a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component or has made an expulsion order against an ex-member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component or against a dependent of a member or ex-member, the authorities of the United States shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own territory or otherwise disposing of him outside Japan. This paragraph shall apply only to persons who are not nationals of Japan and have entered Japan as members of the United States armed forces or civilian component or for the purpose of becoming such members, and to the dependents of such persons.

Article 10
1. Japan shall accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit or license or military driving permit issued by the United States to a member of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.
2. Official vehicles of the United States armed forces and the civilian component shall carry distinctive numbered plates or individual markings which will readily identify them. 3. Privately owned vehicles of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall carry
Japanese number plates to be acquired under the same conditions as those applicable to Japanese nationals.

Article 11
1. Save as provided in this Agreement, members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of Japan.
2. All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United States armed forces, the authorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in Article 15, for the official use of the United States armed forces or for the use of the members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, and materials, supplies and equipment which are to be used exclusively by the United States armed forces or are ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities used by such forces, shall be permitted entry into Japan; such entry shall be free from customs duties and other such charges. Appropriate certification shall be made that such materials, supplies and equipment are being imported by the United States armed forces, the authorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in Article 15, or, in the case of materials, supplies and equipment to be used exclusively by the United States armed forces or ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities used by such forces, that delivery thereof is to be taken by the United States armed forces for the purposes specified above.
3. Property consigned to and for the personal use of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, shall be subject to customs duties and other such charges, except that no duties or charges shall be paid with respect to:
   (a) Furniture and household goods for their private use imported by the members of the United States armed forces or civilian component when they first arrive to serve in Japan or by their dependents when they first arrive for reunion with members of such forces or civilian component, and personal effects for private use brought by the said persons upon entrance.
   (b) Vehicles and parts imported by members of the United States armed forces or civilian component for the private use of themselves or their dependents.
   (c) Reasonable quantities of clothing and household goods of a type which would ordinarily be purchased in the United States for everyday use for the private use of members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, and their dependents, which are mailed into Japan through United States military post offices.
4. The exemptions granted in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply only to cases of importation of goods and shall not be interpreted as refunding customs duties and domestic excises collected by the customs authorities at the time of entry in cases of purchases of goods on which such duties and excises have already been collected.
5. Customs examination shall not be made in the following cases:
   (a) Units of the United States armed forces under orders entering or leaving Japan;
   (b) Official documents under official seal and official mail in United States military postal channels;
   (c) Military cargo shipped on a United States Government bill of lading
6. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods imported into Japan free of duty shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled to import such goods free of duty.
7. Goods imported into Japan free from customs duties and other such charges pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, may be re-exported free from customs duties and other such charges,
8. The United States armed forces, in cooperation with Japanese authorities, shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent abuse of privileges granted to the United States armed forces, members of such forces, the civilian component, and their dependents in accordance with this Article.
9. (a) In order to prevent offenses against laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of the Government of Japan, the Japanese authorities and the United States armed forces shall assist each other in the conduct of inquiries and the collection of evidence.
(b) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within their power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on behalf of, the customs authorities of the Government of Japan are handed to those authorities.
(c) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within their power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes, and penalties payable by members of such forces or of the civilian component, or their dependents.

(d) Vehicles and articles belonging to the United States armed forces seized by the customs authorities of the Government of Japan in connection with an offense against its customs or fiscal laws or regulations shall be handed over to the appropriate authorities of the force concerned.

Article 12

1. The United States may contract for any supplies or construction work to be furnished or undertaken in Japan for purposes of, or authorized by, this Agreement, without restriction as to choice of supplier or person who does the construction work. Such supplies or construction work may, upon agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, also be procured through the Government of Japan.

2. Materials, supplies, equipment and services which are required from local sources for the maintenance of the United States armed forces and the procurement of which may have an adverse effect on the economy of Japan shall be procured in coordination with, and, when desirable, through or with the assistance of, the competent authorities of Japan.

3. Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for official purposes in Japan by the United States armed forces, or by authorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces upon appropriate certification shall be exempt from the following Japanese taxes:
   (a) Commodity tax
   (b) Traveling tax
   (c) Gasoline tax
   (d) Electricity and gas tax.

   Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for ultimate use by the United States armed forces shall be exempt from commodity and gasoline taxes upon appropriate certification by the United States armed forces. With respect to any present or future Japanese taxes not specifically referred to in this Article which might be found to constitute a significant and readily identifiable part of the gross purchase price of materials, supplies, equipment and services procured by the United States armed forces, or for ultimate use by such forces, the two Governments will agree upon a procedure for granting such exemption or relief therefrom as is consistent with the purposes of this Article.

4. Local labor requirements of United States armed forces and of the organizations provided for in Article 15 shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Japanese authorities.

5. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax, local inhabitant tax and social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labor relations shall be those laid down by the legislation of Japan.

6. Should the United States armed forces or as appropriate an organization provided for in Article 15 dismiss a worker and a decision of a court or a Labor Relations Commission of Japan to the effect that the contract of employment has not terminated become final, the following procedures shall apply:
   (a) The United States armed forces or the said organization shall be informed by the Government of Japan of the decision of the court or Commission;
   (b) Should the United States armed forces or the said organization not desire to return the worker to duty, they shall so notify the Government of Japan within seven days after being informed by the latter of the decision of the court or Commission, and may temporarily withhold the worker from duty;
   (c) Upon such notification, the Government of Japan and the United States armed forces or the said organization shall consult together without delay with a view to finding a practical solution of the case;
   (d) Should such a solution not be reached within a period of thirty days from the date of commencement of the consultations under (c) above, the worker will not be entitled to return to duty. In such case, the Government of the United States shall pay to the Government of Japan an amount equal to the cost of employment of the worker for a period of time to be agreed between the two Governments.

7. Members of the civilian component shall not be subject to Japanese laws or regulations with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

8. Neither members of the United States armed forces, civilian component nor their dependents, shall by reason of this Article enjoy any exemption from taxes or similar charges relating to personal purchases of
goods and services in Japan chargeable under Japanese legislation.
9. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods purchased in Japan exempt from the taxes referred to in paragraph 3, shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled to purchase such goods exempt from such tax.

Article 13
1. The United States armed forces shall not be subject to taxes or similar charges on property held, used or transferred by such forces in Japan.
2. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall not be liable to pay any Japanese taxes to the Government of Japan or to any other taxing agency in Japan on income received as a result of their service with or employment by the United States armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in Article 15. The provisions of this Article do not exempt such persons from payment of Japanese taxes on income derived from Japanese sources, nor do they exempt United States citizens who for United States income tax purposes claim Japanese residence from payment of Japanese taxes on income. Periods during which such persons are in Japan solely by reason of being members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents shall not be considered as periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the purpose of Japanese taxation.
3. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be exempt from taxation in Japan on the holding, use, transfer inter se, or transfer by death of movable property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of these persons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of business in Japan or to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

Article 14
1. Persons, including corporations organized under the laws of the United States, and their employees who are ordinarily resident in the United States and whose presence in Japan is solely for the purpose of executing contracts with the United States for the benefit of the United States armed forces, and who are designated by the Government of the United States in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 below, shall, except as provided in this Article, be subject to the laws and regulations of Japan.
2. The designation referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be made upon consultation with the Government of Japan and shall be restricted to cases where open competitive bidding is not practicable due to security considerations, to the technical qualifications of the contractors involved, or to the unavailability of materials or services required by United States standards, or to limitations of United States law.
The designation shall be withdrawn by the Government of the United States:
(a) upon completion of contracts with the United States for the United States armed forces;
(b) upon proof that such persons are engaged in business activities in Japan other than those pertaining to the United States armed forces; or
(c) when such persons are engaged in practices illegal in Japan.
3. Upon certification by appropriate United States authorities as to their identity, such persons and their employees shall be accorded the following benefits of this Agreement:
(a) Rights of accession and movement, as provided for in Article 5, paragraph 2;
(b) Entry into Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 9;
(c) The exemption from customs duties, and other such charges provided for in Article 11, paragraph 3, for members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents;
(d) If authorized by the Government of the United States, the right to use the services of the organizations provided for in Article 15;
(e) Those provided for in Article 19, paragraph 2, for members of the armed forces of the United States, the civilian component, and their dependents;
(f) If authorized by the Government of the United States, the right to use military payment certificates, as provided for in Article 20;
(g) The use of postal facilities provided for in Article 21;
(h) Exemption from the laws and regulation of Japan with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

4. Such persons and their employees shall be so described in their passports and their arrival, departure and their residence while in Japan shall from time to time be notified by the United States armed forces to the Japanese authorities.

5. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States armed forces, depreciable assets except houses, held, used, or transferred, by such persons and their employees exclusively for the execution of contracts referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be subject to taxes or similar charges of Japan.

6. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States armed forces, such persons and their employees shall be exempt from taxation in Japan on the holding, use, transfer by death, or transfer to persons or agencies entitled to tax exemption under this Agreement, of movable property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of these persons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of other business in Japan or to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

7. The persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be liable to pay income or corporation taxes to the Government of Japan or to any other taxing agency in Japan on any income derived under a contract made in the United States with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance or operation of any of the facilities or areas covered by this Agreement. The provisions of this paragraph do not exempt such persons from payment of income or corporation taxes on income derived from Japanese sources, nor do they exempt such persons and their employees who, for United States income tax purposes, claim Japanese residence, from payment of Japanese taxes on income. Periods during which such persons are in Japan solely in connection with the execution of a contract with the Government of the United States shall not be considered periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the purposes of such taxation.

8. Japanese authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in relation to offenses committed in Japan and punishable by the law of Japan. In those cases in which the Japanese authorities decide not to exercise such jurisdiction they shall notify the military authorities of the United States as soon as possible. Upon such notification the military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise such jurisdiction over the persons referred to as is conferred on them by the law of the United States.

Article 15

1.(a) Navy exchanges, post exchanges, messes, social clubs, theaters, newspapers and other non-appropriated fund organizations authorized and regulated by the United States military authorities may be established in the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces for the use of members of such forces, the civilian component, and their dependents. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, such organizations shall not be subject to Japanese regulations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls.

(b) When a newspaper authorized and regulated by the United States military authorities is sold to the general public, it shall be subject to Japanese regulations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls so far as such circulation is concerned.

2. No Japanese tax shall be imposed on sales of merchandise and services by such organizations, except as provided in paragraph 1 (b), but purchases within Japan of merchandise and supplies by such organizations shall be subject to Japanese taxes.

3. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods which are sold by such organizations shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not authorized to make purchases from such organizations.

4. The organizations referred to in this Article shall provide such information to the Japanese authorities as is required by Japanese tax legislation.

Article 16

It is the duty of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents to respect the law of Japan and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this Agreement, and in particular, from any political activity in Japan.
Article 17

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,

(a) the military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise within Japan all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the United States;

(b) the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over the members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents with respect to offenses committed within the territory of Japan and punishable by the law of Japan.

2. (a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of the United States with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, punishable by the law of the United States, but not by the law of Japan.

(b) The authorities of Japan shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of Japan, punishable by its law but not by the law of the United States.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offense against a State shall include

(i) treason against the State;

(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defense of that State.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

(a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces or the civilian component in relation to

(i) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States, or offenses solely against the person or property of another member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component or of a dependent;

(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of Japan shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.

4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities of the United States to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Japan, unless they are members of the United States armed forces.

5. (a) The authorities of Japan and the military authorities of the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents in the territory of Japan and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.

(b) The authorities of Japan shall notify promptly the military authorities of the United States of the arrest of any member of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or a dependent.

(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component over whom Japan is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the United States, remain with the United States until he charged by Japan.

6. (a) The authorities of Japan and the military authorities of the United States shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offense. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.

(b) The authorities of Japan and the military authorities of the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.

7. (a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in Japan by the military authorities of the United States if the legislation of Japan does not provide for such punishment in a similar case.
(b) The authorities of Japan shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the military authorities of the United States for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the military authorities of the United States under the provisions of this Article within the territory of Japan.

8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article either by the authorities of Japan or the military authorities of the United States and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offense within the territory of Japan by the authorities of the other State. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the United States from trying a member of its armed forces for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offense for which he was tried by the authorities of Japan.

9. Whenever a member of the United States armed forces, the civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of Japan he shall be entitled:
   (a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
   (b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him;
   (c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
   (d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, if they are within the jurisdiction of Japan;
   (e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in Japan;
   (f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
   (g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the United States and to have such a representative present at his trial.

10. (a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of the United States armed forces shall have the right to police any facilities or areas which they use under Article 2 of this Agreement. The military police of such forces may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security within such facilities and areas.

   (b) Outside these facilities and areas, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of Japan and in liaison with those authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the United States armed forces.

11. In the event of hostilities to which the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security apply, either the Government of Japan or the Government of the United States shall have the right, by giving sixty days notice to the other, to suspend the application of any of the provisions of this Article. If this right is exercised, the Governments of Japan and the United States shall immediately consult with a view to agreeing on suitable provisions to replace the provisions suspended.

12. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any offences committed before the entry into force of this Agreement. Such cases shall be governed by the provisions of Article 17 of the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America as it existed at the relevant time.

Article 18

1. Each Party waives all its claims against the other Party for damage to any property owned by it and used by its land, sea or air defense services, if such damage
   (a) was caused by a member or an employee of the defense services of the other Party in the performance of his official duties; or
   (b) arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft owned by the other Party and used by its defense services, provided either that the vehicle, vessel or aircraft causing the damage was being used for official purposes, or that the damage was caused to property being so used.

Claims for maritime salvage by one Party against the other Party shall be waived, provided that the vessel or cargo salvaged was owned by a Party and being used by its defense services for official purposes.

2. (a) In the case of damage caused or arising as stated in paragraph 1 to other property owned by either Party and located in Japan, issue of the liability of the other Party shall be determined and the amount of damage shall be assessed, unless the two Governments agree otherwise, by a sole arbitrator selected in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. The arbitrator shall also decide any counter-claims arising out of the same incident.
(b) The arbitrator referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be selected by agreement between the two Governments from among the nationals of Japan who hold or have held high judicial office.

(c) Any decision taken by the arbitrator shall be binding and conclusive upon the Parties.

(d) The amount of any compensation awarded by the arbitrator shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 (e) (i), (ii) and (iii) of this Article.

(e) The compensation of the arbitrator shall be fixed by agreement between the two Governments and shall together with the necessary expenses incidental to the performance of his duties, be defrayed in equal proportions by them.

(f) Nevertheless, each Party waives its claim in any such case up to the amount of 1,400 United States dollars or 504,000 yen. In the case of considerable variation in the rate of exchange between these currencies the two Governments shall agree on the appropriate adjustments of these amounts.

3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the expression “owned by a Party” in the case of a vessel includes a vessel on bare boat charter to that Party or requisitioned by it on bare boat terms or seized by it in prize (except to the extent that the risk of loss or liability is borne by some person other than such Party).

4. Each Party waives all its claims against the other Party for injury or death suffered by any member of its defense services while such member was engaged in the performance of his official duties.

5. Claims(other than contractual claims and those to which paragraphs 6 or 7 of this Article apply) arising out of acts or omissions of members or employees of the United States armed forces done in the performance of official duty, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which the United States armed forces are legally responsible, and causing damage in Japan to third parties, other than the Government of Japan, shall be dealt with by Japan in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) Claims shall be filed considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to claims arising from the activities of its Self-Defense Forces.

(b) Japan may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by Japan in yen.

(c) Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of Japan, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive upon the Parties.

(d) Every claim paid by Japan shall be communicated to the appropriate United States authorities together with full particulars and a proposed distribution in conformity with subparagraphs (e) (i ) and (ii) below. In default of a reply within two months, the proposed distribution shall be regarded as accepted.

(e) The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preceding subparagraphs and paragraph 2 of this Article shall be distributed between the Parties as follows:

(i) Where the United States alone is responsible, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed in the proportion of 25 percent chargeable to Japan and 75 percent chargeable to the United States.

(ii) Where Japan and the United States are responsible for the damage, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally between them. Where the damage was caused by the defense services of Japan or the United States and it is not possible to attribute it specifically to one or both of those defense services, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally between Japan and the United States.

(iii)Every half-year, a statement of the sums paid by Japan in the course of the half-yearly period in respect of every case regarding which the proposed distribution on a percentage basis has been accepted, shall be sent to the appropriate United States authorities, together with a request for reimbursement. Such reimbursement shall be made, in yen, within the shortest possible time.

(f) Members or employees of the United States armed forces, excluding those employees who have only Japanese nationality, shall not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given against them in Japan in a matter arising from the performance of their official duties.

(g) Except in so far as subparagraph (e) of this paragraph applies to claims covered by paragraph 2 of this Article, the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any claim arising out of or in connection with the navigation or operation of a ship or the loading, carriage, or discharge of a cargo, other than claims for death or personal injury to which paragraph 4 of this Article does not apply.

6. Claims against members or employees of the United States armed forces (except employees who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Japan) arising out of tortious acts or omissions in Japan not done in
the performance of official duty shall be dealt with in the following manner:
(a) The authorities of Japan shall consider the claim and assess compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter.
(b) The report shall be delivered to the appropriate United States authorities, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an ex gratia payment, and if so, of what amount.
(c) If an offer of ex gratia payment is made, and accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the United States authorities shall make the payment themselves and inform the authorities of Japan of their decision and of the sum paid.
(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts of Japan to entertain an action against a member or an employee of the United States armed forces unless and until there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.
7. Claims arising out of the unauthorized use of any vehicle of the United States armed forces shall be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, except in so far as the United States armed forces are legally responsible.
8. If a dispute arises as to whether a tortious act or omission of a member or an employee of the United States armed forces was done in the performance of official duty or as to whether the use of any vehicle of the United States armed forces was unauthorized, the question shall be submitted to an arbitrator appointed in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of the Article, whose decision on this point shall be final and conclusive.
9. (a) The United States shall not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of Japan for members or employees of the United States armed forces in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the courts of Japan except to the extent provided in paragraph 5 (f) of this Article.
(b) In case any private movable property, excluding that in use by the United States armed forces, which is subject to compulsory execution under Japanese law, is within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, the United States authorities shall, upon the request of Japanese courts, possess and turn over such property to the Japanese authorities.
(c) The authorities of Japan and the United States shall cooperate in the procurement of evidence for a fair hearing and disposal of claims under this Article.
10. Disputes arising out of contracts concerning the procurement of materials, supplies, equipment, services, and labor by or for the United States armed forces, which are not resolved by the parties to the contract concerned, may be submitted to the Joint Committee for conciliation, provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not prejudice any right which the parties to the contract may have to file a civil suit.
11. The term "defense services" used in this Article is understood to mean for Japan its Self-Defense Forces and the United States its armed forces.
12. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of this Article shall apply only to claims arising incident to non-combat activities.
13. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any claims which arose before the entry into force of this Agreement. Such claims shall be dealt with by the provisions of Article 18 of the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America.

Article 19
1. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, shall be subject to the foreign exchange controls of the Government of Japan.
2. The preceding paragraph shall not be construed to preclude the transmission into or outside of Japan of United States dollars or dollar instruments representing the official funds of the United States or realized as a result of service or employment in connection with this Agreement by members of the United States armed forces and the civilian component, or realized by such persons and their dependents from sources outside of Japan.
3. The United States authorities shall take suitable measures to preclude the abuse of the privileges stipulated in the preceding paragraph or circumvention of the Japanese foreign exchange controls.

Article 20
1. (a) United States military payment certificates denominated in dollars may be used by persons
authorized by the United States for internal transactions within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces. The Government of the United States will take appropriate action to assure that authorized personnel are prohibited from engaging in transactions involving military payment certificates except as authorized by United States regulations. The Government of Japan will take necessary action to prohibit unauthorized persons from engaging in transactions involving military payment certificates and with the aid of United States authorities will undertake to apprehend and punish any person or persons under its jurisdiction involved in the counterfeiting or uttering of counterfeit military payment certificates.

(b) It is agreed that the United States authorities will apprehend and punish members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents, who tender military payment certificates to unauthorized persons and that no obligation will be due to such unauthorized persons or to the Government of Japan or its agencies from the United States or any of its agencies as a result of any unauthorized use of military payment certificates within Japan.

2. In order to exercise control of military payment certificates the United States may designate certain American financial institutions to maintain and operate, under United States supervision, facilities for the use of persons authorized by the United States to use military payment certificates. Institutions authorized to maintain military banking facilities will establish and maintain such facilities physically separated from their Japanese commercial banking business, with personnel whose sole duty is to maintain and operate such facilities. Such facilities shall be permitted to maintain United States currency bank accounts and to perform all financial transaction in connection therewith including receipt and remission of funds to the extent provided by Article 19, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.

Article 21
The United States may establish and operate, within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, United States military post offices, for the use of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, for the transmission of mail between United States military post offices in Japan and between such military post offices and other United States post offices.

Article 22
The United States may enroll and train eligible United States citizens residing in Japan, who apply for such enrollment, in the reserve organizations of the armed forces of the United States.

Article 23
Japan and the United States will cooperate in taking such steps as may from time to time be necessary to ensure the security of the United States armed forces, the members thereof, the civilian component, their dependents, and their property. The Government of Japan agrees to seek such legislation and to take such other action as may be necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and official information of the United States, and for the punishment of offenders under the applicable laws of Japan.

Article 24
1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan except those to be borne by Japan as provided in paragraph 2.
2. It is agreed that Japan will furnish for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the United States and make compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities and areas and rights of way, including facilities and areas jointly used such as those at airfields and ports, as provided in Articles 2 and 3.
3. It is agreed that arrangements will be effected between the Governments of Japan and the United States for accounting applicable to financial transactions arising out of this Agreement.

Article 25
1. A Joint Committee shall be established as the means for consultation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the
implementation of this Agreement. In particular, the Joint Committee shall serve as the means for consultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are required for the use of the United States in carrying out the purposes of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

2. The Joint Committee shall be composed of a representative of the Government of Japan and a representative of the Government of the United States, each of whom shall have one or more deputies and staff. The Joint Committee shall determine its own procedures, and arrange for such auxiliary organs and administrative services as may be required. The Joint Committee shall be so organized that it may meet immediately at any time at the request of the representative of either the Government of Japan or the Government of the United States.

3. If the Joint Committee is unable to resolve any matter, it shall refer that matter to the respective Governments for further consideration through appropriate channels.

**Article 26**
1. This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States in accordance with their legal procedures, and notes indicating such approval shall be exchanged.

2. After the procedure set forth in the preceding paragraph has been followed, this Agreement will enter into force on the date of coming into force of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, at which time the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, shall expire.

3. The Government of each Party to this Agreement undertakes to seek from its legislature necessary budgetary and legislative action with respect to provisions of this Agreement which require such action for their execution.

**Article 27**
Either Government may at any time request the revision of any Article of this Agreement, in which case the two Governments shall enter into negotiation through appropriate channels.

**Article 28**
This Agreement, and agreed revisions thereof, shall remain in force while the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains in force unless earlier terminated by agreement between the two Governments.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Agreement.

Done at Washington, in duplicate, in the Japanese and English languages, both texts equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

For Japan:
NOBUSUKE KISHI
AIICHIRO FUJIYAMA
MITSUJIRO ISHII
TADASHI ADACHI
KOICHIRO ASAKAI

For the United States of America:
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 2ND
J. GRAHAM PARSONS
Appendix 3

Agreement between Japan and the United States of America
Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands
(Signed on June 17, 1971)

Japan and the United States of America,

Noting that the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States of America reviewed together on November 19, 20 and 21, 1969 the status of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in the Joint Communiqué between the Prime Minister and the President issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;

Noting that the two Governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said Joint Communiqué;

Considering that the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said Article; and

Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;

Therefore, have agreed as follows:

Article I
1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning the Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands signed between Japan and the United States of America, respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.

Article II
It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between Japan and the United States of America, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States of America signed at Tokyo on April 2, 1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

Article III
1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual

2. In the application of Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960, to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with paragraph 1 above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces" in paragraph 1 of the said Article IV refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States armed forces, and that the term "improvements" in paragraph 2 of the said Article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

Article IV
1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

2. The waiver in paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorized to maintain its duly empowered officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex grata contributions for restoration of lands to the nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961 and before the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation to the payments made under High Commissioner Ordinance Number 60 of 1967 to claims for damages done prior to July 1, 1950 to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.

4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, or authorized by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article V
1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgments in civil cases rendered by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, provided that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.

2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over and continue to judgment and execution any civil cases pending as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.

4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgments rendered in criminal cases by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
Article VI
1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said Corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that date in conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.
2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided on that date in accordance with Article III of this Agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on that date, except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of this Agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that date with the consent of the Government of Japan.
3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands as are held by the Government of the United States of America as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.
4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration in made prior to the date of entry into force or this Agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan under paragraphs 1 and 2 above are located.

Article VII
Considering, inter alia, that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of this Agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in paragraph 8 of the Joint Communiqué of November 21, 1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs, particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U.S. $320,000,000) over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will pay one hundred million United States dollars (U.S. $100,000,000) within one week after and the remainder in four equal annual installments in June of each calendar year subsequent; to the year in which this Agreement enters into force.

Article VIII
The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa Island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two Governments. The two Governments shall enter into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement on future operation of the Voice of America on Okinawa Island.

Article IX
This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This Agreement shall enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Tokyo and Washington, this seventeenth day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic.

For Japan:
Kiichi Aichi
For the United States of America:
William P. Rogers
Appendix 4

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The attached represent the results of discussions held between the representatives of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States of America concerning Article III of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today.

Tokyo, June 17, 1971

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Japan
LIST A

The following are the installations and sites which the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America are prepared, unless otherwise agreed between them, to agree in the Joint Committee, within their present boundaries, or as indicated in the remarks, as facilities and areas pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the "SOFA") for the use by the United States armed forces as from the date of reversion. The agreements in the Joint Committee will be concluded on the day of entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, and every effort will be made to complete the reparatory work well in advance of that day.
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<td>30.</td>
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<td>32.</td>
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<td>34.</td>
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<td>37.</td>
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<td>Army Housing Area</td>
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<td>Sunabe Army Annex</td>
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<td>Naha Port Facilities</td>
<td>Military Port of Naha</td>
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<td>Shinzato Communications Site</td>
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<td>Yozadake Arm3 Annex No. 1</td>
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<td>Yozadake Army Annex</td>
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<td>South Ammunition Storage Annex</td>
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<td>Camp Kue Tank Farm Nos. 1, 2</td>
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<td>Tengan Booster Station</td>
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<td>Camp Kue Booster Station</td>
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<td>78.</td>
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<td>Irisuna Shima Air Range</td>
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<td>79.</td>
<td>Kume Shima Air Station</td>
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<td>Ukibaru Training Area</td>
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<td>Tsuken Jima Training Area</td>
<td>Tsuken Jima Training Area</td>
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<td>83.</td>
<td>Mae Shima Training Area</td>
<td>Mae Shima Training Area</td>
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<td>84.</td>
<td>Kobi Sho Range</td>
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<td>Army Housing Area</td>
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<td>85.</td>
<td>Sekibi Sho Range</td>
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<td>86.</td>
<td>Miyako Jima VORTAC Site</td>
<td>Miyako Jima VORTAC Site</td>
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<td>87.</td>
<td>Miyako Jima Air Station</td>
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<td>88.</td>
<td>Okino Daito Shima Range</td>
<td>Okino Daito Shima</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunnery Range</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note 1: With respect to the U, S, POL pipelines connecting the POL depots, the U, S, submarine cable under the territorial waters of Japan connected to Camp Sukiran, and the U. S. telecommunications cables connected to the facilities and areas, the Government of Japan will take measures necessary for the use by the United States armed forces under SOFA.

Note 2: There are certain facilities and areas among those listed above which will require that restricted waters be provided contiguous thereto,

Note 3: With respect to the Sea Maneuver Areas to be provided in the territorial waters of Japan and those to be agreed upon on the high seas, the two Governments will continue preparatory work.
LIST B

The following are the facilities and areas which will be returned to Japan after reversion as indicated in the remarks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Onna Site (No.15)</td>
<td>Onna Point Army Annex</td>
<td>On takeover by the Japan Self Defense Forces</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Chibana Site (portion described under the &quot;PRESENT NOMENCLATURE&quot;) (No.23)</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>White Beach Area (portion described under the &quot;PRESENT NOMENCLATURE&quot;) (No.48)</td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<td>Chinen Site No.1 (No.68)</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Chinen Site No.2 (No.69)</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Yozadake Air Station (No. 72)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Yozadake Site (No.73)</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Yozadake Army Annex (portion described under the &quot;PRESENT NOMENCLATURE&quot;) (No.74)</td>
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<td>Yozadake Army Annex No.2</td>
<td>Same as above (Site &quot;A&quot; only)</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Kume Shima Air Station</td>
<td>Kume Shima Air Station</td>
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<td>11.</td>
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<td>Miyako Jima VORTAC Site</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Miyako Jima Air Station</td>
<td>Miyako Jima Air Station</td>
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<td>(No.87)</td>
<td>Miyako Jima ND3 Site</td>
<td>On takeover by the Japan Ministry of Transport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The question of releasing the Machinato Housing Area (No, 61) upon completion of alternative facilities will be a specific subject of further discussion.
LIST C

The installations and sites now used by the Government of the United States of America the whole or part of which will be released on or prior to reversion include the following:

1. Naha Airport
2. Miwa NDB Site
4. Naha Tank Farm No. 2 (Yogi Tank Farm)
5. Naha Wheel Area
6. White Beach Area (Japanese Government use portion)(No, 48)
7. Oku Training Area
8. Sedake Training Area No. 2
9. Motobu Quarry
10. Motobu Auxiliary Airfield
11. Ishikawa Beach
12. Tokashiki Army Annex
13. Haneji Army Annex
14. Kadena Site No. 4
15. Site Oki
16. Site Akamichi
17. Site Kuba
18. Army Police Sub Station, Koza

19. Koza Field Office

20. Protective Shelter, Awase

21. Naha Field Office

22. Sobe Direction Finder Site, West

23. Miyako Jima LORAN-A Transmitting Station

24. Camp Schwab Training Area (approximately 1,043,100 square meters) (No. 9)

25. Camp Hansen (approximately 390,600 square meters) (No. 11)

26. Camp Hansen Training Area (approximately 177,400 square meters) (No. 11)

27. Higashionna Ammunition Storage Annex (approximately 947,100 square meters) (No. 22)

28. Camp Courtney (approximately 396,200 square meters) (No. 29)

29. Camp Shields (approximately 603,000 square meters) (No. 32)

30. Camp Hauge (approximately 53,600 square meters) (No. 33)

31. Camp Kubasaki (approximately 64,700 square meters) (No. 50)

32. Yozadake Air Station (approximately 72,600 square meters) (No. 72)

33. Kume Shima Air Station (approximately 44,500 square meters) (No. 79)

34. Miyako Jima Air Station (approximately 97,700 square meters) (No. 87)

Note: There are also other installations and sites to be released by virtue of Article VI of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.
Arrangement Concerning Assumption  
by Japan of the Responsibility for  
the Immediate Defense of Okinawa

Whereas the representatives of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the U. S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) have discussed matters relating to Necessary coordination between the two defense 
authorities, in connection with the Japanese program for the deployment of its Self Defense Forces 
in Okinawa for the immediate defense of Okinawa after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

Whereas the results of the above-mentioned discussions, which are set out in this Arrangement, 
have been approved by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee at its meeting of 
June 29, 1971.

Therefore, these representatives agree as follows:

1. Assumption by Japan of Immediate Defense Responsibility: 
Japan will assume, in accordance with the schedule as described in the following paragraph, the 
mission for the immediate defense of Okinawa, namely, ground defense, air defense, maritime 
defense patrol and search and rescue to be assigned to JDA.

2. Timing of Japan's Assumption: 
Assumption by Japan of the above defense mission will be completed by the earliest practicable date 
subsequent to the date of the reversion of Okinawa (R-day), but not later than 1 July, 1973.

a. Initial Deployment: 
Initially and within about 6 months after R-day Japan will deploy the following units of proximately 
3, 200 personnel.

(1) Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) - A headquarters, two infantry companies, one 
engineer company, one aviation unit, one supporting unit and others.

(2) Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) - One base unit, one anti-submarine patrol unit and 
others.
(3) Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) - A headquarters, one fighter interceptor unit, one aircraft control and warning unit, one air base unit and others.

b. Additional Deployment:
Additionally, and not later than 1 July, 1973, Japan will deploy a NIKE group (3 batteries), a HAWK group (4 batteries) and appropriate supporting troops to carry out the surface-to-air missile defense and to operate the aircraft control and warning system.

3. Installations:

a. JDA intends to station the units at the following installations:
   
   (1) Naha Airport - JASDF fighter interceptor unit and others and JGSDF aviation units. JMSDF anti-submarine patrol unit will also utilize Naha Airport
   
   (2) Naha Wheel - JGSDF units and such other JSDF units as may be required.
   
   (3) White Beach and Naha Port - JMSDF units. SOFA Article II-4-(a) arrangements as necessary will be worked out for JMSDF’s use of piers, staging areas and others.
   
   (4) The facilities and areas in use of NIKE, HAWK and aircraft control and warning units - JSDF surface-to-air missile units antiaircraft control and warning units being deployed.

b. The United States will cooperate in the location of JSDF communications receiver and transmitter sites and will consider their accommodation within US Facilities and Areas where possible.

4. Air Defense:

a. JASDF will:

   (1) Deploy units to Naha Airport beginning on or about R-day.
   
   (2) Assume air defense alert with F-104J aircraft by R-day plus 6 months and,
   
   (3) Assume operation of the aircraft control and warning system by 1 July, 1973.
b. JASDF NIKE Group and JGSDF HAWK Group will deploy to Okinawa, so as to assume the surface-to-air missile defense mission by 1 July, 1973.

c. Operational responsibility for the air defense of Okinawa will be retained by the USAF until JSDF assumes the responsibility by 1 July, 1973. Command, however, of JSDF and US forces will be exercised through their respective national command channels.

5. **Surface-to-Air Missile and Aircraft Control and Warning System:**

   In the interest of facilitating the early assumption of the air defense of Okinawa, JDA intends to buy and the US Government, through the US DOD, offers to sell, on terms and conditions to be specified separately, the basic aircraft control and warning system and the NIKE and HAWK surface-to-air missile systems to be agreed upon.

6. **Ground Defense, Maritime Defense Patrol and Search and Rescue:**

   JSDF will assume the responsibility for ground defense, maritime defense patrol and search and rescue to be assigned to JDA in Okinawa, as JSDF deployed forces become operational, within 6 months after R-day. JSDF and US forces representatives will in concert prepare detailed plans for the deployment to Okinawa of forces associated with the foregoing functions.

7. **Detailed Implementation Plans**

   For the purpose of implementing the aforementioned JSDF's assumption of the defense mission and its deployment program, detailed implementation plans and arrangements for coordination will be worked out between representatives of JDA and US DOD.

   Tokyo, 29 June 1971

For JDA
(Signed)
Takuya Kubo
Chief, Defense Bureau
Japan Defense Agency

For DOD
(Signed)
Walter L. Curtis, Jr.
Vice Admiral, US Navy
US Senior Military Representative
American Embassy, Tokyo
I have the honor to refer to Article VIII of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today and to propose the arrangements referred to in the said Article as follows:

1. The Voice of America relay station (hereinafter referred to as "the relay station's") will consist of the following facilities owned by the Government of the United States of America:

   A. Transmitting station at O'zuma, Kunigami Village:
      14 operational buildings,
      14 residence houses,
      22 antennas, and
      auxiliary facilities.

   B. Receiving station at Manzamo, Onna Village:
      3 operational buildings,
      27 antennas, and
      auxiliary facilities.

   C. Housing and administrative facilities at Hamakawa, Chatan Village:
      9 residence houses,
      1 administrative building,
      1 operational building,
      5 antennas, and
2. The scope of the transmission activities of the relay station shall be as set forth below:

(1) Medium wave broadcasting
   a. Frequency: 1,178 KC
   b. Power: not exceeding 1,000 KW
   c. Transmission hours per day: not exceeding 6 hours.

(2) Short wave broadcasting
   a. Number of Transmitters: not exceeding
      100 KW .......1
      3~ KW .......2
      15 KW ....... 1
      5 KW....... 1
   b. Frequency-hours per day: not exceeding 32.5 hours
   c. Number of antennas: not exceeding 6.

(3) Languages used
   No languages other than those presently used.

(4) Matters concerning frequencies and other basic characteristics of emission used by the relay station for broadcasting, radio teletype and communication Links other than those listed above will be approved by the competent authorities of the Government of Japan on the basis of the existing characteristics. Any subsequent changes in the characteristics thus approved will be subject to approval of the competent authorities of the Government of Japan. In exceptional cases, the relay station may extend, on an ad hoc basis, its broadcasting hours beyond the limits provided for in (1) c and (2) b above with the approval of the competent authorities of the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of the United States of America will notify the International Frequency Registration Board of frequency assignments.
including seasonal high frequency broadcasting schedules, for the relay station in accordance with the Radio Regulations attached to the International Telecommunication Convention. The competent authorities of the Government of the United States of America will inform those of the Government of Japan of the particulars of such notification.

4. The Government of the United States of America will take necessary steps to remove, as quickly as possible, any jamming or interference caused by the relay station to radio stations or radio receiving facilities regulated by the relevant radio laws of Japan.

5. The Government of the United States of America shall be responsible for just and expeditious settlement of all claims against the relay station or its employees arising from or in connection with its activities.

6. Sole responsibility for the programs relayed through the relay station will rest with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of Japan, however, reserves the right to express its views of the said programs as it considers necessary, and the Government of the United States of America will respect the views so expressed.

7. Details for the implementation of these arrangements will be agreed upon as may be necessary between the competent authorities of the two Governments.

I have further the honor to propose that the present Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply confirming the foregoing arrangements on behalf of the Government of the United States of America shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments, which will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
Tokyo, June 17, 1971

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"(Japanese Note)"

I have further the honor to confirm the above arrangements on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and agree that Your Excellency's Note and this reply shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments, which will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today.

Armin H. Meyer
(U.S. Note)

Tokyo, June 17

Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today and to confirm the understanding reached between the two Governments that the Government of the United States of America will undertake, in consultation with the Government of Japan, to complete necessary preparations as expeditiously as possible for settlement of the question arising out of the submersion of lands in the military port of Naha through disposition of the lands reclaimed and now held by the Government of the United States of America in these islands to the extent necessary for this purpose.

I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm the foregoing on behalf of your Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Armin H, Meyer

His Excellency
Kiichi Aichi
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan
Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's of today's date, which reads as follows:

(U. S. Note)

I have further the honor to confirm the foregoing understanding on behalf of the Government of Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
Appendix 5

*Guidelines for Defense Cooperation*

Report by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, Submitted to and Approved by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee on July 8, 1976

The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee held on July 8, 1976 decided to establish the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation. The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation which was held 8 times, agreed on the following premises and subjects of studies and consultations in assuming the mission committed by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee

1. Premises of Studies and Consultations
   (1) Matters concerning "Prior Consultation," matters concerning the Japanese constitutional limitations and the Three Non-Nuclear principles will not be the subjects of the SDC's studies and consultations.
   (2) The conclusions of the SDC's studies and consultations will be reported to the Security Consultative Committee and the disposition of those conclusions will be left to the judgement of the respective Governments of Japan and the United States. Those conclusions will not be such as would place either government under obligation to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures.

2. Subjects of Studies and Consultations
   (1) Matters relating to the case of an armed attack against Japan or to the case in which such an attack is imminent.
   (2) Matters relating to situations in the Far East other than those mentioned in (1) above, which will have an important influence on the security of Japan.
   (3) Others (joint exercise and training, etc.)

At the outset of conducting its studies and consultations, the SDC heard the Japanese side's basic concept concerning the scope and modalities of defense cooperation between Japan and the United States under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in the case of an armed attack against Japan, and decided to proceed with its work using this concept as a basis for its studies and consultations. The SDC established, with a view to facilitating its studies and consultations, three subsidiary panels, namely the Operations, Intelligence and Logistics Panels. These Panels have conducted studies and consultations from a professional standpoint. The SDC has also conducted studies and consultations on other matters concerning cooperation between Japan and the United States which come within its purview.

The SDC hereby submits for approval to the Security Consultative Committee "The Draft Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation" representing the result of the SDC's activities described above.

Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

These draft guidelines shall not be construed as affecting the rights and obligations of Japan and the United States under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. It is understood that the extension of facilitative assistance and support by Japan to the United States, which is described in the draft guidelines, is subject to the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

I. Posture for Deterring Aggression
   1. Japan, as its defense policy, will possess defense capability on an appropriate scale within the scope necessary for self-defense, and consolidate and maintain a posture to ensure the most efficient operations; and assure, in accordance with the SOFA, the stable and effective utilization of facilities and areas in Japan by U.S. Forces. The United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent capability, and the for-ward deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them.

   2. In order to be able to take coordinated joint action smoothly in the event of an armed attack against Japan, Japan and the United States will endeavor to achieve a posture for cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics.
Accordingly,

(1) In order jointly to conduct coordinated operations for the defense of Japan smoothly and effectively, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will conduct studies on joint-defense planning. They will also undertake necessary joint exercises and training when appropriate. In addition, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will study and prepare beforehand common procedures deemed necessary for operational needs in order jointly to undertake operations smoothly. Such procedures include matters related to operations, intelligence and logistics. As communications/electronics are absolutely essential to effecting command and liaison, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will also determine in advance their mutual communications/electronics requirements.

(2) The JSDF and U.S. Forces will develop and exchange intelligence necessary for the defense of Japan. The JSDF and U.S. Forces will, in order to ensure smooth intelligence exchange, determine in coordination the nature of the intelligence to be exchanged and the specific JSDF/USF units to be assigned responsibility for the exchange. In addition, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will promote close intelligence cooperation by taking such required actions as establishing systems for mutual communications.

(3) The JSDF and U.S. Forces, acting from the basic principle that each nation is responsible for the logistics of its own forces, will closely coordinate with each other or conduct studies in advance in regard to such functions as supply, transportation, maintenance, facilities, etc., so that mutual support can be arranged appropriately when needed. Detailed requirements for this mutual support will be developed through joint studies and planning. In particular, coordination will be made in advance in regard to foreseeable supply deficiencies, quantities, priorities for satisfying deficiencies, emergency acquisition procedures, etc., and studies will be undertaken relating to the economical and efficient utilization of the bases and facilities of the two forces.

II. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan

1. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent;
Japan and the United States will conduct closer liaison and will take necessary measures respectively and, as deemed necessary due to changes in the situation, will make necessary preparations in order to ensure coordinated joint action, including the establishment of a coordination center between the JSDF and U.S. Forces.

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will establish in advance a common standard as regards preparations which will be respectively conducted by the two forces so that the two nations may select coordinated common readiness stages, and ensure that effective preparations for operations can be cooperatively undertaken by the JSDF and U.S. Forces respectively.

This common standard will indicate readiness stages from an increase of unit-alert posture to a maximization of combat-readiness posture concerning intelligence activities, unit readiness, movements, logistics, and other matters relating to defense preparations.

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will respectively conduct defense preparations considered necessary according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement between the two governments.

2. When an armed attack against Japan takes place:
(1) In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.
(2) When the JSDF and U.S. Forces jointly conduct operations for the defense of Japan, they will strive to achieve close mutual coordination to employ the defense capacity of each force in a timely and effective manner.
(i) Concept of Operations:
The JSDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace. U.S. Forces will support JSDF operations. U.S. Forces will also conduct operations to supplement functional areas which exceed the capacity of the JSDF.

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will jointly conduct ground, maritime and air operations as follows:
(a) Ground Operations:
The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and U.S. Ground Forces will jointly conduct ground operations for the defense of Japan. The GSDF will conduct checking, holding and repelling operations.
U.S. Ground Forces will deploy as necessary and jointly conduct operations with the GSDF, mainly those for repelling enemy forces.
(b) Maritime Operations:
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and U.S. Navy will jointly conduct maritime operations for the defense of surrounding waters and the protection of sea lines of communication.
The MSDF will primarily conduct operations for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan; and anti-submarine operations, operations for the protection of ships and other operations in the surrounding waters.
U.S. Naval Forces will support MSDF operations and conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of task forces providing additional mobility and strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces.
(c) Air Operations:
The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and U.S. Air Force will jointly conduct air operations for the defense of Japan.
The ASDF will conduct air-defense, anti-airborne and anti-amphibious invasion, close air support, air reconnaissance, airlift operations, etc.
U.S. Air Force will support ASDF operations and conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of air units providing additional strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces.
(d) When carrying out ground, maritime, and air operations, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will provide necessary support for each other's forces in various activities related to operations, such as intelligence, logistics, etc.

(ii) Command and Coordination:
The JSDF and U.S. Forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. In order to be able jointly to conduct coordinated operations effectively, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will take actions in accordance with operational processes which will be coordinated in advance.

(iii) Coordination Center:
In order jointly to conduct effective operations, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will maintain close mutual coordination on operations, intelligence and logistic support through a coordination center.

(iv) Intelligence Activities:
The JSDF and U.S. Forces will, through operations of their respective intelligence systems, conduct intelligence activities in close cooperation in order to contribute to the joint implementation of effective operations. To support this, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will coordinate intelligence activities
closely at each stage of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination. The JSDF and U.S. Forces will each have responsibility for their security.

(v) Logistic Activities:
The JSDF and U.S. Forces will conduct efficient and appropriate logistic support activities in close cooperation in accordance with relevant agreements between Japan and the United States.

Toward this end, Japan and the United States will undertake mutual support activities to improve the effectiveness of logistic functions and to alleviate functional shortfalls as follows:

(a) Supply
The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(b) Transportation
Japan and the United States will, in close cooperation, carry out transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.

(c) Maintenance
The United States will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin, which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities, and Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. Forces' equipment in Japan. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. As a related activity, Japan will also support U.S. Forces' requirement for salvage and recovery in Japan.

(d) Facilities
The U.S. Forces will, in case of need, be provided additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If it becomes necessary to consider joint use of bases and facilities/areas to improve effective and economical utilization, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will conduct joint use in accordance with the above Treaty and arrangements.

III. Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan

The Governments of Japan and the United States will consult together from time to time whenever changes in the circumstances so require.

The scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended by Japan to the U.S. Forces in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan will be governed by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, its related arrangements, other relevant agreements between Japan and the United States, and the relevant laws and regulations of Japan. The Governments of Japan and the United States will conduct studies in advance on the scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan within the above-mentioned legal framework. Such studies will include the scope and modalities of joint use of the Self-Defense Forces bases by the U.S. Forces and of other facilitative assistance to be extended.
Appendix 6


(released April 19, 1990)

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INTRODUCTION
The United States remains a Pacific power with wide-ranging interests in East Asia, a region whose global importance continues to grow each year. We have invested heavily in the region since the Second World War in political, military, and economic terms, assisting in the development of democratic, market-oriented governments. We have active mutual security agreements with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and have established non-treaty security relationships with several other countries. Economically, the region has surpassed Europe as America's largest trading partner, and the margin of difference continues to grow (Fig. 1).

In fact, our success over the years, globally as well as in the Pacific Rim, has been a key contribution to the evolution of the new politico-military conditions that now require us to review our forward-based defense posture.

Within the East Asian and Pacific region, traditional threat perceptions are changing. In Asia, unlike NATO, a region-wide consensus has never existed about the threat posed by the Soviet Union or about other sources of regional instability. However, since our forward deployments have been most commonly justified as a deterrent to Soviet expansionism, our presence in the region is now seen as less relevant in light of domestic changes within the USSR and prospects for U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. Moreover, nationalist sentiment is on the rise in a number of prosperous Asian nations. Leaders in these countries must contend with influential public opinion that views continued U.S. military presence on their soil as an affront to their sovereignty.

Clearly, important U.S. domestic considerations also must be taken into account. Significant reductions in the defense budget, generated by domestic perceptions of a diminished Soviet threat as well as by fiscal pressures, are probable. At the same time, it is appropriate to expect our prosperous Asian allies - Japan and Korea - to assume greater responsibility for their own defense and, by so doing, to contribute more directly to the stability of the region.
In response to the requirement contained in the FY 1990 Defense Authorization Act, this report discusses specific ways our Asian allies can increase their participation in regional stability and how we can reduce and restructure our military presence in East Asia. Using the specific questions raised in the legislation as a broad framework, this report outlines the rationale for a continued military presence in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade.

Based on our national security objectives and our projections of regional conditions, we conclude that abrupt and major changes in our security posture would be destabilizing. Nonetheless, adjustments to our forward deployed force structure can and should be made to accommodate changing global, regional and domestic realities. The report lays out the parameters for force restructuring and reductions in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade. Within these parameters, it will be the responsibility of the principal military commanders involved to organize their forces to accomplish the missions and objectives we identify.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC SCENE

The 1990's will be a decade of transition in the Asia-Pacific region. Political volatility and turbulence will characterize key countries - China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cambodia and the Philippines to name a few. Political uncertainties are exacerbated by the major changes in generational leadership that will occur, such as in China, North Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia. Intensified economic competition within the region and with the United States will increasingly complicate security relationships. Moscow will undoubtedly be a more active player in the Asian diplomatic arena as it seeks to further mend ties with Beijing and obtain financial and technological aid from Japan and South Korea. Overall, for the United States, the decade will present opportunities, and important challenges: maintaining our security arrangements; meeting stiff technological and economic competition; containing Soviet influence; and managing, with fewer resources, the process of change.

The Soviet Union is conducting unilateral force reductions that should reduce Moscow's capability to conduct a limited ground offensive against the PRC, thereby mitigating an impediment to better relations. The U.S.S.R. is also clearly reducing its modest force posture in Southeast Asia by withdrawing some aircraft and ships from Cam Ranh Bay. In the Soviet Far East Military District which fronts Japan, however, Soviet capabilities still appear to far exceed those needed for defense (Fig. 4). However, at least in the short term, Soviet modernization programs, particularly air and naval, ensure a continued threat to our interests, and allies, and forces in Northeast Asia.

Soviet preoccupation with events in Eastern Europe has not detracted from Soviet interest in Asia, as demonstrated by Premier Ryzhkov's February 1990 tour of the region. Moscow's attention and initiative will most likely increase as Gorbachev's proposed 1991 visit to Japan approaches. The issue of the Northern Territories remains the single greatest obstacle to an improved Soviet-Japanese relationship.

The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the critical linchpin of our Asian security strategy. The relationship, however, could be further strained during the decade by persistent trade problems and charges of unfair competition. Japan will seek a greater role in international decision making, principally in the economic arena, but also on political issues in which Tokyo has special interests - particularly Asian issues. As Japan extends its regional economic influence, latent regional concerns may resurface. Increases in Japanese military strength undertaken to compensate for declining U.S. capabilities in the region could prove worrisome to regional nations, especially if they perceive Japan is acting independent of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

The Korean Peninsula will remain one of the world's potential military flashpoints. The North has retained its reunification objectives, devoting an extraordinary percentage of its national wealth and maintaining a favorable military balance with over a million men under arms, at the expense of the welfare of its citizens (Fig. 5). It belligerently defies the international trend towards freedom and democracy witnessed elsewhere. North and South Korea will continue to engage in competing military modernization programs, with the Soviet Union remaining the primary source of sophisticated weaponry for Pyongyang. While Seoul is economically capable of matching Pyongyang's military buildup, the defense budget must now compete with other programs in South Korea's fledgling democracy. A decision by Pyongyang to pursue a nuclear weapons capability would be extremely destabilizing. Uncertainty surrounds the North Korean succession issue, which could increase the prospects for unpredictable behavior - including the use of military force. Despite these compelling reasons for continued concern,
progress is possible toward either peaceful reunification or a reduction in tensions by implementing a series of confidence building measures.

Chinese political dynamics will likely be volatile as Deng Xiaoping passes from the scene and various factions contend for control. While specific policies toward Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Vietnam will remain of concern throughout the decade, Beijing's strategy calls for a "peaceful international environment" and trade with market-oriented countries such as Japan and South Korea. However, some older generation leaders, more doctrinaire in outlook, appear willing to return to more isolationist policies of "self-reliance," especially now that orthodox ideology is once again dominant in Chinese decision making circles. Elements of the current leadership are also willing to retreat from reforms achieved over the past ten years to maintain internal control.

In Southeast Asia, the outlook for continued growth and stability is generally good, with some notable exceptions. A lasting resolution to the Cambodian problem continues to be problematic. Vietnam has instituted significant economic reforms, but not political reforms, and is in the midst of major generational leadership changes of uncertain outcome. While it is making active efforts to strengthen its ties to non-communist governments, it is unclear whether Hanoi is abandoning its longstanding goal of enforcing hegemony over Indochina.

Other longstanding regional problems with destabilizing potential persist. Unresolved territorial issues include the Spratly and Paracel Islands and Taiwan. Racial and ethnic tensions in multi-racial nations could warrant extra-regional attention. Historical enmity between various Asian states will remain a factor in the development of intra-regional relations. Growing prominence of new regional powers, such as India, is leading to regional anxiety. Proliferation of modern weaponry and missile technology could turn minor disputes into conflicts of major concern. Destabilizing arms sales and technology transfer, both to and from the region, will continue. Finally, illegal narcotics trafficking will pose a major problem.

**U.S. REGIONAL ROLE AND OBJECTIVES**

Despite the decade of change that we foresee, our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past: protecting the United States from attack; supporting our global deterrence policy; preserving our political and economic access; maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony; strengthening the Western orientation of the Asian nations; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; deterring nuclear proliferation; and ensuring freedom of navigation. The principal elements of our Asian strategy - forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements - will remain valid and essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S. interests.

We do not bear this role and retain these forward forces only because we are concerned over the vacuum which would be created if we were no longer there, although that is a source of concern. Nor are we merely motivated by altruism. Simply, we must play this role because our military presence sets the stage for our economic involvement in this region. With a total two-way trans-Pacific trade exceeding 300 billion dollars annually, 50 percent more than our trans-Atlantic trade, it is in our own best interest to help preserve peace and stability.

In the changing global and regional environment of the 1990's, superpower confrontation should diminish. In Asia, which has always been an economy of force theater for U.S. military operations (Fig. 6), the size, disposition, and rationale for our forward deployed forces will be increasingly scrutinized. Nevertheless, in spite of a real and/or perceived reduction of the Soviet threat, what has previously been a traditional aspect of our military presence in the region - the role of regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor - will assume greater relative importance to stability. Over the next decade, as a new global order takes shape, our forward presence will continue to be the region's irreplaceable balancing wheel.

No other power is currently able or acceptable to play such a role, and a U.S. reluctance to continue in this role would be inherently destabilizing. A diminution of U.S. commitment to regional stability, whether perceived or real, would create a security vacuum that other major players would be tempted or compelled to fill. Such a scenario would likely produce a regional arms race and a climate of confrontation. Our policies - political, economic, and military - should evolve to avoid such a possibility and to support our unique and central stabilizing role.
Throughout the Pacific, our security presence moderates the actions of second-tier states with expansionist regional aspirations. By concentrating on the stabilizing aspects of our regional presence, we not only legitimize that presence, but also provide a rationale for increased cost sharing contributions to regional security by our friends/allies. This, in turn, helps temper traditional suspicions and friction between regional parties.

While our presence cannot guarantee the absence of conflict in the region, it can work to localize and minimize hostilities while providing us necessary diplomatic leverage for conflict resolution. In the regional milieu of the 1990's, this is a U.S. military role which will be understood, endorsed, and supported by virtually all the major regional players.

A changing regional security environment, however, requires us to fine tune our security objectives, both regionally and bilaterally. We will need to restructure our Asian-based forces to fit more accurately the most likely security contingencies of the 1990's.

A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE 1990'S & BEYOND

Given these national interests and security objectives, it is essential to position ourselves now to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Our goals in the next decade must be to deal with the realities of constrained defense budgets and a changing threat environment while maintaining our resolve to meet American commitments. In this context, we believe that our forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region will remain critical to deterring war, supporting our regional and bilateral objectives, and performing our military missions. The volatility and uniqueness of the East Asian environment - where the strategic changes in Europe are not mirrored - combined with existing U.S. economy of force, make major force reductions in the Pacific unwise. The 6.3 percent of our total force forward deployed in the Pacific: ensures a rapid and flexible response capability; enables significant economy of force by reducing the number of U.S. units required and allowing allies to share in defense costs; provides an effective logistics base; and demonstrates to our allies and potential enemies a visible U.S. commitment. Consequently, deployment patterns of our forces should remain much as they are.

However we elect to retain our forward deployed presence, U.S. nuclear umbrella will remain a critical element. In large measure, it has been our nuclear commitment that has slowed nuclear proliferation in the area. Movement away from this commitment would have disastrous effects and could destabilize the entire region.

The Strategic Plan:
A continued, substantial air and naval presence in East Asia is required, but measured reductions of ground and some air forces in Korea, Japan and the Philippines can take place. In the Republic of Korea, while not acting precipitously, and always taking into account the military balance on the peninsula, we will begin to draw down ground presence and modify command structures so as to transition from a leading to a supporting role for U.S. forces. In addition to ground force restructuring, some reduction in our Air Force presence may also be in order, as ROK Air Force capabilities improve. Regardless of the scope of our force reductions, we will continue to encourage the Koreans to increase their defense spending - not only to compensate for our reductions, but also to increase their contribution to the cost of our remaining in-country presence.

In Japan, beyond some personnel reductions, we envision little change in current deployment patterns - particularly our forces based at Misawa which serve as a deterrent against the Soviet Union; our key logistics hub at Yokota Air Base which supports global and regional contingencies; and our naval facilities at Yokosuka which possess the best naval repair facilities in the western Pacific and act as a naval force multiplier. However, we will continue to press for Japanese force improvements designed to meet our agreed roles and missions concepts, and increased cost sharing.

In Southeast Asia, our projections are clouded by a variety of uncertainties, including the outcome of the Philippine base negotiations, the unsettled Cambodian situation, and the economic and political growth of the ASEAN countries. We will attempt to retain our basing rights in the Philippines, recognizing that our prospects are uncertain. Prudence requires us to explore alternative arrangements - redeployment to U.S. bases elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific, complemented by expanded access agreements such as those we are currently pursuing with Singapore. While such expanded access arrangements do not offer as much capability as permanent bases, they could advance the objectives of spreading the burden of defense
cooperation and ensuring our continued presence in the region.

As we look to the future, it is clear that the best approach will require a combination of caution and innovation in order to adjust to regional changes while preserving the required degree of U.S. presence. We believe that a phased approach, capable of responding to global and regional reactions, is the soundest means of accomplishing our strategy. The plan outlined below is designed to meet rapidly changing strategic circumstances, the concerns of friends and allies, and budget realities. Accordingly, a U.S. national security review process will be conducted at the end of each phase to determine how best to proceed with the following phase. Country-specific objectives and force adjustments are outlined in succeeding sections; but in broad terms, we envision the following:

PHASE I - 1-3 YEARS: Thin out the existing force structure and begin rearranging security relationships
- Over the next three years, the Department of Defense will, in a balanced and measured way, restructure and reduce its forces in the region without jeopardizing its ability to meet its security commitments. Adjustments in our combat forces will be minimal. As an interim goal, our overall force total of 135,000 forward deployed in Asia will be reduced by 14,000 to 15,000 personnel.

PHASE II - 3-5 YEARS: Reduce and reorganize the force structure
- During this phase, proportionally greater reductions in combat forces will be undertaken incrementally to ensure that potential adversaries do not misread our deterrent capability and intentions.

PHASE III - 5-10 YEARS: Further reduce forces and stabilize at a somewhat lower level as circumstances permit
- Continue modest cuts beyond Phase II reductions, as appropriate given existing circumstances.

This general strategy should remain flexible so that it can be modified according to regional responses, particularly from nations where we presently maintain forward deployed forces. Since the vast bulk of these forces in Asia are located in Northeast Asia where the greatest threat exists (North Korea and the USSR), and our security relationships with Korea and Japan are the most complex, we must pay special attention to the nature and timing of changes that we propose there.

Managing the Cost Sharing Issue:
In the area of cost sharing, we expect increasing assistance from our allies. Increased cost sharing is attainable if we proceed on a steady upward slope with phased goals. The best chance of success in obtaining sizable increases is with proposals made with a definite rationale that can be argued logically in the capitals of those allies, primarily Japan and the Republic of Korea, who are in the best economic position to assume additional responsibilities and increase the share of defense costs they bear. We must avoid the temptation to "decree" that certain levels of Gross National Product or other specific criteria are a "fair share" of the defense cost sharing. Arithmetic formulas for increases based solely on the premise that there are significant trade imbalances or simply that a specific ally "should do more because it has the money" will likely be met with stiff resistance because such approaches can be viewed as challenges to national sovereignty. It will be more productive to demonstrate a clear need and appeal to our allies' sense of national responsibility. A clear definition of the relative roles and missions assured by the United States and particular allies has proven most productive in the past and has the greatest prospect for success over the next decade.

We will work closely with the allies to identify increased responsibilities that can be assumed from the U.S. A key way for the allies to do more is to accept greater responsibility for combined operations, thereby reducing the requirement for part of the U.S. infrastructure associated with the performance of these responsibilities. The Koreans, for example, have already agreed to increase their responsibility in international bodies associated with maintaining the truce, and the Japanese have agreed to provide the U.S. increased space in selected control centers to increase interoperability of the two nations' forces. Having identified areas where the allies can participate more fully in their own defense, we must work closely with them to ensure they develop the force structure necessary to support their increased role. Since major changes in military forces and increased acquisition of hardware are not achieved overnight, we must be patient yet continue to encourage them to improve their capabilities.

In the interim, both Japan and South Korea can contribute more financially to ease the U.S. burden for mutual defense. We will continue to work with the Japanese and Koreans to pursue specific areas for
increased cost sharing. We are also seeking increased commitments from the Japanese for greater contributions to costs involved in maintaining a U.S. forward presence in Japan. Additional initiatives are outlined in the country-specific discussions below.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

Japan

It is in the U.S. interest to maintain a forward deployed presence in Japan over the longterm for two reasons: the geostrategic location of bases and the cost effectiveness of our presence compared to anywhere else.

While leaving the exact nature of our force structure to the military commanders, in general we see a continued, substantial air and naval presence in Japan, but with possibly measured reductions of ground and some support air forces, particularly in Okinawa. On mainland Japan, we envision little change in current deployment patterns. We will maintain USAF forces at Misawa and a forward-deployed carrier at Yokosuka. We will rationalize use of our bases and facilities on Okinawa with the aim of returning property to improve civil-military relations.

Nevertheless, over the next decade our bilateral relationship will continue to be buffeted by trade disputes, a stubborn trade deficit and fears over the loss of technological competitiveness. Additionally, domestic political constituencies in Japan will continue to challenge the need for and merits of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Moreover, from the U.S. side, there will be considerable domestic pressure to reduce U.S. presence in Japan unless Japan funds this presence to the maximum appropriate extent.

Key elements of our strategy in Japan are to:
- reduce as possible our force level in Japan while maintaining essential bases which enable us to provide regional stability and deterrence in Northeast Asia;
- continue to encourage Japan to increase its territorial defense capabilities and enhance its ability to defend its sea lanes out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles, while at the same time discouraging any destabilizing development of a power projection capability;
- engage Japan even more closely in our political efforts with Western allies to maintain stability in key regions of the world, while encouraging Japan's support for regional adjustments, including increased financial support of U.S. forces operating from Japan;
- stress the importance of maintaining interoperability in our military weapons systems by encouraging maximum procurement from the U.S., increasing technology flowback, and discouraging the development of non-complementary systems; and
- increase political-military dialogue and revitalize the security consultative process.

Phase I-1 to 3 Years:
Based upon decisions made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) on how he wishes to configure his forces, we will reduce the level of our military presence in Japan in an incremental way while seeking increased Japanese support for our remaining forces.

Specific actions include:
- personnel reductions of about some 5,000-6,000, including possible reductions in Okinawa;
- the return to the GOJ of excess facilities, particularly those in Okinawa, through already established procedures.

Phase II-3 to 5 Years:
Contingent upon our allies assuming more responsibilities, and the preservation of regional stability, we will pursue additional efficiencies and reductions.

The Japan Self-Defense Force will be encouraged to improve the quality, but not necessarily quantity, of its force structure through the procurement of advanced weapons systems, improved sustainability, and improved command and control and logistics infrastructure.

Phase III-5 to 10 Years:
Depending upon the state of East-West relations, we could begin to make further reductions in our force presence. U.S. deterrent capabilities in Japan - a homeported aircraft carrier, strategic lift aircraft, and
postured Air Force strike assets - will remain to fulfill our regional and global missions and to honor our treaty commitments.

U.S.-Japan Consultations:
Since U.S. forces in Japan have a regional mission in addition to aiding the defense of Japan, it is extremely difficult to identify the direct costs associated with only the defense of Japan. Japan's contribution has continued to increase over the years (Fig. 7). Because Tokyo now pays approximately 35 to 40 percent of the total costs associated with the U.S. presence in Japan, the case could be made that Tokyo is already paying the direct cost of deploying U.S. forces for its defense. However, because Japan accrues significant benefits from U.S. security efforts regionally and, to a great extent, globally, it is appropriate for the U.S. to seek additional cost sharing.

During Secretary Cheney's February 1990 trip, the GOJ acknowledged its need to do more toward assuming increased host nation support. It is difficult, however, to predict the means and timetable.

During Secretary Cheney's trip, Tokyo expressed appreciation for our close consultations to date. Japan views its security as being guaranteed by U.S. naval forces and Korean security as guaranteed by U.S. ground forces. Marked changes to these forces will impact on Japanese psychology.

A near-term reduction of some 5,000-6,000 personnel in U.S. Forces, Japan is acceptable to Tokyo if the bulk of the cuts are ground or other support units.

Efforts to consolidate facilities and areas on Okinawa are proceeding through the bilateral Facilities Adjustment Panel (FAP) process. The FAP has identified all areas of concern and the U.S. and Japan are acting to resolve them as quickly as possible. Although U.S. forces in Okinawa have the strong support of the national government in Tokyo, local political pressures are taken into consideration by the FAP.
Appendix 7

East Asia Strategic Initiative, 1992

A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim Report to the Congress 1992

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Introduction

Since the initial East Asia strategy report was submitted to the Congress in April 1990, we have witnessed a fundamental transformation of the international system. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the demise of its external empire, was the result of global trends reshaping the world: the bankruptcy of communism as an economic and political system; a movement towards democratization and market-oriented economics; and global economic integration sparked by rapid technological change.

Even before the invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration recognized the need to adapt United States national security strategy to the rapidly changing international environment. The result of the Administration's internal review was the President's historic announcement of a new national security strategy on August 2, 1990. The new strategy, one oriented toward critical regions of the world, marked the end of our Cold War global containment strategy.

The new strategy recognizes that the world has changed in fundamental ways and continues to do so, in sometimes unpredictable ways, and often at blinding speed. Accordingly, the strategy was shaped to provide the flexibility necessary to manage the unexpected. Its flexibility derives from its focus on regional, not global, conflict; selective engagement in critical regions of the world; and international cooperation with our friends and allies. Integral to the strategy is the maintenance of strong alliance relationships and the close cooperation of our allies.

In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the end of the Second World War. This system of alliances and friendships constitutes a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented "zone of peace" that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. In the long run, preserving and expanding these alliances and friendships be as important as the successful containment of the former Soviet Union or the Coalition defeat of Iraq.

The regional defense strategy is a forward looking strategy, one that does more than simply react to events as they take place. By anticipating likely challenges and taking steps to address them, it seeks to shape the security environment in ways favorable to the United States and to our allies and friends.

The United States and Asia

Amidst the transformation taking place in international relations, it is useful to bear in mind that US interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition.
By virtue of geography and history, the US is a Pacific power with enduring economic, political and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. For the United States, a maritime power, the Pacific Ocean is a major commercial and strategic artery; oceans are America’s lifeline. Our interests and stake in this dynamic region are large and growing; our future lies across the Pacific no less than the Atlantic.

Our economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific region since World War II has been a major factor in the region’s emergence as one of the engines of global growth. Our two-way trade across the Pacific last year exceeded $310 billion -- nearly one-third larger than our trade with Europe. The US exports more to Indonesia than to Eastern Europe; more to Singapore than to Spain or Italy. US exports to East Asia and the Pacific were $130 billion -- that translates into roughly 2.6 million American jobs dependent on our trade with the region. Moreover, US firms have more than $62 billion invested in Asia.

Our forward-deployed presence has underpinned stability in East Asia and helped secure its economic dynamism. This presence has made the US the key regional balancer, contributed to regional stability, enhanced US diplomatic influence, and contributed to an environment conducive to the growth of US economic interests.

During the Cold War, Asia, like Europe, faced an ideological and military threat from the Soviet Union. At the same time, on the regional level, there existed a multiplicity of security concerns that continue to this day. They differ from country to country and within the subregions of this vast area. During the Cold War, our security presence in the region addressed the global containment aspect of our strategy as well as these historically diverse security concerns. Our concern with the intentions and capability of the Soviet Union may have masked our regional role at home, but that role has always been recognized by our friends, allies and potential adversaries in Asia.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States’ regional roles, which had been secondary in our strategic calculus, have now assumed primary importance in our security engagement in the Pacific theater. In addition, our presence in the Asia-Pacific region has always been essential to our ability to meet contingencies in the adjacent Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region.

The key to our forward military presence has been and remains a network of largely bilateral security alliances -- with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines -- and cooperation with other friendly nations. The current economic and political success of most of our allies and friends in the region makes it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for meeting mutual security challenges. We are in the process of building more mature and more reciprocal economic, political, and defense partnerships with our allies and friends to meet the demands of a new era and shape the emerging security environment.

The lesson of the Gulf war is that, despite the end of the Cold War, there remain real challenges to our national security interests. Threats to our vital interests could arise with little notice or predictability in the Asia-Pacific region as well. The social, economic and political transition now under way in Asia is positive but uncertain. Unlike Europe, communist regimes remain in power in East Asia -- China, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam although leadership and generational changes are underway in these states. The outcome of these transitions could have a major impact on security and stability of the region. In addition, threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emerging nationalism amidst longstanding ethnic and national rivalries, and unresolved territorial disputes combine to create a political landscape of potential instability and conflict.

Clearly, the stability of the fastest growing economic region in the world is a matter of national interest affecting the well-being of all Americans. Our economic prospects, the promotion of democratic values and human rights, and our traditional security interests all require sustained engagement by the United States in this important region. Maintaining a credible security presence is an important element in our effort to build a sense of Asia-Pacific community vital to the post-Cold War international system now taking shape.

Our engagement in regional security must take into account changes in the international environment, domestic political realities, and the ability of our allies and friends to share responsibility in shaping a new era. Our objective is to adjust our presence to reflect all these elements. This report discusses ways and means we and our allies and friends are moving toward these goals in the framework outlined in previous Congressionally mandated reports.

This report reflects the reporting requirements mandated in the FY1992-93 Defense Authorization Act which reflects the consensus between the Congress and the Administration on the fundamental precepts of our approach to Asian-Pacific strategy. The Congress found that:
The alliances between the United States and its allies in East Asia greatly contribute to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. It is in the national interest of the United States to maintain a forward-deployed military presence in East Asia.
The pace of economic, political, and social advances in many of the East Asian countries continues to accelerate.
The ability of our Asian friends and allies to contribute to their own defense has increased significantly. Although the level of defense burdensharing by Japan and South Korea has increased steadily, Congress believes it is desirable that they continue to assume greater defense responsibilities.
Finally, and most importantly, the United States remains committed to the security of its friends and allies around the Asia-Pacific rim.
These findings clearly reflect agreement between the Administration and the Congress on the fundamental approach to our
national security interests, and the means to those ends around the Asia-Pacific Rim. Our review of the security environment, current trends and potential sources of instability suggests our policy of a phased approach in determining US military posture in East Asia and the Pacific is appropriate for the foreseeable future.

Security Environment
At the end of World War II, the United States was the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. Our national security objectives centered on defending American territory as far forward as possible, global containment of the Soviet Union, and protecting friends and allies.

Our military strategy, dictated largely by the distances involved in transiting the Pacific Ocean, has been to forward deploy forces to permanent base infra-structures, primarily in Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia. We have complemented our presence through the development of a range of bilateral security arrangements. This approach worked well because of the diverse threat perceptions, disparate cultures, histories, political systems, and levels of economic development among our friends in the region.

Our strategy to contain the Soviet Union and to prevent the rise of a regional superpower has been successful. We have deterred another outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, and in broad terms, our presence has contributed to regional peace, stability and prosperity. American economic involvement, political leadership, and our military presence in the region have enhanced our influence in the most economically dynamic area of the world. These factors have also contributed to the relative stability that has underwritten East Asia’s dramatic economic success and made possible the spread of democracy.

Key Aspects of Asian Security
The US-Japan relationship remains key to our Asian security strategy. In the past, Japan’s strategic location served as a barrier to Soviet aggression; today, US forces and Japanese Self Defense Forces maintain their vigilance as political changes follow their course in Russia and in Northeast Asia. US forces in Japan provide for stability throughout the region, and remain an essential element of the deterrent against North Korean adventurism. The continuing US presence in Japan and the strength of the US-Japan security relationship are reassuring to many nations in the region as well as to Japan.

One of the encouraging changes in the strategic landscape is the progress being made to end the war in Cambodia. Two years ago, prospects for achieving an end to the fighting in Cambodia while at the same time preventing a return to power of the Khmer Rouge seemed remote. With the leadership of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the support of the international community, particularly Australia, Indonesia and Japan, an agreement is now in place that will hopefully lead to permanent peace and a government chosen through UN sponsored elections. Much could still go wrong, but the promise of peace has already had a beneficial impact on the security environment.

A remarkable development over the past two years is the important role that nature has played in altering our presence in the region. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo diminished, for us, the value of Clark Air Base in the Philippines. As a result of continuing volcanic action and uncertainty regarding future eruptions, the US decided to relinquish Clark -- a valuable regional logistics hub which included the instrumented air training range known as Crow Valley -- before a final base agreement was concluded with the Government of the Philippines.

Unfortunately, the Philippine Senate chose to reject the base agreement, laboriously reached over eighteen months of negotiations, and set in motion a total US withdrawal from the Subic Bay complex of facilities -- the last base used by the US in the Philippines. This withdrawal will be completed by the end of 1992, ending nearly 100 years of US presence there. However, our Mutual Defense Treaty remains in force and joint exercises will continue. We remain friends, and depart Subic without rancor.

Developments in the Philippines accelerated the process, foreshadowed in the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative report, of shifting the US military posture in Southeast Asia from a large, permanent presence at a single complex of bases in the Philippines to a more widely distributed, less fixed, posture. This posture consists of regional access, mutual training arrangements, periodic ship visits, intelligence exchanges, and professional military educational programs rather than permanently stationed forces.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula has undergone significant changes since the April 1990 report; in some ways the situation has improved, while in others it remains uncertain and problematic. Few would have predicted two years ago that South Korea and the Soviet Union would normalize relations, that Beijing would open an official commercial office in Seoul, that both South and North Korea would be in the United Nations, and that North and South Korea would have signed both a non-aggression pact and an agreement to forswear the possession and development of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, North Korea has not yet implemented these agreements, has still not allowed effective bilateral monitoring and inspection of its nuclear program, and has continued to build up its massive, oversized conventional forces. Until North Korea takes further steps to alleviate tensions and relieve concerns about its nuclear program, the military situation in Korea will remain threatening.

Despite North Korea’s desperate economic situation, we have seen no sign of a slowdown in its accumulation and forward deployment of a massive conventional weapons capability, particularly ballistic missiles. North Korea has already produced some 450-500 SCUD missiles, and is developing a longer range (1000 KM/600 MI) version that could hit targets anywhere.
on the Korean peninsula and much of Japan. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, a scenario that has been the basis of much of our planning -- a global war, starting in Europe but quickly spreading to Asia and the Pacific -- has become less relevant. But the residual power projection capability of Russian naval and air forces -- stationed close to our Northeast Asian allies -- in Siberia and Russian Northeast Asia remains a major concern. In addition, Russia retains a formidable nuclear arsenal which must still be factored into our strategic calculus. Recent agreements between President Bush and President Eltsin have stabilized nuclear arsenals for the remainder of this century.

China continues to play an important role in the regional balance of power. It is important that this role be a positive one consistent with peace and stability. Its growing industrial and technical capabilities, its large military establishment (with a military budget which has recently increased), and its immense population make it a major factor in any regional security equation. It now has generally friendly and stable relations with its Asian neighbors. A stable US-China relationship is an important element in the regional equilibrium.

Taiwan continues to be a political and economic success story. Our sixth largest trading partner in the world, with hard currency reserves over $80 billion, Taiwan is an essential factor in the economic health of Asia and has played a constructive role in the region. US unofficial relations with Taiwan have been strong and mutually beneficial.

The steadfast friendship of our close ally Australia continues to provide a source of strength for regional security tasks, economic development and political stability. Australia's area of primary strategic interest covers Indochina, Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Its willingness to host critical communications and intelligence facilities and to facilitate frequent ship visits and exercises makes it an invaluable strategic partner.

Summary
Clearly, the stability of, and our access to, the fastest growing economic region in the world is a matter of national interest affecting the well-being of all Americans. Our economic prospects, the promotion of democratic values and human rights, and our traditional security interests all argue for the need for sustained security engagement by the United States in this important region. Sustaining a credible security presence for the long term is an important element in our effort to build the post-Cold War international system now taking shape. Naturally, our security engagement must, and will, take into account changes in the regional and international environment, our own political and economic situation, and the ability of our allies and friends to share responsibility in shaping a new era.

US Security Interests In East Asia and the Pacific

US Security Interests

Against a background of historic change in the global security environment, United States security interests in Asia endure:

- protecting the United States and its allies from attack;
- maintaining regional peace and stability;
- preserving our political and economic stability;
- contributing to nuclear deterrence;
- fostering the growth of democracy and human rights;
- stopping proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems;
- ensuring freedom of navigation; and
- reducing illicit drug trafficking.

Our military forces in East Asia and the Pacific must be capable of achieving the following fundamental security missions:

- defending Alaska, Hawaii, and the connecting lines of communication (LOCs) to the continental United States;
- protecting US territories and Freely Associated States for which the US has defense responsibilities;
- assisting our allies in defense; and
- maintaining the security of the LOCs throughout the Pacific as well as the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and the East and South China Seas.

SIX PRINCIPLES OF OUR SECURITY POLICY IN ASIA

In Tokyo on November 22, 1991, Secretary Cheney affirmed to our regional allies that US security policy in Asia continues to be guided by six basic principles:

- Assurance of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific.
- A strong system of bilateral security arrangements.
- Maintenance of modest but capable forward-deployed US forces.
- Sufficient overseas base structure to support those forces.
- Our Asian allies should assume greater responsibility for their own defense.
- Complementary defense cooperation.

These principles shape the United States' future East Asian security role. They are not focused on the narrow range of existing threats, but allow a more diverse range of possibilities that cannot be foreseen.
Sources of East Asian and Pacific Regional Instability

Korea

North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapons capability continues to be the most urgent threat to security in Northeast Asia. While South Korea and North Korea have signed a reconciliation pact and a joint declaration for a non-nuclear peninsula, uncertainty over North Korea's compliance will remain until credible inspections are taking place. North Korea's nuclear weapons developments, when seen in light of its conventional military buildup and its ballistic missile program, illustrate that the Korean Peninsula remains a source of potential conflict requiring US and South Korean vigilance and deterrent capability. The North Korean conventional threat -- a million man army, two-thirds of which is deployed within 100 KM of the Demilitarized Zone persists. Our knowledge of the factors influencing political and military decision making in Pyongyang is limited. Given the uncertainties surrounding the pending political transition in Pyongyang, South Korea and the US must be prepared for North Korean "worst case" contingencies that range from implosion and collapse to desperate aggression. The outcome will affect not only the future of the Korean Peninsula but stability throughout Northeast Asia.

Communist States in Asia

Of the five remaining Communist regimes in the world, four are in East Asia -- the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, North Korea and Laos. As democratic ideas and free market principles continue to expand, these systems are facing the reality of Communism's economic and political failure. Many see political pluralism as a threat to the perpetuation of their regimes and react uncertainly, with some countries trying to permit the obvious benefits of free market economics to improve their economies while trying to keep the accompanying political and ideological influences at a distance. These regimes will change, but it is difficult to predict whether the process will proceed peacefully or violently. Options could range from following the "European model" of Communist change, to evolving into authoritarian governments that would maintain tight political control while permitting free market economic activity and increasing social pluralism. Southern coastal China, for example, appears well on the way toward the latter socioeconomic transformation.

People's Republic of China (PRC)

Chinese politics will almost certainly be volatile as Deng Xiaoping and the current octogenarian leaders pass from the scene. The leadership's ability to effect a successful transition is of great consequence for the PRC's internal stability and the stability of its immediate neighbors, for continued economic progress, and for the future direction of its foreign policy towards the region and beyond. Beijing's modernization strategy is premised on a peaceful international environment and continuing strong commercial ties with key trading partners. Chinese policies toward Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam will remain barometers of its orientation.

Beijing's policies with respect to nuclear and missile proliferation remain matters of serious concern to the United States and much of the international community. Not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but in also Southwest Asia and the Middle East, Chinese observance of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) guidelines will be important to US security interests.

Taiwan

The situation in the Taiwan Strait remains peaceful, and the relationship between Beijing and Taipei is improving with increasing trade, contact and tourism. It is in our interests to encourage these trends. US policy remains as defined in the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques. In keeping with this policy, we will sustain our efforts to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Cambodia

Events in Cambodia suggest that the implementation of the comprehensive political settlement agreement signed in Paris on October 23, 1991, which includes a ceasefire, repatriation of refugees, and internationally supervised elections, will be the most complex and expensive operation ever undertaken by the United Nations. The United States supports the Paris Agreement as the best -- possibly the only -- means of producing a stable peace and ensuring the right to self-determination through free and fair elections. It is also the best means to prevent a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. Without peace and a stable government in war-torn Cambodia, the tensions that have been at the core of military alliances, weapons procurement, and regional political conflict for over a decade could persist.

Philippines

Despite the establishment of lasting democratic institutions, prospects for instability in the Philippines have not diminished. The 24 year old Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army insurgency has stalled in recent years, plagued by internal splits and government penetration. Nevertheless, it remains a viable political and military force in many parts of the countryside, where its exploitation of local grievances and social injustices make it capable of growth should conditions worsen. Its terror tactics continue to pose serious security threats to Philippine and US officials.

Spratly Islands

There are many claimants to all or part of the Spratly Islands -- a group of atolls and reefs lying between Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. China and Taiwan both claim the entire area, Vietnam and the Philippines claim large portions, and Malaysia and Brunei claim parts of the southern fringe of the group. All except Brunei occupy areas within their claims, and none of the claimants has indicated any willingness to abandon its claim or to relinquish territory in a general settlement.
In 1988, there were small naval clashes between China and Vietnam, and these nations continue to be the most likely to engage in armed conflict over the Islands. Both countries have been actively fortifying forces in and around the area of the Spratlys. In February 1992, China reaffirmed its claim to the Spratlys and, unfortunately, its readiness to use force to back up its claim, although Beijing has also said it is prepared to support a peaceful resolution. Some Southeast Asian leaders have suggested that the territorial claims could be set aside, and joint exploration of the islands' natural resources undertaken -- with a division of profits among the parties involved. However, until such a plan is actually developed and agreed upon, the Spratlys will continue to be a potential source for regional instability.

Burma
The Burmese Government, under the State Law and Order Restoration Council, continues to suppress domestic opposition and has steadfastly refused to implement the results of the 1990 elections. It continues to arrest large numbers of people for political activity. It has also been aggressively purchasing military hardware -- tanks, jets, artillery and naval craft -- from a variety of sources, mostly China. Burma is now the world's largest producer of opium and heroin, and the government has undertaken few law enforcement measures against traffickers. It appears that the military regime has reached accommodation with the insurgent ethnic groups to ignore narcotics activities in exchange for peace.

These policies have led to rising numbers of refugees, tensions with Bangladesh, and conflicts that have spilled across the border with Thailand and caused concern in Bangkok. All of these heighten the prospects for regional instability and serious border problems with immediate neighbors.

Proliferation
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in East Asia will continue to be a concern in the 1990s, principally because North Korea, as of this writing, is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. North Korea has also been developing an extended range version of the Scud missile, called the Scud-C, and supplying these missiles and their technology to states in the Middle East. Although China and North Korea are the nations we will monitor most closely, we must also be alert to the development of technologies in other countries that can lay the groundwork for introduction of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Summary
Given the increasing economic interdependence of Asian and American economies, instability in the region can directly affect our interests and well being. We must be prepared to deal with the changing circumstances in the region within the framework of US interests. This is most effectively done through a security concept founded on basic principles that can be adapted to evolving circumstances.

Military Posture in East Asia

Overview
The United States' military forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is an essential element of our global military posture. Forward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible crisis response capability; contribute to regional stability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemony; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region; enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of US forces required to meet national security objectives; overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific Ocean; and demonstrate to our friends, allies and potential enemies alike a tangible, visible US interest in the security of the entire region.

Phased Approach to Adjusting Force Structure
The phased approach to orderly, rational troop strength adjustments, outlined in the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative Report, remains valid today. That approach requires an assessment of the future strategic situation at the end of each Phase. Following this assessment, a judgment is made on what forward deployed force structure meets our security objectives, our allies' security needs, and supports our basic security principles. Rather than trying to create a plan that attempts to anticipate every likelihood and projects troop strength figures well into the next century, we have adopted a more flexible and responsive approach, as illustrated by the decision to postpone Phase II troop adjustments in Korea until we can assess North Korea's nuclear threat. This section reviews the progress that has been made since the adoption of the three-phased approach and assesses future steps that can be taken to maintain an appropriate force structure forward deployed in East Asia.

Streamlining Our Forces in Phase I (1990-1992)
In November 1990, the Secretary of Defense approved a plan by the unified commander, USCINCPAC, to reduce American presence in the region before December 31, 1992 (the end of Phase I of the April 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative report). After detailed review of the security environment and projected requirements, the Department of Defense determined it could reduce US forces in Japan, Korea and the Philippines by 15,250. This total fell well within Presidential guidelines calling for reductions of 10 to 12 percent from the total 135,000 personnel stationed in East Asia (including naval forces afloat) at the beginning of 1990.

Specific force reductions during Phase I included more than 5,000 Army personnel, 5,400 Air Force personnel, almost 1,200 Navy personnel, almost 3,500 Marines, and 200 joint organization personnel.

The force reductions included both operational and support units. Selective reductions in the size of some units were made in
addition to the withdrawal of entire units. Typical of the reductions were: a restructuring and downsizing of selected Marine units on Okinawa; removal of an Air Force communications unit and the SR-71 squadron from Japan; and the removal of an engineering group, military intelligence and signals brigade personnel and headquarters personnel from Korea.

Dealing with the US Military Departure from the Philippines

In June 1991, the United States Air Force began its departure from Clark Air Base, which had suffered extensive damage from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Volcanic damage and uncertainty regarding future eruptions resulted in the decision to relinquish Clark Air Base even before a final base agreement was negotiated with the Government of the Philippines; the base was formally turned over to the Philippine Government in late November 1991. Clark was a valuable regional logistics hub. Its associated instrumented air training range, known as Crow Valley, provided a unique air training capability for US forces and Asian air forces which conducted bilateral and multi-lateral training exercises there. The Air Force is moving much of the training it previously conducted at the Crow Valley range to Alaska.

The Philippine Senate rejected the newly negotiated base agreement and set in motion a total US withdrawal. In late December 1991, after several months of discussions on the possibility of an extended withdrawal agreement, the Philippine Government notified the United States that in accordance with the treaty, US forces must be withdrawn from Subic Naval Base and Cubi Point Naval Air Station by the end of 1992. The high value of the Subic/Cubi Point facility was its geographic location and the availability of all major training and logistics functions at a single site. We will not be able to replicate the structure which existed in the Philippines, nor must we. Subic’s logistical functions can be accomplished at other locations, and the Pacific Fleet’s carrier-based aircraft will train elsewhere in the region as opportunities arise.

The loss of Subic will not result in a decline in our military capability; the only impact on our Asia-Pacific military “footprint” will be in terms of training and logistics. Our departure from Subic will not result in a reduction in at-sea operations by the Seventh Fleet or shrinkage in the number of ships operating in the Western Pacific. The size of the Pacific Fleet is determined by maritime interests in the Pacific, not by our access to Subic Bay. It is doubtful whether nations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific will witness any reduction in our naval profile in the region. Without Subic, the Navy will likely be calling at more ports and in more countries than in the past. Ship repair facilities, both military and commercial, and supply facilities throughout the Pacific will be used on a greater scale.

There will, however, be a reduction in the number of naval personnel assigned in the region. Roughly 4,100 of the some 5,900 military billets at Subic will be disestablished. Many of these are positions that supported the base infrastructure (for example, personnel who worked in the Naval Supply Depot or Naval Magazine) and are no longer necessary. Some of these personnel drawdowns would have occurred as a part of the Phase II reductions even if the Philippine Senate had approved the long-term agreement we had negotiated with the Philippine Government.

Of the remainder, some 1,200 military personnel from Subic will transfer to Guam. That move will include VRC-50 (the airborne logistics support squadron for the Seventh Fleet), Naval Special Warfare Unit One (SEALs), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Five, and personnel from a number of other units such as the Ship Repair Facility and the Naval Hospital. We have an agreement with the Singapore Government to relocate a small logistics staff of roughly 100 people -- Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific -- to Singapore. This unit provides logistics support to Seventh Fleet ships. A small number of naval personnel will go to a variety of locations in Japan.

**Summary of Philippine Withdrawal, Relocation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Troop Strength in the Philippines after Planned Reductions</th>
<th>11,310</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>5,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Navy</td>
<td>4,328</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army and Marine, and other Positions</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disposition of Military Positions after Withdrawal from the Philippines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions Reassigned in East Asia/Pacific</th>
<th>3,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positions Reassigned Elsewhere</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions Disestablished</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1990 EASI Report included Army troops and Marines from Okinawa temporarily assigned to the Philippines for exercises and enhanced security, respectively. Relocations within the region include the US territory of Guam.
Recognizing the Value of Access

Our impending departure from the Philippines has raised domestic debate over why the US needs or wishes to retain a forward-deployed posture. At the same time, it has fueled an opposing set of questions from foreign friends, questions marked by uncertainty and anxiety about whether the US is disengaging from the region and what this would mean for the stability and prosperity enjoyed throughout the region since the Second World War.

Indicative of the regional interest in keeping the US engaged has been the willingness of the Government of Singapore to permit expanded US military access. Vice President Quayle and then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew signed a memorandum of understanding in Tokyo on November 13, 1990, permitting US use of facilities in Singapore. US Navy ships have been docking in Singapore for more than 25 years for maintenance, repairs, supplies, and crew rest and recreation. Under the terms of this agreement, there has been a modest increase in US use of Singapore’s ship maintenance and repair facilities. Singapore’s Paya Lebar airfield is also used for short-term rotations by USAF aircraft. It should be emphasized that the US is not constructing a base in Singapore; rather, US forces make use of existing Singaporean facilities at Paya Lebar and Sembawang Port. This is one form of access which represents a new approach to maintaining US presence in the region. This new approach will consist of a network of bilateral arrangements that facilitate training, exercises and interoperability which, in lieu of permanent bases, will permit the US to remain engaged and forward deployed in Southeast Asia.

The presence of US forces in Southeast Asia helps foster stability and regional security, and contributes to the region’s growing prosperity. We have friendly and growing defense relationships with several Southeast Asian states, and we have always considered our defense ties to these countries important; this will not change with our departure from the Philippines. Training, exercises, information exchanges, dialogues on issues of mutual concern, and military access are important elements of any close defense relationship. The scope and pace of expanding security ties will be determined by the needs and concerns of our friends. For our part, we recognize that military contacts and defense cooperation with other countries in Southeast Asia my well become one of the most meaningful signs of our continued interest in the region.

We have no intention of either disengaging militarily or attempting to replicate the large permanent presence we had in the Philippines. New bases would not only be prohibitively expensive and excessive for our post-Cold War requirements, but also would not be welcomed by many in the region. Instead, we are capitalizing on circumstances to change the nature of our military presence in Southeast Asia to one that more accurately reflects the post-Cold War strategic situation.

Summary of Phase I, 1990-1992

During the period 1990-1992, the Department of Defense restructured and reduced its forces in the region without jeopardizing its ability to meet its security commitments. Adjustments in our combat forces of about 12% were proposed and that target was met. Planned reductions of 15,250 will be completed by the end of 1992.

In addition to the planned reductions in Phase I which were reported to Congress on February 28, 1991, the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the Philippine Senate's failure to ratify an arrangement for continued use of the Subic Naval Base will result in an additional withdrawal of some 8,300 personnel from East Asia and the Pacific by the end of 1992.

Projection of Permanently Forward Deployed Personnel in Japan and Korea End of Phase I(December 31, 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,227*</td>
<td>37,413*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>Army 27,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy (shore-based)</td>
<td>6,498</td>
<td>Navy (shore-based) 400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>21,511</td>
<td>Marines 500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>15,440</td>
<td>Air Force 9,513</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Does not include relocations from the Philippines currently in progress.

Pacific Forces

Economy of Force Theater
Major Pacific Power and Key Stabilizing Influence
Protects US Interests in Pacific Region to Include Southwest Asia and Indian Ocean

Forward Presence

Korea
- 1 Div (-), 1 FWE

Japan
- 1 (+) FWE
- 1 CVBG; 1 ARG

Marine Expeditionary Force

Crisis Response

Hawaii / Alaska
- 1 Div (+), 1AC / 1 (-) RC FWE

CONUS
- 5 CVBG

Force Adjustments in Phase II (1993-1995)

Pacific forces will be structured for an essentially maritime theater, placing a premium on naval capabilities, backed by essential air and ground forces for enduring deterrence and immediate crisis response. Additional ground forces withdrawals from Korea were planned in Phase I, but suspended in light of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. Half of our nation's carrier and amphibious forces are oriented toward the East Asia and Pacific region. This includes one forward deployed carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group and a Marine Expeditionary Force positioned in Japan. Air Force posture will be 2 to 3 fighter wing equivalents in Korea and Japan. Crisis response forces focused on the Pacific region include those stationed in Hawaii, Alaska and the continental US. These include more than one division, one fighter wing, five carrier battle groups, and amphibious forces. The peacetime operations of Pacific region forces, particularly those that are forward deployed, reinforce the network of US bilateral relations and provide the common glue that holds together this framework of diverse relationships.

Active bilateral and multilateral exercise programs between the US services and the armed forces of friendly and allied nations will provide tangible evidence of our commitment to the region while increasing the operational readiness and capabilities of our Pacific forces. Major joint exercises with our allies in Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand take place annually, as do a large number of smaller military-to-military exercises. For example, small training exchanges and exercises by US Army units stationed in Hawaii, Alaska and Okinawa with many of the region's ground forces have mutually benefitted all participants and clearly demonstrated the value of conducting forward presence operations.

Reaffirming Our Presence in Japan

Japan continues to be America's key Pacific ally and the cornerstone of US forward deployed defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese archipelago affords US forward deployed forces geographically crucial naval, air and ground bases on the periphery of the Asian land mass. Under the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan provides a stable, secure, and low-cost environment for our military operations and training. Japan also supplies by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies, over 3.3 billion dollars in Japan's Fiscal Year ending March 1991. The high level of Japanese support makes Japan the least expensive place in the world, including the US, to station our forces. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union and the ensuing decreased military threat to the region, our presence in Japan remains a vital aspect of our forward deployed posture. US Military forces based in Japan contribute to the security of Japan and are well located for rapid deployment to virtually any trouble spot in the region. US forces operating from bases in Japan are committed not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the preservation of peace and security in the entire Far East region, and are prepared to deal with a wide range of local and regional contingencies. Given the great distances associated with the Pacific theater, forces maintained in Japan fill the requirement for forces capable of dealing with regional contingencies. As a result of the division of roles and missions between the U.S. and Japan, Japan has concentrated on defense of the home islands and sea lane defense out to 1000 nautical miles while the U.S. has assumed a more regional perspective. The continuing Japanese defense buildup has made Japan more secure, and significantly enhanced bilateral security in the post-Cold War environment. However, some defensive shortfalls do exist in the areas of sea lane defense -- including airborne early warning and ship borne anti-air capability -- and air defense -- particularly anti-missile capability.

In Japan, Phase II adjustments will involve minor overall change, continuing the Phase I restructuring of the USAF presence in Okinawa where a composite Air Force wing has been organized and 200 billets eliminated. This new concept placed under one command (18th Wing) the AWACS, tankers and F-15s located in Kadena. In Phase II, additional organizational changes will result in the reduction of approximately 200 US Air Force billets in Okinawa. The number of F-15s per squadron will be reduced from 24 to 18 aircraft, resulting in an additional reduction of approximately 500 positions. The 432 Fighter Wing (F-16s) at Misawa will not change.

Maintaining Deterrence in Korea

The United States and South Korea could defeat an invasion of the South by North Korea. But in the process of doing so,
large areas of South Korea might be devastated, particularly Seoul, which is only some 26 miles from the Demilitarized Zone. Seoul is the economic, political and cultural center of Korea and would likely be one of North Korea's initial objectives, just as it was in 1950. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the issue in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is not just being able to win a war, but more importantly, to deter aggression from North Korea.

While planning to retain a ground and air presence on the peninsula, US forces will continue to shift from a leading to a supporting role within the coalition. The transition of the ROK to the leading role in its own defense is an essential element of our long-term strategy. It reflects both the maturity and growing capabilities of the ROK armed forces and the desires of the ROK. Over the longterm, US forward peacetime presence will be reduced somewhat, while sustaining the ability to reinforce the ROK in wartime. Additionally, the US will continue to assist the ROK military in force improvement, while at the same time adjusting coalition structures and capabilities to match "leading to supporting" objectives. One example is through training and frequent combined exercises, such as TEAM SPIRIT, ULCHI-FOCUS LENS, and FOAL EAGLE. Another is to help the ROK purchase or produce military systems that improve its military capabilities in critical warfighting functions.

The strategy for implementing the "leading to supporting" initiatives recognizes that full self sufficiency will be unaffordable and unattainable over the short- or mid-term. Certain capabilities such as strategic and operational intelligence, strategic and prompt tactical air power, naval support, and selected ground combat capabilities, will continue to be provided. The US will also continue to support South-North tension reduction efforts. We envision a US presence in the ROK as long as the Korean people and government want us to stay and threats to peace and stability remain. As progress in tension reduction continues, further adjustments will be made.

The ROK's transition to a leading role in its own defense is proceeding as planned. In 1991, a ROK Army major general replaced a US flag officer as Senior Member of the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). Although since that time, North Korea has refused to meet with the MAC at the flag officer level, some meetings continue to occur below the flag officer level. We also began withdrawal of US personnel from positions directly on the DMZ. In 1992, we will deactivate the Combined (ROK/US) Field Army, and a ROK Army four-star general has been assigned, for the first time, as the Combined Ground Component Commander.

FROM A LEADING TO SUPPORTING ROLE IN KOREA 1991:  
Assigned ROK Army Major General as senior member of UNCMAC  
Began withdrawal of US troops from DMZ  
1992:  
Deactivate Combined Field Army  
Assigned ROK Army four-star general as Combined Ground Component Commander  
Complete the withdrawal of US 2nd Infantry Division from DMZ  
Phase II in Korea

In November 1991, Secretary Cheney decided to postpone planned Phase II troop reductions in Korea until the dangers and uncertainties surrounding the North Korean nuclear weapons program have been thoroughly addressed. In the future, should reductions be appropriate, e would still leave in place both a combat and support structure with an emphasis on sustainability and logistics infrastructure -- key elements of deterrence because they represent the means to rapidly reinforce our forces. Specifically, by the end of Phase II in December 1995, our combat posture in Korea would include, at a minimum, the 2nd Infantry Division, with a strength of one mechanized and one combat aviation brigade, and the US 7th Air Force, with an equivalent strength of one Tactical Fighter Wing.

Combined Forces Command (CFC) Disestablishment

Should the North Korean threat sufficiently diminish, the CFC may be disestablished. An assessment of the threat will be completed no later than December 1994. Based on that assessment, a decision will be made whether the CFC headquarters can be disestablished -- the final step in the transition to a ROK leading role -- or whether it should remain beyond the end of Phase II (December 1995).

Summary of Phase II-1993 through 1995

Reductions in combat forces, particularly in Korea, have been and will continue to be undertaken cautiously and after close consultation with the ROK Government. Any changes will be made in ways which ensure that potential adversaries do not misread our deterrent capability and intentions. Secretary Cheney deferred planned reductions from South Korea because of the uncertainty posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Small reductions of US Air Force personnel in Japan are due to a reorganized US Air Force posture in Okinawa.

Progress continues toward shifting from a leading to a supporting role in South Korea.

Phase III and Beyond (beginning 1996)

In Japan, we envision little basic change in our force posture after implementation of Phase II (end of 1995). The US military will be at Base Force strength level at that time. Forward deployed naval and air forces will be primarily regionally oriented in their mission and ready to assist Japan, as required, against any unforeseen aggression. Japan will continue to develop its capability to provide for its own territorial defense, as well as continue to develop its air defense capabilities and the capability to conduct sea lane defense out to 1000 nautical miles. In Korea, force posture will be dictated by the North
Korean threat, deterrence considerations and the potential regional role of our forces. In Southeast Asia, we hope to have access agreements for US forces with several countries throughout the region. Through wider regional access in Southeast Asia, we intend to promote our continued, stabilizing presence in the region into the next century.

Following Phase III, our broad concept is to enter the 21st century with a presence in the Asian-Pacific region that comports with the overall military structure of the United States, known today as the Base Force. As long as we are welcome in East Asia, we plan to maintain a modest but appropriate presence in Japan and Korea. In Southeast Asia, our military engagement will continue to be through a network of various arrangements, (the Singapore access arrangement being one possible type) and exercises that allow us to contribute to regional stability without a permanent base structure.

Enhanced Interoperability with Our Allies

One aspect of the principle of complementary defense cooperation deserves special attention -- the importance of management of the regional arms trade and military technology development. US policy on arms sales is clear; we will avoid introduction of new types of equipment that 1) substantially increase power projection capabilities, 2) burden economies and/or political systems, or 3) create or escalate arms races or create destabilizing military imbalances. We consider nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missile transfers inherently destabilizing.

Within these policy guidelines, the US will remain engaged in armaments cooperation in the region to promote interoperability and improved capabilities for the US and our Asian friends, strengthening deterrence and enhancing stability. With identical equipment, US alliance partners almost invariably share training, maintenance, logistics, and doctrine. The resulting human and material connections at every level are the force multiplying sinews of effective defense cooperation.

The flow of arms and military technology between the US and our friends and allies in the Pacific Rim region involves primarily Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea have obtained US defense manufacturing technology through these programs, and a number of other countries in the region (particularly Singapore and Malaysia) have developed repair and maintenance technology.

The flow of arms and technology normally takes place through commercial sales of defense articles, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements, and coproduction or licensed production of US defense equipment. In total, foreign allies' purchases of US defense articles have increased slightly every year, and commercial arms deliveries parallel FMS agreements. Both Burma and China are exceptions, since commercial sales and FMS to these countries have been suspended because of human rights abuses.

US allies in the region are striving to diversify their sources of defense equipment. Traditionally, the flow of arms has been one way, from the US to these nations. While that is changing as economics and defense industries become increasingly sophisticated, the reliance upon the US for the most sophisticated weapon systems has not been affected significantly. A few allies appear to be capable of some degree of self-sufficiency through domestic development and production. For other allies in the Pacific Rim, diversification means giving serious consideration to what European nations have to offer.

There is mounting pressure from allies to combine the transfer of technology with defense sales. Because of the time required to negotiate and conclude defense research and development arrangements with DoD, and stringent US constraints on technology transfer and third-country sales, some nations have begun to enter into technology cooperation agreements with other countries. For example, the Republic of Korea has concluded umbrella Defense Industrial Cooperation agreements with France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and is discussing cooperative defense arrangements with several other countries. In order to avoid an adverse impact on US-allied interoperability, the US will have to intensify efforts to remain competitive throughout the Pacific.

Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of productive and innovative arrangements. Japan's FS-X program and the Korean Fighter program represent significant and successful cooperative ventures under these new conditions. The FS-X is a co-development program based on the F-16 airframe; the details of the production phase have yet to be determined. The KFP, unlike the FS-X, is a co-assembly and co-production program. Korea will acquire 120 F-16's: 12 purchased off the shelf, 36 aircraft kits to be assembled in Korea, and 72 to be produced under license in Korea.

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194
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<td>Marines</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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</table>

NOTE:
*Korean troop reductions deferred in light of North Korean threat
**Estimated Relocations to Japan, Korea, and Singapore. Does NOT include Guam.

Managing the Cost Issue

Recent Progress

The US government's success in negotiating new cost-sharing arrangements with Japan and Korea demonstrates our allies' desire to support US forward presence in the region. In an agreement signed in January 1991, the Japanese government pledged to assume roughly three-quarters of the costs of stationing US forces in Japan (not including US military and DoD civilian personnel costs). The United States and South Korea agreed in June 1991 that the ROK would assume one-third of the won-based costs of stationing United States forces in Korea by 1995. The ROK also signed a wartime host-nation support agreement with the US in November 1991.

Sharing Roles and Missions

We continue to work closely with allies to identify responsibilities that can be assumed by host nations. A key way for the allies to do more is to accept greater responsibility for combined operations, thereby reducing the requirement for that part of the US infrastructure associated with the performance of these responsibilities. As examples, Korea has increased its responsibility in UN Command truce supervision and has begun assuming a greater role in its own defense, and Japan has agreed to provide the US control center access to increase interoperability between our two nations' forces. In Japan, we will continue to work toward agreement on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and other areas to further enhance defense cooperation. Having identified areas where our allies can participate more fully in their own defense, we will work closely with them to ensure they develop the force structure necessary to support an increased role.

Japan

Japan's willingness to assume a substantial and increasing share of the costs of stationing US forces in Japan is a clear indication of the value Japan places on our security partnership. Because of Japan's cost-sharing contributions, it is especially cost effective to station US forces in Japan. In general terms, the United States pays only for the salaries of military and civilian personnel, operations and maintenance for US forces, operations and maintenance for US family housing, limited military construction costs, and expenses due to currency fluctuations. The Government of Japan has agreed to assume most

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of the appropriate yen-based costs of maintaining our forces there. Japan funds the Facilities Improvement Program (which pays for almost all military construction in Japan), leases for land used by US forces, environmental compensation, utilities, and labor cost sharing. The Government of Japan also incurs indirect costs such as waived land use fees, foregone taxes, tolls, customs, etc.

Under the Special Measures Agreement for host nation support which Secretary Baker and former Foreign Minister Nakayama signed on January 14, 1991, Japan's already substantial contributions increased through the addition of utilities costs and all local labor costs over the next five years. By 1995, we estimate that Japan will be paying about 73% of the cost of stationing US forces in Japan (less US salaries).

The consolidation and reversion of excess US military facilities in Japan is an ongoing process. Under the auspices of the US-Japan Joint Committee, facilities are consolidated or realigned when possible to eliminate unnecessary costs and reduce the impact of military operations on host communities. Other facilities are returned as appropriate when suitable replacements are provided by the Government of Japan.

Japan's worldwide contributions to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm amounted to over $13 billion. Early in the crisis, Japan earmarked $2 billion for the frontline states and directed $22 million toward refugee assistance, and later pledged another $38 million to assist refugee related problems. Separately, Japan designated $2 billion for direct assistance to the multinational forces. In January, 1991, the Government of Japan pledged an additional $9 billion to the multinational forces, almost all of which was provided to the US in cash.

Japan has fulfilled its Desert Shield/Desert Storm financial commitments. In addition, a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force minesweeping flotilla worked closely with the US Navy and other allied forces in the spring and summer of 1991 to clear mines from some of the most difficult areas of the Persian Gulf.

### Japanese Costsharing

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>US %</th>
<th>Japan %</th>
<th>Japan % w/o US salaries</th>
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Notes:
- 1992-1995 are estimates based on 1991 stationing cost data and a yen rate of 134/$. U.S. costs include non-appropriated fund labor costs and are based on US fiscal year.
- GOJ host nation support includes non-budgeted categories and is based on JFY, which is six months later than US fiscal year.
- 1992-95 cost sharing estimates based on GOJ budget projection for labor and utilities contributions. Does not include any wage or inflation increases for U.S. military, U.S. civilian or local national hires.

Korea

The consultations on restructuring the ROK-US security relationship during Secretary of Defense Cheney’s visit to Seoul in February 1990 began a process of transition for US forces from a leading to a supporting role in ROK defense matters. In addition to presenting the phased proposals discussed earlier, we asked that Seoul substantially increase its contribution to cost sharing.
US cost sharing proposals have centered on Korea assuming an increasing share of the won-based costs associated with supporting US forces. US Forces in Korea (USFEC) won-based costs are defined as total peninsula stationing expenses, excluding US military and DoD civilian personnel costs. These costs may amount to approximately $900 million in 1995 depending on the level of US presence. Under the US-ROK agreement, Korea will pay 1/3 of won-based costs by 1995. Two key new elements in US-ROK cost sharing are ROK contributions to indigenous labor costs and an increase in military construction funding. We have also sought greater flexibility in administering the various cost sharing programs already in place.

The Department of Defense and the Department of State (Ambassador-at-Large for Burdensharing) have conducted extensive negotiations with the Republic of Korea aimed at expanding Korea's cost-sharing contributions. In 1991, the ROK contributed $150M, a 115% increase over the 1990 level of $70 million. The 1992 contribution is $180 million, a 20% increase over the 1991 contribution. Further increases are anticipated over the next three years in order to reach one-third of won-based costs by 1995.

A bilateral cost sharing committee has been established to identify and resolve administrative problems hampering cost sharing execution. Additionally, the ROK has agreed to changes in how construction costs are shared, allowing greater flexibility in construction of essential warfighting projects needed by US forces. Agreement has also been reached between the ROK and US Governments on a legal basis for labor cost sharing, a key element of cost sharing programs. The ROK National Assembly approved $43 million in labor cost sharing for 1991 and subsequently $58 million was authorized for 1992. Furthermore, both governments have agreed to discuss a future (post 1995) cost sharing program based upon an indexing formula to determine future ROK monetary contributions. Both governments see this method as useful to providing an orderly mechanism to facilitate out-year planning and negotiation. The details of these future implementation issues will be addressed in upcoming negotiations. In addition to the support outlined above, the ROK provides: land at no cost for US bases and training areas; 5,800 personnel to augment the US Army forces on the peninsula; an increasing portion of the cost of maintaining the Joint US Military Affairs Group in Korea; and the maintenance and storage cost of allied war reserve munitions.

In order to lower the visibility of American troops in Seoul, the ROK and US agreed in 1988 to relocate all US military units out of Seoul. The ROK promised to provide equal or better facilities at its expense for the relocated units. The relocation is scheduled to be completed by 1997. As the drawdown of US forces continues, we will consolidate those troops in three enclaves. These relocations will also better align US force dispositions with wartime missions, reduce the costs of forward stationing through consolidation and return of uneconomical facilities, return selected historically important properties to the ROK, and reduce the visibility of US forces forward deployed.

In addition to Korea's cost sharing contributions, South Korea's support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm was timely and generous. The Republic of Korea was the first nation to respond with vital airlift and sealift support. Subsequent offers of assistance included over $500 million dollars to the anti-Iraq coalition of which $355 million was pledged to support the US military effort.

The Republic of Korea also dispatched a medical support group consisting of some 154 personnel, and deployed five C-130 aircraft, including 156 ground support personnel to the Gulf. The cost of these two units is in addition to the $500 million in cash, transportation, and assistance-in-kind that was pledged by the ROK. Korea has converted pledged assistance that was not used, because of the war's early conclusion, to other forms of support. This final package includes $104M of military equipment, materiel, services, and infrastructure improvements identified by USFK. These contributions will be over and above the defense cost sharing program.

Improved ROK Capabilities

Planned reductions of US forces stationed in Korea are made possible because of steady improvements in ROK defense capabilities. The ROK defense budget for 1991 was approximately $10.8 billion, roughly 4 percent of ROK GNP. Under its current Force Improvement Program (FIP III), South Korea continues to devote about one-third of its defense budget to investment in force upgrades.

Improvements in ROK defense capabilities have come in all areas of the South Korean military. New Chinook helicopters provide the South Korean Army with an improved medium to heavy lift capability, and tactical reconnaissance capability and tactical air defenses are improving with the acquisition of additional RF-4C and F-4D/E aircraft and the proposed Korean Fighter Program. New army combat units are being organized, and South Korea has begun adding some high technology radar and electronic warfare equipment. Some of these improvements have also come from South Korea's own defense industry, such as its domestically produced main battle tank.

Findings

In addressing the questions posed by the Congress, we were required to review the assumptions and strategy of the 1990 East Asia Strategic Initiative report. This re-examination, factoring in both historic international change and Asia-Pacific regional continuities, has confirmed the findings of the initial report. The Asia-Pacific region is vital to the United States. To protect and advance our interests, we must retain a forward-deployed military presence there, while at the same time, adjusting it in response to changes in the strategic environment.
In the Asia-Pacific region, unlike Europe where the end of the Cold War has fundamentally transformed the security equation, many crucial aspects of the security environment endure -- communist regimes, facing generational and leadership change, continue in power; the Korean Peninsula remains a critical flashpoint, only intensified by the threat of proliferation. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, US interests in the region have changed little. We have a large and growing economic stake in the region; we are committed to the promotion of human rights and democratic values; and we still see it in our strategic interest to ensure that no single state dominates the region. Our sustained security engagement serves to further our interests in this dynamic and vital region. The combination of our regional military presence, our economic engagement, and political leadership has given the United States a unique voice in Asian-Pacific affairs. Under American aegis, an environment supportive of economic growth and open to democracy has evolved.

We will remain militarily engaged in the region, but the physical aspects of our engagement have and will continue to evolve. We will vacate the Philippines by the end of 1992; the huge, permanent base structure there will not be replicated elsewhere. We will rely on the cooperation of our friends and allies and work to build access arrangements to support our forward deployed presence. The presence of US forces will enhance our overall bilateral security relationships and improve the interoperability of our respective military forces.

We reaffirm the conclusions of the 1990 report that:
our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is critical to the security and stability of the region;
our forward deployed presence is the very foundation of stability in region and allows the United States to play its unique role as regional balancer and honest broker;
stability in the Asia-Pacific region serves the vital national interest of the United States and the interests of our allies;
accordingly, the United States can and must play a role in securing the future of this vast, complex, and dynamic region.
The Cold War is over, but diverse international and intra-national conflicts pose potential threats to United States interests. The challenge for the United States is to work with our allies and friends to promote stability in this context. I have asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to undertake a series of regional security reviews consistent with President Clinton's "Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," to meet this challenge.

The East Asia Strategy Report is the first of this series. Two previous Department of Defense strategy reports, in 1990 and 1992, envisioned post-Cold War troop reductions continuing in the region through the end of the decade. This year's report, by contrast, reaffirms our commitment to maintain a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future. This report also highlights strategies and themes common to the other regional reports that will follow. These include:
- strengthening U.S. bilateral alliances while pursuing new opportunities presented by multilateral security dialogues.
- maintaining forward deployment of U.S. forces and access and basing rights for U.S. and allied forces.
- ensuring that security policies have the support of the American people and Congress.
- promoting military-to-military contacts and security assistance.
- halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- sharing responsibility for maintaining regional and global security.

I welcome your attention to this report.

(Signed)
William J. Perry

Introduction

Consider East Asia in 1975. The United States was withdrawing from Vietnam, and many observers predicted that widespread instability would follow a broader American withdrawal from the region. Compare these predictions with the stable and prosperous East Asia of 1995. The important reasons that the gloomy predictions proved wrong were American alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial United States forces. Security is like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it. The American security presence has helped provide this "oxygen" for East Asian development.

America's record over the past half century has been one of consistent strength and leadership. Our forward deployed and forward stationed forces in Asia ensured broad regional stability, helped to deter aggression against our allies, and contributed to the tremendous political and economic advances made by nations of the region. Concerns about American withdrawal heard today were voiced twenty years ago as well, in the years following the Vietnam War. For the security and prosperity of today to be maintained for the next twenty years, the United States must remain engaged in Asia, committed to peace in the region, and dedicated to strengthening alliances and friendships.

History, geography, and demography make the United States an integral part of the region. The states of Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington border on the Pacific Ocean, and Hawaii is surrounded by it. American citizens on three Pacific island territories - Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas - live closer to Asian capitals than to Washington. The increasing number of Americans who trace their ancestry to the Asia-Pacific - numbering over seven million - is yet another indication of America's connection to the nations of the Pacific Rim.

The United States has been the pre-eminent Pacific power since World War II, but our interests in the region date back more than two centuries. When the United States was only a few years old in 1784, a United States trading ship, the Empress of China, inaugurated commercial ties with China. One hundred and three years before the Battle of the Coral Sea, United States Navy ships first visited Australia. The United States negotiated Japan's opening to
international trade in the 1850s, and mediated the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. From these beginnings through the Second World War and the Cold War that followed, the United States has served as a key stabilizing factor in the region. America has pledged its commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region and has spent its resources and blood fulfilling that pledge. The United States has sent military forces to major wars against aggression in Asia during this century - World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, as well as a number of smaller conflicts. As these experiences have proven, America's interests in the region must be protected and America's commitments will be honored. They also provide a lesson: Asian tensions have the potential to erupt in conflict, with dire consequences for global security.

The interests at stake during these conflicts continue to compel American attention today. Asia remains an area of uncertainty, tension, and immense concentrations of military power. Many of the largest armies in the world are in East Asia and the Pacific, including those of nuclear weapons states. Three major powers in Asia - the United States, Russia and China - are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

America clearly has a stake in maintaining the alliance structure in Asia as a foundation of regional stability and a means of promoting American influence on key Asian issues. Asian friends and allies are critical to the success of our global strategy in many respects. Their cooperation is necessary to deter potential threats, counter regional aggression, ensure regional peace, monitor attempts at proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and help protect sea lines of communication both within the region and from the region to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

Asia today also has new significance. Its role is vital to the pursuit of a more open international economic system. United States trade with the Asia-Pacific region in 1993 totaled over $374 billion and accounted for 2.8 million United States jobs. Given Japan's economic and political weight, it is a natural partner in our efforts to fashion a viable post-Cold War regional and international order. The region has also produced other economic successes - China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand - each of whom are key United States trade partners and will play an increasingly important role in the global economy.

The long history of close American cultural, economic, and security ties to the Asia-Pacific region reflect fundamental United States national interests that will only grow in coming years. The United States' role as a force for regional stability remains central and has not diminished.

Our forward deployed forces in Asia, based primarily in the Republic of Korea and Japan have ensured broad regional stability, helped to deter aggression against our allies, and contributed to the tremendous political and economic advances made by nations of the region. Today, this commitment continues through a stable forward-deployed force of about 100,000 United States personnel, backed by the full range of capability at the ready for the United States Pacific Command. Post-Cold War reductions in United States forces in the Asia-Pacific have essentially leveled off. Within this stable force level, capabilities will continue to improve as weaponry and equipment are upgraded.

A continuing United States security presence is viewed by almost every country in the region as a stabilizing force. Allies of the United States can base their defense planning on a reliable American security guarantee. But even beyond the nations with whom the United States has a treaty alliance, the stability brought about by United States military presence provides a sound foundation for economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, benefiting Asians and Americans alike.

In the post-Cold War era, the United States has begun to share responsibility as well as the benefits of global and regional security with its friends and allies. It will continue to do so as these states grow stronger economically and develop global leadership roles. Japan and Republic of Korea contribute to regional as well as their own security when they provide generous host-nation support for United States forces. Australia increasingly plays a global role in promoting international security. Australia, Singapore, and many other nations contribute to regional security by providing access for United States military forces. Asian countries also contribute significantly to global peace-keeping and development aid.

The United States does not view this wider responsibility-sharing as a substitute for American leadership or for our overseas United States military presence. Active United States engagement is still essential for mobilizing ad hoc international coalitions on security and other issues, as the United States did in the Gulf War and as it has done more
recently in bringing together key countries in the region to persuade North Korea to shut down a program that could produce nuclear weapons.

United States interests in the region are mutually-reinforcing: security is necessary for economic growth, security and growth make it more likely that human rights will be honored and democracy will emerge, and democratization makes international conflict less likely because democracies are unlikely to fight one another. President Clinton's repeated trips, summits, and meetings with the region's leaders indicate the Administration's recognition of the growing importance of these intertwined American interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States National Security Strategy published in July 1994 is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are: to enhance security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and to promote democracy abroad.

In accordance with the National Security Strategy, this document explains United States defense policy toward furthering these goals in the Asia-Pacific region. It builds upon the Strategy's emphasis on maintaining a strong defense capability to enhance U.S. security and to provide a foundation for regional stability through mutually beneficial security partnerships. As the Strategy states, East Asia is a region of growing importance to American goals: nowhere are the strands of our three-part strategy more intertwined; nowhere is the need for continued engagement more evident. In thinking about the Asia-Pacific region, security comes first, and a committed United States military presence will continue to serve as a bedrock for America's security role in this dynamic area of the world.

The regional security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region emphasizes strengthening the bilateral alliances that have been at the heart of United States strategy for more than forty years. The United States is also committed to contribute to regional security through active participation in new multi-lateral fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum. Through such multi-lateral mechanisms the countries of the region seek to develop new cooperative approaches to achieve greater stability and security. Additionally, the Pacific Command sponsors multi-national military activities. The Clinton Administration is open and receptive to these approaches. From our perspective, they will complement, but not supplant, United States bilateral ties in the region.

Within this broad strategic context, the specific security objectives we will pursue include the following:

- work with allies and friends to refocus our security relations on the new post-Cold War challenges;
- strengthen our bilateral partnership with Japan which serves as the basic mechanism through which we work together to promote regional and global security;
- maintain our strong defense commitment to and ties with the Republic of Korea, in order to deter aggression and preserve peace on the Peninsula;
- work closely with our ally Australia to pursue the numerous security objectives our nations share;
- engage China and support its constructive integration into the international community, including participation in global efforts to limit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foster transparency in its defense policy and military activities;
- fully implement the Agreed Framework on North Korea's nuclear program while standing ready to respond if North Korea does not meet its obligations or threatens United States allies;
- work with Russia to develop mutually advantageous approaches that enhance regional stability;
- contribute to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait;
- work with ASEAN and others to explore new "cooperative security" approaches through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF);
- encourage creation of a sub-regional security dialogue in Northeast Asia;
- support efforts by countries in the region to strengthen democracy;
- continue to seek the fullest possible accounting of those missing in action from the wars the United States has fought in the region in defense of others;
- prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
- work to halt the flow of narcotics.

America's Permanent Interest in the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region
United States interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: peace and security; commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition. Recent trends, particularly the increasing economic importance of Asia and the political and security uncertainties in the region in the wake of the Cold War, have clarified United States’ interests in the region. Recent events have also highlighted the importance of our military presence in Asia to United States operations around the globe.

America's vital national interests are clearly stated in the President's National Security Strategy:
- to preserve the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure;
- to advance a healthy and growing United States economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad;
- to promote a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish; and
- to enhance a system of healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

United States security objectives and foreign policy are geared toward furthering these mutually reinforcing domestic and international interests.

Since World War II, the United States has been the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. During the Cold War, our national security objectives centered on defending American territory as far forward as possible, global containment of the Soviet Union, and protecting friends and allies. Our military strategy, dictated largely by the distances involved in transiting the Pacific Ocean, was to forward station forces to permanent bases, primarily in Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia.

We complemented our presence through the development of a range of bilateral security arrangements. This approach continues to be appropriate because the leading states in the Asia-Pacific region have diverse threat perceptions and disparate cultures, histories, political systems, and levels of economic development.

The United States’ network of diverse bilateral relationships in the 1990's includes mutual security alliances, a variety of access arrangements, and informal periodic military-to-military exercises and exchanges. These bilateral relationships address numerous security concerns that are often unique to individual nations in the region. Taken as a whole, however, they have formed a strong regional network promoting peace and security. The United States has six security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region, including security treaties with Japan (September 8, 1951), the Republic of Korea (October 1, 1953), Australia (September 1, 1951), the Republic of the Philippines (August 30, 1951), and Thailand (September 6, 1954); and the Compact of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau (signed November 4, 1986). These bilateral commitments remain inviolable, and the end of the Cold War has not diminished their importance. Moreover, United States interest in developing layers of multilateral ties in the region will not undermine the significance of core bilateral ties.

What Does Asia's New Economic Success Mean for American Interests?
The Asia-Pacific region is currently the most economically dynamic region in the world, and on that basis alone its security would be critical to America's future. The prosperity of Asia is, in part, a result of successful American policies that have underwritten Asian security and have underpinned Asia's economic development. The Pacific Rim today is collectively the United States' largest trading partner. We expect Asia and the Pacific (excluding the United States) to account for about on-third of the world's economic activity at the start of the next century. Asia's prosperous stability is in turn vital to America's economic health and to the world's security.

Asia's recent growth rates have outpaced those of the rest of the world. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan have grown on average over 7 percent for the last five years. China's economy has grown over nine percent per year for the last decade. The People's Republic of China's southern and coastal areas are enjoying a market-oriented manufacturing boom and are increasingly integrated with other economies, particularly Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The Republic of Korea, one of Asia's greatest success stories, has moved from a subsistence economy to advanced manufacturing in a single generation.

If high savings rates, strong emphasis on education, pragmatic market-based economic policies and, with few exceptions, relatively stable politics continue to characterize Asia's economies, economic growth is likely to be
sustained. Asia's growth has given rise to a middle class and a large new consumer population. Ambitious development plans are creating a huge demand for infrastructure. The People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, for example, plan to spend over $500 billion on infrastructure improvements by the year 2000. All of these trends make it certain that Asia will be an increasingly important market for the United States.

The United States economy will be strengthened through trade and investment opportunities offered by the dynamic Asian economies. The American economy is increasingly dependent on trade; as a share of Gross Domestic Product, merchandise exports have doubled in the last two decades from 5.5% to 11.6%. Much of the growth of this sector is attributable to Asia. During the 1970s and 1980s, United States exports to the Asia-Pacific region grew twice as fast as exports to the European Community. American two-way trade with Asia today accounts for more than 36% of total American world trade. On a per capita basis, people in Asian countries import more American goods than do people in European countries. United States exports to the Asia-Pacific region are growing toward a third of worldwide United States merchandise exports.

Asia's international financial role has naturally grown as well; some 40 percent of global bank reserves are now in seven leading East Asian economies, compared with only 17 percent in 1980. Japan, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore together have foreign exchange reserves totaling 270 billion dollars. Our reliance on these and other sources of foreign capital further underscores Asia's growing importance to the United States. Much of Asia's economic growth has a direct relationship to its security environment. As an example, Asia's demand for oil from outside the region makes the security of access routes imperative. The Asia and Pacific region's (excluding the United States) oil demand of 14.5 million barrels per day in 1992 was larger than that of Europe, making it the second largest oil consuming region after North America. The Persian Gulf now supplies 70% of the region's total oil imports; by the turn of the century, over 90% of imports from outside the Asia-Pacific region are expected to come from the Persian Gulf. United States and Asian interests are clearly served by the maintenance of the sea lines of communication that support worldwide trade in oil and other goods.

Growing regional dependence on oil from the Middle East highlights the importance of America's ability to move forces through the sea lines to support contingencies in the Middle East.

In this context, United States military presence in the region supports many of our broad objectives and those of our allies. It guarantees the security of sea lanes vital to the flow of Middle East oil, serves to deter armed conflict in the region, and promotes regional cooperation. It also denies political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of powers, preventing any such group from having command over the vast resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States presence also allows developing countries to allocate resources to economic growth and expands markets for United States exports. By helping to preserve peace, expenditures on our continuing defense presence deter conflicts whose costs would be far greater.

In short, the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is a matter of vital national interest affecting the well-being of all Americans. Our economic prospects, the promotion of democratic values and human rights, and our traditional security interests all require sustained engagement by the United States in this important region.

Maintaining a credible security presence in Asia is vital to the post-Cold War international system now taking shape.

What Are the Challenges and Opportunities Facing America in Asia?

Asia is characterized by diversity - ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic and geographic. Historical animosities remain strong; a sense of cohesion has been lacking. From the first Sino-Japanese war through the Sino-Soviet confrontation, and conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, there has been a pattern of recurrent confrontation and conflict among the major powers in Asia. While we no longer face a hegemonic Soviet threat in Asia and the Pacific, we still confront a challenging military threat on the Korean peninsula, as well as a complex array of re-emergent tensions. Many of these challenges derive from the coming transitions in key East Asian states - the outcome of which will determine to a large extent the nature of the future East Asian security environment. The social, economic and political transition now occurring in Asia is encouraging but uncertain. Leadership transitions could have a major impact on security and stability of the region. In addition, threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emerging nationalism amidst long-standing ethnic and national rivalries, and unresolved territorial disputes add to a political landscape of potential instability and conflict. We can not ignore Asia's long-standing antagonisms; nearly all countries of the region carry memories of distrust and suspicion resulting from historic conflicts.
If the United States does not provide the central, visible, stabilizing force in the Asia and Pacific region, it is quite possible that another nation might - but not necessarily in a way that meets America's fundamental interests and those of our friends and allies. Insecure nations will build up their armaments. Arms races could in turn foster fear and instability.

If the American presence in Asia were removed, the security of Asia would be imperiled, with consequences for Asia and America alike. Our ability to affect the course of events would be constrained, our markets and our interests would be jeopardized. To benefit from the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States must remain fully engaged economically, diplomatically, and militarily. Our engagement in the region must also take into account changes in the international environment, domestic political and economic realities, and the ability of our allies and friends to share responsibility in shaping a new era and maintaining regional security and prosperity. Our strategy is designed to reflect all these elements.

Careful handling and appropriate policies will determine whether challenges facing Asia create turmoil, instability or conflict on the one hand, or become opportunities to promote stability and ensure peace on the other. The following tour d'horizon describes key subregional challenges and opportunities for United States security policy in Asia today.

Engagement: Modernizing and Strengthening Our Alliances and Friendships

Japan

There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives. Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia. It is seen not just by the United States and Japan, but throughout the region, as a major factor for securing stability in Asia. The President has made clear that our overall relationship with Japan is composed of three pillars - our security alliance, political cooperation, and economics and trade. We must not allow trade friction to undermine our security alliance, but if public support for the relationship is to be maintained over the long term, progress must continue to be made by both sides in addressing fundamental economic issues.

Japan's new global role involves greater Japanese contribution to regional and global stability. Japan is the world's largest Official Development Assistance provider and has increased its involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the globe, including in Mozambique and Zaire. Japan supports emerging democracies, particularly in Asia. Japan's continuing close cooperation with the United States in a strategic partnership, including generous host nation support arrangements, is conducive to regional peace and stability and supports broad mutual global objectives.

The Republic of Korea

Our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, as it has been for over forty years. The Republic of Korea-United States combined defense structure rests on three strong pillars: the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, Combined Forces, and the annual Security Consultative process. The United States also continues to support South-North talks on tension reduction efforts. Until North and South Korea find a peaceful solution to their differences, we remain committed to the terms of the forty-five year old Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement and its mechanisms must remain until an appropriate agreement supersedes them. Only South and North Korea can resolve the division of Korea, and therefore replacement of the Armistice by an appropriate agreement can come about only through direct dialogue between South and North Korea.

The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea is more than a treaty commitment, it is a vital component in our national objective of supporting and promoting democracy. Even after the North Korean threat passes, the United States intends to maintain its strong defense alliance with the Republic of Korea, in the interest of regional security.

The Desirability of Exploring New Multilateral Security Initiatives

A significant new element of this Administration's Asian security policy has been constructive participation in and support for regional security dialogues. As President Clinton said in Korea, “Some in the United States have been reluctant to enter into regional security dialogues in Asia, but I see this as a way to supplement our alliances and forward military presence, not to supplant them. These dialogues can ensure that the end of the Cold War does not
provide an opening for regional rivalries, chaos and arms races.” Our participation in these dialogues is an important element of our security engagement in the region.

The interest in new multilateral approaches to regional security arose from the uncertainties created by the end of the Cold War and concerns aroused by the United States’ departure from its bases in the Philippines. At the same time, the increasing economic integration and interdependence of the Asia-Pacific region has given nations a shared interest in preserving the peace that underpins their prosperity. Because relations among the major powers in Asia are more constructive than at any time in the past century, the post Cold War period provides an excellent and unique opportunity to shape a positive and cooperative security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

Working with ASEAN, the United States has supported the establishment of a new security forum for the region. In 1993, ASEAN proposed and others agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as Asia's first broadly based consultative body concerned with security issues. In contrast to Cold War collective defense against a common enemy, the ARF was conceived as an inclusive group not directed against any country. The ARF, which met for the first time in July 1994, includes the ASEAN countries, the United States, Australia, Canada, China, European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and Vietnam. Its initial purpose is to provide a forum for consultation on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States believes the ARF can play a useful role in conveying governments’ intentions, easing tensions, constraining arms races and cultivating habits of consultation and cooperation on security issues. We envision that the ARF will develop over time into an effective region-wide forum for enhancing preventive diplomacy and developing confidence-building measures. We believe that discussion of modest defense transparency measures would be a constructive area for future work. Discussions might include such measures as limited exchanges of defense data, the publication of defense white papers, and submission of information to the UN arms register. Efforts in areas such as disaster relief and peace-keeping could also help establish patterns of cooperation. Furthermore, the ARF presents an opportunity for a non-confrontational discussion of the relevance of democratization for regional security.

Historically, Northeast Asia is the area where great power interests have clashed most sharply. Consequently, the United States believes that the unique long term security challenges in Northeast Asia argue strongly for the creation of a separate sub-regional security dialogue for Northeast Asia. Such a dialogue would be developed in close consultation with our allies, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. To lay the groundwork for establishing such a forum, the United States has participated in a series of mixed government/academic conferences on Northeast Asian security issues with Japan, the Republic of Korea, China and Russia. North Korea has been invited but has participated only in a preparatory session. The pattern of consultations among key countries for many months, which led to the October 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, may help create conditions for establishing a Northeast Asia security dialogue.

These and other multilateral consultations on security issues are elements in the "overlapping plates of armor" for regional security described in the President's July 1993 speech in Seoul. Our other multilateral consultations include ad hoc coordination on the North Korean nuclear issue; policy planning talks with Japan, the Republic of Korea and other allies; and participation in mixed government/academic United States-Japan-Russia trilateral meetings.

Enhancement: Reaching Beyond our Traditional Allies and Friends

China

The rapid growth in China's material strength has raised the importance of China in the Asian security equation. China is a nuclear weapons state, a leading regional military power and a global power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Although it still has a low GNP per capita compared to other leading economic powers, it has one of the largest and fastest-growing economies in the world. It is thus essential for peace, stability, and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region that China is stable and continues to develop friendly relations with its neighbors. The Chinese leadership has asserted that international peace and stability are prerequisites for China’s achieving its economic modernization goals. In the early 1990s, China has normalized relations with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Republic of Korea, hosted the first-ever visit by Japan's emperor, and agreed to participate actively in multilateral organizations like APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China's published defense budget figure has doubled in the past five years, with real growth - adjusted for inflation - estimated at about 40 percent. This figure probably does not encompass all of China's defense expenditures. By comparison, American, Japanese and Russian defense spending has either remained level or decreased in the same
period. China is investing in modern fighter aircraft, including Russian SU-27s, as well as other new-generation military capabilities. It has expanded its bluewater naval capabilities, and there is persistent speculation that it intends to acquire an aircraft carrier. Much of the Chinese defense budget increase represents growth from a low base, plus China's effort to replace obsolete equipment, adjust doctrine to the new global security environment, and improve the professionalism of its armed forces of 3.2 million. China also continues to conduct underground nuclear tests, as part of its overall strategic weapons modernization program, but has indicated interest in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that may be signed in 1996.

China's military posture and development have a great impact on the expectations and behavior of other states in the region. Although China's leaders insist their military build-up is defensive and commensurate with China's overall economic growth, others in the region cannot be certain of China's intentions, particularly in this period of leadership transition. China's military modernization effort is in an early stage, and its long-term goals are unclear. Moreover, it has territorial disputes with several neighboring states. Absent a better understanding of China's plans, capabilities and intentions, other Asian nations may feel a need to respond to China's growing military power. This will be particularly true as China modernizes its strategic forces, naval assets and other forces capable of power projection. The United States and China's neighbors would welcome greater transparency in China's defense programs, strategy and doctrine.

The United States, for its part, is enhancing its military dialogue with China in order to promote better mutual understanding, as well as greater transparency and trust. This dialogue is maintained through periodic high level visits, participation in professional fora, and functional exchanges. Through the newly established Defense Conversion Commission, we hope to facilitate cooperation between Chinese defense enterprises and American businesses in civilian production.

Russia
Russia is an Asia-Pacific regional power and an adverse shift in Moscow's policies would have an impact on Asia's security. On April 4, 1993, at the Vancouver meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin, the two presidents "declared their firm commitment to a dynamic and effective United States-Russian partnership that strengthens international stability." This commitment has great relevance for the Asia-Pacific region. Russia has contributed to international efforts toward peace, notably in connection with Cambodia and North Korea. Similarly, Russia has worked together with China to demilitarize their long contiguous border. Russian officials and scholars participate constructively in the various official and semiofficial fora to promote regional stability and security. Russia has a significant role to play in preventing the emergence of future security problems in Asia and the Pacific.

The Importance of Addressing Long-standing Regional Issues

North Korea
North Korea remains a source of unpredictability and potential danger for the region. Its excessive emphasis on military development at the expense of basic economic, political, and social development poses a threat to its neighbors. Even with a badly deteriorating economy and years of poor harvests, North Korea has given priority to its military structure. North Korea continues to expend its national resources to:
- mechanize its huge, offensively postured ground forces;
- expand its already massive artillery formations;
- enhance the world's largest special operations force; and
- improve its large ballistic missile arsenal.

North Korea's history of aggression, threats to peace, and exports of missile technology have created a context in which its development of nuclear weapons would be an extremely dangerous threat to security on the Peninsula, in Asia and for global non-proliferation. At the same time, North Korea's conventional military threat to the Republic of Korea has not abated, and requires continued vigilance and commitment of United States forces.

Territorial Disputes
Contested claims to islands and territorial waters in the South China Sea are a source of tension in Southeast Asia that could carry serious consequences for regional stability. There are six claimants to parts of the Spratly Islands - the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. All but Brunei maintain a
military presence in the contested area, which is believed to be rich in oil deposits. The United States has urged peaceful settlement of South China Sea issues, and strongly opposes the threat or use of military force to assert any nation's claim. The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims and is willing to assist in the peaceful resolution of the dispute.

It is worth noting in this context that the United States regards the high seas as an international commons. Our strategic interest in maintaining the lines of communication linking Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean make it essential that we resist and maritime claims beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention. Continued Russian occupation of Japan's Northern Territories is another source of tension in East Asia and stands in the way of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty. The United States recognizes the legitimacy of Japan's claim to the Northern Territories. Progress in Japan-Russia negotiations on Northern territories issues would enhance peace and stability in Northeast Asia generally and accelerate Russia's long term integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

Taiwan

Peace in the Taiwan Strait has been the long-standing goal of our policy toward Taiwan. United States arms sales to Taiwan are designed to serve this end. We welcome the growing dialogue between Taipei and Beijing and applaud actions on both sides which increase the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

United States' Force Structure in Asia for the Rest of the Century

The Rationale for Continued United States Forward Presence in Asia

United States military forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response capability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region; enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of United States forces required to meet national security objectives; overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific Ocean; and demonstrate to our friends, allies and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of the United States' interest in the security of the entire region.

Nothing conveys the same clear message of our security commitment as much as our visible United States military presence, proving we are engaged and consulting closely with our allies and friends, vigilant to protect our shared interests. The United States is trusted in Asia, partly because we send our sons and daughters to stand as guarantors of peace and security in Asia. The United States has the capability, credibility, and even-handedness to play the "honest broker" among nervous neighbors, historical enemies, and potential antagonists.

After the Cold War, American ground forces forward deployed in Asia were adjusted carefully to retain the capability required to keep the peace in Asia and the Pacific. Our forces in the region were reduced from approximately 135,000 in 1990 to approximately 100,000 in 1994. Adjustments will be made from time to time due to changing security environments, technological advancements, and reorganizations required by changes in overall force structure. Our presence in Asia, however will remain strong enough to address regional requirements and to enable us to respond to global security contingencies, in the Middle East and elsewhere.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, for example, our force structure in Asia successfully provided deterrence to regional threats in Asia, thus allowing forces in Hawaii, California, and elsewhere to deploy to the Middle East. Our bases also facilitated the coalition's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Asian nations provided access to ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities for personnel, ships and aircraft transiting the region enroute to the Middle East. Australia and other allies contributed troops arid resources to the coalition effort. The United States alliance with Japan was instrumental in Japan's commitment of minesweepers and billions of dollars to offset the expenses of coalition forces. Korea's support of sealift, in-kind support, and expenses offsets was also very important.

Having United States forces in Asia also promotes democratic development in Asia, by providing a clear, readily observable example of the American military's apolitical role. Our overseas presence helps us forge strong bonds with regional military leaders. Through joint exercises and training programs, they gain exposure to American standards of military professionalism, and we gain insight into, and personal ties with, their societies.
Because of a program of cost sharing with our allies, it is actually less expensive to the American taxpayer to maintain our forces forward deployed than in the United States. Cost sharing is exactly that. Japan and the Republic of Korea have indicated they will continue to help defray the costs of maintaining American forces in their countries. The Clinton Administration's Bottom Up Review, the study initiated by Secretary Aspin "to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up," reflected our continuing commitment to Asia. The Review emphasized sustaining robust United States forces overseas; modernization initiatives that include improvements in United States airlift, sealift, and prepositioned assets to improve crisis response; high leverage improvements in the United States' ability to locate and destroy enemy military assets; and more capable battlefield surveillance platforms and advanced munitions that make the early arriving forces more potent.

To support our commitments in East Asia, we will maintain a force structure that requires approximately 100,000 personnel. In Korea, this includes an Army division (consisting of two brigades as well as headquarters and support elements) and a United States Air force combat wing. We are also prepositioning military equipment in South Korea to increase our ability to respond to crises. In light of the continuing conventional capability of North Korea, we have permanently halted a previously planned modest drawdown of our troops from South Korea, and are modernizing the American forces there as well as assisting the Republic of Korea in modernizing its forces. We will continue to provide sufficient forces and support assets to constitute a reliable defense capability in Korea that can deter or halt and defeat a North Korean invasion even if our forces are engaged in a major regional contingency elsewhere in the world.

Maintaining our Strong Presence in Japan

United States security policy in Asia and the Pacific relies on access to Japanese bases and Japanese support for United States operations. United States forces in Japan are committed to and prepared for not only the defense of Japan and other nearby United States interests, but to the preservation of peace and security in the entire Far East region. United States bases in Japan are well-located for rapid deployment to virtually any trouble spot in the region. Given the great distances associated with the Pacific theater, assured access to bases in Japan plays a critical role in our ability to deter and defeat aggression.

In Japan, we will continue to station a Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, and will also continue to forward deploy an aircraft carrier battle group, and an amphibious ready group. We will also retain more than one wing of Air Force combat aircraft in Japan, and the Navy's Seventh Fleet will continue routine patrols of the Western Pacific. Japan supplies by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies. Japan also provides a stable, secure environment for our military operations and training. Under a January 1991 agreement and other arrangements, the Government of Japan has assumed an increasing share yearly, and will assume virtually all local labor and utility costs of maintaining our forces by this year. Japan also funds leases for land used by United States forces and incurs indirect costs such as waived land use fees, foregone taxes, tolls, customs, and payments to local communities affected by United States bases. Taken together, these categories represent contributions of a magnitude of more than $4 billion annually. As part of its host nation support, Japan also funds facilities construction under the Facilities Improvement Program. This contribution is an additional amount of approximately $1 billion per year. Gradual defense improvements have made Japan more secure, and significantly enhanced bilateral security in the post-Cold War environment. As a result of a division of roles and missions, in accordance with Japanese Constitutional constraints, Japan has concentrated on defense of the home islands and sea lane defense out to 1000 nautical miles while the United States has assumed responsibility for power projection and nuclear deterrence. This division enhances the operational flexibility of both sides, and provides a practical guide to structuring and maintaining our forces. Most importantly, however, it contributes to overall regional security. The United States-Japan alliance, while mutually beneficial, has far-reaching benefits extending to the maintenance of peace and stability of the entire international community.

Japanese procurement of major United States weapons systems has also been beneficial to both countries. Japan buys large amounts of military equipment and services from the United States every year. Interoperability of major systems, purchased directly or license built, is a major aspect of the security relationship. The long list of United States equipment in Japan's inventory includes AWACS, Patriot, AEGIS, MLRS, F-15s, P-3, C-130, SH-60 and UH-60 helicopter, and numerous gun, missile, torpedo, and sensor programs.
Shortfalls in the Japanese defensive arsenal continue to exist in sea lane defense - including airborne early warning and ship-borne anti-air capability. Deficiencies also exist in land based and ship borne anti-missile capability. However, Japan is in the process of purchasing AWACS and adding AEGIS capability to its fleet. We are also exploring with Japan cooperative efforts in Theater Missile Defense.

The FS-X fighter co-development project, which was controversial in its early stages, has potentially profound benefits. These include transfer to the United States of Japanese defense-related technology, royalties for United States companies, and jobs for United States contractors. There will be future opportunities for aircraft modernization and joint development in a number of areas. We are placing greater emphasis on technology-sharing, which we expect to characterize the future of United States-Japan defense procurement cooperation.

Sustaining Deterrence in Korea

The United States and the Republic of Korea would defeat an invasion of the South by North Korea. A war, however, would cause tremendous destruction on both sides of the DMZ, particularly in and around Seoul, which is the economic, political and cultural center of Korea and only some 26 miles from the Demilitarized Zone. It is therefore important to recognize that the issue in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is not merely winning a war, but more importantly, deterring aggression from North Korea. In this context, our treaty commitment and the presence of United States troops in South Korea help deter any North Korean aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the United States would automatically and immediately be involved in any such conflict.

If we detect signals of an impending attack, we are poised to react decisively. The United States maintains approximately 37,000 military personnel in the Republic of Korea. Their mission is to contribute to deterrence, participate in the defense of the Republic of Korea should deterrence fail, and promote the defensive capabilities of allied forces through combined training. Should deterrence so require, these in-place forces can be promptly augmented.
Appendix 9  
*Improvement of Implementation Procedures of SOFA Article 17*  

Agreement Relating to Article 17, Paragraph 5 (c) on Transfer of Custody Prior to Indictment Reached at Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, October 25, 1995

1. The United States will give sympathetic consideration to any request for the transfer of custody prior to indictment of the accused which may be made by Japan in specific cases of heinous crimes of murder or rape. The United States will take full account of special views Japan may put forward in the Joint Committee as to other specific cases it believes should be considered.

2. Japan will submit requests for the transfer of custody to the Join Committee when it has material interest in such case.
Appendix 10

Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century
(April 17, 1996, Tokyo, Japan)

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the United States helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the United States are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom.

2. For more than a year, the two governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.

THE REGIONAL OUTLOOK

3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.

At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability.

THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE AND THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY

4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries.

In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the United States. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

(a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new "National Defense Program Outline" adopted in November, 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime
Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan’s security.

(b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S. The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.

(c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan’s contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

BILATERAL COOPERATION UNDER THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas.

(a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.

(b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.

(c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship.

(d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the support fighter (F-2).
The two governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.

6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities.

In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the "Special Action Committee on Okinawa" (SACO), and welcomed the far reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the United States in the region, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts.

The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the United States and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

GLOBAL COOPERATION

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the United Nations and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Both governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the
prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the United Nations and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

CONCLUSION

9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three legs of the Japan-U.S. relationship - security, political, and economic - are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.

April 17, 1996 Tokyo

Prime Minister of Japan

President of the United States
The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November, 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were agreed upon by the Government of Japan and the US Government at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides agreed that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to consolidate, realign and reduce US facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO is scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SACO, working with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and thorough discussions. As a result of these discussions, the SACO and the Joint Committee earlier announced a number of concrete steps to address Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) related issues such as noise reduction initiatives and adjustments to operational procedures.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Usui, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale agreed to several significant initiatives on the basis of the discussions conducted thus far at the SACO. These measures, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa, while fully maintaining the capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan. The total acreage of US facilities and areas in Okinawa is estimated to decrease by approximately 20 percent.

The SCC has emphasized the importance of implementing these measures in a timely manner without delay, and has instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. In order to minimize the impact of the activities of US forces on Okinawa, the Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate to implement the following:

**Return Land:**
- Return Futenma Air Station. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed. The airfield's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained through relocations of facilities. This will require construction of a heliport on other US facilities and areas in Okinawa; development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base; transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base (see Implementation of Noise Reduction Initiatives); and a joint US-Japan study on emergency use of facilities in the event of a crisis.
- Return Major Portion of Northern Training Area while ensuring access to the ocean.
- Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (land).
- Return Sobe Communications Site. Return Sobe Communications Site once a new site is constructed at Camp Hansen (Central Training Area) in the next five years.
- Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield. Relocate parachute drop training.
- Return Most of Camp Kuwae. Relocate the Naval Hospital and other facilities there to other US facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Return Senaha Communications Station. Relocate the Senaha Communications Stations and associated facilities to Torii Station and other US facilities and areas in Okinawa, allowing the release of land.
- Return Portions of Makiminato Service Area. Return land adjacent to Route 58.
- Return land as a result of housing consolidation. Develop a joint plan to consolidate US housing areas in Okinawa which will allow for the return of a significant portion of land in older housing areas including Camp Kuwae (Lester) and Camp Zukeran (Foster).
- Accelerate return of Naha Port. Build a new port at Urasoe to allow for the return of Naha Port.

**Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**
- Terminate artillery live-firing training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis. Relocate 155mm artillery live-fire training to the mainland of Japan.
- Relocate parachute drop training to Iejima.
- Terminate conditioning hikes on public roads in Okinawa.
Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:
- Implement agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee.
- Transfer KC-130 Hercules aircraft, relocate their supporting facilities, and transfer AV-8 Harrier aircraft. Transfer KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station and relocate their supporting facilities to Iwakuni Air Base in conjunction with the transfer of a similar number of Harrier aircraft to the United States.
- Relocate Navy P-3 operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways, and move MC-130 operations from the Navy ramp.
- Build new noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base.
- Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:
- Establish new procedures to provide timely information on US military aircraft accidents.
- Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Review and publicize guidelines for access to US facilities and areas.
- Implement agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces official vehicles.
- Expand education programs for voluntary automobile insurance.
- Review and publicize quarantine procedures.
- Publicize guidelines on removing expended munitions at Camp Hansen.
The two sides agreed to continue to study additional issues, including US recreational facilities.
Appendix 12
SACO Agreement Final Report (12/2/96)
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce US facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of US forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between US forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee as described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.
Return Land:

- **Futenma Air Station** - See attached

- **Northern Training Area**
  
  Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

  Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121 ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.

  Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

- **Aha Training Area**
  
  Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release US joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.

- **Gimbaru Training Area**
  
  Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

- **Sobe Communication Site**
  
  Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

- **Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield**
  
  Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.

- **Camp Kuwae**
  
  Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other US facilities and areas in Okinawa.

- **Senaha Communication Station**
  
  Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

- **Makiminato Service Area**
  
  Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

- **Naha Port**
  
  Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres). -Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
Consolidate US housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:
- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
  Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese Fiscal Year 1997.
- Parachute drop training
  Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads
  Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:
- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station
  Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
  Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
  Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
  Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
  Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of US forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:
- Accident reports
  Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on US military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.

In addition, as part of the US forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving US forces' assets or facilities.
-Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
-Visits to US facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to US facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
-Markings on US forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical US forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other US forces vehicles by October 1997.
-Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the US has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
-Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under US laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by US authorities.
In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the US Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
-Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
-Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the US forces in the United States.
-Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee
Appendix 12-a

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)
(December 2, 1996, Tokyo, Japan)

1. Introduction.
a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).

b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SCC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC.
a. Pursue construction of a SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable runway (approximately 1300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.

b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.

c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Stations but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.

d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational, cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing US facilities and areas.

c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other US military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.

f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)--supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

b. Pontoon Type--platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

c. Semi-Submersible Type--platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps.
a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definition of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.

c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.
Appendix 13
Revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(New York, September 23, 1997)

I. THE AIM OF THE GUIDELINES

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

II. BASIC PREMISES AND PRINCIPLES

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by the United States and Japan will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the Charter of the United Nations.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

III. COOPERATION UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the "National Defense Program Outline." In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of
the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as SCC and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchanges in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

When either or both Governments participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

3. Bilateral Programs

Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

IV. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST JAPAN

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as
appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities which could develop into an armed attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place
(1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions
Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.

In conducting bilateral operations, U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective Forces' ground, maritime and air services. The Self-Defense Forces will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. Forces support Self-Defense Forces' operations. U.S. Forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces.

The United States will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

(2) Concept of Operations
Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan
U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attack against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense. U.S. Forces will support Self-Defense Forces' operations and conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces.

Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication
U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations.

U.S. Forces will support Self-Defense Forces' operations and conduct operations, including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces.
Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. Forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces. The United States will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support Self-Defense Forces' operations.

Responses to Other Threats

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. Forces depending on the situation.

U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. Forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

Command and Coordination

U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

Communications and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

Logistics Support Activities

U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

Supply

The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will
support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.

Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. Forces' equipment in Japan; the United States will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. Japan will also support U.S. Forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will make joint use of Self-Defense Forces facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

V. COOPERATION IN SITUATIONS IN AREAS SURROUNDING JAPAN THAT WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON JAPAN'S PEACE AND SECURITY (SITUATIONS IN AREAS SURROUNDING JAPAN)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.
(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

Relief Activities and measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a flow of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the flow; the United States will provide appropriate support.

Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. Forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for U.S. and Japanese noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. In instances in which each decides it is appropriate, the two Governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out their evacuations, including for the securing of transportation means, transportation and the use of facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. If similar need arises for noncombatants other than of U.S. or Japanese nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

Use of Facilities

Based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. Forces of Self-Defense Forces facilities and civilian airports and ports.

Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. Forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. Forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished
from areas where combat operations are being conducted.
In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets. The Self-Defense Forces, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) U.S.-Japan Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. Forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

VI. BILATERAL PROGRAMS FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE COOPERATION UNDER THE GUIDELINES

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the United States and Japan to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role for presenting policy direction to the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The SDC will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant milestones to the SCC and the SDC.

(1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.
Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that results of these efforts will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. Forces, the Self-Defense Forces and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. Forces and Self-Defense Forces operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved. They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contacts. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

VII. TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the U.S.-Japan security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.
Appendix 14

East Asia Strategy Report
(November 23, 1998)

Introduction

The story of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is one of continuity, but within that larger context there is change and reaffirmation. The Department of Defense issued its first and second East Asian Strategy Reports (EASR) in 1990 and 1992, respectively, to outline the changes we would make in our strategy and force structure in response to the end of the Cold War. In 1995, DOD issued a third report, this time noting that continuing areas of uncertainty and tension require a reaffirmation of our security commitments to the region. Where the 1990 and 1992 reports anticipated reductions in our forward deployed forces, the 1995 report confirmed our intention to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the region for the foreseeable future, while increasing our efforts to share security responsibilities with our friends and allies, and to broaden bilateral and multilateral engagement. Based on this approach, we have taken a series of strategic steps over the past three years to reduce areas of uncertainty and to reinforce the region’s progress toward economic prosperity and political cooperation:

- Through the Quadrennial Defense Review, we have confirmed our ability and intention to maintain a robust overseas military presence of approximately 100,000 in the region, while harnessing new technology to retain our lead in capabilities;
- We have strengthened our alliance with Japan through the April 1996 Joint Security Declaration and the September 1997 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, working within the framework of our alliance relationship to enhance security cooperation and readiness with Japan;
- We have expanded our security cooperation and military access in Southeast Asia, while working with ASEAN states to enhance region-wide dialogue and confidence-building through the ASEAN Regional Forum;
- We are working with South Korea and China to engage North Korea through the Four Party Talks on a formula for reducing tensions and making the transition from armistice to lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula;
- We reaffirmed our security alliance with Australia through the 1996 Joint Security Declaration (“Sydney Statement”) pledging mutual cooperation on regional and global security concerns;
- We continue to build the foundation for a long-term relationship with China based on comprehensive engagement, as reflected in the 1997 and 1998 Clinton-Jiang Summits and as typified by a range of military exchanges and security dialogues;
- We have worked with our friends and allies in the region to initiate new mechanisms for transparency and confidence building, including trilateral and multilateral meetings; defense forums; and combined education at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii; and
- We have focused attention on the threat from weapons of mass destruction, addressing potential proliferation through the Agreed Framework and missile nonproliferation talks with North Korea, and improving our capabilities for counterproliferation through various means, including research and development of theater missile defense.

These steps are credible and sustainable because they are clearly in the interests of the United States, our allies and partners. Countries in the region watch our level of commitment as a key determinant of regional peace and stability. The dispatch of USS Nimitz and USS Independence during the March 1996 crisis, for instance, reaffirmed to Asia-Pacific nations U.S. commitment to peace and stability in the region. Consistent with our global security strategy, U.S. engagement in Asia provides an opportunity to
help shape the region’s future, prevent conflict and provide the stability and access that allows us to conduct approximately $500 billion a year in trans-Pacific trade.

While our policies since the 1995 EASR have confirmed U.S. commitment to the region and strengthened bilateral relationships, areas of uncertainty remain and new challenges have emerged. North Korea’s August 1998 missile launch and uncertainty over its commitment and adherence to the Agreed Framework threaten to set back the prospect for renewed South-North dialogue and progress in Four Party Talks to reduce tensions on the Peninsula and achieve a peace treaty. The Asian financial crisis has shaken the region’s assumptions about uninterrupted economic development and is testing regional economic cooperation, globalization, and the livelihood of two billion Asians. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 also add new complications not only for South Asia but also for security calculations of Asia-Pacific nations.

Indonesia’s economic and political difficulties will pose challenges to the established order both internally and in the region. In Cambodia and Burma, domestic crises threaten the region’s progress toward stable political cooperation. Historical mistrust and territorial disputes, including those in the South China Sea and elsewhere, remain unresolved, providing potential flashpoints over issues of sovereignty and nationalism. Crises outside the region, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, increasingly affect regional security, as Asia becomes more dependent on Gulf oil supplies for economic growth. In spite of these challenges, however, we still see a region mostly at peace, where interests converge and the reservoir of political will to deal with new challenges runs deep. The intention of the United States is to help dampen the sources of instability by maintaining a policy of robust engagement, overseas presence and strengthened alliances, while searching for new opportunities to increase confidence and a spirit of common security. Where our strategy during the Cold War was primarily one of worldwide strategic deterrence, today we must deter actions in critical localized areas, such as the Korean Peninsula, while maintaining our capability to respond to crises should they emerge anywhere around the world. In time of peace, our responsibility also extends to taking actions that shape the strategic environment to sustain the peace and prevent conflict over time.

In this way, U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region reflects and supports our global security strategy. DOD’s 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) presented the three integrated concepts of Shape, Respond, and Prepare: the United States will remain globally engaged to shape the international environment; respond to the full spectrum of crises; and prepare now for an uncertain future. The United States aims to promote a stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific community in which the United States is an active player, partner and beneficiary. This fourth East Asia Strategy Report is not being issued because of a change in our security strategy. Our priorities remain constant, but as always, we remain ready to promote fresh approaches to security in response to changes in the regional environment.

Finally, the EASR process itself represents a fundamental U.S. interest to promote openness and transparency of force structure, defense strategy and military doctrine throughout the region. Transparency fosters understanding, and enhances trust and confidence among nations. Other nations may choose to challenge elements of this report, but they cannot claim ignorance of American intentions, approach and status in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. welcomes honest dialogue concerning this report as constructive for mutual understanding and trust, and we encourage the continued development of similar public documents throughout the region to promote these ends.

Section 1. MAINTAINING COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT: "PRESENCE PLUS"

Maintaining an overseas military presence is a cornerstone of U.S. National Security Strategy and a key element of U.S. military policy of "shape, respond, and prepare." In Asia, U.S. force presence plays a particularly key role in promoting peace and security in regional affairs. However, this presence, while serving a critical shaping function, is but one element of general U.S. overseas engagement in the Asia-Pacific region that includes everything from conventional diplomacy, to international trade and investment, to people-to-people contact in educational, scientific and cultural exchanges. The U.S. military role itself, reflected in the USCCINCPAC Theater Engagement Plan, is far broader and more actively constructive in host countries than simply waiting for military action. The diversity of U.S. activity reflects comprehensive U.S. overseas engagement to protect and promote security interests in Asia, or "Presence Plus."
The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is geographically the largest unified command in the U.S. defense structure. It stretches from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa, and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. USPACOM’s area of responsibility includes the Pacific, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, encompassing 43 countries. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), commands approximately 300,000 personnel of all U.S. services, about one-fifth of the total U.S. Armed Forces. Approximately 100,000 of USCINCPAC’s military personnel are forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.

1.0 Principles of U.S. Military Presence in Asia
U.S. military presence in Asia has long provided critical practical and symbolic contributions to regional security. Our forces stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as those rotated throughout the region, promote security and stability, deter conflict, give substance to our security commitments and ensure our continued access to the region.

Our military presence in Asia serves as an important deterrent to aggression, often lessening the need for a more substantial and costly U.S. response later. Today deterrent capability remains critical in areas such as the Korean Peninsula. A visible U.S. force presence in Asia demonstrates firm determination to defend U.S., allied and friendly interests in this critical region.

In addition to its deterrent function, U.S. military presence in Asia serves to shape the security environment to prevent challenges from developing at all. U.S. force presence mitigates the impact of historical regional tensions and allows the United States to anticipate problems, manage potential threats and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes. Only through active engagement can the United States contribute to constructive political, economic and military development within Asia’s diverse environment. Forward presence allows the United States to continue playing a role in broadening regional confidence, promoting democratic values and enhancing common security.

Overseas military presence also provides political leaders and commanders the ability to respond rapidly to crises with a flexible array of options. Such missions may include regional and extra-regional contingencies, from humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation and peacekeeping operations to meeting active threats as in the Arabian Gulf. During the Arabian Gulf crisis in early 1998, for example, USS Independence deployed to the Gulf and was an important element of our deterrent force posture that alleviated the crisis. Military presence also enhances coalition operations by promoting joint, bilateral and combined training, and encouraging responsibility sharing on the part of friends and allies.

1.1 Force Structure
The 1995 East Asia Strategy Report stated that the United States will maintain approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region. This report reaffirms that commitment. We will sustain our presence with contributions from all military services, ensuring that we have maximum operational flexibility in the event of a crisis.

This force level in the region is based on our analysis of the strategic environment for now and in the future, and the military capabilities needed to achieve our goals. The presence of 100,000 U.S. military personnel is not arbitrary -- it represents the formidable capabilities of the U.S. Eighth Army and Seventh Air Force in Korea, III Marine Expeditionary Force and Fifth Air Force in Japan, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet, all focused on shaping, responding and preparing as necessary to achieve security and stability in the region.

Important actions have been undertaken to enhance the ability of these forces. These range from updated bilateral defense arrangements such as the Defense Guidelines with Japan, to increasingly sophisticated exercises and training with countries in the region, to the technological revolution that our militaries are now undergoing. All these additions enhance our presence in the region.

1.2 U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia
U.S. bases in Japan and Korea remain the critical component of U.S. deterrent and rapid response strategy in Asia. U.S. military presence in the region also enables the United States to respond more rapidly and flexibly in other areas.

The basic outlines of U.S. force presence in Japan and Korea will remain constant. Japanese peacetime host nation support (HNS) remains the most generous of any of America’s allies around the world,
averaging about $5 billion each year. Despite its severe financial crisis, Korea too provides substantial support for maintenance of U.S. troops, recognizing like Japan that HNS is a critical strategic factor in the alliance.

Both nations continue to modernize their forces and have procured substantial amounts of U.S. equipment, services and weapons systems to enhance interoperability and cooperation between alliance forces. In fact, the U.S. has more equipment in common with Japan than any other ally. Korea hosts the U.S. 7th Air Force, including the 8th and 51st Fighter Wings, and the 8th Army, including the 2nd Infantry Division. Japanese bases maintain the U.S. 5th Air Force, including 18th Wing, 35th Fighter Wing and 374th Airlift Wing, Navy 7th Fleet, including USS Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group and USS Belleau Wood Amphibious Ready Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 9th Theater Area Army Command (TAACOM) and 1st USA Special Forces Battalion. The diversity, flexibility and complementarity of our force structure in the region provide credible and practical contributions to regional stability and security.

The maintenance of a diverse and flexible force presence in Asia remains of fundamental strategic importance to the U.S. In addition to providing U.S. commanders great flexibility in tailoring forces to meet national objectives, a strategic mix is essential to a credible deterrent posture because it presents an enemy with an overwhelming array of capabilities against which to defend.

Southeast Asia and Australia

After the closure of our bases in the Philippines in 1992, the United States has benefited from a series of access agreements and other arrangements with Southeast Asian partners that have supported continued U.S. military engagement. These arrangements, including port calls, repair facilities, training ranges and logistics support, have become increasingly important to our overseas presence. For example, Singapore announced in early 1998 that its Changi Naval Station, which will be operational in the year 2000, will be available to U.S. naval combatants and include a pier which can accommodate American aircraft carriers. In January 1998, the United States and the Philippines negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement that, when ratified, will permit routine combined exercises and training, and ship visits. Thailand remains an important refueling and transit point for possible operations to neighboring trouble spots, including the Arabian Gulf. Australia has long provided key access to facilities for U.S. unilateral and combined exercises in order to ensure readiness and coordinated responses to regional contingencies. The existence of such arrangements throughout the region underscores the increasing importance of Southeast Asia and Australia to regional security, and their commitment to a credible and potent U.S. overseas presence as a cornerstone of their security interests.

Additionally, U.S. port calls to Hong Kong have continued uninterrupted since the reversion of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty. These port calls also contribute constructively to U.S. military presence in the region, allowing for minor maintenance and repair of transiting ships.

Good Neighbors

Although our overseas presence in Asia serves both regional and U.S. security interests, the impact on local communities in host countries can be great. The United States understands and appreciates the sacrifices of the citizens who live near training areas or bases, and who sometimes endure noise and other inconveniences. U.S. forces work to mitigate these effects and coordinate closely with officials at both the national and local levels, and local citizens groups to reach mutually satisfactory arrangements. In Japan, for instance, U.S. forces have relocated artillery training and, when possible, carrier landing practice to alleviate the inconvenience to local residents. The United States has also worked with Japan to establish quiet hours to minimize the impact of routine air operations on local communities. In both Japan and Korea, there has been a continuing effort to address environmental issues associated with its base presence. The U.S. has pledged to work closely with Japanese and Korean authorities to ensure U.S. military operations and maintenance of military facilities are carried out with due regard for the environment and public safety.

The U.S. has also made progress to return base and training-related land, to alter operational procedures in host countries in an effort to respond to local concerns, and to be better neighbors while maintaining operational capabilities. For instance, the U.S. and Japan established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) process in 1995 to consider ways to reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on Okinawa with the aim of alleviating the burden on the Okinawan people. The result was the SACO
Final Report, released in December 1996. The report outlined 27 measures to reduce, realign and consolidate U.S. facilities and areas on Okinawa, adjust operational procedures and improve implementation of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, such as timely notification of all major accidents.

The SACO report presented a plan under which the U.S. would return 11 pieces of land, encompassing 21 percent of the total area used by the United States on Okinawa. The centerpiece of the land return program is the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from the crowded southern portion of Okinawa. The replacement facility will maintain the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities.

The U.S. and Japan remain strongly committed to implementation of the SACO Final Report. In Korea, the United States and the Republic of Korea also completed negotiations in December 1997 to return about 5,000 acres of U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK) training areas to the ROK government. In exchange, U.S. forces in Korea secured access to ROK Army training areas. In this way, the United States and ROK responded both to the needs of the people of Korea and the mission requirements of USFK.

In addition, U.S. personnel have reemphasized the importance of being good guests who make constructive contributions to the communities in which they live. U.S. forces and their spouses in Japan and Korea, for instance, sponsor cultural and social events, contribute to environmental clean-up activities, maintain local parks, provide assistance to charitable institutions and contribute in a variety of other ways to improving their communities.

1.3 Exercises, Training and Military Sales

U.S. strategy emphasizes the importance of active bilateral and multilateral exercise programs between the United States services and the armed forces of friendly and allied nations. Significant joint, combined and other smaller military-to-military exercises take place annually with our allies in Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines.

Exercises serve as a visible demonstration of U.S. commitment to the region, improve interoperability and readiness, and demonstrate our ability to form and lead effective coalitions. Exercises promote burden sharing on the part of friends and allies and facilitate regional integration. They exhibit our capabilities and resolve, and provide realistic conditions for working with the technologies, systems and operational procedures that will be crucial in times of crisis. International exercises also provide geographic familiarity and foster an understanding of cultures, values and habits of other societies.

The United States also participates in a variety of combined training activities. These include Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE) and Observer Training. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) and its component E-IMET (Expanded IMET) programs, which focus on promoting responsible military values and lasting ties between U.S. and regional military leaders, are also essential elements of U.S. regional strategy. Section 4 addresses the benefits of IMET and E-IMET in greater detail.

U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs also play a key role in supporting our regional engagement strategy. FMS ensures critical interoperability with allies and friends that facilitates coalition operations. FMF programs enable key friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities by financing acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. While only two countries -- Cambodia and Laos -- received FMF grants in FY97 (for demining operations), FMF may serve as an effective tool in the future to assist our Asia-Pacific allies and friends as they weather the current financial crisis.

1.4 Technological Revolution

The Department of Defense recognizes that even as we maintain the ready, versatile forces necessary to meet the challenges of shaping and responding in the near term, we must at the same time be transforming our forces, capabilities, and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the future. This transformation involves more than the acquisition of new military systems. It means harnessing new technologies, operational concepts and organizational structures to give U.S. forces greater mobility, flexibility and military capabilities so they can dominate any future battlefield. In 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released Joint Vision 2010 to address the impact of advances in technology and information systems on U.S. military strategies, force structure and operations around the world.
The "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) that embodies this transformation in U.S. military capabilities is already being felt in Asia. Advances in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance will combine with the introduction of new weapons systems to revolutionize U.S. ability to respond rapidly to any conflict and dominate any battlefield situation. The United States will continue to ensure that we maintain interoperability with forces of allied and partner nations. This can be achieved through joint research and development, combined doctrine development and training, and a focus on the compatibility of systems.

The impact of the technological revolution on U.S. forces in Asia will be substantial, supplementing our forward deployed personnel to enhance dramatically our operational capabilities in the region. However, the full promise of RMA remains in the future. The improvements in military hardware and support systems are not yet at the stage of fundamentally altering our strategic perceptions or force structure in the region, or elsewhere around the world.

Separate box: Even as Asia-Pacific nations work to base their societies increasingly on advanced, computer-based technologies, we must remain aware of, and indeed anticipate, potential complications such modern and intricate systems may engender. The "Year 2000" (Y2K) computer problem, for instance, threatens to affect major public and private operating systems around the world, with potentially substantial impact on economic, social and military security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The "Y2K problem" is the term used to describe the potential failure of information technology prior to, on or after January 1, 2000. The potential exists because of the widespread practice of using two digits, not four, to represent the year in computer databases, software applications and hardware chips. Difficulties will arise in the Y2K when that year is 00 and information technology will be unable to differentiate it from the year 1900.

DOD is taking the Y2K problem seriously and has generated cross-service work groups to address the issue. Likewise, the United States encourages all nations in the region to redouble their attention to the problem, and work together to anticipate and manage this potential security challenge.

1.5 Comprehensive Engagement

U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region to promote mutual security extends beyond military bases and access to encompass a broad range of vehicles for promoting our interests and influence. Our diplomatic missions serve at the forefront as the engine of U.S. overall engagement with the region. U.S. trade and investment, cultural, social and religious exchanges, foreign study and tourism all contribute markedly to comprehensive and constructive U.S. overseas engagement in Asia. Approximately 400,000 U.S. citizens, excluding military personnel and dependents, live, work and study in the region. Thousands more travel to the region as tourists each year, serving as unofficial ambassadors of U.S. values and friendship. U.S. businesses conduct more than $500 billion in trade and have invested more than $150 billion throughout the region, serving in the process as exemplars of the benefits of market capitalism.

The presence of U.S. military personnel in the region multiplies our diplomatic impact through engagement with counterparts and the demonstration of professional military ethics and conduct in a democratic society. The combination of U.S. political, military, diplomatic, economic and social engagement that this activity in the region represents reassures friendly nations and encourages pursuit of policies in U.S. and regional interests. In this way, the full range and diversity of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region must not be overlooked when considering the value of U.S. overseas presence to security.

Section 2. ENHANCING OUR REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The U.S. recognizes and reaffirms the critical role that our alliances play in securing peace and stability in Asia. We also highly value the substantial progress we have made in our bilateral and multilateral relationships throughout the region as we explore a range of vehicles for promoting constructive ties among nations. These frameworks complement rather than supplant one another, serving to promote general stability. The United States welcomes continued development of such frameworks throughout the region as long as they remain transparent and constructive.

Consistent with these principles, U.S. alliances in the region have long served as the cornerstone of regional security. In contrast to Cold War-era alliances, they are not directed at any third power but serve the interests of all who benefit from regional stability and security. The United States views the reaffirmation and enhancement of these alliances over the past three years, and the concurrent and
complementary development of constructive ties with non-allied states, as evidence of our continued confidence that an integrated network of security relations is in the mutual interest of all Asia-Pacific nations.

This section reviews the development of U.S. regional relationships over the past three years. Section 6 will address our vision of the future course of these relationships into the new century.

2.0 Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the linchpin of our security strategy in Asia. The end of the Cold War changed the security environment in Asia and challenged some assumptions about the purpose and role of the alliance. The United States and Japan recognize the fundamental and continuing contribution of the alliance to the defense of Japan and regional peace and stability. Both sides have moved actively over the past three years to update the framework and structure of joint cooperation to reflect the new environment.

In April 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, which reaffirmed the continued and growing importance of our alliance to the security of both nations and to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Joint Declaration established a vision for preserving and strengthening the bilateral security partnership. Included was an agreement to conduct a review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in order to update the alliance and enhance bilateral defense cooperation.

The September 1997 release of revised Defense Guidelines marked a new era in U.S.-Japan relations and regional security. Besides further outlining bilateral cooperation during normal circumstances and for the defense of Japan, the new Guidelines provided the basis for more effective bilateral cooperation during a regional crisis that affects Japan’s peace and security.

In the new Guidelines, Japan has set forth a more definitive role in responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. For instance, the revised Guidelines outline Japanese rear area support to U.S. forces responding to a regional contingency. This support may include providing access to airfields, ports, transportation, logistics, and medical support. Japan would also be able, as applicable, to cooperate and coordinate with U.S. forces to conduct such missions and functions as minesweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and inspection of ships to enforce UN sanctions. By enhancing the alliance’s capability to respond to crises, the revised Guidelines are an excellent example of preventive diplomacy: they contribute to shaping the security environment by improving deterrence and stability in the region.

Defense cooperation under the Guidelines will remain consistent with rights and obligations set forth in the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the limitations of Japan’s Constitution and basic principles of international law. The United States and Japan will determine independently whether to cooperate, consistent with the Guidelines, in the event of a regional contingency. This decision will be based on the nature of the situation. As such, the concept "situations in areas surrounding Japan" embodied in the revised Guidelines is not geographical but situational.

During the review process, U.S. and Japanese officials engaged in extensive briefings throughout the Asia Pacific region on the scope, objectives and substance of the Guidelines review. This exercise in transparency should serve as a model for other nations in the region as they establish and update their defense relationships and strategies in the future.

2.1 Toward a Lasting Security Partnership with the ROK

The long-run U.S. objective remains a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear, democratic, reconciled, and ultimately reunified Peninsula. Toward this end, the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) serves as the foundation on which all U.S. diplomatic, defense, and economic efforts on the Korean Peninsula rest. Our treaty commitment and the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea help deter any North Korean aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the U.S. would immediately be fully engaged in any such conflict. The U.S. and ROK continue to maintain and strengthen the three major elements of our security alliance: the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, bilateral consultations and combined military forces.

The strong U.S.-ROK deterrent posture has created the potential for improved security conditions and political relations on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, a firm stance by the United States and ROK laid the groundwork for the 1994 Agreed Framework, which froze North Korea’s nuclear facilities at
Yongbyon and Taechon under IAEA inspection, defused a critical source of tension and deflected what could have been a military confrontation with North Korea.

Ongoing concerns about DPRK compliance with the Agreed Framework have underscored the need for continued vigilance and close monitoring of the terms of the agreement. However, the United States still regards a properly functioning Agreed Framework as the best vehicle available for limiting North Korean nuclear activities and creating an opening to pursue other issues of concern with the DPRK, such as missile and chemical weapons proliferation and the recovery of Korean War remains. The United States will insist that North Korea abide fully by its obligations under the Agreed Framework and will pursue any suspect DPRK activity until it has been clarified and resolved satisfactorily. If North Korea proves unwilling to fulfill the terms of the agreement, the United States will pursue its fundamental security interests through other diplomatic and security means.

A strong U.S. and ROK security posture has also fostered the Four Party peace process, which convened in plenary sessions in December 1997, March 1998, and October 1998. This proposal for peace talks among North and South Korea, the United States and China has enabled the United States and ROK to create a diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.

However, the most critical forum for lasting peace and security on the Peninsula, remains direct South-North contact. Only South and North Korea can resolve the division of Korea. Until a permanent peace arrangement is concluded with genuine reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the United States remains committed to the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to closely coordinating its policy towards North Korea with the ROK.

U.S. and ROK military forces unified under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) continue to enhance their capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression. Although the substantial deterioration in North Korea’s economic conditions has inevitably affected its military forces, North Korea is still capable of inflicting terrible destruction on South Korea, especially with artillery, missile, and chemical weapons. Even as it issues periodic appeals for food for its citizens, North Korea expends very substantial resources on military exercises and the enhancement of certain military capabilities. Its August 1998 missile launch, which overflew Japan, underscored for the entire region that North Korea, despite its domestic hardship, continues to pose a threat not only on the Peninsula but to common regional security.

In response to this continuing threat, the CFC continues to modernize its military equipment, with significant upgrades in armor, artillery, attack aviation, counterfire, and pre-positioned stocks. Also, to sharpen readiness, the Command is continually refining its vigorous program of exercises, field training, computer simulation and reinforcement plans.

Deteriorating economic conditions, including its serious food shortage, have raised troubling questions about future developments in North Korea. In these uncertain circumstances, the ROK and United States continue to consult closely to prepare for a wide range of contingencies. We cannot ignore the possibility that potentially destabilizing conditions could arise in the North in the form of famine, massive refugee flows, or other disruptive scenarios. The United States and South Korea will work together to resolve such situations at the lowest level of tension possible and in a way that is least disruptive to regional stability.

The ROK’s own economic difficulties may challenge its ability to maintain financial and other security-related responsibilities. The United States will work with South Korea to minimize the impact of the crisis on stability on the Peninsula. Despite a substantial reduction of the ROK’s defense budget, the ROK has assured the United States that it will maintain combined operational readiness and deterrent capabilities.

Anti-Personnel Landmines in Korea

Korea is a unique theater of operations for U.S. forces. Boasting the most heavily fortified border in the world, Korea is one of the last remaining examples of Cold War-era confrontation. Along the DMZ, just 24 miles from Seoul, the North Korean Peoples’ Army has nearly 600,000 troops, more than 2,400 tanks, and over 6,000 artillery pieces. It is an area where hostilities could erupt with little or no warning. Anti-personnel landmines (APLs) serve as an integral component of U.S. capability to deter and defend the ROK against a potential invasion by the DPRK. The extensive barrier system in place, which is linked to the restrictive terrain, is key to U.S.-ROK integrated defense plans and to minimizing U.S. and ROK civilian and military casualties that would result from the absence of APLs during an invasion.
Citing his responsibility to protect U.S. troops, President Clinton announced in September 1997 that the United States would not sign the Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines. He noted that the Convention did not contain an adequate transition period for the United States to safely phase out and develop alternatives to its APLs, including those in Korea. Neither did it contain a provision permitting use of U.S. self-destructing mixed anti-tank mine systems, which are critical for effective defense on the Korean Peninsula.

President Clinton has directed the Department of Defense to end the use of all anti-personnel landmines outside Korea by 2003, including those that self-destruct. For Korea, the objective is to have alternatives to anti-personnel landmines ready by 2006.

2.2 Building on a History of Cooperation: Australia and the Pacific
The U.S.-Australia alliance remains as close as any alliance we maintain in the region. Australia and the United States have fought alongside one another in five major conflicts in this century: both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. We have some 250 bilateral legal arrangements and agreements in place that are specifically defense-related.

In July 1996, the U.S. and Australia reaffirmed their alliance commitments in the Joint Security Declaration ("Sydney Statement"). The Joint Declaration strengthened our cooperation to include new and expanded combined exercises and opportunities for training. Our combined exercise schedule is robust and covers the full range of operational and tactical cooperation and interoperability, from full-scale joint/combined activities to unit-level tactics involving all branches of the services of both countries. In March 1997, TANDEM THRUST, a combined United States-Australia force-on-force field training exercise, was the largest military exercise conducted in Australia since World War II. Some 17,000 U.S. and 5,000 Australian troops participated.

Besides significant bilateral exercises, the U.S. Navy conducts numerous port calls annually. In 1997 alone, the U.S. Seventh Fleet made 102 port visits to Australia. Increased Australian and U.S. combined training, particularly in the Northern Territory, is also being explored.

New Zealand and the Pacific Islands
Although U.S. relations with New Zealand are generally positive, the major policy disagreement remains over New Zealand’s prohibition of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels in its waters. The United States suspended ANZUS alliance defense obligations to New Zealand in 1986 and revised its defense policy to prohibit exercises and place limits on other aspects of the bilateral defense relationship. The United States appreciates the contribution of New Zealand to regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and important shared defense policy goals, including its participation in a range of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions around the world, and its contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Given the findings of then-Prime Minister Bolger’s "Somers Report" in 1992 affirming the safety of nuclear-powered warships, the U.S. hopes that in the future conditions will allow full restoration of military cooperation with New Zealand.

The United States has specific legal responsibility for the defense of the U.S. territories of Guam and American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and, under the Compact of Free Association, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Republic of Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Economic Relations and the Security and Defense Relations of the compact with the RMI and FSM are due for renegotiations in October 1999. The facilities at Kwajalein Atoll, located within the RMI, afford the U.S. military the opportunity to conduct ballistic missile defense and intercontinental ballistic missile testing, space surveillance, and research and development. Continued lease option for facilities at Kwajalein Atoll is guaranteed until 2016 regardless of the outcome of the Compact renegotiation.

We continue to support the developing nations of the South Pacific and note their contributions to regional and international peacekeeping efforts. We remain engaged in the area though our Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Humanitarian and Excess Property programs, supporting the establishment and growth of democratic processes and the role of the military in those processes.
2.3 U.S.-Thailand Alliance: Partners in Practice
Our longstanding alliance with Thailand remains strong and serves a critical function in enhancing our strategic interests worldwide. Thailand has been a consistent supporter of the U.S. overseas presence in Asia, and a strong partner in addressing global issues such as counterproliferation and drug trafficking. Our bilateral relationship with Thailand has facilitated U.S. access and interoperability. The relationship has afforded the U.S. important refueling and transit arrangements that have enhanced our ability to operate within the region.

Thailand's cooperation is essential to support counterdrug and anti-piracy operations, activities of the Joint Task Force Full Accounting [POW/MIA], and munitions pre-positioning operations. The War Reserve Stockpile Agreement has been a real success, and has contributed to increased readiness in Southeast Asia.

COBRA GOLD is the largest joint training opportunity in Southeast Asia and the centerpiece of an impressive joint exercise program that provides training opportunities and enhances interoperability. To the United States, COBRA GOLD provides an important opportunity to communicate through action our continued serious commitment to the security and well-being of our treaty ally, and demonstrate how serious we are about remaining engaged in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States will work with Thailand to minimize the impact of its current economic difficulties on security needs. It is important that Thailand retain interest in preserving a high level of interoperability to serve our common interests should we have to conduct joint military operations in the region.

We also continue to assist the efforts of the Thai armed forces to modernize and streamline their organization, and improve their leadership capabilities. We want to reinforce the increasing professionalism of the military, which has contributed to the continued development of democracy in Thailand.

2.4 After Bases: Solidifying our Alliance with the Philippines
The U.S.-Philippine security relationship has evolved since the withdrawal of U.S. military bases in 1991-92. We are gradually establishing a post-bases relationship that is consistent with our activities elsewhere in the region -- exercises, ship visits, exchanges, and policy dialogues. Upon ratification by the Philippine Senate, the January 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, which lays out the legal status of U.S. defense personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with official duties, will facilitate expanded military cooperation. The visit of President Ramos to Washington in April 1998 further affirmed our mutual commitment to the timely resumption of U.S. training activities in the Philippines. Familiarity, cooperation and interoperability are important ingredients of a strong alliance, and we will work to solidify the U.S.-Philippines security partnership in the coming years. Despite lingering suspicion by some in the Philippines that the United States is seeking to re-establish a military foothold, the era of U.S. bases is over. We seek to develop the defense relationship in ways and at a pace comfortable to the Philippines.

2.5 Comprehensive Engagement with China
The United States understands that lasting security in the Asia-Pacific region is not possible without a constructive role played by China. The October 1997 and June 1998 summit meetings between President Clinton and President Jiang marked a turning point in U.S.-China relations and were central events in furthering the U.S. strategy of comprehensive engagement with China.

China presents numerous challenges, as well as opportunities, in our regional security strategy. As a nuclear weapons state, a leading regional military power, and global player with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, China plays a key role in Asia-Pacific security. The United States, and indeed the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, has a substantial interest in China’s emergence as a stable, secure, open, prosperous and peaceful country. Prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia depend heavily upon China’s role as a responsible member of the international community.

The United States and China share many common global and regional interests. The United States and China both have an interest in maintaining regional stability to foster continuation of Asia’s economic development. We share with China an interest in its emergence as a stable, prosperous nation. We both share strong interests in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We both have concerns for world and Asian
stability resulting from nuclear testing in India and Pakistan. We cooperate in countering a wide range of non-conventional security threats.

China’s rise as a major power presents an array of potential challenges. Many of China’s neighbors are closely monitoring China’s growing defense expenditures and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including development and acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft, programs to develop mobile ballistic missile systems, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, and advanced surface-to-air missiles; and a range of power projection platforms. Given international and regional focus on China’s growing military power, China’s adherence to multilateral nonproliferation and arms control regimes, and to increased military transparency are of growing importance. The United States welcomed China’s publication of a Defense White Paper in August 1998 as a positive step towards greater openness.

In a significant move toward greater transparency and participation in international security dialogue, China released a White Paper in July 1998 entitled, “China’s National Defense.” The document outlines the Chinese Government’s views on international and regional security issues, and its own defense policies. The paper restates China’s desire to resolve outstanding issues in regional affairs through diplomatic means and to work with other nations to establish a stable regional security framework for the Asia-Pacific region. The White Paper also explains that China’s primary national security concern is economic construction. Finally, the White Paper highlights China’s growing role in global security problems such as nonproliferation.

“China’s National Defense” asserts Beijing’s view that the enlargement of military blocs and the strengthening of military alliances have added “factors of instability” to international security. This view runs counter to the prevailing recognition that U.S. alliances in Asia have promoted stability. China’s economic modernization has benefited from the constructive regional environment that U.S. alliances in Asia have promoted. China has an important role in the evolving security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region and the development of multilateral institutions that complement the existing network of bilateral alliances. As the United States, China and others in the region work to build that security architecture, the greatest challenge will be to manage the gap that still exists in strategic visions and to develop mutually acceptable approaches to security.

Dialogue between the United States and China will also remain critical to ensure that both countries have a clear appreciation of one another’s regional security interests. Dialogue and exchanges can reduce misperceptions between our two countries, increase our understanding of Chinese security concerns, and build confidence between our two defense establishments to avoid military accidents and miscalculations. The agreement not to target strategic nuclear weapons at one another, reached during President Clinton’s June 1998 visit to China, was also an important symbolic action that reassured both sides and reaffirmed our constructive relationship.

The United States and China have continued to make progress in establishing institutional frameworks for communication and mutual understanding. The United States has undertaken this approach on a step-by-step basis to avoid false expectations and to build on actual achievements. The establishment of a direct Presidential communications link in May 1998 provides an important conduit for consultation on global, regional and bilateral issues. The Military Maritime Consultation Agreement of January 1998 is designed to establish a process for dialogue between the two militaries that will enhance understanding and trust as our maritime and air forces operate in close proximity to one another. DOD has also begun to conduct regular high-level strategic dialogue through annual Defense Consultative Talks, which were initiated in December 1997. Our militaries have exchanged port visits and begun exchanges on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And we have conducted reciprocal senior defense and military visits and continued defense academic exchanges through our respective National Defense Universities.

Hong Kong
The United States Navy conducts 60-80 port calls a year to Hong Kong. This program has continued uninterrupted since the reversion of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty. Port calls to Hong Kong contribute to U.S. overseas presence in the region, allowing for minor maintenance and repair of transiting ships. Continued access to one of the world’s premier quality-of-life ports contributes positively to sailor retention and also serves as symbolic support for the continued autonomy of Hong Kong as called for in the 1984 UK-PRC Joint Declaration, and Hong Kong’s Basic Law.
Taiwan
The United States maintains robust but unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan, governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and guided by the three U.S.-PRC joint communiques. We have consistently held that the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resolve. The United States has an abiding interest that any resolution be peaceful. In accordance with the TRA and consistent with the three U.S.-PRC communiques, the United States sells defensive arms to Taiwan to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Our limited arms sales have contributed to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and to creating an atmosphere conducive to the improvement of cross-Strait relations, including dialogue.

2.6 Enhancing Nascent Relations with Mongolia
The United States has enjoyed excellent relations with Mongolia since establishment of diplomatic relations in 1987. The United States has supported Mongolia’s commitment to democracy, free markets and integration into the Asia-Pacific security network as consistent with our interests. The United States welcomes the inclusion of Mongolia in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and will work in coming years to facilitate Mongolia’s participation in a wide range of multilateral conferences involving Asia-Pacific military forces. In addition, the United States supports continued specialized military training and education through the IMET program, future joint training in such areas as disaster preparedness, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, expansion of our nascent policy dialogue on international and security issues, and the establishment of regular high level political and military visits between our countries.

2.7 Broadening Cooperation with Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia, particularly through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has played an increasingly important role in regional security. The nations of ASEAN have grown more confident and assertive in the years following the end of the Cold War, an appropriate posture for countries that have undergone a generation of considerable struggle, accomplishment and development. Despite the financial crisis that has shaken the area’s leading developing economies, we expect that these countries will continue as important security partners.

ASEAN’s patterns of consultation, cooperation and consensus, now being adopted in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), are an important model for regional cooperation. ASEAN nations join with the United States in common purpose to prevent conflict, enhance stability, promote economic growth, and assure that the interests of all nations are taken into account. ASEAN has distinguished itself by tackling such issues as political instability in Cambodia and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Consistent with this common purpose is open support and advocacy among ASEAN nations of a continued U.S. military presence in the region. Port access agreements, military training and education programs, and other bilateral and multilateral security-related frameworks complement U.S. overseas presence and further affirm Southeast Asia’s increasing importance as a regional partner for enhancing security.

The security of the United States and the region has benefited from the markets and friendships that have developed between the U.S. and ASEAN nations. The United States will remain committed to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia both in good times and in bad.

Brunei
Brunei has publicly supported the U.S. role in maintaining Asia-Pacific security, including a continuing U.S. military presence in the region. U.S. defense objectives in Brunei are modest: the United States desires active, albeit limited, military interaction in the form of periodic small-scale exercises using Brunei’s jungle training facility, ship and personnel visits, and aircraft transits. In political-military terms, however, a friendly and relatively active military-to-military relationship fits within our overall security framework. Our 1994 Defense Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding and periodic bilateral meetings conducted under its auspices form the foundation of our defense ties.

Burma
The United States continues to have serious concerns about the repressive and unstable situation in Burma. The Burmese government’s intransigent and repressive policies against its own citizens, including its failure to honor the results of legislative elections held in 1990, pose challenges to regional stability and security. The results are all too evident in the many thousands of refugees who have fled across borders to escape continued fighting and repression. U.S. economic sanctions on Burma serve notice to the regime that the deteriorating situation in the country affects U.S. interests. Now that Burma has become an ASEAN member, we look to ASEAN to shoulder greater responsibility for producing progress by prodding the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to halt its repression of the democratic opposition, move to meaningful political dialogue with the National League for Democracy under Aung San Suu Kyi, and with the ethnic minorities, and continue effective action against the narcotics trade.

Cambodia
The United States suspended assistance to the Royal Cambodian Government, including military assistance to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), as a result of the events of early July 1997, which unseated the First Co-Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Humanitarian aspects of U.S. assistance to Cambodia, including assistance to the Cambodian Mine Action Center, continued during this interim period. However, training, exercises and the provision of equipment and security assistance remained suspended. The United States will reevaluate the situation after Cambodia seats a new government following the parliamentary elections held in late July 1998. Prior to suspension of U.S. military assistance, the United States has stressed the importance of comprehensively reforming the RCAF, including reducing the number of troops, instilling and sustaining discipline, providing consistent pay to the military, and eliminating corruption. U.S. military assistance to Cambodia featured non-lethal humanitarian assistance including English-language training, training for military engineers, medical exercises, and assistance to the Royal Government’s efforts to reintegrate Khmer Rouge defectors into society. The U.S. has a strong interest in, and willingness to support, Cambodian military reforms.

Indonesia
As the world’s fourth most populous nation and home to the world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia has played a pivotal role in fostering regional stability and will continue to have a critical influence in the Asia-Pacific region into the next century. Indonesia’s geostrategic position and regional influence make it important for the United States to maintain a cooperative bilateral defense relationship. Indonesia’s vast span of thousands of islands forms a gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and straddles some of the world’s most critical sea lines of communication. Indonesia’s support for long-term U.S. presence in the region also has been an important factor in our overall regional security strategy.

In the security arena, as in political and economic affairs, the U.S. and Indonesia share important, broad interests in promoting stability and peaceful resolution of conflict both regionally and internationally. Indonesia has been a cornerstone of ASEAN, has served as an influential participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC, and has demonstrated leadership on regional security problems such as Cambodia and the South China Sea. Indonesia has also established a long tradition of supporting UN peacekeeping operations and has been heavily involved in global disarmament efforts. The unprecedented financial crisis and political transition with which Indonesia is currently grappling will focus Jakarta’s energies on internal stability and recovery for the foreseeable future. The outcome of the economic turmoil and political evolution nonetheless will have an important impact on regional stability and security. Economic restructuring and the opening of the political system pose serious challenges for post-Soeharto governments and have the potential to significantly affect many nations in the region. Continued U.S. engagement in Indonesia will help promote the stability necessary to manage this difficult situation.

Laos
The United States remains committed to exploring ways of broadening and developing our military relationship with Laos. Lao POW/MIA cooperation is good and producing results. A majority of remaining cases of missing Americans are actively being pursued through substantive leads.
The United States remains interested in establishing a defense attaché office in Laos to complement offices opened in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1995. DOD interests in counter-narcotics programs, especially the aggressive efforts of Laos to eliminate heroin production and refinement, require on-the-ground management and collection support. Our growing humanitarian assistance programs in the Lao countryside serve to build contacts within the Lao Ministry of Defense to address these and other concerns.

Malaysia
Our bilateral defense relationship with Malaysia has expanded and matured over the past decade because of our shared regional outlook and mutual security interests. Malaysia publicly supports a continued U.S. military presence in Asia and makes available naval and air maintenance and repair facilities. Our ship visits and exercises in Malaysia, which have gradually increased, have become an important component of our Southeast Asian presence. We will look for ways to expand our access to, and engagement with the Malaysian defense establishment. Malaysia is also a regional leader in UN peacekeeping operations, as well as an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, offering additional avenues for enhanced cooperation in the future.

Singapore
Singapore has been Southeast Asia’s leading advocate of a continued U.S. military presence. Singapore actively searches for ways to keep the United States engaged in the region, whether in multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, or by expanding U.S. military access opportunities in Singapore itself. Well before the U.S. entered basing negotiations with the Philippines in the early 1990s, Singapore offered to conclude an access agreement that would help disperse the U.S. presence and spread the political responsibility of hosting U.S. forces. The 1990 Access Memorandum of Understanding has been instrumental in sustaining our post-bases presence in Southeast Asia. Although fewer than 200 U.S. personnel are permanently assigned to Singapore, we conduct a variety of naval and air training, most notably fighter aircraft deployments that occur approximately six times per year. A naval logistics unit -- Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific -- that was relocated from Subic Bay at the time of our military withdrawal from the Philippines assists in fleet support and coordinates bilateral naval exercises in Southeast Asia. Singapore continued its forward-looking engagement effort by offering U.S. access to its long-planned new pier facility at Changi that can accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier. This initiative will greatly facilitate our carrier visits and operations in the region, and represents Singapore’s strong commitment to continued close relations with the United States into the next century.

Vietnam
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam in July 1995, the United States has kept the initial stages of the U.S.-Vietnamese security relationship purposefully modest in pace and scope. Initiatives have focused on enhancing mutual understanding. The fullest possible accounting of missing in action from the Indochina War continues to be the most important issue in the bilateral relationship. At the same time, the Department of Defense has a range of regional security interests that could profitably be addressed through normal, routine contacts with the Vietnamese military. Our goal is to develop a frank and serious dialogue with Vietnam about such issues and build mutual confidence. The security relationship must also be transparent, leaving no possibility that our intentions will be misunderstood by others in the region. The United States is prepared to move forward with incremental steps aimed at improving the relationship in a manner maintaining our priority concern of accounting for missing American service personnel.

2.8 Expanding Regional Cooperation with Russia
Although Russia is traditionally considered a European power, geographically, historically and culturally, Russia is also an Asia-Pacific nation.
In the past, the Soviet Union’s contributions to Asia-Pacific security was deemed either negative or negligible. Today, America welcomes the Russian Federation’s active and constructive role in Asia-Pacific security as important to regional stability. Military exercises and cooperation, port visits, and both senior-level and staff-level exchanges with the region’s armed forces have enhanced transparency and trust, and reduced suspicions left over from the Cold War. Russian engagement in such regional fora as the ARF may enhance habits of security cooperation.

In November 1998, Russia will become a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which will enhance Russia’s engagement with its Asia-Pacific neighbors and increase its participation in a variety of multilateral economic discussions. The development of Russia’s economy, including the Far East region with its abundant natural resources, can contribute substantially to regional economic growth and buttress regional peace. At the same time, Asian capital and know-how can fuel Russia’s prosperity and contribute to its historic transition from an authoritarian communist regime to a liberal, market democracy.

Increasing Russian engagement may help relieve historical tensions and resolve several longstanding disputes that have plagued the region. For example, Russia and Japan are working toward the conclusion of a peace treaty to fully normalize the relationship between the two countries. Toward that end, they have begun to identify new paths toward settling their dispute over the Northern Territories, which has delayed completion of the treaty for half a century. Their pledge at the Krasnoyarsk summit of November 1997, to do their utmost to conclude a treaty by the year 2000 benefits the United States and all who value regional security.

Likewise, Russia has enhanced its relations with South Korea, while its relationship with China has improved markedly. The 4000-mile shared border between Russia and China has historically been a military flashpoint. As a result of joint initiatives, today the border disputes have largely been resolved, military equipment has been drawn back, cross-border trade has increased and relationships focus more on development of resources than marshalling of forces. The United States welcomes these improved relations.

Interaction between the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and Russian military forces has expanded rapidly in recent years from a few high-level exchange visits to substantive, routine and cooperative working-level meetings. USPACOM has also established a range of conferences, symposia and other fora on such issues as special operations, military medicine, search and rescue, criminal investigation and peacekeeping operations, to further strengthen our bilateral relationship in the region. These activities will continue to expand.

As an Asia-Pacific power with a substantial presence and relevance to the security of the region, Russia’s open and constructive participation in regional security affairs will remain in the U.S. national interest.

2.9 Supporting the Development of Security Pluralism

In only a short time, frameworks for discussion and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region beyond traditional bilateral relationships have become an important and permanent feature of the regional security structure. The scope of these activities has widened dramatically and is critical in a region whose nations do not have many institutional links. The United States supports and participates actively in this growing pattern of security pluralism. Multilateral dialogues include larger meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, sub-regional minilateral confidence-building efforts, and other fora for interaction and discussion of regional security matters. Meanwhile, bilateral discussions in the region have proliferated rapidly in recent years to address lingering tensions and historical disputes, or simply to enhance mutual confidence and encourage transparency.

Multilaterals

The United States engages in a variety of official and unofficial multilateral security dialogues to enhance mutual cooperation and trust in Asia, most notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Initiated by ASEAN nations, the ARF includes 22 members representing Asia, Europe and North America, including the United States. The ARF has developed into a useful vehicle for official region-wide discussion and exchange. The ARF’s attention to promoting greater mutual understanding and transparency promises to build trust among Asia-Pacific nations and others outside the region, and provide an important contribution to regional security.
Also contributing to the development of multilateral discussion are a number of unofficial security fora -- ranging from trilaterals to larger "minilateral" groupings. The United States, Japan and Russia, for example, have begun an unofficial dialogue process that anticipated the historic November 1997 summit meeting and thawing of relations between Japan and Russia, while the U.S., Japan and ROK have established an official forum for discussion and cooperation that has facilitated not only trilateral but bilateral relations. Academics from the United States, Japan and China have begun a dialogue that may lead eventually to official trilateral talks between these three critical Asia-Pacific nations.

These and other minilaterals are intended to be overlapping and interlocking, complementing each other to develop an informal security framework for promoting understanding and mutual confidence, and facilitating bilateral ties between participants. The current emphasis on trilateral meetings does not prevent their expansion into broader forums involving more nations. Multilateralism in all its forms will become an important element of U.S. engagement in the region in coming years.

The United States also participates regularly in regional conferences on practical security cooperation, as well as other multilateral fora designed to address specific regional problems, from political turmoil in Cambodia to the Four Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, established by the U.S. Pacific Command, has served as a further vehicle of security pluralism by facilitating open exchanges of ideas and perspectives among government officials throughout the region to foster understanding, cooperation and study of security-related issues.

The United States views all of these multilateral mechanisms, built upon the foundation of solid bilateral relationships and continued U.S. military presence in the region, as playing an increasingly important role in regional affairs in the future.

Growth of Bilateral Discussions between Asia-Pacific Nations

The Asia-Pacific region has witnessed dynamic growth in bilateral diplomatic and defense interaction in recent years, leading to progress in addressing many of the historical tensions and security problems that plague the region. China and Japan have established a security dialogue that in 1998 included the first visit of a Chinese Defense Minister to Japan in 14 years and Japanese Defense Minister to China since 1987. Russia and Japan have held a series of summit meetings and have resolved to complete a formal peace treaty that includes resolution of the Northern Territories dispute by the year 2000. China and Russia have reached agreement on most of their longstanding border dispute. The United States welcome the landmark Japan-ROK summit meeting in October 1998 that addressed longstanding historical tensions between the two nations. Japan and the ROK have been working together to address continued tension on the Peninsula while addressing constructively outstanding bilateral issues. The growth of bilateral interaction is clearly positive for regional security.
Section 3: PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Continued U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region also facilitates the promotion of democracy, one of the three central U.S. security goals of the 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS). Support for the growth of democratic institutions and processes in Asia will remain a key U.S. security interest. Promoting democracy does more than foster our ideals. It advances our interests because we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we, and the entire community of nations, will be. Democratic values of transparency and accountability have proved critical not only in the political but also economic realm to ensure sustainable development and stable societies. These values will also affect the way nations interact externally, enhancing openness and ultimately promoting mutual confidence and regional stability.

U.S. military engagement in Asia promotes the spread of democratic norms primarily by helping establish the kind of secure environment under which democracy can develop and flourish. The presence of severe international tensions or immediate national security threats enable authoritarian regimes to argue that democracy is a luxury and that strong and assertive central control is required to meet challenges. Conversely, a secure regional environment enables nations to focus on internal development, both economic and political, and provides the breathing space for invention, experimentation and development that a transition to democracy requires.

More directly, our interaction with the armed forces of regional allies and friends promotes democratic norms and values in the Asia-Pacific region. Military-to-military contacts allow us to better understand our military counterparts throughout the region and provide a mechanism through which we can work to constructively engage new generations of military leaders. Such contact is a key component of our military strategy in Asia.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is an important tool in this regard. By exposing military leaders to democratic values, and working to foster respect for civilian authority and military professionalism, IMET provides a window through which we can positively influence the development of foreign military institutions. While such engagement cannot be expected to guarantee a perfect human rights record on the part of any military force, it nonetheless represents an important opportunity to encourage adherence to the rule of law, respect for basic human rights, and appropriate professional conduct in the face of internal or international challenges. Indeed, constructive civil-military relations are an essential element of a democratic society.

Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), mandated by the U.S. Congress as part of the overall IMET program, deepens exposure to IMET principles by broadening program participation to include civilians performing defense-related functions. By engaging representatives from nongovernmental organizations and national parliamentarians to address topics such as defense resource management, military justice, civil-military relations and human rights, E-IMET courses reinforce constructive civil-military values and promote democratization within participant nations.

The United States will continue to promote the development of democratic processes and norms throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The United States recognizes the achievements of many Asian nations in making difficult but successful democratic transitions over the past several years. Their achievements, as well as the aspirations of millions of others in the region, demonstrate that Asian values include the promise of democracy. This promise has been at the heart of U.S. purpose since our nation’s founding, and we remain committed to assisting all nations of the Asia-Pacific region in the realization of this promise in the interest of our common security.

Section 4. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Stemming and countering the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and the missiles to deliver them remains a strategic priority of the United States. The United States actively participates in international efforts to develop and support global norms preventing the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, since proliferation will sometimes occur despite our best efforts, the United States must also be prepared to deter the use of these weapons, defend against their delivery and counter their effects.
4.0 Nonproliferation

Proliferation remains a serious security challenge, and one of increasing concern to the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies. Increasing regional competition and tension, combined with significant technical expertise, could increase the spread of WMD capabilities within the region. Indeed, the global proliferation of WMD, the perception that they have both military and political utility and the increasing likelihood of their use -- whether in war, as a tool for political blackmail, or by terrorists -- all serve to increase the threat to U.S. and allied forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Stemming the spread of WMD will become increasingly difficult under these conditions, though no less critical for maintaining international peace and security. The United States employs several measures to prevent WMD proliferation, from attempts to persuade nations that their security interests are best served by not acquiring WMD, to limiting a nation’s ability to obtain WMD technologies or devices through the promotion of arms control regimes and the use of sanctions and other punishments.

Several countries in the Asia-Pacific region possess the ability to produce and export WMD. Entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997 and a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and Asia-Pacific nations focused attention on and strengthened the nonproliferation regime in the region. While nonproliferation efforts often are largely diplomatic in nature, DOD plays an important supporting role by providing inspection, verification and enforcement support for nonproliferation treaties and control regimes; helping to identify states that might acquire, or are acquiring, NBC capabilities; and, when necessary, conducting interdiction missions. The nature of the proliferation threat necessarily requires continuous vigilance.

Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, followed by each nation’s claim to nuclear power status, threaten to complicate global nonproliferation efforts, as well as security perceptions and the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has strongly condemned the actions of India and Pakistan as counterproductive to regional and international stability, as well as to the South Asian nations’ economic and security interests. In addition to upholding the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other key arms control conventions, all nations in the region should redouble their commitment to regional cooperation in light of these actions to manage any changes in their security perceptions, ensure that their responses remain appropriate and constructive to common interests of peace and stability. Asia-Pacific nations should engage where possible with India and Pakistan to reduce tensions in South Asia, and discourage further development and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and production of fissile material in the region.

Korean Peninsula

The United States places high priority on cooperation with South Korea, since it faces the greatest military threat from WMD due to North Korea’s considerable inventory of chemical and biological weapons, and means of delivery. The United States and South Korea have formed a Nonproliferation Task Force to address regional proliferation issues, especially our mutual concerns about North Korean proliferation activities.

While the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, substantially reduced the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, close monitoring of North Korea’s full compliance, as well as continued support for the Agreed Framework process from the United States, ROK and Japan is critical to reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea has developed the No-Dong missile, and is developing Taepo-Dong 1 and 2 missiles as potential delivery systems for its WMD. In August 1998, North Korea flight-tested the Taepo-Dong 1 missile, apparently with a small satellite attached. No satellite entered orbit, but the DPRK demonstrated new missile capabilities with this launch. The Taepo-Dong 2 could have a range of more than 4000 kilometers. North Korea also has the ability to deliver chemical weapons with its ballistic missiles. The implications of the DPRK’s missile program reach far beyond the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region, however. North Korea continues to place a high priority on the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment and related technology, particularly to countries in South Asia and the Middle East. The United States entered a dialogue with Pyongyang in April 1996 to seek a negotiated freeze on North Korean missile technology exports and indigenous missile programs. Although no agreements have yet been reached, these discussions continue.
China
The United States places a high priority on its nonproliferation dialogue with China. The United States and China will continue to hold frank discussions on nonproliferation issues. Substantial progress on nuclear issues led to implementation of the 1985 U.S.-PRC Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement. In other areas, differences have narrowed but continue at levels that are not helpful to our bilateral relationship. In particular, the United States is concerned about activities of Chinese entities in the missile and chemical fields. However, the United States recognizes progress, including China's ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), participation in the Zangger (Nonproliferation Treaty Exporters) Committee, a multilateral nuclear export control group, and other related commitments made in the past few years to bring China's nonproliferation practices and regulations more in line with international norms. U.S.-Chinese consultations on these issues at both the expert and senior policy level will continue.

4.1 Counterproliferation
In addition to preventing WMD proliferation, the United States will prepare itself and its allies to deter use of such weapons, defend against their delivery and counter their effects. The United States will retain the capacity to respond to those who might contemplate the use of WMD and to prevail in any conflict in which these weapons are used, so that the costs of using WMD will be seen as outweighing any possible gains. Since U.S. forces are likely to fight in coalition with other nations in future conflicts, the combined readiness of the coalition to deal with WMD threats or use is of great concern. If future partners are not prepared to fight in a chemical/biological environment, any combined efforts would be vulnerable to such attacks.

In addition to discussing proliferation concerns in the region, we have focused on improving military capabilities in the face of NBC threats and identifying areas of cooperation in programs and activities designed to combat the use of WMD. The United States conducts on-going dialogues with the Republic of Korea and Japan in particular since they face the threat of WMD use from North Korea's considerable inventory of chemical weapons and means of delivery. U.S. and ROK forces have also participated in exercises and war games designed to increase understanding of and preparation for the threat or use of WMD.

The development of Theater Missile Defense is a key element in this strategic equation. We will continue our efforts to establish an arrangement with Japan to advance the technologies that will enable us to help defend Japan and counter the threat posed by WMD delivered by ballistic missiles. Such cooperation will speed progress toward our goal by combining the efforts of the two nations best equipped to take on this challenge. It will further strengthen the alliance as our two defense acquisition corps, industries, and militaries grow closer through partnership.

Cooperation between the Australian Defense Science and Technology Office (DSTO) and the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has also been robust and broad in scope. The Australians have increased funding for DSTO's research into defense against ballistic missiles. This close cooperation is a significant factor in the strengthening of counterproliferation regimes in the Asia-Pacific region.

Section 5: THE SEARCH FOR COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
The term "comprehensive security" refers to a broader definition of security that encompasses elements unrelated to traditional military power and influence. Relatively new and unconventional threats to international security are typically not based on an ability to seize territory or defeat military forces. Rather, they may bypass military forces entirely to directly threaten the basic political, economic and social fabric upon which the stability and prosperity, and therefore security, of a nation or region are based. That these threats may bypass traditional military structures does not mean that defense establishments cannot play important roles in meeting these challenges. This section addresses several transnational threats that are projected to be of particular strategic concern to Asia-Pacific security in coming years.
5.0 Terrorism
East Asia is not immune to the threat of terrorism or penetration by international terrorist groups. A new and particularly dangerous phenomenon is represented by ad-hoc, loosely knit groups of extremists who have gained deadly operational experience in the Afghan conflict, and now travel the region in an effort to expand their networks and operational capabilities.
Some terrorism is state-sponsored. Other terrorist activities are rooted in ethno-religious tensions, such as the insurgent operations of radical elements in the Philippines. In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo, the cult that carried out a Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, further demonstrated the vulnerability of Asian societies to terrorist attacks. The attack also highlighted the potential connection between the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
Difficult political, economic and social changes occurring throughout the region in coming years may exacerbate popular discontent and frustration that can fuel resort to terrorism as a means of redress. In such an environment, terrorist groups may consider the Asia-Pacific region’s relatively benign operational environment as an increasingly attractive theater of activity. The nations of the region should prepare themselves for this possibility and work together to establish cooperative frameworks for preventing and addressing terrorist threats.

5.1 Environmental Degradation
Economic development in the Asia-Pacific region has come at substantial environmental cost. Although environmental problems largely stem from internal, domestic activities of individual nations, the impact of these activities often has transnational effects, such as on air and water quality. The threshold for conflict may be high, but the cumulative effect of these conditions on regional tensions cannot be ignored.
Concern about environmental degradation has also facilitated military-to-military contacts between the United States and Asian nations. The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed a comprehensive program to address environmental aspects of military operations, including pollution prevention, conservation of natural resources, decontamination and fire safety. U.S. military engagement with other nations on environmental matters has proved to be a productive area for cooperation between militaries. In addition to the direct environmental benefits, through this mechanism trust is established that may lead to easing of tensions and better understanding of different military cultures.
The United States and China, for instance, have agreed to cooperate to address military environmental protection. Secretary of Defense Cohen and China’s Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian signed a joint statement in September 1998 authorizing discussions to define the scope and content of this cooperation. As a result of these contacts, China’s People’s Liberation Army has developed a special office to oversee its environmental program. This example of military environmental cooperation may serve as a model for military-to-military interaction throughout the region.
DOD has developed strong and effective environmental cooperation with Australia and Canada. This trilateral partnership addresses issues such as management of hazardous materials, and detection and clean-up of contaminated sites. The partnership is also working to engage other Asian nations in a dialogue on military environmental issues that are common to the region.
DOD continues to hold conferences in the Asia-Pacific region that bring together military representatives to discuss environmental issues. The United States has hosted these conferences since 1996. The conferences have resulted in a growing appreciation in the region for military environmental issues and for the importance of incorporating an environmental dimension into military operations as both a domestic and international security matter.

5.2 Infectious Diseases
Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7 (PDD NSTC-7), established a national policy to implement actions to address the threat of emerging infectious diseases by improving surveillance, prevention and response measures. PDD NSTC-7 states that the national and international system of infectious disease surveillance, prevention and response is inadequate to protect the health of United States citizens from emerging infectious diseases. PDD NSTC-7 further mandates that DOD’s mission be expanded to include support for global surveillance, training, research and response to emerging infectious disease threats.
DOD will strengthen its global disease reduction efforts through centralized coordination, improved preventive health programs and epidemiological capabilities, and enhanced involvement of military
treatment facilities around the world, including U.S. and international laboratories in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Naval Medical Research Unit - Two (NAMRU-2) in Jakarta, Indonesia, and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) in Bangkok, Thailand.

5.3 Drug Trafficking
 Drug trafficking throughout the Asia-Pacific region continues to threaten United States interests both at home and abroad. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), through Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West, provides DOD counterdrug support to U.S. Country Teams and partner nations. JIATF West’s mission is to apply DOD-unique resources to conduct detection and monitoring operations and to support efforts of law enforcement agencies and U.S. Country Teams to disrupt and deter international drug trafficking throughout the region. Southeast Asia is the world’s leading region for poppy cultivation and heroin production, particularly within the Golden Triangle, comprised of parts of Burma, Laos and Thailand. Burma is by far the world’s largest opium producer. Its annual production of opium typically accounts for more than 60 percent of worldwide production and about 90 percent of Southeast Asia’s production. However, drug trafficking routes traverse the entire region, posing significant challenges to our international efforts to reduce availability of illicit drugs in the United States. Various concealment methods, along with widely dispersed international organized crime organizations, also make interdiction difficult without adequate resources and intelligence. The influence of drug kingpins on the stability and authority of regimes in the region must also be watched as a potentially agitating force. In addition, trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals used for illicit drug production, particularly from China, has emerged as a serious drug-related threat. The illicit drug trade has a direct impact on domestic security and social stability in the United States. DOD counterdrug support will continue to support the detection, disruption and deterrence of drug trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region.

5.4 Energy
 Asia is entering a period in which its demand for energy will grow. Rapid population growth and economic development are fueling this trend. In the next decade, Asia will generate a larger increase in oil demand than all of the OECD countries combined. The regional energy market is characterized by a number of developing economies, all of which will be seeking to meet growing energy demands. China and the economies of ASEAN will account for the largest increase in imports. In the new century, a greater percentage of Asia’s energy requirements for oil will have to be satisfied by producers in the Arabian Gulf. As a result, promoting stability in the Arabian Gulf, maintaining freedom of the seas, protecting sea lines of communication, particularly in the Strait of Malacca, and other efforts to safeguard energy supplies will become a challenge of increasing mutual interest. Asian investment of both capital and technology will develop extraction and transport infrastructure for the Russian Far East and Central Asia. Russia controls the world’s seventh largest proven oil reserves and the largest gas reserves. Peaceful and constructive cooperation among Asian nations in energy development in Russia and Central Asia may further contribute to regional stability and energy security. In today’s energy market of adequate supply, increasing resource competition is manageable. Over time, however, demand may outstrip supply, leading to security concerns over resource supply and access. If new sources of supply do not live up to expectations or tensions threaten supply routes, such as pipelines and sea lines of communication, resource competition will become an increasingly relevant security concern.

5.5 Humanitarian Relief
 Humanitarian operations to promote peace and address humanitarian crises in nations suffering a natural disaster, civil strife or other forms of conflict may likewise serve important U.S. security interests and values, including preservation of regional stability, and promotion of democracy and human rights. Even if U.S. security is not immediately threatened, instability, violence and large-scale human suffering often pose a long-term menace to important U.S. political and economic interests. Security aside, operations to alleviate widespread suffering also reflect the instincts of the American people to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need wherever they are.
U.S. comprehensive engagement in Asia, as elsewhere in the world, includes readiness to deploy U.S. forces to alleviate humanitarian crises in the region when appropriate. While the U.S. military is generally not the best instrument for addressing a humanitarian crisis, in some situations use of the military’s unique capabilities may be both necessary and appropriate. This is particularly true when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond or when the need for immediate relief is urgent and only the U.S. military has the ability to respond rapidly enough before appropriate longer-term assistance arrives.

In Asia, U.S. forces have engaged in a variety of humanitarian relief efforts in recent years, most notably disaster relief. The United States responded swiftly with assistance for citizens of Kobe after the 1995 earthquake devastated the Japanese city. U.S. forces helped douse wildfires in Indonesia that were threatening the health and safety of nations throughout Southeast Asia. After a violent earthquake and massive floods struck China in 1998, U.S. forces quickly airlifted blankets, tents and food to alleviate the suffering of those affected by the disasters. The U.S. remains prepared to respond constructively throughout the region should emergencies occur in the future.

In many areas around the world, U.S. forces have combined humanitarian relief efforts with peacekeeping operations (PKO). The United States will remain an advocate of and active participant in PKO missions where important or compelling humanitarian interests are at stake. The most notable peacekeeping effort in Asia in recent years was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which oversaw refugee repatriation, civil administration reform, demobilization of militias, the organization and conduct of elections in 1993, and other matters in an effort to bring relief to the long-suffering people of Cambodia.

5.6 Instruments of Comprehensive Security

To address transnational threats to U.S. and regional security interests, creative application of a variety of instruments is required. Traditional instruments such as intelligence gathering, military readiness and diplomacy remain central to this effort. Special efforts to combat security threats posed by weapons proliferation and terrorism will require increasing cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, not only within the United States but internationally. The United States, through public and private sources, may also employ its international economic and political development assistance to address root causes of transnational security challenges. The United States may also use political influence through bilateral contacts and multilateral fora, including regional bodies and global institutions such as the United Nations, to raise awareness and combat challenges as they arise.

Our allies and partners should engage similarly through their development assistance programs and national security institutions. Transnational threats clearly require transnational remedies. The cumulative impact of U.S. and international attention to transnational issues will prove essential to meeting these challenges. The United States will place increasing emphasis on the critical need for close consultation, cooperation and coordination of international efforts to combat transnational threats.

At the heart of all these efforts, however, is continuation of U.S. overseas presence and active engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Absent such engagement, the United States would possess neither the credibility nor the tools to adequately address new, transnational challenges.

Section 6. SUSTAINING U.S. ENGAGEMENT: U.S. STRATEGIC VISION FOR A NEW CENTURY

[SecDef quote: "In the security realm, it is critical to understand the interplay between what is fixed and what is in flux if we are to successfully anticipate and manage change, and thereby ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for ourselves, our children and generations that follow. This is truly the great challenge as we leave the post-Cold War transition period and enter, and indeed create, a new era. And it is a challenge that demands of us even greater cooperation than we have successfully shown in the past."

Although the years since the end of the Cold War have led to change in the Asia-Pacific region, the years to come promise even more profound developments. The United States is optimistic about the future of the region and the continued engagement of the United States as a stabilizing force in the midst of change. Our vision of a stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific region in the new century will demand continued vigilance and flexibility, and a renewed commitment to close cooperation and consultation with our allies and friends. This vision will also require that the United States undertake a comprehensive approach to regional affairs to help promote constructive change.
6.0 Maintaining Overseas Presence: Bases, Access and Good Neighbors

U.S. overseas presence in the Asia-Pacific region, including the continued maintenance of approximately 100,000 military personnel for the foreseeable future, will continue to promote regional strategic interests, and provide evidence of undiminished U.S. commitment and engagement. Our force structure will continue to reflect our conception of regional strategic requirements and the capabilities necessary to support them, and remain the subject of continued consultation with our allies. In coming years, the United States will also examine new modes of sustaining and supporting this presence within the region.

The continued development of support -- outside the traditional basing structure -- in such nations as Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines will enhance U.S. strategic interests in maintaining regional stability and a credible power projection capability in the region and beyond, including to the Arabian Gulf when necessary.

U.S. bases in Japan will remain the anchor of our regional force presence. U.S. forces in Korea will continue to deter aggression on the Peninsula and promote stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The combination of traditional basing structures and new modes of support for U.S. force presence will continue to provide the flexibility and credibility that has promoted regional stability in the past, and that promises to meet the challenges of the future.

Meanwhile, the promotion of good will between U.S. forces and host nations will continue to be a critical element of U.S. overseas presence. Cooperation with host nations and communities will remain critical not only between base commanders and local officials, but between every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, and every local citizen. We will engage in greater dialogue and consultation with host nations on measures to reduce the local impact of our forces, as demonstrated by our close cooperation with Japan on SACO, and assure tangible contributions to local societies and quality of life through civic projects and other initiatives. Likewise, U.S. forces will enhance their effort to promote understanding of the strategic purpose of their presence and the connection between U.S. training activities and the missions for which they must prepare. The United States will welcome the input of host governments to facilitate this process as an essential strategic element of sustaining U.S. presence while ensuring maximum operational readiness of U.S. forces into the future.

6.1 Updating Alliance Partnerships

As this report has indicated, in preparing for change, the United States will build upon the framework that has been developed over the past several years to guide future U.S. strategy towards the region. Foremost, the U.S. will continue to strengthen its strategic partnerships with allies, which serve as important pillars from which to address regional political and military challenges. All of our alliance relationships promise to expand both in scope and degree in coming years to encompass more comprehensive concepts of security cooperation.

As our most important bilateral alliance in the region, the U.S.-Japan partnership in particular will remain critical to U.S. and regional interests -- as important to Asia’s future as it has been to its past. The United States sees no substitute for this historic relationship as the region prepares to address old and new challenges into a new century.

In the next century the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain the linchpin of our regional security policy and must therefore continue preparing to respond to regional threats and to engage in preventive diplomacy. The United States and Japan will continue building a global partnership based on our shared values, mutual interests and complementary capabilities. Full and effective implementation of the 1997 Defense Guidelines will contribute substantially to this process. We also expect that Japan will bring its considerable diplomatic and economic tools to the task of preventing future security problems. Japan’s strong condemnation of nuclear tests in South Asia, and active engagement to mitigate the impact of this destabilizing development continue to be welcome and important initiatives to support global nonproliferation efforts.

Regular nonproliferation consultations begun in July 1998 and our strong joint response to North Korea’s missile launch in August 1998 highlight the benefit to both sides of longer-range planning and information sharing. We expect such consultation and cooperation to expand. The United States will also continue to view Japan as a key part of the solution to the economic and financial crisis in the region. The United States further envisions a continued U.S. overseas presence in Japan that secures peace and whose troops continue to be supported by the central government, and welcomed as partners and good
neighbors by the local communities with whom they interact. Maintaining host nation support levels, and continued joint commitment to implementing the SACO Final Report will be central factors in this regard.

The United States also takes a longer-term view of its relationship with South Korea. The situation on the Korean Peninsula will remain the most serious security threat in the Asia-Pacific region in the near term. The U.S.-ROK alliance will continue to promote stability and deterrence on the Peninsula, as we work with all nations of the region to help shape a more stable Northeast Asia.

The United States welcomes the public statements of ROK President Kim Dae-Jung affirming the value of the bilateral alliance and the U.S. military presence even after reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. strongly agrees that our alliance and military presence will continue to support stability both on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region after North Korea is no longer a threat. The bilateral alliance and U.S. military presence will continue to contribute to the residual defense needs of Korea and assist in the integration of the two Koreas as appropriate. Beyond the Peninsula, instability and uncertainty are likely to persist in the Asia-Pacific region, with heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals, unresolved territorial disputes and historical tensions, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery serving as sources of instability. After reconciliation and, ultimately, reunification, the United States and Korea will remain deeply committed to mitigating such regional sources of instability.

Also, in keeping with the growing global role of the ROK, the United States and ROK will continue to share a worldwide commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, arms control and nonproliferation, right of access to international sea, air and space, and promotion of democratic and free market practices. The bilateral security alliance and overseas presence of U.S. military forces will continue to serve as important instruments for achieving these common objectives over the long term. The U.S. also envisions continued expansion and deepening of the U.S.-Australia alliance over the coming years. Australia will continue to be important to our presence in Southeast Asia, as the U.S. and Australia develop and monitor interaction and cooperation on security issues through our well-established working relationships and the AUSMIN ministerial meetings. With continued development and planning, Australia will provide an increasingly important regional locus for both unilateral and joint training, particularly in the Northern Territory. The two sides will continue to work closely together on international peacekeeping and other UN operations, which contribute to mutual security interests in such places as the Arabian Gulf and Cambodia.

The United States will also continue to explore ways to enhance our longstanding alliances with Thailand and the Philippines. These valuable partnerships must continue to develop to ensure continued regional stability and to enable all sides to address a range of security interests, including drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation and weapons proliferation. Expanded U.S. access, joint activity and interoperability with Thai forces will remain critical to address these mutual interests. We will continue to work closely with the Philippines to develop our partnership in ways that will promote our respective security interests.

Enhancing Regional Cooperation

Overall, the United States must increasingly emphasize regional cooperation with allies to address future challenges. An important element of regional cooperation will include enhancing our strategic consultations. Formal dialogues such as regular defense and foreign minister talks with Japan (Security Consultative Committee, or “2+2”) and Australia (AUSMIN), and annual Security Consultative Meetings with the ROK, as well as the less formal interaction that occurs continually between allies, provide the context for official security consultations. These discussions will continue and deepen at all levels. The United States understands the growing importance of developing deeper and more substantive partnerships with both defense and military establishments of its allies to account for changes in the strength of our partners and fully realize the potential of these partnerships to meet the challenges of a new century.

For instance, regional cooperation may also increasingly encompass use of common facilities, as well as reciprocal military provision of supplies, services and logistical support. In nations where the United States maintains bases or conducts regular training and exercises, the conclusion of Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) will not only provide for such assistance but also offer material and symbolic evidence of regional support for U.S. presence in general. The signing of a revised ACSA with
Japan in April 1998 was a step in this direction, and the United States will seek other ACSA agreements elsewhere in the region in coming years.

6.2 Engaging China: From Confidence-Building to Cooperation
[Quote: “We want China to be successful, secure and open, working with us for a more peaceful and prosperous world.” President Clinton, Speech at Peking University, June 28, 1998]
The United States intends to continue confidence-building efforts with China in coming years through greater contacts, exchanges and visits at all levels of our government and military establishments. The annual Defense Consultative Talks process will continue to develop as an important forum for high-level strategic dialogue. During President Clinton’s June 1998 visit to China, the United States and China agreed that their respective military establishments would observe a joint training exercise of the other side, and pledged to cooperate on military environmental protection and security. Consistent with these initiatives, the United States will seek further progress in Chinese military transparency, particularly in strategic doctrine, budgets and force structure.

In coming years, the United States will also seek to expand not only confidence-building measures but also active bilateral cooperation with China on issues of mutual interest. These will include joint efforts in such areas as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations, and other activities to promote freedom of the seas, safety of international sea lines of communication and peaceful resolution of disputes, including on the Korean Peninsula. The United States will continue to consult with China on productive approaches to the regional financial crisis. The two sides have also reaffirmed their shared interest in restoring stability to South Asia and strengthening international nonproliferation efforts. Although the United States and China have a long history of interaction, missing from this contact over much of the past two centuries has been continuity, balance and a sober dialogue concerning mutual interests and strategic visions. It is clear that the United States and China have substantial mutual interests in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity not only in the region but internationally. Active cooperation between the two sides to secure these interests, therefore, will become not only desirable but imperative as we enter a new century.

6.3 Continued Integration of Russia into Asia-Pacific Security Affairs
Russia’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs will expand in coming years as historical tensions ease, and bilateral and multilateral interaction is regularized. The United States welcomes and will continue to encourage such involvement as constructive to the general development of the region. Economically, further integration of Russia into regional security affairs will promote growth both by enhancing general stability and by enabling productive use of respective economic instruments and natural resources. Interaction between U.S. and Russian military forces in the Asia-Pacific region will also continue to expand. The United States envisions a future where U.S. and Russian forces work together with other nations in the region, for instance, to provide effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Likewise, a stable and involved Russia may contribute substantially to stemming weapons proliferation. The benefits of Russia’s constructive involvement in regional security affairs cannot be ignored as an important element in the strategic mix in Asia.

6.4 Strategic Innovations for Asia-Pacific Security: A Network of Overlapping and Interlocking Institutions
As indicated in this report, the U.S. views the cumulative effect of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral security relationships as establishing a diverse and flexible framework for promoting common security in the Asia-Pacific region into the next century. The United States views the continued development of the ASEAN Regional Forum, for example, as an important vehicle for exchanging views on regional issues such as the South China Sea, enhancing mutual understanding and confidence, and potentially addressing preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The continuation and broadening of minilateral contacts will also remain a U.S. strategic priority and take its place alongside traditional mechanisms of dialogue in coming years.

In particular, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other transnational security concerns, such as environmental degradation, drug trafficking and terrorism, will require extensive regional interaction and creative, multilateral approaches that often transcend traditional bilateral or military remedies. The task for the region will be to encourage all nations to recognize and address domestic problems that have
transnational security implications, and to mobilize and coordinate a full range of national and international tools to meet these non-traditional security challenges.

6.5 Addressing the Regional Financial Crisis
The severe financial crisis faced by many of Asia’s leading developing economies beginning in mid-1997 sent a shock wave not only through the region but around the world. The United States recognizes that it is not immune to the economic and political fallout of the crisis. The United States views the Asian financial crisis as a core security concern. In meeting the economic challenges of the crisis, the United States will remain committed to playing a leading role in mitigating the national and international effects of economic setbacks suffered in the region. U.S. engagement and presence in the region during this difficult transition period, therefore, remains as critical as ever to provide reassurance of continuity and stability in the midst of change, and to enable contacts with regional leaders to promote constructive development.

6.6 Promotion of Transparency
Consistent with the stabilizing values of open government, transparency must become a transcendent principle as nations increasingly interact to normalize relations and security initiatives arise to reflect the new security environment. The U.S. remains committed to conducting its regional affairs in an open and transparent manner and encourages all nations and institutions involved in regional security initiatives to conduct their activities similarly to instill trust and establish a standard that will enhance stability in the region.

Conclusion
As stated in the Introduction, this report itself represents an important exercise in transparency. The 1998 East Asia Strategy Report has outlined U.S. perspectives, relationships, interests and strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region as the specter of the Cold War recedes and we move into the 21st century. The region will face many challenges in coming years: some we will anticipate, others we will not. The vision outlined in this section and throughout this report should make clear that the United States is prepared to join with the other nations of the Asia-Pacific region to address the challenges of a changing world and will remain steadfast in its commitment to comprehensive engagement in the region into the new century.
Petition: Revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement

Dear Sir:

We understand that U.S. military bases in Japan play vital role in maintaining the security arrangement between Japan and the United States, thus contributing not only to security of Japan but also to peace and stability of the Far East.

However, approximately 75% of the land area exclusively used by the U.S. Forces Japan is concentrated in Okinawa. The military bases account for about 11% of the total land area of Okinawa and nearly 20% in the main island of Okinawa. As those bases are adjacent to residential areas, the lives of prefectural people are greatly impacted by incidents, accidents and environmental problems stemming from the bases as well as by crimes committed by the U.S. military personnel, civilian employees and their dependents. Hence, reduction and realignment of U.S. military bases and revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement are issues of great importance to our prefectural administration.

From the standpoint of improving the welfare for the prefectural people and protecting lives and human rights of the people from various incidents and accidents stemming from the military bases, the Okinawa Prefectural Government believes that the review of the current military base operations and others is required. That is why the prefectural government has taken every opportunity to ask the government of Japan and the United States to revise the SOFA.

Further, when the prefectural government proposed the selected site for the relocation of Futenma Air Station last November, it again requested the revision of the SOFA. On December 2nd last year, the National Government decided on a policy to "sincerely address the improvement to the SOFA procedures and make necessary improvement".

The understanding and cooperation from the local residents are essential in maintaining U.S. military bases and ensuring the smooth operation of the bases under the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. And thus, it is necessary to expeditiously redress the problems of local residents' concern stemming from the military bases.

Also, on this past July 14th, the "Letter of Opinion concerning the Revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement" was unanimously approved at the Prefectural Assembly Session. Moreover, "Petition concerning the Revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement" was unanimously approved on July 27th at the Okinawa Municipal Council for Military Land Conversion and Base Problems, comprised of members from the prefectural government and municipalities where military bases are hosted.

Therefore, we petition on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement as itemized on the following pages and thus, ask for your special consideration.

Sincerely,

Keiichi Inamine
Governor
Okinawa Prefecture
Articles of the SOFA Revisions Sought
Courtesy Translation

1 ARTICLE 2 (The Use of Facilities and Areas, Etc.)
(1) ARTICLE 2 shall specify that if request is made by the concerned local governing bodies to maintain security of local citizens’ lives and improve welfare, regarding the content of agreement on each facility and area which is to be concluded by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall examine this request.

(2) ARTICLE 2 shall specify that the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall hear the opinion of the concerned local governing bodies and shall respect their intentions when conducting the examination mentioned above. Further, it shall specify that the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall hear the opinion of the concerned local governing bodies and shall respect their intentions when examining the return of the facility(ies) and area(s) as well.

(3) ARTICLE 2 shall specify that the agreement concerning each facility and area, which is to be concluded by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, shall state matters such as the scope of facilities and areas as well as the purpose of use and the conditions of use for the facilities and areas.

2 ARTICLE 3 (Measures Regarding Facilities and Areas)
(1) Article 3 shall specify that the U.S. forces shall provide the local governing bodies with any necessary and appropriate support for performance of duties, which includes entering the facilities and areas by reporting in advance. However, it shall specify that in cases of emergency, immediate entrance can be made by the local governing bodies without notice in advance.

(2) Article 3 shall specify that information on incidents or accidents stemming from activities by U.S. forces, such as aircraft accidents and mountain forest fires, that may give impact on public safety or environment shall be promptly provided to the concerned local governing bodies, even in cases when they occur inside the facility(ies) and area(s). It shall also specify that appropriate measures shall be taken for prevention of disaster from spreading.

(3) Article 3 shall specify that Japanese law, such as Air Navigation Law, shall be applied when activities, including exercises, training as well as maintenance and construction of facilities by U.S. forces are carried out.

3 Article 3 A (Environmental Preservation within Facilities and Areas) * New Section
Article 3 A shall specify that the following environmental items be newly established.

The United States shall be responsible for preventing any kind of pollution, arising from activities by the U.S. forces, such as soot and smoke, polluted water, red soil and waste disposal. Further, the United States shall be responsible for taking necessary measures for properly preserving the natural environment.

Further, for all activities of U.S. forces in Japan, Japanese law concerning environmental preservation shall be applied.

When developing plans for the facilities and areas, the U.S. forces shall minimize any impact the plans may have on people, plant and animals, soil, water, air and cultural assets. Further, before and after implementing projects based on the concerned plan, the impact of the concerned projects shall be surveyed, predicted or measured and evaluated regularly. The survey results shall also be released. Moreover, both the governments of Japan and the United States, on the basis of the concerned survey results, shall discuss measures for environmental preservation.

In regards to environmental pollution stemming from U.S. forces' activities, the United States shall be responsible for taking appropriate restorative measures. Responsibility for the expenses arising from such measures shall be discussed between the governments of Japan and the United States.

4 Article 4 (Return of Facility(ies))
In regards to the return of the facility(ies) and area(s) in use by the U.S. forces, the governments of Japan and the United States shall conduct joint surveys in advance on items such as environmental pollution, environmental destruction and disposal of unexploded shells etc. caused by U.S. forces activities. Further, when such things as environmental pollution is confirmed, necessary measures shall be taken by the governments of Japan and the United States for developing and implementing restorative plans, such as environmental clean-up. Responsibility for bearing the expenses of these shall be discussed between both the governments of Japan and the United States.

5 Article 5 (Port and Landing Fee Exemptions)
(1) Article 5 shall specify that except in cases of emergency, U.S. forces shall be prohibited the use of civil airports and ports, in order to secure smooth routine operation of the commercial aircraft and commercial ships as well as to maintain their safety.

(2) Article 5 shall stipulate that "access to" and "movement" written under this article shall not include any activity that is considered, in essence, as
exercise and/or training.

6 Article 9 (The Status of U.S. Armed Forces and Related Personnel)
   Article 9 shall specify that Japanese law shall apply to inspection of persons, animals and plants as well as to public health of persons.

7 Article 13 (Taxation)
   Article 13 shall specify that private vehicles and light-weight vehicles of members of the U.S. armed forces, civilian employees and their dependents shall be taxed at the same rate as private vehicles of Japanese people.

8 Article 15 (Management, etc. of Organizations)
   Article 15 shall specify that its Paragraph 3 be revised so that services, provided by organizations within the facility(ies) and area(s), shall be restricted in the same way with the sales of merchandise, when they are provided to the Japanese.

9 Article 17 (Jurisdiction)
   Article 17 shall specify that if there is any request from the Japanese authorities for transfer of the suspect's custody before charges are issued, U.S. military authorities shall respond to this.

10 ARTICLE 18 (Renunciation of Claims)
   (1) Article 18 shall specify that when damage arises due to act or illegal act by the members, employees, or their dependents of the U.S. armed forces, during the time they are not carrying out the performance of official duties, and if such things as the amount of compensation for damage to be paid to the damaged party does not satisfy the final decision amount made at court, both the governments of Japan and the United States shall bear the responsibility for covering the difference of the amount. Article 18 shall also specify that the Japanese and the United States governments shall discuss their responsibilities in bearing the expenses for covering the deficit of the compensation amount.

   (2) Article 18 shall specify that when there is an order by the Japanese court, the U.S. authorities shall seize the U.S. armed forces members' or employees' rights of claim for benefits such as salaries to be paid to them, and turn them over to the Japanese authorities.

11 Article 25 (The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee)
   Article 25 shall specify that the agreements made at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee shall be immediately announced to the public.

CONTENT AND EXPLANATION FOR ARTICLES OF THE SOFA REVISIONS SOUGHT

1 Article 2 (The Use of Facilities and Areas, Etc.)
   Request for Revision
   (1) Article 2 shall specify that if request is made by the concerned local governing bodies to maintain security of local citizens' lives and improve welfare, regarding the content of agreement on each facility and area which is to be concluded by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall examine this request.

   (2) Article 2 shall specify that the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall hear the opinion of the concerned local governing bodies and shall respect their intentions when conducting the examination mentioned above.

   Further, it shall specify that the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall hear the opinion of the concerned local governing bodies and shall respect their intentions when examining the return of the facility(ies) and area(s) as well.

   (3) Article 2 shall specify that the agreement concerning each facility and area, which is to be concluded by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, shall state matters such as the scope of facilities and areas as well as the purpose of use and the conditions of use for the facilities and areas.
The U.S. military bases take up approximately 11% of the total land area of the Okinawa Prefecture and occupy approximately 19% of the main island of Okinawa, which means that many of the bases are located in the vicinity of prefectural people's residential areas. Thus, the content and the procedures of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, which provides the legal basis for the operation etc. of the U.S. military bases, are an issue of importance as they give direct impact upon prefectural people's lives.

Yet, the existing Status of Forces Agreement is not structured to reflect the intentions of the residents living in the vicinity of the bases and of the local governing bodies who are mainly affected in terms of issues such as provision, operation and return of the bases.

The Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) believes that acquiring the understanding and cooperation of the local residents and the local governing bodies neighboring the U.S. military bases is indispensable in order to work towards the solution for issues arising from the bases.

To make this possible, for cases when there are requests from the local governing bodies, to maintain security of residents' lives and to improve welfare, concerning the conclusion and amendments of the agreement on each facility and area which is to be concluded by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, OPG thinks it is necessary to adopt a mechanism to reflect the local citizens' voices in the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. Further, OPG thinks it is necessary to adopt the same kind of mechanism to reflect the local citizens' voices in the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement when examining the return of facility(ies) and area(s).

And more, OPG believes that there is necessity in considering the intentions of the residents living in the vicinity of the bases and of the local governing bodies before concluding the agreement which specifies the details of operation for each facility and area, such as the scope, the purpose of use and the condition of use, as well as before publicly announcing the content of the agreement.

Still more, in Germany, when facilities are provided to NATO forces, an agreement stating on the scale, the type, the conditions, the providing period of the facilities, etc. is to be concluded based on Article 48, Paragraph 3(a) of Bonn Supplementary Agreement and based on Paragraph 4, written on "On Article 48", of a supplementary writing of the same agreement.

2 Article 3 (Measures Regarding Facilities and Areas)

Request for Revision
(1) Article 3 shall specify that the U.S. forces shall provide the local governing bodies with any necessary and appropriate support for performance of duties, which includes entering the facilities and areas by reporting in advance. However, it shall specify that in cases of emergency, immediate entrance can be made by the local governing bodies without notice in advance.

(2) Article 3 shall specify that information on incidents or accidents stemming from activities by U.S. forces, such as aircraft accidents and mountain forest fires, that may give impact on public safety or environment shall be promptly provided to the concerned local governing bodies, even in cases when they occur inside the facility(ies) and area(s). It shall also specify that appropriate measures shall be taken for prevention of disaster from spreading.

(3) Article 3 shall specify that Japanese law, such as Air Navigation Law, shall be applied when activities, including exercises, training as well as maintenance and construction of facilities by U.S. forces are carried out.

Content and Explanation

Whenever an incident or accident caused by the U.S. military bases occurs, the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) has requested the entrance to the bases for on-base investigation, if it is necessary, and prompt information release regarding incidents and accidents in order to remove the prefectural people's fear.

The governments of Japan and the United States, through agreements of Saco Final Report in December 1996 and the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, have adjusted and implemented the procedures for permission to enter facility areas and the procedures for reporting the occurrence of incidents and accidents.

Yet, even after the agreement has been made, it is hard to say that the prompt entrance to the U.S. military bases as requested by the local governing bodies is actually realized.

Further, in regards to the notification of incident(s) or accident(s) to the local governing bodies at the time of its/their occurrence(s), the existing procedures do not include the notification of incidents or accidents that occur within the U.S. military bases. From the standpoint to placate the prefectural people's anxiety by releasing accurate information in a timely manner, OPG thinks it is necessary to further deliberate the procedures for notifying the incidents and accidents.

Moreover, in our country, according to the Air Navigation Law in Special Cases, some regulations in Air Navigation Law, such as Flight Prohibited Area specified in Article 80 and Minimum Safety Altitude specified in Article 81, do not apply to the operations of U.S. forces. Yet, in Germany, relevant German law shall apply to NATO force's exercises and training, based on Article 45, Paragraph 2 and Article 46, Paragraph 2 of Bonn Supplementary Agreement.

To reduce aircraft noise pollution and danger of accidents, OPG thinks it is necessary for our country to follow Germany's example and have U.S. military aircraft, similarly with civilian aircraft, operate in accordance with relevant Japanese law.
Moreover, there is a necessity that Vehicle Restriction Order based on Article 47 of the Road Law, the Law of Special Prevention Measure against Nuclear Power Disaster, and the Cultural Properties Protection Law be applied to U.S. military activities such as exercises, training as well as maintenance and construction of facilities.

Based on Vehicle Restriction Order, Article 14, the U.S. military is exempted from application of this order, which is written on measurements of vehicle such as the width, the heaviness, the height, and length based on Article 47 of the Road Law. However, from the standpoint of maintaining security of the road traffic, OPG thinks it is necessary to apply the Vehicle Restriction Order to the U.S. military as well.

Further, accidents such as radiation accidents caused by U.S. nuclear warships are not subject to the Law of Special Prevention Measure Against Nuclear Power Disaster established last year. Yet, in order to dispel the fear of the residents living in the vicinity of the port where nuclear warships make port calls, OPG believes that it is necessary to apply this concerned law to the U.S. military and to take measures against disaster in case any accident of radiation etc. occurs.

Moreover, according to the Cultural Properties Protection Law, Article 57, Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 6, if the owner of the land discovers what are recognized as remains such as of an old burial mound or of habitation site, the owner shall notify the concerned bodies. However, these regulations under the Cultural Properties Protection Law do not apply for such things as construction of facilities conducted by the U.S. military. Thus, appropriate measures for protection of the burial assets when they are discovered cannot be taken. Therefore, in order to preserve cultural assets, OPG believes it is necessary to apply these regulations under the Cultural Properties Protection Law to the U.S. military as well.

3 Article 3 A (Environmental Preservation within Facilities and Areas)  * New Section

Request for Revision

Article 3 A shall specify that the following environmental items be newly established.

The United States shall be responsible for preventing any kind of pollution, arising from activities by the U.S. forces, such as soot and smoke, polluted water, red soil and waste disposal. Further, the United States shall be responsible for taking necessary measures for properly preserving the natural environment.

Further, for all activities of U.S. forces in Japan, Japanese law concerning environmental preservation shall be applied.

When developing plans for the facilities and areas, the U.S. forces shall minimize any impact the plans may have on people, plant and animals, soil, water, air and cultural assets. Further, before and after implementing projects based on the concerned plan, the impact of the concerned projects shall be surveyed, predicted or measured and evaluated regularly. The survey results shall also be released. Moreover, both the governments of Japan and the United States, on the basis of the concerned survey results, shall discuss measures for environmental preservation.

In regards to environmental pollution stemming from U.S. forces' activities, the United States shall be responsible for taking appropriate restorative measures. Responsibility for the expenses arising from such measures shall be discussed between the governments of Japan and the United States.

Content and Explanation

Environmental issues developing from U.S. military bases are of grave concern to prefectural people living adjacent to the bases as the issues have direct bearing on their security of livelihoods and properties. These issues include noise pollution by U.S. military aircraft, noise and vibration accompanied by live-firing exercises and disposal of expired shells, destruction of natural environment by mountain forest fires and red silt outflow, oil/fuel and polluted water outflow and clean up of hazardous waste such as PCBs.

In Germany, based on Article 53, Paragraph 1 of Bonn Supplementary Agreement, German law, in principle, is applied to use of facilities by NATO forces. Also, based on Article 54A, Paragraph 2, NATO forces are to conduct evaluation of the impact on environment and "where detrimental effects are unavoidable, to offset them by taking appropriate restorative or balancing measures."

The Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) believes that it is necessary for our country to follow the above-mentioned Germany's example and apply Japanese law, concerning environmental preservation, to the U.S. forces in order to prevent any serious destruction to the environment from occurring. In particular, OPG thinks it is necessary to establish a system, legal or not, concerning environmental issues. This system shall include conducting evaluation of the impact on environment and monitoring the environment regularly for U.S. military projects, which are equivalent to projects subject to Japanese law concerning our country's environmental impact evaluation. Further, the system shall include discussing the measures for environmental preservation by both the governments of Japan and the United States on the basis of the concerned survey results as well as conducting survey and implementing clean up measures when environmental pollution occurs.

In addition, in cases when the environment gets polluted, OPG thinks it is necessary to specify the responsibilities of the United States as the polluter so that timely and appropriate restorative measures can be taken.

Also, in order to apply Japanese law to the U.S. forces, OPG thinks Japanese law on items such as preventing pollution to soil shall be adjusted (establish a new law and/or revise the existing law).
4 Article 4 (Return of Facility(ies))

Request for Revision
In regards to the return of the facility(ies) and area(s) in use by the U.S. forces, the governments of Japan and the United States shall conduct joint surveys in advance on items such as environmental pollution, environmental destruction and disposal of unexploded shells etc. caused by U.S. forces activities. Further, when such things as environmental pollution is confirmed, necessary measures shall be taken by the governments of Japan and the United States for developing and implementing restorative plans, such as environmental clean-up. Responsibility for bearing the expenses of these shall be discussed between both the governments of Japan and the United States.

Content and Explanation
In the existing Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, the United States is exempted from responsibility for restoring the facility(ies) and area(s) to the original condition, which is associated with the return of the facility(ies) and area(s), and further, there is no clear regulation concerning procedures for conducting environmental survey and clean up, which is also associated with the return of the facility(ies) and area(s).

However, from the standpoint for smooth reutilization of land, it is necessary to grapple with the issues of environmental survey and clean up, associated with the return of facility(ies) and area(s), prior to the return of the facility(ies) and area(s).

For this to happen, cooperation from the United States, who had been using the concerned facility(ies) and area(s), is indispensable. Even by looking at this situation from the standpoint of polluter's responsibility, the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) thinks it is necessary for the United States government to jointly address the issues with the Japanese government, who is the provider of the facility(ies) and area(s).

Particularly in the case of our prefecture, because approximately 66% of land area of the U.S. military facilities is privately owned land, it is necessary for the land owner to feel safe about using the returned land. For this to occur and for smooth reutilization of land, OPG believes it is necessary to clearly stipulate the procedures for environmental survey and clean up, which is associated with the reversion of land, and also to implement immediate as well as sufficient restorative measures for the facility(ies) and area(s).

5 Article 5 (Port and Landing Fee Exemptions)

Request for Revision
(1) Article 5 shall specify that except in cases of emergency, U.S. forces shall be prohibited the use of civil airports and ports, in order to secure smooth routine operation of the commercial aircraft and commercial ships as well as to maintain their safety.

(2) Article 5 shall stipulate that "access to" and "movement" written under this article shall not include any activity that is considered, in essence, as exercise and/or training.

Content and Explanation
In regards to the use of civil airport by U.S. military aircraft based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) has consistently requested the U.S. military to refrain from using the civil airport. However, on this past February 15, U.S. Marine Corps aircraft landed for refueling purposes at Ishigaki Airport, where it is crowded due to commercial aircraft taking-off and landing as well as such aircraft using the apron. Hence, strong opposition was voiced by local residents and prefectural people.

Since our prefecture is comprised of many remote islands, aircraft and ships are an important means of transportation not merely in the daily lives of the prefectural people but also for the development of industries in Okinawa which is aiming to make tourism its mainstay. Thus, to ensure smooth and safe operations for aircraft and ships, OPG thinks it is necessary to prohibit use of civil airports and ports by the U.S. military except in cases of emergency such as inclement weather, malfunction of the aircraft and the crew getting sick.

Further, with Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement as the basis, it has been reported that activities, which could only be seen as exercises or training, are conducted involving "access to" and "movement" between facilities and areas of U.S. armed forces. OPG thinks exercises and training should be conducted within the provided facility(ies) and area(s). Hence, OPG thinks it is necessary to clarify the definition of "access to" and "movement" between facility(ies) and area(s) and to clearly prohibit any activity considered, in essence, as exercises and/or training to involve in "access to" and "movement" between facility(ies) and area(s).

6 Article 9 (The Status of U.S. Armed Forces and Related Personnel)

Request for Revision
Article 9 shall specify that Japanese law shall apply to inspection of persons, animals and plants as well as to public health of persons.
Content and Explanation

The SACO Final Report states that newly agreed procedures shall be taken when U.S. military forces related persons enter Japan or when those people bring in plants or animals into the country. In particular, the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) thinks that a certain degree of progress has been made as new procedures were established for inspection of plants, which had not been specified in the agreement of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee before.

However, in Germany, according to Bonn Supplementary Agreement, Article 54, Paragraph 1, German laws apply to NATO forces on matters concerning prevention and extermination of contagious disease of persons, animals and plants as well as prevention of increase of insects harmful to plants and their extermination.

In order to dispel anxiety of the residents living in the vicinity of the bases fearing that contagious disease from overseas may be brought into Japan, OPG thinks Japanese law should apply concerning inspection of persons, animals and plants as well as public health of persons and conduct inspection of the U.S. military under the Japanese authorities.

7 Article 13 (Taxation)

Request for Revision

Article 13 shall specify that private vehicles and light-weight vehicles of members of the U.S. armed forces, civilian employees and their dependents shall be taxed at the same rate as private vehicles of Japanese people.

Content and Explanation

In regards to vehicle tax on private vehicles of U.S. military forces related persons, “Special Vehicle Tax Regulation on Private Vehicles Owned by Members of the U.S. Armed Forces and Related Persons” has been revised, taking consideration of the notification issued by the Administrative Vice-Minister for Home Affairs, which is based upon the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement in February, 1999. As a result, tax rate has been raised from April 1999.

However, even after this revision, the vehicle tax on private vehicles of U.S. military forces related persons has a markedly lower tax rate than the tax rate on vehicles owned by Japanese.

Further, this difference in tax rate is the same in the case of tax on light-weight vehicles. Light-weight vehicle tax on private vehicles of U.S. military forces related persons has a markedly lower tax rate compared to tax rate on vehicles owned by Japanese people.

In our prefecture's case, private vehicles owned by U.S. military forces related persons are as many as approximately 25,000 vehicles. Hence, rise in demands for administrative work is accompanied by increase of traffic which then lead to heavy burden on the financial aspect of the prefecture.

If such private vehicles, owned by U.S. military forces related persons, are taxed with the same tax rate as vehicles owned by Japanese, the tax revenue will increase by approximately 780 million yen annually. Our prefecture has a weak financial base. Therefore, the increasing of tax rate on private vehicles owned by U.S. military forces related persons to the same rate imposed on Japanese-owned vehicles, is an important as well as an urgent issue to expand the revenue resource of the prefecture.

8 Article 15 (Management etc. of Organizations)

Request for Revision

Article 15 shall specify that its Paragraph 3 be revised so that services, provided by organizations within the facility(ies) and area(s), shall be restricted in the same way with the sales of merchandise, when they are provided to the Japanese.

Content and Explanation

In regards to the organization's sales and disposal of merchandise stipulated under Article 15 of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, agreements on details of restrictions, procedures for disposal, etc. have been reached at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, which are stated in Paragraph 3 of the same Article.

However, there is no clear regulation on matters such as what the restrictions and procedures are when the Japanese use the services or facilities provided by such organizations, which include playing golf in the golf course and going on board Cessna aircraft within the facility(ies) and area(s).

These organizations, based on Article 15, Paragraph 1(a), are not subject to Japanese taxation. Hence, from the viewpoint of fair taxation, the Okinawa Prefectural Government thinks it is necessary to establish clear regulation on detailed restrictions and procedures when Japanese people use the services and facilities of the organization, in the same way the regulation is stated for sales and disposal of merchandise.
9 Article 17 (Jurisdiction)

Request for Revision

Article 17 shall specify that if there is any request from the Japanese authorities for transfer of the suspect's custody before charges are issued, U.S. military authorities shall respond to this.

Content and Explanation

In regards to custody of suspects, who are members of U.S. armed forces and civilian employees, and whom Japan has jurisdiction over, there has been a certain degree of progress. It has been decided by "the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement regarding criminal justice procedures", on October 25, 1995, that in cases of brutal crimes, the United States shall "give sympathetic consideration to any request (made by Japan) on transfer of suspect's custody to Japan's jurisdiction before charges are issued".

Yet, to implement procedures based on this agreement, Japan must make the proposal and discussion must take place at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. Thus, it is expected that this will require quite a lot of time.

Also, in cases other than brutal crimes, it is only written that the U.S. shall "consider (Japan's) opinion thoroughly" for Japan's request for transfer of custody before indictment. Thus, whether or not the U.S. will approve of the transfer of custody before charges are issued is not clear.

In the case of the hit-and-run accident of a high school girl, which occurred in October 7, 1998 in Kitanakagusuku Village, there were voices of strong resentment from the prefectural people, as our country's police authorities could not arrest and hold custody of the U.S. military suspect before charges were issued.

Afterwards, this concerned suspect was soon charged and the custody was given to our country's police authorities. Yet, there have been cases in the past, in which a suspect, held in custody by the U.S. military, escaped from the U.S. military base to the United States. Therefore, there are firm voices from the prefectural people saying that the content of the agreement, reached at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in October 1997, is insufficient and requesting that the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement be revised to have Japan, in all cases, promptly hold custody of the suspect before charges are issued.

In Germany, under Bonn Supplementary Agreement's Article 22, Paragraph 2(b) (II), it is written that, "in the event of a special case in which the German authorities request that the suspect be turned over to their custody, sending country (NATO forces) shall consider the request in a spirit of goodwill". Hence, from the perspective to secure fundamental human rights such as the people's lives and properties, the Okinawa Prefectural Government thinks it is necessary to revise the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement on the above-mentioned item.

10 Article 18 (Renunciation of Claims)

Request for Revision

(1) Article 18 shall specify that when damage arises due to act or illegal act by the members, employees, or their dependents of the U.S. armed forces, during the time they are not carrying out the performance of official duties, and if such things as the amount of compensation for damage to be paid to the damaged party does not satisfy the final decision amount made at court, both the governments of Japan and the United States shall bear the responsibility for covering the difference of the amount. Article 18 shall also specify that the Japanese and the United States governments shall discuss their responsibilities in bearing the expenses for covering the deficit of the compensation amount.

(2) Article 18 shall specify that when there is an order by the Japanese court, the U.S. authorities shall seize the U.S. armed forces members' or employees' rights of claim for benefits such as salaries to be paid to them, and turn them over to the Japanese authorities.

Content and Explanation

There has been a certain degree of progress in regards to the compensation for the damaged party when members or employees of the U.S. armed forces cause incidents or accidents during the time they are not carrying out the performance of official duties. This progress is the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement procedures, indicated on SACO Final Report in December 1996, concerning items such as payment procedures of ex gratia payment and monetary gift, claim of payment in advance, and system for interest-free loan.

However, even in this revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement procedures, the payment to the damaged party by the Japanese and the United States governments is not recognized as legal responsibility. It is only written as "efforts will be made for payment".

And similarly, the procedures for claiming payment in advance and the system for loaning without interest for the damaged party are not established as legal systems.

Therefore, in order for the damaged party, whom the U.S. armed forces' members, employees or their dependents have inflicted damage upon, to have prompt and sufficient compensation, the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) believes it is necessary to adopt a system to promptly cover the damage of the damaged party under the legal responsibility of both the governments of Japan and the United States, including the adjustment of the Japanese law so that the damaged party's right to obtain compensation is legally and clearly stipulated.

Further, there are quite frequent cases in this prefecture where women have children with U.S. military forces related persons but cannot obtain
child support from them, and thus face financial difficulties in their lives.

Under Article 18, Paragraph 9 (b) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, it is stipulated, “In case any private movable property, which is subject to compulsory execution under Japanese law, is within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, the United States authorities shall, upon the request of Japanese courts, possess and turn over such property to the Japanese authorities.” Yet, there is no stipulation concerning matters such as seizing the rights of claim of the U.S. military forces related persons, which includes seizing their rights of claim for benefits such as salaries paid by the Government of the United States to them.

In Germany, under the Bonn Supplementary Agreement, Article 34, Paragraph 3, it is stipulated that, “Compulsory execution on the members of the armed forces or the civilian employees, such as seizure of salary to be paid to them by their government and prohibition of payment based on the order of German court or German authorities, shall be conducted only to the extent the law applied at the concerned sending country allows.” Thus, OPG thinks it is necessary to specify, in our country as well, that the following compulsory execution ordered by the Japanese court are made possible: seizure of rights of claim of benefits such as salaries paid to U.S. military forces related persons; prohibition of payment; and others.

Aside from this, there are quite a few cases in which raising civil suit and taking procedures for compulsory execution become markedly difficult. When U.S. military forces related persons, assigned to Okinawa, retire or transfer to another location outside of Japan, they may leave the Japanese women (the wife or common-law wife) behind and lose contact with them. Hence, the civil suit and the execution is in regards to status, including divorce matters or recognition of child by the father, or in regards to financial matters, such as claiming of expenses for bringing up a child by the women left behind.

In order to guarantee the rights of livelihood for the mother and the child, who are no longer under the SOFA status due to U.S. military forces related persons’ retirement or transfer to location outside of Japan, OPG believes it is necessary to do the next things. Adopt a new agreement between Japan and the United States concerning systems such as a “child support” system so that an official organization can claim and collect the expenses for bringing up a child for the mother and the child and at the same time, adjust the Japanese law (which includes establishing a new law and/or revising the existing law) to carry out this agreement.

11 Article 25 (The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee)

Request for Revision
Article 25 shall specify that the agreements made at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee shall be immediately announced to the public.

Content and Explanation
In Okinawa, many bases are adjacent to residential areas. Thus, military base operations, which are based upon the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and agreement by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, are of great concern to the residents living in the vicinity of the bases and the local governing bodies.

The Japanese and the United States governments took account of announcing the agreement by the Joint Committee when they decided to improve the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement procedures and stated that the Committee will "seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements” in the SACO Final Report of December 1996.

However, the agreements made thereafter by the Committee have not been fully exposed.

The Okinawa Prefectural Government believes that swift announcement of the agreements reached by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee is the foundation of building confidence between the U.S. forces and the local residents as well as the local governing bodies. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly stipulate the prompt exposure of the agreement.
Appendix 16

Prime Ministers in Japan, 1970-2004

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Sato Eisaku</td>
<td>1970.1.14</td>
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*Japanese Ambassadors to the United States, 1970-2004*

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### Appendix 19

*Directors of North American Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972-2002*

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*Japanese Ambassadors for Okinawa Affairs, 1996-2004*

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*Directors General of the Defense Agency, 1972-2004*

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## Appendix 23

*Directors of the Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (Naha), 1972-2004*

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*Commanders of 1st Combined Brigade, Naha, SDF, 1972-2004*

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### Appendix 26

*Chairmen of Okinawa Special Committee of Diet, 1967-2004*

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<td>Yamamoto Toshinaga</td>
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<td>Hasegawa Jin</td>
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<td>Hoshino Juji</td>
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<td>Inamine Ichiro</td>
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<td>Hara Bunhei</td>
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<td>Ueda Minoru</td>
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# Appendix 27

## U.S. Presidents, 1969-2004

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<td>Gerald R. Ford</td>
<td>August 1974-January 1977</td>
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<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>January 2001-</td>
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## Appendix 28

*U.S. Secretaries of State, 1969-2004*

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<td>Henry A. Kissinger</td>
<td>1973 - 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyrus R. Vance</td>
<td>1977 - 1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>George P. Shultz</td>
<td>1982 - 1989</td>
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<td>James A. Baker, 3d</td>
<td>1989 - 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawrence S. Eagleberger</td>
<td>1992 - 1993</td>
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<td>Warren M. Christopher</td>
<td>1993 - 1996</td>
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<td>Madeleine Albright</td>
<td>1996 - 2001</td>
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<td>Colin L. Powell</td>
<td>2001 -</td>
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Appendix 29  
*U.S. Ambassadors to Japan, 1972-2004*  

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<tr>
<td>Robert S. Ingersoll</td>
<td>April 1972-November 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>James D. Hodgson</td>
<td>July 1974-February 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Mansfield</td>
<td>July 1977- December 1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael H. Armacost</td>
<td>May 1989- July 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter F. Mondale</td>
<td>September 1993- December 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas J. Foley</td>
<td>November 1997- April 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Howard H. Baker, Jr.</td>
<td>July 2001-</td>
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*U.S. Consuls General in Okinawa, 1972-2004*

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<td>Richard W. Petree</td>
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<td>John A. Sylvester, Jr.</td>
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<td>Ulrich A. Straus</td>
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<td>Edward M. Featherstone</td>
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<td>Karl Spence Richardson</td>
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<td>Timothy A. Betts</td>
<td>2000-2003</td>
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<td>Thomas G. Reich</td>
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# Appendix 31

## U.S. Secretaries of Defense, 1969-2004

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<td>Melvin R. Laird</td>
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<td>Elliot L. Richardson</td>
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<td>May 24, 1973</td>
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<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>July 2, 1973</td>
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<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td>November 20, 1975</td>
<td>January 20, 1977</td>
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<td>Richard B. Cheney</td>
<td>March 21, 1989</td>
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<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td>January 20, 2001</td>
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### Appendix 32

#### Past Commanding Generals

**III Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Corps Bases Japan, 1970-2004**

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<td>LtGen D. J. Robertson</td>
<td>24 Dec 70 – 8 Jan 72</td>
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<td>LtGen L. Metzger</td>
<td>9 Jan 72 – 8 Jan 73</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen M. P. Ryan</td>
<td>9 Jan 73 – 31 Dec 73</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen H. Poggemeyer, Jr</td>
<td>1 Jan 74 – 30 Dec 74</td>
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<td>MajGen C. W. Hoffman</td>
<td>31 Dec 74 – 11 May 75</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen K. J. Houghton</td>
<td>1 Jun 75 – 14 Aug 75</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen N. W. Gourley</td>
<td>15 Aug 75 – 6 Jan 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen H. L. Wilkerson</td>
<td>7 Jan 76 – 20 Jul 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen J. L. Koler, Jr</td>
<td>21 Jul 76 – 18 Feb 77</td>
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<td>MajGen N. C. New</td>
<td>19 Feb 77 – 16 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen A. G. Schwenk</td>
<td>17 Jul 77 – 10 Jul 78</td>
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<td>MajGen C. J. Killeen</td>
<td>11 Jul 78 – 5 Sep 79</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen W. R. Maloney</td>
<td>6 Sep 79 – 2 Jun 80</td>
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<td>MajGen Kenneth. R. Robinson</td>
<td>3 Jun 80 – 25 Jul 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen S. G. Olmstead</td>
<td>26 Jul 80 – 21 Jun 82</td>
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<td>MajGen R. E. Haebel</td>
<td>22 Jun 82 – 8 Jun 84</td>
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<td>MajGen Glasgow</td>
<td>9 Jun 84 – 4 Jun 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen Edwin J. Godfrey</td>
<td>5 Jun 86 – 10 Sep 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtGen Norman. H. Smith</td>
<td>11 Sep 87 – 26 Sep 89</td>
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<td>*MajGen Henry. C. Stackpole, III</td>
<td>27 Sep 89 – 9 Jul 91</td>
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<td>*MajGen N. E. Ehlert</td>
<td>10 Jul 91 – 2 Jun 92</td>
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<td>*MajGen D. R. Gardner</td>
<td>3 Jun 92 – 24 Jun 94</td>
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<td>*MajGen C. W. Fulford, Jr</td>
<td>25 Jun 94 – 26 May 95</td>
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<td>*MajGen W. E. Rollings</td>
<td>27 May 95 – 18 Jul 97</td>
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<td>*LtGen Frank. Libutti</td>
<td>19 Jul 97 – 8 Jun 99</td>
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<tr>
<td>*LtGen Earl. B. Hailston</td>
<td>9 Jun 00 – 31 Jul 01</td>
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<tr>
<td>*LtGen Wallace. C. Gregson</td>
<td>1 Aug 01 – 16 Jul 03</td>
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<td>LtGen Robert. R. Blackman</td>
<td>17 Jul 03 –</td>
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* held/holds simultaneously the billet of Commander, Marine Forces Japan
## Appendix 33

*Governors and Prefectural Leadership, 1972-2004*

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<td>Yara Chobyo</td>
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<td>Nojima Takemori</td>
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<td>Akamine Takeji</td>
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<td>Zakimi Takeyoshi</td>
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<td>Koja Tokuzen</td>
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<td>Miyahira Hiroshi</td>
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Appendix 34
Directors of Base Affairs Office of OPG, 1972-2004

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Appendix 35
Okinawa Prefectural Assembly Speakers, 1972-2004

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<td>Iramine Kokichi</td>
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### Appendix 36

*Okinawa Prefectural Assembly Base Committee Chairpersons, 1974-2002*

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### Appendix 37

*Chairmen of Prefectural LDP, 1972-2003*

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Chairmen of Prefectural JSP/SDP,

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*Chairmen of Prefectural JCP, 1973-2004*

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*Chairmen of Prefectural OSMP, 1972-2004*

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<td>Zukeran Choho</td>
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<td>Shimabukuro Soko</td>
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# Appendix 41

*Chairmen of Prefectural Komeito, 1970-2004*

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<td>Ohama Choko</td>
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<td>Shiraho Taiichi</td>
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<td>Takara Masahiko</td>
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## Appendix 42

*Meetings of the Tripartite Liaison Committee, 1979-2003*

(Source: Base Affairs Office, OPG)

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|     |            |                | 2. Aircraft Accidents  
|     |            |                | 3. Prevention of Red Dirt Overflow (into sea)                         |
| 16  | 1995.3.17  | OPG Harbor View Hotel | 1. Aircraft Noise Reduction Measures  
|     |            |                | 2. Aircraft Accidents  
|     |            |                | 3. Enforcement of Discipline                                         |
| Restart | 1999.2.13  | OPG Harbor View Hotel | (on restarting TLC after 4-year hiatus)  
| 17  | 1999.7.12  | MOFA Harbor View Hotel | 1. Improvement of Coordination and Information Exchange following Incidents and Accidents at the Local Level as well as Prevention of Accidents and Safety Measures  
|     |            |                | 2. Discipline Among U.S. Forces and Dependents, particularly among minors  
|     |            |                | 3. Status of Enrollment in Voluntary Insurance (and Measures taken)  
|     |            |                | 4. Temporary Use of Facilities  
|     |            |                | 5. Other Items  
|     |            |                | English Language Exchange between Bases and Local Communities         |
| 18  | 1999.9.9   | US Camp Butler | 1. Environmental Problems  
|     |            |                | 2. Noise Problems  
|     |            |                | 3. Use of Roads within Bases by Japanese Emergency Vehicles  
|     |            |                | 4. Y2K Issue (computers)  
|     |            |                | 5. Special Olympics                                                   |
| 19  | 2000.2.14  | OPG Harbor View Hotel | 1. Kadena Aero Club’s Sessna Plane  
|     |            |                | 2. Reduction of Effects of Training on Local Residents  
|     |            |                | 3. Mutual Support System at Times of Fires  
|     |            |                | 4. Oil Spills and Golf Balls  
|     |            |                | 5. Seminar on Japanese Environmental Management Standards             |
|     |            |                | 2. Fires as a Result of Live Fire Exercises  
|     |            |                | 3. Support for Japanese Women in Problems that Emerge from Marriage to Members of U.S. Forces and Dependents  
|     |            |                | 4. Promotion of Companies in Prefectural for Base-Related Orders and On-base Sales  |
|     |            |                | 2. Environmental Safety on U.S. Bases  
|     |            |                | 3. Provision of Information Relating Incidents and Accidents  
|     |            |                | 4. Investigation of Cultural Assets on Bases  
|     |            |                | 5. Promotion of Joint Activities with Local Communities              |
| 22  | 2002.2.12  | OPG Harbor View Hotel | 1. Expansion of English Language Volunteer Program  
|     |            |                | 2. Countermeasures against Pine-eating insects on U.S. Bases  
|     |            |                | 3. Environmental Problems  
|     |            |                | 4. Provision of Information with Regard to Emergency Landings on U.S. Facilities and Areas and Unexploded Ordnance  
|     |            |                | 5. Prevention of Incidents and Accidents among Dependents  
|     |            |                | 6. Internship Program for Students                                    |
| 23  | 2002.7.31  | MOFA Harbor View Hotel | 1. Prevention of Incidents and Accidents by U.S. Forces and Dependents  
|     |            |                | 2. Provision of Information with Regard to Aircraft Accidents on U.S. Bases and Areas  
|     |            |                | 3. Cooperation in Environmental Protection  
|     |            |                | 4. Support for Establishment of non-governmental organization between people of prefecture and U.S. citizens in Okinawa  |
| 24  | 2003.5.2   | US Camp Butler | 1. Prevention of Incidents and Accidents by U.S. Forces and Dependents  
|     |            |                | 2. Restraint on Exercises and Implementation of Safety Measures  
|     |            |                | 3. U.S. Forces Japan Orientation Program  
|     |            |                | 4. Other Items                                                          |
## Appendix 43

*Meeting of Okinawa Policy Council, 1995-2003*

(Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)

<table>
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| 1<sup>st</sup> | 1996.10.4 | • On the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council  
• On the membership of the Okinawa Policy Council |
| 2<sup>nd</sup> | 1996.11.12 | • On the Chart of the Make-up of the Project Team of the Okinawa Policy Council  
• On the Recommendations of Each Ministry regarding Okinawa Promotion  
• On the Chart of Respective Budget Requests for Okinawa in FY 1997 |
| 3<sup>rd</sup> | 1996.12.17 | • Recommendations by the Discussion Group on Problems of Villages, Towns, and Cities in Okinawa Hosting U.S. Military Facilities Okinawa  
• Chairman Shimada’s Statement at the November 19 Press Conference  
• Project Team of the Okinawa Policy Council |
| 4<sup>th</sup> | 1997.2.18 | • On the status of the Project Team of the Okinawa Policy Council  
• On the Distribution of Special Promotion Funds for Okinawa  
• Overview of Okinawa-Related Funds for FY 1997 |
| 5<sup>th</sup> | 1997.5.27 | • On the Distribution of Special Promotion Funds for Okinawa  
• On the Activities of the Project Team of the Okinawa Policy Council  
• On Funding the Stimulation of Villages, Towns, and Cities in Okinawa Hosting U.S. Military Facilities Okinawa for FY 1997  
• On the Intra-Party Agreement and Diet Resolution on Okinawa Promotion Policies |
| 6<sup>th</sup> | 1997.7.29 | • On the Interim Conclusions of the Project Team of the Okinawa Policy Committee  
• Report of OPG’s Committee on Promotion and Deregulation of Industry and Economy |
| 7<sup>th</sup> | 1997.9.19 | • On the Distribution of Special Promotion Funds for Okinawa  
• On the Chart of Respective Budget Requests for Okinawa in FY 1998  
• On the Report of the Study Group of Mid- to Long-term Prospects for Okinawa’s Promotion |
| 8<sup>th</sup> | 1997.11.7 | • On New Industrial Policies for the formation of the Cosmopolitan City  
• On the Status of the Implementation of Report of the Study Group of Mid- to Long-term Prospects for Okinawa’s Promotion |
| 9<sup>th</sup> | 1998.12.11 | • Overview of Okinawa Development Agency’s 3rd Supplementary Budget for FY98 |
| 10<sup>th</sup> | 1999.1.29 | • Overview of Okinawa-Related Funds for FY 1999  
• On the Direction of Procedures for Emergency Responses |
| 11<sup>th</sup> | 1999.4.26 | • On the Final Implementation of Emergency Responses  
• On the Study for the Plan for Naha’s International Distribution Harbor  
• Basic Ideas regarding the Okinawa Economic Promotion 21st Century Design  
• Overview of Activities on Funds for Special Measures for Okinawa Promotion |
| 12<sup>th</sup> | 1999.6.29 | • Okinawa Economic Promotion 21st Century Design Interim Report  
• Overview of Okinawa Economic Promotion 21st Century Design Interim Report |
• Distribution of Special Funds for Okinawa Promotion  
• Overview of Requests for Okinawa-Related Funds for FY 2000  
• Central Government’s Plans to Deal with Governor’s Requests |
| 14<sup>th</sup> | 1999.12.17 | • Direction of Promotion of Areas Near Site of Futenma Airfield Relocation  
• Direction of Promotion of Northern Part of Okinawa Prefecture  
• Direction of Promotion of Military Land Conversion |
• Overview of Okinawa Economic Promotion 21st Century Design Final Report  
• Distribution of Special Funds for Okinawa Promotion |
| 16<sup>th</sup> | 2001.1.16 | • On Governing Committee of Okinawa Policy Council  
• On the Establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council  
• On the Special Distribution of Funds for Okinawa’s Promotion  
• Status of Implementation of Okinawa Economic Promotion 21st Century Design |
| 17<sup>th</sup> | 2001.9.4 | • Plan for Special Distribution of Funds for Okinawa’s Promotion  
• Plan for Main Features of Okinawa Promotion in FY 2002  
• Basic Direction on Deliberation of New Law for Okinawa Promotion |
| 18<sup>th</sup> | 2002.1.25 | • Central Features of Special Measures Law for Okinawa Promotion  
• On the Special Distribution of Funds for Okinawa’s Promotion  
• Plan for Main Features of Okinawa Promotion in FY 2002 |
| 19<sup>th</sup> | 2002.7.9 | • Okinawa Promotion Plan |
| 20<sup>th</sup> | 2002.9.10 | • On the Special Distribution of Funds for Okinawa’s Promotion  
• Plan for Main Features of Okinawa Promotion in FY 2003 |
| 21<sup>st</sup> | 2002.12.6 | • On the Special Distribution of Funds for Okinawa’s Promotion  
• Additional Implementation of Countermeasures for Industry and Employment |
| 22<sup>nd</sup> | 2003.4.22 | • On the Special Distribution of Funds for Okinawa’s Promotion  
• On Handling Arrangements by Each Ministry and Agency to Promote the holding of International Conferences in Okinawa |
| 23<sup>rd</sup> | 2004.4.23 | • Supplementary funding for Industrial Promotion of Tourism |
## Appendix 44

*Meetings of the Futenma Replacement Facility Committee, 2000-2002*

(Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>On the Future Procedures for Establishing the Basic Plan for the Replacement Facility</td>
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<td>On the Prefecture’s Desires for Civilian Functions for Joint Civilian-Military Use</td>
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<td>2000.10.31</td>
<td>On the Shape of the Land at the Construction Area and Eco-system</td>
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<td>On the Eco-system</td>
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<td>On the Revision of the Rules Governing the Council</td>
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<td>On the Overviews of the Respective Construction Methods</td>
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<td>On the Status of the Consultations with the Local Residents</td>
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### Appendix 45

**Base related Revenues in Okinawa, 1971-2000**

(Source: Military Base Affairs Office of OPG)

(Unit: 100 million, %)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Okinawa's Gross Expenditure (A)</th>
<th>Revenues from outside the prefecture (B)</th>
<th>Revenues generated by military-related transactions</th>
<th>Revenues from tourism (D)</th>
<th>Net product from agriculture, forestry, fisheries (E)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Total (C)</td>
<td>Expenditure of SOFA status people</td>
<td>Salary of Japanese base employees</td>
<td>Rent for land occupied by military bases</td>
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## Appendix 46

**Summary of USMC Community Relations and Volunteer Activities, 2001-2003**

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<th>Events</th>
<th>Military participants</th>
<th>Local participants</th>
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## Appendix 47
Base-Related Crimes Committed by SOFA Personnel
(Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government)

1. Number of Cases

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<th>Brutal crimes</th>
<th>Assaults</th>
<th>Larcenies</th>
<th>White-collar crimes</th>
<th>Immoral conduct</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total number of crimes (in Okinawa)</th>
<th>Percentage of Crimes committed by SOFA status personnel</th>
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<th>Other</th>
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**Note:**
1. Based on data obtained from Okinawa Prefectural Police Headquarters (data for each year as of the end of December)
2. The number excludes that of traffic accidents.
3. SOFA status people means U.S. military service members, civilian employees, and the families.
4. Figures for 2001 are not included in the Total figure.
### Appendix 50

*Population and Households in Okinawa by City, Town, and Village (As of 1 October, 1999)*

(Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency)

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#### City Population Household

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<td>Kitanakagusuku village</td>
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<td>4,866</td>
</tr>
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<td>4,555</td>
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<td>Tamagusuku village</td>
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<td>2,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinen village</td>
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<td>Oozato village</td>
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<td>Nakazato village</td>
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<td>1,798</td>
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<td>Zamami village</td>
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<td>Aguni village</td>
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<td>Tonaki village</td>
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<td>Minamidaito village</td>
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<td>Kitadaito village</td>
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<td>307</td>
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<td>511</td>
</tr>
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<td>Izena village</td>
<td>1,939</td>
<td>757</td>
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<td>Ueno village</td>
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<td>Tarama village</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total village</strong></td>
<td><strong>212,656</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,633</strong></td>
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Appendix 51

(Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population per 1 km² of total land area</th>
<th>Population per 1 km² of inhabitable area</th>
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<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>314</td>
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### Appendix 52

*Population Growth in Okinawa, 1971-1999*

(Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency)

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Total population (1000)</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>1,312</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase rate (per previous year)(%)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(Male 639)</td>
<td>(Male 644)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live birth rate (per 1000 population)</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>(Female 662)</td>
<td>(Female 667)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (per 1000 population)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural increase rate (per 1000 population)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social increase rate (per 1000 population)</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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### Appendix 53

**Ration of Unemployed in Okinawa, 1973-2000**

(Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (Average)</th>
<th>Labor force 15-29 years old</th>
<th>Unemployed 15-29 years old in unemployed</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>502</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>561</td>
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<td>572</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>571</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
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## Appendix 54

Layoffs of Military Base Employees, 1972-1995

*(unit: 人)*

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<tr>
<th>dates</th>
<th>Contracted number</th>
<th>Master Labor Contract</th>
<th>Mariners Contract</th>
<th>Indirect Hire Agreement</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Cumulative Number Laid-off</th>
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<tr>
<td>1972.5.31</td>
<td>15,412</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>19,980</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972.12.31</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>3,968</td>
<td>19,054</td>
<td>926</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973.12.31</td>
<td>13,756</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2,503</td>
<td>16,327</td>
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<td>1974.12.31</td>
<td>11,403</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>13,131</td>
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<td>1975.12.31</td>
<td>9,605</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>11,126</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976.12.31</td>
<td>7,174</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6,887</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>8,263</td>
<td>11,717</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978.12.31</td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>7,599</td>
<td>12,381</td>
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<td>1979.12.31</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>7,219</td>
<td>12,761</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995.3.31</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>7,806</td>
<td>12,174</td>
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</table>

## Appendix 55

**Number of Tourists and Income Related to Tourism, 1972-1999**

(Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Foreigner</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Annual increase rate</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual increase rate</th>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>444</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,524</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>93.5</td>
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<td>118.0</td>
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<td>1,747</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1,808</td>
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<td>1,801</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1,971</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1,898</td>
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<td>2,010</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,784</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2,054</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,000</td>
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<td>1,965</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>2,276</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
<td>2,534</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>2,395</td>
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<td>2,625</td>
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<td>114</td>
<td>2,671</td>
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<td>2,928</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<td>2,804</td>
<td>154</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>3,275</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>3,358</td>
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<td>2,953</td>
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<td>3,152</td>
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<td>3,442</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 56

Gross Prefectural Domestic Product by Industry
(Source: Economic Planning Agency, Okinawa Prefecture)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Okinawa)</td>
<td>(Japan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary industries</td>
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<td>938</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>735</td>
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<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Manufacturing)</td>
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<td>6,656</td>
<td>6,867</td>
<td>6,325</td>
<td>6,193</td>
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<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Construction)</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>6,347</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>1,303,798</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wholesale and retail trade)</td>
<td>3,117</td>
<td>16,169</td>
<td>26,130</td>
<td>27,191</td>
<td>27,791</td>
<td>28,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
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<td>(Services)</td>
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<td>35.6</td>
<td>13,664</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>14,429</td>
<td>42.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Less) Imputed service charge</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,682</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21,465</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>32,507</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>
**Appendix 57**

*Prefectural Domestic Expenditure and Economic Growth Rates in Okinawa, 1972-1998*

(Source: Economic Planning Agency. Okinawa Prefecture)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Nominal gross prefectural product (100 million yen)</th>
<th>Economic growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Prefectural income per capita (A) (1000 yen)</th>
<th>Gap between A and national income per capita (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5,074</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>445</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10,028</td>
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<td>826</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>15,647</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<td>21,465</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
<td>1,598</td>
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Appendix 58

Comparison of Reductions in U.S. and SDF Facilities in Japan


(Unit: Square Kilometers)
About the Author

Robert D. Eldridge is an Associate Professor of International Public Systems, specializing on U.S.-Japan Relations and Japanese Diplomacy, at the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University, and Director of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Division, Center for International Security Studies and Policy (CISSP) at the University.

He has been a Special Research Fellow for the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai), a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Suntory Foundation (Suntory Bunka Zaidan), a Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (Heiwa Anzen Hosho Kenkyusho), or RIPS.

He has published extensively on the contemporary and historic aspects of U.S.-Japan relations and Okinawa in such leading journals and newspapers as Chuo Koron, Kokusai Seiji, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan Times, Daily Yomiuri, Asia-Pacific Review, and Asian Survey. In 1999, he was awarded the prestigious Yomiuri Rondan Shinjinsho (new Opinion Leader of the Year Award) from the Yomiuri Shimbun, the first time a non-Japanese has won it. In 2001, he authored The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 (Routledge-Garland), with the Japanese version coming out in 2003 (winning the 25th Suntory Prize for History and Civilization and the 15th Asia-Pacific Award). In addition, in early 2004, he published The Reversion of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations (Lexington Books), with the Japanese version having come out the year before. Currently, he is working on a book to be titled The Road to Reversion: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1952-1972.

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